Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) as a model for conflict resolution is Southern Africa: A case of Madagascar.

BY

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DEDICATION

This document is dedicated to my dearest mother. She is always my strength. I humbly dedicate this to you mum for you are a selfless woman who has always wished to see the success of her seed. Thank you mum for the seed is blooming into a beautiful tree. Special dedication goes to my father. The fruits of your investments are there to show. I also dedicate this piece to my future family with love.
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Above all, I would like to thank the Lord Almighty for leading me this far. It is only by his greater grace that this piece has become a reality even under difficult circumstances. All I can say is “TO GOD BE THE GLORY.”
ABSTRACT

The study analyses the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Organ for Politics, Defence, and Security (OPDS) as a model in conflict resolution. The research employed a case study of Madagascar in order to rank the OPDS conflict resolving mechanism. The crisis in Madagascar revolved around an unconstitutional removal of a democratically elected and legitimate government in 2009. The crisis began on 26 January 2009 with the political opposition movement led by Antananarivo mayor, Andry Rajoelina, which sought to remove President, Marc Ravalomanana. The crisis reached its peak on 21 March 2009 when Andry Rajoelina was declared the president of the High Transitional Authority of Madagascar, five days after Ravalomanana transferred his power to a military council and fled to South Africa. The international community castigated the unconstitutional takeover of power. Contemporary political disturbances, the world over have a characteristic of being contagious. Therefore, the SADC bloc had to react before the crisis could metamorphoses into a regional one. The research also provides a good opportunity for a deep assessment of the effectiveness of the OPDS in regional conflict resolution. The research is also driven by the need to display the significance of regional cohesion and cooperation in the face of a crisis as in the case of Madagascar. This study therefore attempts to answer this conundrum and in the process assesses the conflict resolution strategies employed by SADC. The researcher used various methodologies that include in-depth interviews, internet research and documentary search. The research concluded that despite the challenges that were involved in its conflict resolution endeavour in Madagascar the SADC OPDS to a greater extent succeeded in bringing stability to Madagascar. The SADC efforts culminated to the return of the country to a more democratic path with the holding of elections in 2013. These elections marked the restoration of constitutional governance in Madagascar with Hery Rajaonarimampianina was named president following the 2013 election, which were deemed fair and transparent by the international community. These developments were unanimously saluted as successes that have put Madagascar back on the map.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AU      African Union
CHS     Commission of Human Security
COMESA  the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa
EU      European Union
FLS     Front Line States
GPA     Global Political Agreement
HAT     High Transition Authority
ICG-M   International Contact Group on Madagascar
ISDS    Inter-State Defense and Security Committee
NGOs    Non-Governmental Organisations
OIF     Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie
OPDS    Organ for Politics, Defense and Security
SADC    Southern African Development Community
SADSEM  Southern African Defence and Security Management Network
UN      United Nations

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

Madagascar went through a period of political instability and uncertainty from 2009 to around 2016 following a coup d’état. Under the SADC democratic guidelines, the unconstitutional change of government in Madagascar called for regional intervention. From 2009, tensions between the country’s last elected president, Marc Ravalomanana, and an opposition movement led by Andry Rajoelina, then the mayor of the capital city, Antananarivo, initiated political instability. Mass protests in early 2009 and eventual military support for the ouster of President Ravalomanana culminated in his forced resignation from office. Ploch (2012:12) wrote that Rajoelina then seized power and, with other leaders, formed an interim self-declared transitional government, the High Transitional Authority, (HAT, after its French acronym). During the crisis, Ravalomanana fled to South Africa where he still lives while at least 130 people were killed.

Ploch (2012:14) revealed that the periodic protests by Ravalomanana’s supporters after the takeover led to violent clashes with security forces. Negotiations brokered by SADC between the conflicting parties led to the signing of an agreement in 2009 in Maputo, Mozambique to establish an inclusive, transitional government. However, Rajoelina subsequently appointed a cabinet seen to be primarily composed of his own supporters. Southern African leaders and Madagascar’s opposition parties rejected the proposed government, and negotiations resumed. Two later agreements also failed to result in a unified transitional process.

The unconstitutional change of power and resulting political impasse have negatively affected economic growth and development efforts and strained Madagascar’s relations with international donors. Foreign governments, including the United States, reacted to Rajoelina’s seizure of power by sanctioning the government in various ways (for example, through suspension of membership in some multilateral bodies, restrictions on aid, personal sanctions on some
individuals, and removal of trade benefits) (Ploch, 2012:12). Until September 2011, when most key political movements signed a Southern African Development Community (SADC)-mediated transitional roadmap, international mediation and national efforts to agree upon a transition process had foundered. Notwithstanding continuing political disputes, implementation of the roadmap has gone relatively smoothly.

Envoys from the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), and SADC, in concert with the influential Madagascar Council of Christian Churches, attempted to mediate between Ravalomanana and Rajoelina. Mediators first brought the two rivals together in February 2009, but Rajoelina refused to participate in further talks until Ravalomanana officially stepped down. The AU condemned the events of 16 March 2009 as an attempted coup d’état, and the former AU Commission Chairman Jean Ping warned the Malagasy military against handing power to Rajoelina. Southern African leaders then suspended the country from SADC. In late April 2014 CHt.Mhe AU, SADC, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF), the permanent members of the UN Security Council, the EU, and other interested governments formed an International Contact Group on Madagascar (ICG-M) to provide a unified front for international pressure on the parties to resolve the political crisis.

Lunn (2012:4) wrote that from exile, Ravalomanana maintained that he had been forced out and remained the rightful president. WikiLeaks later reported that Ravalomanana began to recruit mercenaries with a view to attempting to overthrow Rajoelina by force soon after he went into exile. Rajoelina and his backers were also criticised for their intolerance of opposition. When Ravalomanana supporters launched protests of their own within the country, they were banned. Clashes led to deaths on the street. Investigations and trials of Ravalomanana era officials were launched. As mediation continued, led by an International Contact Group involving the UN, AU, SADC and La Francophonie, a key point of dispute became the claims of former presidents Ravalomanana, Didier Ratsiraka and Albert Zafy to return from exile and even possibly stand in future presidential elections. In truth, the real sticking point for Rajoelina was the return of Ravalomanana. The international community indicated that it would prefer that all the contending leading figures, including Rajoelina, should agree not to stand, so that Madagascar could make a fresh political start. In August 2009, all the negotiating parties agreed to a 15-
month transition under which Rajoelina would retain his leadership position but a genuinely inclusive government of national unity would be established to oversee the transition. But the plan very quickly foundered over appointments to the government as Rajoelina reneged on his promise to promote maximum inclusiveness.

Rajoelina subsequently reverted to a unilateral approach, announcing that there would be parliamentary elections in March 2010 and appointing a new Prime Minister. Although he later agreed to postpone the elections, in that month the AU imposed sanctions on him and 108 other members of the HAT for failing to implement the August 2009 agreement. The EU and the US also froze development aid. However, neither introduced restrictive measures such as asset freezes or travel bans. The US also withdrew privileged access rights to its markets for Madagascar’s textile exporters.

However, Rajoelina persisted in his unilateralism, with the objective, critics claimed, of legitimating the regime over which he is presiding. In November 2010, he held a referendum on a new draft Constitution. Despite opposition calls for a boycott, a 74% vote in favour was recorded. On the day of the referendum, there was an attempted coup by military officers opposed to Rajoelina, but this collapsed after three days. The International Contact Group refused to accept the legitimacy of the result on the grounds that the referendum had been held outside the internationally mediated process. Independent observers reported significant irregularities.

1.2 Statement of the problem

The crisis in Madagascar revolved around an unconstitutional change of government. The 2009 Malagasy political crisis began on 26 January 2009 with the political opposition movement led by Antananarivo mayor Andry Rajoelina, which sought to oust President Marc Ravalomanana from the presidency. The crisis reached its climax on 21 March 2009 when Andry Rajoelina was declared the president of the High Transitional Authority of Madagascar, five days after Ravalomanana transferred his power to a military council and fled to South Africa.

Ploch (2012;14) revealed that the international community immediately condemned Rajoelina and his ascension as unconstitutional: Financial support and foreign investments stopped and the
country fell into one of the worst economic crises in its history. Under the SADC guidelines on good governance and democracy, an unconstitutional change of government is unwelcome to the region. The effects of a coup d'état are contagious through the issue of refugees and economic decline. These issues thus called for an immediate SADC involvement to bring the country back to the democratic path. Therefore the need to unearth and establish the effectiveness or the ineffectiveness of the SADC OPDS in the face of a crisis in one of the countries of its jurisdiction.

1.3 Research Questions

This study is going to focus on the following research questions:

- What led to the Madagascar political conflict from 2009?
- What mechanisms did the SADC utilise in solving the Madagascar crisis?
- Has SADC managed to resolve the political conflict in Madagascar?

1.4 The Objectives of the study are to:

- Examine the genesis and evolvement of the Madagascar crisis from 2009.
- Critically analyse the conflict resolution and management strategies employed by the SADC in its mediation efforts to solve the political impasse in Madagascar.
- Assess whether the SADC was successful in resolving the conflict in Madagascar.

1.5 Research Assumptions

The study assumes that:

i. SADC has partially succeeded in solving the Madagascar crisis.

ii. Madagascar managed to thaw intrastate political conflicts through the involvement of OPDSC and SADC Summit of Heads of State in the mediation process.

iii. If the SADC has failed in resolving the Madagascar crisis it is because of the conflict between domestic and international law.
1.6 Significance of study

The research will provide a good opportunity for a deep assessment of the effectiveness of the OPDS in regional conflict resolution. The research is also driven by the need to display the significance of regional cohesion and cooperation in the face of a crisis as in the case of Madagascar.

Despite the existence of several documented academic and other literature on the Madagascar crisis, there is little research done on the persistent Madagascar problem. There is also a need to address the following questions, did SADC do all that was in its powers to pacify and end the polarity between the two main Madagascar opposition parties? If not where did SADC go wrong?

This study therefore attempts to answer this conundrum and in the process assesses the conflict resolution strategies employed by SADC. In the same vein, this research will generate further research amongst academics, research institutions and civic bodies reevaluating the conflict resolution mechanisms used by SADC to try to solve the Madagascar case. This research may have a bearing on how future conflicts in the region and Africa may be handled.

1.7 Limitations to the study

The researcher conducted this research while at work hence there was less time to interview all concerned stakeholders from the targeted sample. However, the researcher made efforts email interview guides to respondents within the possible minimal time. The researcher was also able to conduct telephone interviews to those who were not be able to conduct face to face interviews.

1.8 Delimitations of the study

The study will focus on analysing the SADC’s strategies in conflict resolution in Madagascar’s intrastate conflict. The study will place particular emphasis on the period between 2009 and 2014
because many academic analysts as the starting point when the crisis started and 2014 as the period when the situation began to normalize regard 2009.

1.9 Definition of key terms

1.9.1 Conflict

Conflict according to Wallensteen (2002) is a social situation in which a minimum of two parties strive at the same moment in time to acquire the same set of scarce resources. Conflict is struggle or clash between opposing forces and there is no agreement.

1.9.2 Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution is a way for two or more parties to find a peaceful solution to a disagreement among them. The disagreement may be personal, financial, political, or emotional. When a dispute arises, often the best course of action is negotiation to resolve the disagreement. Miall (2004) defines conflict resolution as a change in the situation which removes the underlying source of conflict.

1.9.3 Conflict Transformation

Conflict transformation is a way of trying to change a conflict to bring a peaceful outcome. This is also a way of trying to create a win-win situation for both conflicting parties. Conflict transformation focuses on the changing of armed conflicts into peaceful ones, based on a different understanding of peacebuilding. It suggests replacing the term “conflict resolution” with the term “conflict transformation” (Rupesinghe, 1995).

1.10 Proposed Chapter Outline

The study consists of five chapters:
Chapter 1: This chapter, which serves as the introduction to the study, presents the background of the study, statement of the problem, objectives of the study, research questions, significance of study, limitations to the study, delimitations and proposed chapter outline.

Chapter 2: This will provide an overview of the conceptual and theoretical framework of the subject under study. The chapter will also look into the various literature coverage of the subject under discussion in order to appraise the role of SADC in conflict resolution in Madagascar, and explains the conceptual foundations of the analysis.

Chapter 3: This chapter explores the methodology that was employed in carrying out the research.

Chapter 4: The chapter will be preoccupied with data presentation and analysis and it will also look into implications of the findings and their limitations and conclusions drawn from the investigation. Discussion of findings will also be conducted.

Chapter 5: The chapter will provide the summary of the whole project. It will also provide a conclusion based on the link between literature review and the key findings of the investigation. The chapter will also provide recommendations based on the findings.

1.11 Summary

This chapter provided the background of the research as well as the overall introduction of the research project. The chapter also highlighted the research objectives, questions and methodology. The next chapter will provide an overview of the conceptual and theoretical framework of the subject under study. The chapter will also look into the various literature coverage of the subject under discussion in order to appraise the role of SADC in conflict resolution in Madagascar, and explains the conceptual foundations of the analysis.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it provides a broad overview of the concepts that this research uses. It defines, describes and analyses the key concepts of conflict and conflict resolution. Concepts that relate to the idea of peace are also discussed such as peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building. Second, this chapter develops a theoretical framework, which this study uses in the appraisal of the role of SADC in the resolution of the Madagascar crises. This study is guided by two theories, namely the integration theory and the human security theory. This chapter therefore presents an overview of these two theories and states how they are used in understanding the role of SADC in the Madagascar crises resolution process. In this chapter a number of literature will be used in discussing the pertinent issues of the investigation.

2.1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1.1 Conceptualising conflict

SADC is an intergovernmental organisation that focuses on economic and political matters based in Southern African region and is one of the continent’s most prominent regional co-operation bodies. The organisation played an important role in the area of conflict resolution both in the Southern African region and in Central Africa, particularly in the Madagascar, Zimbabwe and DRC conflicts. This role is defined and analysed from a conflict resolution perspective.

Conceptualising conflict is a necessary first step to analysing conflict resolution. Scholars define ‘conflict’ in many ways. Generally, the term conflict refers to clash of interests, ideologies, values, and struggle between individuals within states (civil wars) and between states, competition over scarce resources, incompatible goals by different groups (Effendi, 2010:84). Wallensteen (2002;16) defines conflict “as a social situation in which a minimum of two parties
strive at the same moment in time to acquire the same set of scarce resources”. According to Ross (1967) cited by Mitchell 1981:15) conflict is a situation in which two or more human beings desire goals which they perceive as being obtainable by one or the other, but not both.

Effendi (2010:84) describes conflict in terms of the following necessary components: first, incompatibility of interests or a contradiction or what Mitchell (1981) calls “a miss-match” between social values and social structure; second, negative attitudes in the form of perceptions or stereotypes about others; and third, behaviors of coercion and gestures of hostility and threats (Kotze, 2002:78-79). All three components of the triangle have to be present to constitute a conflict. If one or more of them are absent, there is a latent or structural conflict. Mitchell (1981) sees conflict as a dynamic process in which the three factors are constantly changing and influencing each other.

Conflicts arise for a myriad of reasons that are often a combination of politics, economics and social factors. The conflicts that have taken place in SADC region have been classified as political, economic and social. However, political conflicts appear to be the dominant form of conflict in the region. The focus in this chapter is on political conflicts that arise due to power rivalries that affect political stability and peace in the SADC countries.

Political conflict occurs when the nature of the incompatibility is political. Politics by definition functions in a context of scarcity, such as the scarcity of resources, scarcity of power, scarcity of identity and scarcity of status (Kotze, 2002:78). Political scientists describe conflict as a political phenomenon that emerges when states harbor

2.1.2 Conflict Resolution

SADC has adopted the language of conflict resolution, but what exactly does it mean? According to Burton (1990:2-3) the resolution of conflict means the transformation of relationships in a particular case by the solution of the problems which led to the conflicted behaviour in the first place. Such a transformation does not necessarily eliminate future problems in the relationship, or remove residual antagonisms. In this regard, Burton (1990:3) point out that the aim of conflict resolution is to transform conflict. For Burton, conflict transformation is a further development of conflict resolution. Furthermore, this author concludes that the terms conflict resolution and
conflict transformation are used relatively interchangeably in terms of their meaning and application.

According to Miall (2004;15), conflict resolution means a “change in the situation which removes the underlying source of conflict. If a conflict is settled by the military victory of one side and the other does not accept the outcome and begins organising another fight, the underlying conflict has clearly not been removed and such a conflict would not be considered resolved”.

Consequently, the fundamental principles of conflict resolution are two. Firstly, the parties should be satisfied with the outcome, which meets their felt needs and interests, and secondly there should not be use of any coercion to achieve such an outcome. According to Wallensteen (2002:8), conflict resolution refers to the resolution of the underlying incompatibilities in a conflict and mutual acceptance of each party’s existence. Groom (1990;94) declares that a complete satisfaction of parties comes only if "they have and do actually have, full knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the dispute and the aspirations of other parties”. He also maintains that conflict resolution is a goal rarely realised in practice.

However, Zartman (2000) introduced the notion of ‘ripeness’ in conflict resolution and defends the concept of a mutually hurtful stalemate. According to Zartman (2000;51), a conflict may be resolved only when each protagonist acknowledges the fact that they will not be able to reach a solution on their own or when they feel that escalation will lead to a catastrophe and that the costs are unbearable. Ripeness depends on internal political changes within conflicting groups, such as the emergence of new leaders or the break-up of a government.

Therefore, conflict resolution is a political process that requires a combination of factors and institutions from the grassroots to the international level. In this study, SADC’s role is in a conflict resolution as a third party intervener, which is classified as a peacemaker (mediator), peacekeeper and peace builder. The term peacemaking is often equated with conflict resolution, while peacekeeping with conflict management and the term peace-building is equated with conflict transformation. Conflict resolution is used as a term encompassing all three dimensions noted above and refers both to the process of bringing about change in the situation which removes the underlying source of conflict and to the completion of this process. The definition adopted assists in the classification and clarification of SADC activities in the SADC region. The
processes of conflict resolution are characterised by three dimensions, which include the nature of conflict, conflict resolution mechanisms and the outcomes of such mechanisms.

2.1.3 Nature of conflicts

It is crucial to understand the nature of conflict in SADC region for its effective resolution. To comprehend the nature of a conflict, the study identifies and examines the parameters such as the type of the conflict, its causes, the actors involved in the resolution of the conflict faced by SADC in the region.

2.1.4 Types of conflicts

There are many different typologies of conflict (Singer 1996:43-47; Holsti 1996;21; Wallensteen 2002). From these typologies, two main types of conflict are discernible, namely inter-state and intra-state conflict that SADC has been involved with. However, for the purpose of this study the focus will be on the intra-state conflict.

In recent years a new type of conflict described by Kaldor (2002;2) as the “new war” has increasingly come to the fore. This type of conflict takes place within and across states, in the form of civil war, armed insurrection, violent secessionist movement and other domestic warfare. Civil war is one of the most explosive of intra-state conflicts and occurs between the armed forces of the government and an opposing civil organised group, within the state borders. Intra-state conflicts are the dominant form of conflict in the post-Cold War era. This conflict may occur between two or more groups of power contenders within a state, each seeking access to political power in order to advance its interests and goals. For example, most of the intra-state conflicts within the SADC region have centered on the fight for political power between 1995 and 2010. These intra-state conflicts were recorded in countries such as Angola, DRC, Lesotho, Namibia, Malawi, Madagascar, Zambia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe (Nathan 2006;611).

According to SADC Treaty, the SADC Organ is mandated to resolve intra-state conflict within the territory of a state and inter-state conflict between a state and another state (SADC 2001: article 2). While SADC has had its share of inter- and intra-state conflicts, the majority of its conflicts were internal and these internal conflicts appear to be increasing, as elsewhere. Therefore, it is important to analyse the underlying causes of internal conflict.
2.1.5 Actors in internal Conflicts

Actors refer to individuals or groups who are involved in a conflict. The actors differ in their goals and interests, their positions, capacities to realise their interests and relationships, with other actors. In most cases, the key actors in internal conflicts are the governments, rebel groups, the military, militias, foreign governments and multinationals. However, the various actors employ an array of methods for promoting their agendas, especially the articulation of their claims to state power. Some use the mobilisation of grassroots support. Others use methods such as the organisation of demonstrations and the formation of militias (Kieh 2002:38). Besides, the various groups are supported by external factors who have a stake in the outcome of the conflict.

2.1.6 Mechanisms of Conflict Resolution

In cases where conflicts cannot be prevented or managed, there are commonly used mechanisms to resolve them. Conflicts can be resolved through several ways. The following are some of the most significant methods used by different institutions, as well as SADC. Various conflict resolution mechanisms are peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building.

**Peacemaking**

Peacemaking is an important mechanism of conflict resolution. It refers “to the use of diplomatic means to persuade parties in conflict to cease hostilities and to negotiate a peaceful settlement of their dispute” (UN Department, 2000:72). It involves negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, good offices applied after a dispute has crossed the threshold into armed conflict. According to Conteh-Morgan (2004:282), peacemaking has been defined as the proactive intervention to encourage warring factions to settle their dispute. This study adopts the general definition of peacemaking that is provided by the UN Department of Public Information in 2000 as mentioned above.

Peacemaking is one of the methods used by SADC in dealing with emerging crisis situations, as well as conflicts that have erupted. SADC has made progress in its capacity to respond to political conflicts in the Southern African region through mediation. It has been actively involved in three mediation missions to Zimbabwe, Madagascar and Lesotho, Hartmann (2013:3). It has also facilitated various peacemaking initiatives, which included the negotiation and signing of the ceasefire Agreement in Lesotho, DRC, Madagascar, and Zimbabwe.
Mediation, according to Murithi (2009:72), is the process of bringing parties to the negotiation table to seek a peaceful settlement of their conflicts. It is the third party facilitation of resolution of conflicts through dialogue, premised on win-win or positive-sum. In Africa, age, personality and political position determine the choice of a peacemaker. Smith (1994:148) contends that the intervening third party needs power in order to bring the disputants to the point where they will accept mediation. As Rugumamu (2002:186) states, the key to third party intervention is the creation of condition of ‘ripeness’ in the conflict. In the context of SADC, the bloc used mediation to resolve the Madagascar and Lesotho and DRC conflicts.

SADC has yet to establish a mediation unit to strengthen its peacemaking capacity. The SADC practice has been to use former heads of states for mediation. For example, in Zimbabwe, SADC deployed the then South African President, Thabo Mbeki, to mediate the resolution of the post-election crisis, leading to the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in September 2008. Kotze (2002:80) argues that the use of elderly statesmen is sometimes contemplated as a valuable source for mediation. However, most of them cannot guarantee success. They have experience in negotiation as political leaders but not necessarily in mediation, and they seldom have the infrastructural support to sustain a settlement process. Therefore, irrespective of how attractive and idealistic it appears to be, it is likely that the success is relatively low. Sir Ketumile Masire, deployed to mediate in the DRC conflict on behalf of SADC, faced the same predicament. The former Mozambican President, Joaquim Alberto Chissano was the head of the SADC mediation team in Madagascar.

Some analysts argue that SADC has had meager successes on peacemaking in the Southern African region (Cawthra and Nieuwkerk 2004:11; Nathan 2010:7-8). Cawthra and Nieuwkerk (2004:11) state that SADC has had few successes, and its efforts have almost always contributed to stability and security. In practice, the community has seldom been able to resolve matters as a collective body and has tended to devolve diplomatic processes and negotiations to one or more member states. For example, South Africa (and before it Botswana) brokered the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and South Africa, Botswana and Mozambique were mandated to resolve the Lesotho crisis.
Peacekeeping

The majority of interventions fall in the category of peacekeeping as opposed to peacemaking. Peacekeeping is another important mechanism of conflict resolution. Conteh-Morgan (2004;282) defined peacekeeping as the use of military intervention to maintain peace and prevent an increase in confrontation. Boutros-Ghali (1992) identified peacekeeping as “the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is an activity which expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace”. For the purpose of this study, peacekeeping is defined as the act of maintaining peace through the use of military intervention forces.

Moreover, peacekeeping operations require a clear and precise mandate for operations, which can be unambiguously translated into effective action on the ground in the pursuit of clear objectives. Mandates should take into account the need for peacekeeping operations to remain impartial in implementing their mission and to operate with the consent of all parties to the conflict. They also need to be framed with a view to the quality and quantity of resources which the international community would be ready to commit (Rugumamu 2002;187).

2.2 Theoretical Framework

The objective of this section is to discuss a theoretical framework for the appraisal of the role of SADC in conflict resolution in Madagascar. Borggat, (1996) opines that a theoretical framework is collection of interrelated concepts. It is a ‘compass’ to the research determining what issues to measure and what relationship to look for. The importance of the theoretical framework in any research is to clarify the problem and assist in determining the best approach to its solution (Anderson and Arsenaut, 1999:57). This study is guided by two theories, namely the integration theory and the Human Security Theory.
2.2.1 Integration theory

According to Deutsch (1957;36) theories of integration offer explanations of how and why supranational governance has developed. Haas (1958;16) defined integration as the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. (Makinda and Okumu, 2007) postulated that regional integration is the level of governance between the national and global levels, where states have come together by establishing cooperative endeavours by designing common policies in the political, economic and strategic spheres and establishing common institutions in the pursuit of their collective goals and interests.

According to Brigid Laffan (1992), sovereign states participates in regional integration for various reasons because, they expect tangible benefits, whether political, economic or social. Politically, a country may participate in a regional scheme in order to bolster its military prowess, augment its political stature, and deter or wade off aggression from hostile neighbors. Similarly, countries may integrate to achieve economies of scale, optimally allocate scarce resources, and accelerate economic growth or to increase trade. Socially, countries may also participate in regional integration for socioeconomic reasons, either to facilitate factor mobility or to stem the influx of immigrants from less affluent neighboring countries. In any case, participating in regional endeavors can plausibly increase the fortunes of the domestic economy.

According to Cawthra (2013;34), in many countries the capacity of states is weak, with severe crisis in many regions of the continent, states being unable to perform the most basic of the duties of states, that of providing security. African strategy to reverse this trend rests on improving governance and accountability in each state, strengthening both continental and regional organisations, and international cooperation. For example, the situation in Madagascar after the 2009 political crisis had reached levels were the country’s institutions responsible for maintaining security had become compromised. Therefore, the SADC OPDS had to intervene in order to bring sanity and stability.
The question of Africa’s regional integration has preoccupied many African leaders since the early years of independence. Many have viewed it as a tool for promoting economic growth and sustainable development and improving the living standards of the African people. The overall strategic objective of regrouping African countries was to fight the impact of colonialism and build a united Africa. The formation of the OAU, now the African Union (AU) was the first step towards promoting continental unity. Since its inception, significant new efforts have been put in place (Cawthra (2013;34).

Thus, there are two very significant developments in African integration efforts in recent years. One is the transformation of the continental organisation, the OAU into the African Union with increased mandate and better structures to tackle important continental issues. The other is the establishment of the African Economic Community with clearly set time table and tasks for its realisation. Since the African Union is the lead organisation in all the efforts at continental and regional integration in the continent, it is pertinent to look at its evolution, its policies and some of its activities, as well the road map it has charted for the realisation of the African Economic Community. Within the short span of its life however, it has gone beyond the brief of its predecessor especially with regards to conflict management and is doing a great deal in building the institutions necessary for managing conflicts (Makinda and Okumu, 2007). The Union launched a Peace and Security Council in 2004, consisting of 15 member states appointed by the Assembly of Heads of State, with three representatives from each of the five regions of the continent as designated by the AU. It is the lead organ of the AU in the management of conflicts in the continent. Thus unlike its predecessor, that dealt with conflicts through ad hoc mechanisms, the AU has institutionalized conflict management. It has not only sent peacekeeping forces to the Darfur region in Sudan, the first for the organisation, but also organised several rounds of talks in the Nigerian capital, Abuja between the warring factions there. It has also organised another force (AMISOM) and stationed it in Mogadishu, Somalia, in support of the beleaguered Transitional Federal Government there. Under the OAU, strict observance of the principle of non-interference was the rule, but the AU has also committed itself to strengthening good governance; it has condemned and isolated regimes that came to power through coups and unconstitutional means.
Cawthra (2013:46) disclosed that, conflicts and civil strives in Africa provide a hurdle to jump in the integration process of Africa. It is striking that “virtually every country in Africa has either a festering or full blown conflict to deal with.” Since no war leaves the neighbouring countries unaffected, what may generally begin as a “small” misunderstanding over power, resources can quickly spread around the entire region with the outcome of displacement of people, aid flow, and investments are reduced, development projects are brought to a standstill. That is the reason why regional bodies such as the SADC intervene even in intra-state disputes such as the case of Zimbabwe and Madagascar. These crises have a contagion effect within the region and the continent at large.

Another hurdle to integration in Africa has been the lack of sustained political willingness and commitment to put in place agreed policies and plans has been one of Africa’s major problem, and in the context of the AU and SADC (Cawthra (2013:50). Lack of political willingness is “expressed in the chronic non-observance of commitments undertaken within the respective agreements and in the insufficient use of the instruments set up by these agreements.” Furthermore, for integration to succeed, some element of national sovereignty must be sacrificed. However, hardly any African state ruler is really prepared to do so because “the transfer of resources and power of decisions to a supranational institution means a dissolving of the mass of patronage with which they can buy loyalty.” In Madagascar, Rajoelina was unwilling to step down as was propounded by the SADC OPDS.

According to Cawthra (2013:52) the last challenge is related to the question of how to incorporate Africans not governments in the regional integration process. These new initiatives are challenged by civil society for being elitist and top-down in their approaches, having been drawn up by a few Heads of State, and virtually excluding civil society in their preparation.” Nongovernmental forces in Africa have been the most prominent and consistent advocates for democratic and good governance reforms. Presently, civil society in Africa is insisting that evaluation committees, for example in the realms of the AU and SADC, must be composed not only of government appointees, but also of parliamentary representatives, ombudsmen, officials of counter-corruption agencies and representatives from non-governmental organisations (NGOs), think tanks and the private sector. Unless societal forces are given a
prominent role both in the policy direction of these regional initiatives, there is a danger that African governments “will pat one another on the back and turn away from confronting the fundamental and deeply rooted perversions of governance that represent the core obstacle to achieving these regional goals. Then these initiatives will just degenerate into a sad iteration of the previous failures.”

2.2.2 Human Security Theory

The concept of human security has its origins in the Cold War and has been embedded and understood in militaristic terms. However, it has evolved to encompass a number of pertinent elements in the contemporary world and has shifted from the traditionally understood state-centric model of security to a human centered one. It now also focuses on individuals rather than simply the state and the military (UNDP: 1994). The UNDP came up with seven elements that are enshrined in human security and include the following: Economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, political security that entails protection of civil rights, freedoms and responsibility; Personal security which guarantees freedom from physical violence and threats, right to human dignity and freedom of person.

The objective of human security is therefore to “safeguard the vital core of all human lives from….pervasive threats in a way that is consistent with long term fulfillment” (Commission of Human Security (CHS) 2001). Human security therefore include both human rights and human needs hence the need to employ it in explaining vital issues like the crisis. The people in Madagascar experienced horrendous eco-political problems that were a threat to their survival, their families and those of their relatives. Eade (1998:18) noted that the traditional meaning of security took for granted the safety of the individual. Eade went on to argue that: ‘The only legitimate security is security that is rooted in the well-being of people. We have all observed that you can have a secure state, in the traditional sense-full of insecure people who face poverty, destitution and threats to their integrity.

The theoretical assumptions of human security are centered on the individual as the most important referral point of security. This means that the notion of human security has shifted focus from inter-state and military focus towards the individual and the community he resides in. This entails physical security of the individual, her/is security from injury, violence, sickness,
poverty or psychological harm (Ban, 2008). This theory entails taking preventive measures to minimize risk and vulnerability by taking remedial action where prevention fails.

According to the UNDP (1994:22) report human security is vital because it is universal in the sense that security is crucial and of paramount importance. This envisages that it has no boundaries; it has no gender, age, political affiliation, nation or social class. This entails that when the ‘individual’s security is under threat all nations are likely to be affected. Famine, disease, political disputes and violence are no longer isolated events confined to boarders but the consequences affect neighbouring countries. Human security is preventable and the cost preventing human insecurities is better than dealing with disastrous reparations of human insecurity. Human security has become people centered because it now focuses on how people live in society, how they exercise their ‘political’ choices, and whether they live in conflict or peace (UNDP, 1994).

The human security theory is relative to this study because of its expansive nature. It provides a broader framework for examining the topic under study. The theory does a good job to unravel that security is much broader than traditional military dimensions. Madagascar experienced serious political turmoil that was arguably triggered by a “human selfish agendas. The human security theory encompasses issues of human needs and human rights. It must be borne in mind that freedom to vote for a political party of choice and security is ‘two sides of the same coin.’ Freedom to vote for a political party of your choice is therefore intrinsic to human security since human survival and freedom of choice is the core or ‘crux’ of security. Freedom to choose a political party to provide societal public goods are therefore essential to human security for this also determines life expectancy. Peace and good political and economic governance permits accountability, transparency, freedom, multiparty-ism and development, hence the thrust of this study is exploring the success of the SADC in resolving the Madagascar crisis.

The impact of the socio-political and economic crisis on peace and security amongst the Malagasy is arguably linked to human security as the effects reveal themselves in the form of personal security, community security, health security educational security and housing security when people are displaced against their will which are among the seven elements enshrined in the UNDP 1994 report. Intrastate conflict is therefore a serious threat to human security as people are denied the chance to do their day-to-day activities and are forced to migrate to
neighbouring countries as ‘economic refugees’ or running away from political persecution. Because of the crises that occurred in Madagascar there were many family dislocations as breadwinners sought ‘greener pastures, or when some family members fled from political motivated violence losing their jobs in the process. Many had their homesteads destroyed and have never had the opportunity to freely vote for a political party of their choice.

2.3 Literature Review

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) states launched on 28 June 1996 a mechanism for resolving both inter and intra-state conflicts in the region. Known today as the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) or simply the SADC Organ, this embodies two approaches to conflict resolution, namely force and persuasion. The former suppresses conflict while the latter manages or transforms it by helping conflicting parties to achieve a negotiated settlement. However, the choice of any of these approaches is not a matter for the populations of member states but SADC heads of state. Indeed, the SADC Protocol legalizing the Organ envisages no role for the national populations of member states in invoking or managing it.

The OPDSC was also intended to serve three distinct purposes: first, to address human security needs in Southern Africa during intra- and inter-state conflicts and general political instability; second, to advance a common regional foreign policy, political cooperation, and democracy; and third, to respond to sub-regional conflicts through peacemaking, peacekeeping, or peacebuilding measures. Additionally, the OPDSC aims to provide a flexible and timely response to conflict situations. Yet, as it stands, these goals remain unrealized due to an absence of coherence and stability in policy.

Thus democracy, SADC’s supposedly most cherished political value, has to give way to regional and ultimately individual state security. Cilliers, 2004: 108) wrote that as a tool of states, the Organ is a single-track conflict resolution mechanism anchored in Hobbes and Rousseau’s state of nature totalitarian ideology. Unleashing the SADC Organ on any forces, even the region’s peoples, thought to be threatening peace, security and stability requires no prior sanction of the member states’ national parliaments. The Organ is beyond the purview and control of the
national parliaments of the community’s constituent states, with no scope for intervention by such assemblies and the civil society.

Hammerstad (2003: 144) postulated that civil wars, coups and other unconstitutional seizures of power, riots or violent protests paralyzing governments and genocides, are examples of threats that are to be squashed through the use of the SADC Organ. SADC’s conflict resolution mechanism is also supposed to be a guarantor of democracy or a means of promoting and protecting it. In pursuit of these broad collective security objectives that include the protection of democracy, SADC can use the Organ in either its forms, namely persuasive and coercive aspects. SADC’s individual member states maintain peace and security inside their countries and decide what and when a particular episode threatens national security, and whether this is a matter for the Organ.

Lunn (2012;12) wrote that the political crisis in Madagascar, began when Andre Rajoelina successfully ousted the incumbent President, Marc Ravalomanana, in March 2009 and installed himself instead, albeit formally as a transitional leader pending elections. Ravalomanana had won the 2001 presidential election but found himself engaged in a prolonged struggle to establish himself in the post after his opponent, incumbent Didier Ratsiraka, refused to accept defeat. At the time, the African Union (AU) suspended Madagascar’s membership and led mediation efforts to end the crisis, which only ended when Ratsiraka fled into exile in June 2002.

Lunn (2012;12) added that over time, Ravalomanana became increasingly authoritarian and corrupt, giving clear indications that he was planning to use his powers as the incumbent to sabotage a possible challenge from Rajoelina at the next presidential elections. A popular, if young and inexperienced, mayor of Antananarivo, the capital, who had locked horns consistently with the President over the capital’s substantial debts and official harassment of his broadcasting station, Rajoelina organised mass street protests, some of which ended in violence, and was able to bring part of the security forces over to his side. In what many have characterised as a pre-emptive ‘democratic coup’, Rajoelina then created a rival government, the High Transitional Authority (HAT) in January 2009. Ravalomanana eventually resigned and fled into exile in South Africa in March 2009. At this point, Rajaolina himself became head of the HAT and announced that a new Constitution would be drawn up.
Cynics claimed that his main motivation for doing this was that the existing Constitution stated that a person must be 40 before they were eligible to be president and Rajoelina, at the time, was only 34. Ploch (2012;23) revealed that Rajoelina’s new government eventually announced a timetable for a transition of power, in which presidential elections were initially scheduled for October 2010.

Rajoelina’s rise without the imprimatur of an election victory disputed or not, meant that the international community could not welcome him. Characterising what had happened as an illegal military coup, it called for a return to democracy. The AU and the Southern African Development Community suspended Madagascar’s membership (Lunn (2012; 13).

Ploch (2012;23) wrote that from exile, Ravalomanana maintained that he had been forced out and remained the rightful president. WikiLeaks later reported that Ravalomanana began to recruit mercenaries with a view to attempting to overthrow Rajoelina by force soon after he went into exile. Rajoelina and his backers were also criticised for their intolerance of opposition. When Ravalomanana supporters launched protests of their own within the country, they were banned. Clashes led to deaths on the street. Investigations and trials of Ravalomanana era officials were launched. As mediation continued, led by an International Contact Group involving the UN, AU, SADC and La Francophonie, a key point of dispute became the claims of former presidents Ravalomanana, Ratsiraka and Zafy to return from exile and even possibly stand in future presidential elections. In truth, the real sticking point for Rajoelina was the return of Ravalomanana.

Ploch (2012;23) wrote that there was general consensus amongst most of those interviewed that the long-term causes of the conflict can be traced back to the post-independence history of Madagascar, which saw long periods of autocratic and authoritarian rule, periodic crises involving military intervention in politics (in 1971, 1991 and 2001/2) and a failure to establish a consolidated democracy or effective governance. The general conditions of poverty and marginalisation were also identified as factors, and this was seen to have worsened under Ravalomanana’s rule.

While not a cause, there was an international dimension to the crisis. France has traditionally been the major international influence in Madagascar (Ploch (2012;23). Ravalomanana, who has extensive business interests in Southern Africa, was seen as steering the country away from the
French sphere, emphasizing stronger links with the USA, South Africa, and the East. While no respondents believed that the French orchestrated the events of 17 March 2009, it is evident that the French government was quick to work with Rajoelina, and gave him some protection at crucial periods leading up to and immediately after the coup. Although France did not officially recognise Rajoelina’s de facto government and is publicly even-handed, most respondents (from all sides of the spectrum) believed that France has played a behind-the-scenes role in support of Rajoelina (Ravalomanana has gone further by labeling him a ‘puppet’ of France). This may have been motivated by the belief that it was the best solution to prevent the country from sliding into chaos and civil war, but most respondents also thought that the intention was to restore and shore up French influence and business interests in the country.

Ploch (2012:23) wrote that SADC countries (with the exception of South Africa) have few interests in Madagascar and there is only very limited diplomatic representation. At the same time, there is an almost complete lack of knowledge within Madagascar about SADC, and the Rajoelina camp likes to project the country’s involvement in the regional community as a personal project of Ravalomanana, carried out for business reasons (with some justification). Despite this, SADC was involved at an early stage in the crisis, although it took it some time to make any sustained interventions.

The Foreign Minister of Swaziland, Lufto Dlamini, visited Madagascar in February 2009 as the crisis began to unfold, but had nothing much to show for it. The day after the unconstitutional change of government on 17 March, Zambia called for Madagascar’s suspension from the bloc, while the OPDS met on 19 March 2009 and took a position of refusing to recognise Rajoelina, indicating that it would consider imposing sanctions if the constitutional order was not restored. Lunn (2012;12) noted that the following day, the AU’s PSC followed suit. At the extraordinary summit of the OPDSC held on 31 March 2009, Madagascar was suspended from membership, with the executive secretary of SADC, Thomaz Salamao, urging Rajoelina ‘to vacate the office of the president as a matter of urgency, paving the way for unconditional reinstatement of President Ravalomanana’. (Mail and Guardian 31.3.2009). Sanctions were again threatened, and more controversially, King Mswati mooted the option of a military intervention using the SADC BRIGADE, and logistics, such as the provision of transport aircraft by Angola were discussed. This came as something of a shock to most Madagascans, and was exploited by Rajoelina, who
whipped up nationalist fervour around the issue. Indeed, military respondents in this study divulged that the armed forces were actively preparing to fight back against any SADC BRIGADE intervention – certainly the consequences, both politically and militarily, would have been disastrous for SADC, although in reality SADC BRIGADE was never in a position to carry out such an operation and there was no political authorisation for it. The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) also supported the option of military intervention to restore democracy, in a statement adopted at a summit held in Zimbabwe and chaired by King Mswati III of Swaziland.

Lunn (2012;18) wrote that Ravalomanana also descended on Swaziland, to lobby for support, military or otherwise, and at the end of March 2009, a summit of SADC itself affirmed its earlier position of supporting his reinstatement and suspending Madagascar from membership. Rajoelina responded to these developments by announcing that Madagascar would quit SADC. The former prime minister of Swaziland, Absalom Themba Dlamini, arrived in Madagascar on 11 May 2009 to convey SADC’s position to Rajoelina. However, mediation was under way under auspices of the UN and the AU, and Dlamini realised that SADC’s position was both untenable in terms of realities on the ground, and out of phase with that of other international actors, and he returned to Swaziland on 29 May 2009, apparently urging a rethink. A further delegation, representing the Organ Troika, visited Madagascar at the end of April 2009.

Lunn (2012;12) revealed that on 20 June 2009, SADC held another extraordinary summit at heads of state level to consider what to do about Madagascar. Here it moderated its original strong position, and appointed Joaquim Chissano, assisted by a team of mediators, to try to reach a compromise position leading to new elections. This eventually led to the convening of the Maputo meeting from 5 to 8 August 2009 where the framework for elaborate transitional arrangements, leading to elections in 15 months time, were agreed by the four Madagascan ‘movements’. It was really only after this that the spectra of a SADC ‘invasion’ was laid to rest and that SADC was perceived by most actors as being even-handed.

As more than one informant put it, the appointment of Chissano ‘changed everything’ and SADC was perceived to be acting more even-handedly – and King Mswati played an increasingly less important role as Mozambique began to prepare for its chairing of the OPDS through the annual process of rotation (which took place at the SADC summit in early September 2009). Most
respondents indicated to the author that subsequent to Chissano’s appointment they could detect little difference between the positions adopted by SADC. Most accepted that SADC had a leading role to play given the chief mediator function of Chissano, even if the AU was officially the lead agency. However, a further crisis broke out when SADC states, acting as a bloc, prevented Rajoelina from addressing the UN General Assembly at the end of September 2009. This sparked an angry threat by the Rajoelina government to refuse visas to officials from SADC states.

SADC initially took the strongest position on the unconstitutional change of government, but eventually SADC painted itself into a corner and marginalised itself, in that it was out of sync with its international partners, while the situation on the ground (especially the position of the armed forces) prevented a mere return to the status quo. However, this does not make the issue go away. The fact of the matter is that SADC and the AU are not able to draw a line in the sand that prevents unconstitutional changes of government, there is a danger that old African practices of coups and the like will continue. Already the AU has backtracked by allowing some regimes that came to power by unconstitutional means to re-legitimise themselves by the simple expedient of holding elections, and a similar approach to Madagascar would further consolidate this tendency.

It is also not clear that SADC took a principled position, or whether its support for Ravalomanana was informed more by solidarity between heads of state, who form a kind of informal club at the core of SADC; in other words, ‘regime solidarity’. There was a widespread belief amongst informants, partly shared by Lunn (2012;12), that what motivated SADC’s apparently principled stand was mostly a fear of contagion: that in other countries, populist leaders might emerge with support from key security institutions to overthrow existing regimes.

Ploch (2012;23) noted that with regard to SADC, there has been a palpable lack of capacity to support the mediation process. It has been proposed that a secretariat be established in Antananarivo to assist the transition, but perhaps more importantly, SADC’s rather ad hoc approach to mediation should be replaced by a more institutionalised approach. Certainly, the secretariat of SADC played relatively little role in the negotiations, which were left to political heads, with all the problems associated with this (for example, the personal position of the autocratic King Mswati III and his lack of credibility as an advocate for democracy). The
establishment of a dedicated, professional, full-time secretariat to assist in tracking crises, working out possible solutions and supporting mediation or negotiation efforts would be an important step forward. There was also little if no involvement of civil society in the process. A professional mediation unit could assist in involving civil society organisations which could contribute a wide range of skills, expertise and credibility to the process, which was otherwise the preserve of the ‘club of heads of states’ and their ministers or senior officials. This, however, needs to be seen in the context of a generally weak civil society in Southern Africa, and its almost complete absence in Madagascar, apart from the churches.

The SADC involvement finally led to the establishment of a 15-month power-sharing agreement to conclude with a general election in 2010, which failed to occur; a subsequent agreement aimed for an early 2013 election, the first round was held on 25 October 2013 and the second on 20 December 2013.

Ploch (2012;23) recommended that SADC should also give some thought as to what role it could play in the future development of Madagascar and the consolidation of democracy in that country. Some respondents, for example, indicated that the regional organisation could play a role in security sector reform and the consolidation of democracy. In this regard, the policy frameworks that SADC has developed, including the elections guidelines, will be important instruments.

SADC itself can play an important role in the supervision and monitoring of elections. Ploch (2012;23) also transcended that while the integrity and stability of the armed forces is fragile and important to maintain (on the basis of the ‘reconciliation’ agreement reached by the armed forces themselves) this does not obviate the need for a significant programme of security sector reform, in particular to ensure that democratic political control over the armed forces is secured. In this, SADC, or member states of SADC such as South Africa, Namibia or Mozambique, could also play an important role (there was considerable interest in training programmes put on in 2008 by the Southern African Defence and Security Management Network (SADSEM)).

Ploch (2012;23) disclosed that breaking the cycle of repeated constitutional crises and violations required the development and consolidation of much deeper forms of democracy, including the development of sustainable political parties based on principles of transparency and accountability, as well as the consolidation of civil society. With the notable exception of the
Madagascar council of churches (especially the Archbishop of Antananarivo), civil society appears to have been unable to play any role in mediating or at least mitigating the crisis.

SADC has an important role to play in all these transitions and transformations. To do this, it has itself to strengthen and consolidate its institutional capacities, and to be able to mobilise actors within the community’s member states that have undergone kindred transformations from authoritarianism to democracy. There is an assumption that once a country has engaged in a democratic transition there is a linear process to consolidate democracy. The recent crisis in Madagascar has demonstrated (once again) that this is untrue, that reversals – or cycles - of repeated violation, are possible if not probable.

Many Malagasy people, at least based on the submissions of the informants in this study, regard the intervention of SADC and other external actors as violating Madagascar’s sovereignty. Ploch (2012;23), however, sovereignty has not been ‘god-given’ for some centuries: it has to be earned through support of the citizens through institutionalised democratic means, as well as the acceptance not only by other sovereign states but by multinational institutions. Pre-eminent amongst these is the UN, but subsidiary regional organisations – in this case the AU and SADC – play a vital role. If SADC is to find the strength to deal with endemic, cyclic, systemic crises like that in Madagascar, it really needs to improve its institutional, conceptual and mobilising potentials. Cawthra (2013;34) First it needs to actually bring Madagascar into the SADC community. Then there are thin lines between painting oneself into a corner, having the capacity to actually engage with realities on the ground and dealing with sometimes converging international interests, and maintaining and promoting common principles of good governance.

Bekoe (2016;23) wrote that through SADC efforts constitutional governance was restored in January 2014, when Hery Rajaonarimampianina was named president following the 2013 election, which were deemed fair and transparent by the international community. These developments were unanimously saluted as successes that have put Madagascar back on the map. Bekoe (2016;23) also wrote that a Extra-ordinary Summit of SADC Heads of state and Government also lifted the suspension on Madagascar and invited the country to immediately resume its participation in all SADC activities and processes. In a communiqué issued yesterday, 30th January 2014, Summit congratulated Hery Rajaonarinampianina for his election as the First President of the Fourth Republic of Madagascar and welcomed his undertakings towards national
reconciliation, and social and economic recovery made during his inauguration on 25 January 2014. Summit also welcomed the decision by the Peace and Security Council of the AU on 27 January, 2014 to lift the suspension on Madagascar. Summit commended Member States for standing firm on SADC principles against those who usurp power through violence and unconstitutional means; and by consistently supporting the Malagasy people throughout the difficult times brought about by the unconstitutional change of Government in the country. Furthermore, the Summit recognized and commended the support of the International Community in returning Madagascar to constitutional order. The year 2016, marked great progress in Madagascar when the country hosted the COMESA’s Heads of State Summit in October 2017, and the International Summit of la Francophonie in November 2016.

However, Makoa (2009:11) was of the view that the SADC conflict resolution mechanism as institutionalized in the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS), has narrowed than expanded the spread of democracy in Southern Africa and traded democracy for security of the

2.4 Summary

This chapter provided a broad overview of the concepts that this research uses. It defined, described and analysed the key concepts of conflict and conflict resolution. Concepts that relate to the idea of peace are also discussed such as peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building. This chapter also developed a theoretical framework, which this study uses in the appraisal of the role of SADC in the resolution of the Madagascar crises. This study was guided by two theories, namely the integration theory and the human security theory. This chapter therefore presented an overview of these two theories and how they are used in understanding the role of SADC in the Madagascar conflict resolution process. This chapter also unearthed information relating to the subject under study from existing literature. Various authors have written about the causes and the nature of the Madagascar conflict. A number of authors also covered the involvement of the SADC OPDS. From the existing literature, SADC succeeded in resolving the conflict in Madagascar. The research will go a long way in feeling the gaps that where left by the existing literature. This will be done by deepening the research by conducting interviews of stakeholders to the Madagascar crises whom were not covered from previous researches on the subject. The
next chapter will look into the research methodology that was applied in the acquisition and assembling of data.
CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This section of the study presents the research methodology used to assemble data. Research methodology implies the way in which a researcher retrieves data from the selected sampling frame, methods to collect data, instrument to be used and how is the data scrutinised and presented. Leedy and Ormrod (2010:100) define research methodology as the “framework to extract meaning from the data collected”. The research is two pronged; it utilized two approaches to data collection. Firstly, the study utilised desk research wherein academic and professional journals, articles, newspaper articles, academic books were extensively reviewed to get an insight on the role-played by SADC in resolving the Madagascar impasse. Secondly, the researcher administered questionnaires and in-depth interviews, which were essential in gathering pertinent data and information during field research. Research methodology as described by Babbie and Mouton (2001: xxvii) refers to the various methods, techniques and procedures that are employed in the process of implementing a research project.

This study employs a qualitative research paradigm. Denzin and Lincoln (1994:2) define qualitative research as follows: “qualitative research is the multi-method in focus, involving an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject matter. This means that qualitative researchers are studying phenomena in its natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, these phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them.” In this study, qualitative research approach is most suitable as it will allow the researcher to understand the meaning and contextual dynamics of SADC’s actions in resolving the Madagascar crisis.
3.1 Research Design

Blanche et al (2006: 27) defines “a research design as a plan or blue print of how a researcher intends to conduct a study.” This involves plans for data collection, data gathering instruments, and how data would be processed and analysed to give meaning to research findings. In the view of the foregoing, Ghauri et al (2005: 32) pointed out that “a research design should be effective in producing the required information within the constraints put on the researcher such as time, budget and skills”. In essence, the research design guides the researcher on the data to collect, how to collect, process and analyse it in order to answer the research question. The research design in the study used the case study of Madagascar. The study adapted the approach of gathering and analysing data relating to the effectiveness of the SADC OPDS as a model of conflict resolution in Madagascar. In this study a qualitative method was employed. The qualitative data was collected from interviews with key informants, as well as documentary study. The approach of looking at the past and current situations in Madagascar afforded the researcher an opportunity to make an empirical investigation through the gathering of comprehensive, systematic and in-depth information about the state of affairs in the country.

3.2 Sampling

Cochran (2003: 67) defines sampling “as the selection of the specific research participants from the entire population and is conducted in different ways according to the type of study”. Time, cost, and inconvenience forbid contacting every individual, thus justifying the gathering of information about only part of the group in order to draw conclusions about the whole. Sampling decisions are required about not only which people to interview or which events to observe, but also about settings and processes. The sampling plan used in the research was non-probability (purposive sampling) class. Babbie (2009: 47) notes, “A representative sample is crucial to quantitative research and must reflect the population accurately so that inferences can be drawn”. A chosen sample must reflect the attributes and attitudes of the entire population under study when accurate conclusions relating to the whole population are being sought or are wanted.

According to Williamson et al (1997: 111), “purposive sampling refers to a judgmental form of sampling in which the researcher purposely selects certain groups or individuals for their
relevance to the issue being studied”. The study utilised this technique to select eminent academics in the field of conflict resolution. The respondents are more or less directly linked to the area of study and the information they have on Madagascar proved to be very essential for the research.

According to Bailey (2001: 56), “purposive sampling method is less complicated, less expensive and may be done on a “spur-of-the-moment” basis to take advantage of the available and perhaps unanticipated respondents without the statistical complexity of probability sampling”. It is against these merits of convenience, cost-effectiveness that led the researcher to sample officials who have been linked to Madagascar and SADC involvement in Madagascar.

3.2.1 Sample Frame

According to Strauss and Corbin (1998:32) a sampling frame is a set of information used to identify a sample population for statistical treatment. A sampling frame includes a numerical identifier for each individual, plus other identifying information about characteristics of the individuals, to aid in analysis and allow for division into further frames for more in-depth analysis. The population for this research consisted of officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and eminent academics in the field of conflict resolution. The respondents were chosen based on their knowledge of the SADC OPDS. The respondents were chosen for their involvement in the processes that led to the ultimate resolution of the crisis in Madagascar for example members of the Zimbabwe Foreign Affairs department.

3.3 Data Gathering Techniques

Dooley (2003: 56) wrote, “Data collection is the process of gathering relevant data about the subject”. According to Martins et al (2009:35) “the data collection process may vary from relatively simple observation at a specific location to an extensive survey of large corporations across the world”. The study made use of both primary and secondary data. For an exploratory study, the process of collecting information involves primarily in-depth Key Informant Interviews. Creswell (2012:161) revealed that interviews are of paramount importance because
the help in describing the meaning of the phenomenon for a small number of individuals who have experienced it. Interviews play a central role in the collection of data. Therefore, the primary data in this study were collected through conducting face-to-face interviews, telephone or email interviews with some participants in the peace negotiations and some SADC officials in order to obtain an in-depth understanding of the problem. The interviews were conducted in a period of six months.

This study also made use of secondary materials. Library-based research was conducted. This search of secondary materials has uncovered two types of sources. The first type consisted of the literature comprising books, journals and other classical scientific resources dealing with the subject matter. The second type includes newspapers, treaties, protocols, charters, brochures, publication, decisions, recommendations, official reports, statements, communiqués and official websites of SADC in order to get additional information on the role of SADC in the conflict resolution process in DRC.

It is noteworthy that the study used face-to-face interviews, and documentary research methods in the acquisition of the required data and to give way for triangulation of data. Bryman (2001: 509) defines triangulation as “the use of more than one method or source of data in the study of a social phenomenon so that findings may be crosschecked”. These methods of data collection include interview, case studies or questionnaires.

3.3.1 Interviews

As a complimentary stride to documentary research, in-depth interviews were conducted with the key respondents. Slocum et al (1995:25) notes, in-depth interviews are face-to-face discussions between the interviewer and the interviewee for the purpose of gathering detailed information on particular social phenomena”. The key informants are those individuals assumed to be well versed in the subject of conflict resolution within the SADC bloc. Williamson et al (1997: 133) ascertain that “interviews attempt to collect information in a systematic manner, which allows for the description and explanation of the beliefs, values, and beliefs of people”. In-depth interviews were used in this research as the interviewer drew immediate feedbacks as they clarification on complex issues were sought between the interviewer and the interviewee.
The researcher used personal interviews at the Zimbabwean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a number of learning institutions in Zimbabwe. Personal interviews are were questionnaires are completed through a face-to-face contact with the respondent. The main advantage with personal interviews is that there is a high response rate and there is room for probing into some responses. As such, key informant interview guides were used to solicit for responses from the Zimbabwean Ministry Foreign Affairs officials and prominent academics in the field of conflict resolution. Both open and closed ended questions were used for collecting data in this study. Data collection is immediate and there is capture of non-verbal responses under personal interviews.

In case the interview could not be recorded, for lack of permission to do so, the researcher took notes during the interview. Potential interviewees had requested to indicate their consent prior to being interviewed. In addition, they were given guarantee of confidentiality and anonymity.

According to Williamson et al (1977: 143) “when using interviews respondents are encouraged to relate their experiences by describing whatever events, that seem significant to them, as well as to provide their own definitions of their situations by revealing their opinions and attitudes as they see fit”. In addition, the interviewing situation increases the response rate because many people who are unable for example, to fill out a questionnaire by themselves can and will respond to the same questions when the interviewer asks them.

Interviews are however, beset with the problem of facilitating appointments with respondents such as senior officials at the Zimbabwean Ministry of Foreign Affairs who often have busy schedules. In this study, the key respondents were Zimbabwean Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, trade experts from the University of Zimbabwe (UZ), staff at the Southern African Research and Documentation Centre (SARDC) and researchers from Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) Cape Town who provided informed analyses on the effectiveness of SADC in resolving the Madagascar crisis. Interviews enabled the researcher to probe further into issues and seek clarification on matters that have some controversies.
3.3.2 Documentary Research

The study also relied on secondary information in the form of documentary research to gather information about the effectiveness of SADC in conflict resolution. Oppenheim (2012: 2) defines documentary research “as entailing the systematic analysis of written records thus enabling the researcher to familiarize with existing works and current discourse on the subject under research. Documents such as newspaper articles, academic and professional journals and Revenue Reports were extensively reviewed as this facilitated familiarization with the already going works and on-going debates on conflict resolution within the auspices of the SADC. Documents provide a permanent record of facts, which can be referred to constantly for reference purposes. The findings of the content analysis are meant to provide a benchmark for sound recommendations. However, some documentary evidence may be overtaken by events such that it may misrepresent facts as they appear on the ground.

The researcher also made use of electronic media, in the form of internet sites (that is e-library where journals, books, articles, magazines and other corpus of material online in soft copy format were consulted). This helped to suffice the problem of old and out-dated books some of which might be tattered, mutilated and vandalized thus making it possible to explore issues relating to how regional and global expensive and information has to be carefully selected as junk data can be posted thereof.

3.4 Validity of Research Instruments

Best and Khan (1993;208) define data validity as that quality of a data-gathering instrument that enables it to measure what it is supposed to measure. Cooper and Schindler (2003;43) go on to elaborate on the content validity of a measuring instrument as the extent to which it offers an adequate coverage of the investigative questions guiding the study. According to Sattler (1982;29) validity is the “depth to which a test measures what it is supposed to measure and also the relevance with which inferences can be made on the basis of the test results.” In order to include validity in this research, the interview guides were pre-tested in a pilot study. The interview guides were then reinvented and adjusted so that they focus on relevant areas of the study.
3.5 Data Analysis Procedure

Blanceh et al (2006;58) notes, “The main objective of data analysis is to transform data into meaningful form in order to respond to original research questions”. Clavert (1991;185) argues, “It is quite difficult to discuss the different stages of qualitative data analysis because they are more fluid and less clearly delineated, than is usual in quantitative work”. In this study, data was analysed both qualitatively and quantitatively. Quantitative approaches are concerned with hard facts and theory testing. Neuman (2003;98) posits, “In quantitative analysis, observations are put into numerical form and manipulated in some ways based on their arithmetic properties. In this vein, researchers assemble, classify, tabulate, and summarise data so that some meaning is arrived at”. During data analysis, research findings undergo a process of skimming whereby the researcher will remain with information that is relevant for the research in question.

Data that was collected through interviews and documentary sources was subjected to qualitative data analysis techniques in this study. According to Neuman (2003;103) “in qualitative data analysis, data is presented in the form of words, pictures, descriptions or narratives and anecdotes”. This research involved analysing, discussing and examining data obtained through interviews and documentary analysis.

3.6 Ethical Considerations

Ethics according to Orb et al (2001) pertain to doing well and avoiding harm in research. Ethics also refer to the correct rules of conduct when carrying out research. It is the moral responsibility of a researcher to protect research participants from harm. Ethical considerations were taken into account in this research and these include:

- Informed consent which ensures that before a study is undertaken, the researcher sought for permission from participants to participate after explaining what the research is all about, that is, the purpose of the study, procedures involved, the length of time taken in participating, potential or foreseeable risks and benefits in participating so that they make an informed decision when they decide to take part in the study.
- The Confidentiality ethic which stipulates that the respondents and all the data obtained from them be kept anonymous unless they give their full consent. The researcher also ensured that no names were used in the research and in findings.
Withdrawal from the study where the researcher informed respondents from the very beginning that they had the right to quit participating in the study. Even at the end of the study a respondent had a final opportunity to withdraw the data they had provided for the research.

3.7 Summary

In this chapter, the researcher described the research design that was used to provide the ultimate strategy for answering the research questions for this study. It highlighted the tools and techniques that were employed in both primary and secondary data collection. A case study of Madagascar was used that helped in unearthing the effectiveness of the OPDS in the Southern African region. The next chapter will be preoccupied with data presentation and analysis it will also look into implications of the findings and their limitations and conclusions drawn from the investigation. Discussion of findings will also be conducted.
CHAPTER 4

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.0 Introduction

The chapter will be preoccupied with data presentation and analysis it will also look into implications of the findings and their limitations and conclusions drawn from the investigation. Discussion of findings will also be conducted. The chapter will also look at the envisaged roles of the SADC OPDS. The research tools that were employed include key informant interviews and document research, unearthed adequate information which helped the researcher to understand the roles that were played by the SADC OPDS in resolving the Madagascar crisis. The findings, thus, were found to be critical in assessing the sustainability of internationally negotiated peace settlements. The research used the findings from the proposed tools in line with the literature obtained to come up with academic positions on the various issues raised in the review of literature. The chapter is guided mainly by the objectives to this study.

4.1 Envisaged Role of SADC’s OPDS

Information obtained from desktop researches indicated that the heads of states and governments within the Southern African region under the auspices of the SADC developed the protocol, which established the OPDS at an Extraordinary Summit on 28 June 1996. Taylor (2014:34) wrote that the official communique establishing the protocol stipulated that the OPDS will be functional at summit, ministerial and technical levels independently of other SADC branches and it will include the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) of the Front Line States. As such, the OPDS took over the security mandate of the Front Line States (FLS) coalition, established in 1976 and dissolved in 1994, whose mandate was to secure the liberation of southern African countries and counter regional destabilization by apartheid South Africa. On 14 August 2001, the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security was adopted in Blantyre, Malawi.
The protocol committed SADC member states to regional arrangements dealing with close cooperation on matters of politics, defence and security (Muntschick, 2011;87).

The researcher also unearthed that the protocol capacitates the SADC bloc to take forcible military intervention in intra-state conflict to forestall and impede large-scale warring and to safeguard democracy by protecting the interests of a legitimate administration or government. It also permits SADC to take action in interstate conflict to prevent cross-border aggression or the threat of such aggression or disagreement over territorial boundaries. Muntschick (2011;87) wrote that the OPDS is governed by a troika, comprising of the current Chair, the out-going Chair and the in-coming Chair of SADC. The troika system facilitates consultation and leadership by the present, past and next SADC chairpersons. Muntschick (2011;87) further noted that its most active component is the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC). The OPDS is the institution of the SADC mandated to address issues such as political stability, conflict prevention, management and resolution, democracy and human rights as well as issues pertaining to peace and security.

Muntschick (2011;87) revealed that the general objective of the OPDS is to promote peace and security in the region. The specific objects of the organ are to promote the development of democratic institutions and practices within territories of state parties and to encourage the observance of human rights as established in the Charter and Conventions of the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN). The OPDS also aims at developing a collective security capacity including a Mutual Defence Pact for responding to external threats, and promoting peace-making and peace-keeping in order to achieve sustainable peace and security in the sub-region.

Information obtained the Centre for Conflict Resolution unanimously pointed out that the OPDS further seeks to promote political co-operation among states and the evolution of common political values and institutions. More importantly, under Article, 2 (f) the organ is mandated to consider enforcement action in accordance with international law and as a matter of last resort where peaceful means have failed (Muntschick, 2011;87).

The decision by SADC heads of states at their 2003 Summit to approve the establishment of the sub-region’s Mutual Defence Pact has been of fundamental significance. Its adoption significantly contributes towards the attainment of a security community. In its definition of
“destabilise”, the pact acknowledges the best interests of both the state and its people. Article 1(2) (c) of the pact for provides for the necessity for constitutional changes of government. It however recognises the inadequacy of the state by defining collective self-defence, stipulating that states can only achieve sustainable peace, stability and security in the sub-region through participation and working together. Cawthra (2013;12) also wrote that the pact also acknowledges the limits of sovereignty; it notes that the sovereign state is in the medium and long term contrary to the interdependence of states of the southern African region.

Through the research from the Southern African Research and Documentation Centre (SARDC) it was uncovered that despite the fact that the SADC Organ enshrines noble principles and values and is desirous of ensuring close co-operation on matters of politics, defence and security and the promotion of peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, conciliation, mediation and arbitration, such principles do not inspire much confidence. This is so for the reasons according to Murithi (2009;32) SADC has in practice often fallen short of successfully enforcing the observance of the values of human rights, rule of law, democratic national institutions and protection of the people from state sponsored violence by some of its predatory member states.

4.2 The Madagascar crisis

Information obtained from THE Centre for Conflict Resolution unanimously pointed out that civil protest and uprising against Madagascar’s President Ravalomanana made him loose the support of the security forces and lead to a military takeover of the civilian government. However, Cawthra (2010;13-17) noted that the armed forces quickly delegated power to Andry Rajoelina, who had become a successful politician during the past years and was the former President’s key political opponent, and designated him to become the legitimate leader of the country on the basis of popular support. After these development the deposed President Ravalomanana went into exile in South Africa.

Nevertheless, the unconstitutional seizure of power by Rajoelina and the overthrow of the legitimate government was regionally and internationally condemned as coup d’état and lead to great condemnation of the country (Cawthra, 2010;13-17). The respondent from the Zimbabwean Ministry of defense who requested anonymity said that with political turmoil and military rule in Madagascar, the country became not only internally instable but also a
threat to the SADC region due to its potentially destabilising effects (This situation then
demanded SADC intervention into the affairs of Madagascar.

However there was a point of confluence on all the interview and key informant research
subjects that the causes of the crises in Madagascar can be traced back to the post-independence
history of the country. According to Muntschick (2011;44) that post independence era witnessed
long periods of autocratic and authoritarian administrations, intermittent conflicts involving
military intervention in politics (in 1971, 1991 and 2001 to 2002) and a failure to establish
effective governance. The conditions of poverty, a poor standards of living, and marginalisation
were also revealed as factors, and this was seen to have dampened under Ravalomanana’s rule.

4.3 Conflict resolution and management strategies employed by SADC in Madagascar.

According to a respondent from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Centre for Conflict
Resolution, the SADC’s first move in reaction to the Madagascan crisis was the dispatch of a
preliminary taskforce for assessment purposes in February 2009. Muntschick (2011;45) also
wrote that on the 19th March 2009, the Troika of the OPDS met for an Extraordinary
Summit in Swaziland and stated that SADC “Condemns in the strongest terms the
unconstitutional actions that have led to the illegal ousting of the democratically elected
President of a SADC Member State” and thus “cannot recognize Mr. Rajoelina as President of
Madagascar. Muntschick (2011;45) went on to say that the Organ justified its position
particularly by referring to Rajoelina’s violation of “the core principles and Treaty of
SADC, the African Union and the United Nations Charters and threatened to impose
sanctions on the island state in order to restore law and order. However, Cawthra (2010:20)
wrote that the issue of the nature of sanctions was controversially discussed among SADC
members with Swaziland and Angola even considering a military intervention of the
organisation.

According to Cawthra (2010:20) SADC firstly opted for taking the path of injecting a diplomatic
punishment on Madagascar. On the 30th March 2009, an Extraordinary Summit of SADC Heads
of States met in Mbabane, Swaziland. The Summit confirmed the statement of the OPDS and
expressed the support for a reinstatement of the former Ravalomanana as the President of
Madagascar. Most significantly the summit also suspended Madagascar from all SADC’s structures and organs until the return of the Country to constitutional stability. The summit according to Cawthra (2010:20) also encouraged SADC states to stand united and firm against the illegal removal of the democratically elected Government of Madagascar.

With the suspension of Madagascar, SADC not only executed its most grave diplomatic sanction on a member state, but illustrated itself as a unitary actor with functioning institutions and a coordinated (foreign) policy on regional security matters (Taylor, 2014:78). Despite the diplomatic sanctions, SADC was keen to take a proactive role in the settlement of the Madagascan crisis and engaged in conflict management and mediation.

Taylor, (2014:78) wrote that an Extraordinary SADC Summit held in June 2009 paved the way and underscored the organisation’s self-conception as guarantor of regional security. It appointed the former President of Mozambique, Joaquim A Chissano, assisted by a high level team of mediators to lead and coordinate the all stakeholders dialogue in Madagascar and emphasised its desire to closely cooperate with the African Union, the UN and the rest of the international community.

At the same time, SADC dismissed any idea of military intervention (Cawthra, 2010: 20). According to Taylor(2014:78), the SADC regional security cooperation in the Madagascan crisis proved to be fairly successful, at least with regard to the central aspect of state-security. This is because SADC took a more leading role as a mediator although this finally took place within a broader AU-framework and thus was institutionally supported by an extra-regional actors. Despite that fact that the former President Ravalomanana did not return to office, the SADC helped in preventing a political and socio-economic chaos or civil war and the potentially destabilising regional effects of the Madagascar crisis. (Cawthra, 2010: 21-23)

According to the Ministry of foreign affairs official the SADC involvement in the Madagascar crises finally led to the establishment of a 15-month power-sharing agreement to conclude with a general election in 2010, which failed to occur; a subsequent agreement aimed for an early 2013 election, the first round was held on 25 October 2013 and the second on 20 December 2013.

Bekoe (2016;23) wrote that through SADC efforts constitutional governance was restored in January 2014, when Hery Rajaonarimampianina was named president following the 2013
election, which were deemed fair and transparent by the international community. These developments were unanimously saluted as successes that have put Madagascar back on the map. Bekoe (2016;23) also wrote that an Extra-ordinary Summit of SADC Heads of state and Government also lifted the suspension on Madagascar and invited the country to immediately resume its participation in all SADC activities and processes. In a communiqué issued yesterday, 30th January 2014, Summit congratulated Hery Rajaonarimampianina for his election as the First President of the Fourth Republic of Madagascar and welcomed his undertakings towards national reconciliation, and social and economic recovery made during his inauguration on 25 January 2014. Summit also welcomed the decision by the Peace and Security Council of the AU on 27 January, 2014 to lift the suspension on Madagascar. Summit commended Member States for standing firm on SADC principles against those who usurp power through violence and unconstitutional means; and by consistently supporting the Malagasy people throughout the difficult times brought about by the unconstitutional change of Government in the country. Furthermore, the Summit recognized and commended the support of the International Community in returning Madagascar to constitutional order. The year 2016, marked great progress in Madagascar when the country hosted the COMESA’s Heads of State Summit in October 2017, and the International Summit of Ia Francophonie in November 2016.

However, Makoa (2009;11) was of the view that the SADC conflict resolution mechanism as institutionalized in the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS), has narrowed than expanded the spread of democracy in Southern Africa and traded democracy for security of the region. This argument is nevertheless farfetched since insecurity is the greatest threat to the thriving of a democratic process and institutions.

4.4 An Assessment on whether the SADC OPDS was successful in resolving the conflict in Madagascar.

Findings by this researcher from Academics, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) and Southern African Research and Documentation Centre (SARDC) obtained that the SADC campaign in ending the Madagascar crises was overally successful despite a number of shortcomings. The researcher noted that while the conflict in Madagascar is, relatively, the shortest-running and perhaps least historically troubling among conflicts in Southern Africa, the relations between the UN, AU and SADC in its conflict resolution efforts
on the island had been tension-filled and problematic. Confusion and a lack of integrated leadership undermined the mediation process. After the coup in 2009 six mediators from different organisations were quickly sent to Madagascar and it was unclear who would take the lead (Taylor, 2014;78). The SADC communiqué issued on 12 July 2009 included collaboration with the AU, UN and International Organisation of la Francophonie (IOF), as well as ensuring that Malagasy ownership of the process, in the mandate of the SADC mediation effort in that country. This, however this collaboration was never actually achieved.

The researcher also observed from various sources that despite the establishment of a ‘contact group’ that first met 30 April 2009 and the mandate of AU Special Envoy, Ablassé Ouedraogo, to take the lead in overseeing the peacemaking efforts, the mediation of the Joint Mediation Team was dominated by SADC’s mediator, Joaquim Chissano. Taylor (2014;78) wrote that this lack of clarity on leadership undermined the seriousness of the peacemaking process among the parties.

The research also noted that the AU-UN relationship in 2009 was characterised by rivalry, which contributed to ending the UN’s mediation mandate in 2010, leaving African figures to take the lead. Taylor (2014;78) revealed that relations between the AU and SADC were also tense in the first year of mediations and the AU stepped back to let SADC take the lead in 2010. Rather than clearly leading, however, the next phase was characterised by a lack of unity and cooperation among the international community, including the appearance of political interventions by France, which maintained an active diplomatic role. Chissano’s leadership was no longer welcomed by all the parties in 2010 and France urged the South African President Jacob Zuma to take a leading role, while South Africa was still trying to support SADC leadership. The failure of the last international attempt created the impetus for a national, home-grown solution. However, as the national solution also failed to formulate a plan of action that is acceptable to all the parties, SADC was left to try its luck again and organised successful elections that restored political order and a semblance of democracy (Lunn, 2012;33). It is clear that this lack of coordination and diplomatic infighting complicated, rather than facilitated, the peace effort in Madagascar.

Similarly, Nathan (2013;206) has attributed SADC’s poor record of peacekeeping and peace-building to three major problems: an absence of common values among member states, which
militates against effective responses to crises and the development of mutual trust and common policies, the reluctance of member states to surrender a degree of sovereignty to multinational bodies, which is a sine qua non of regional integration; and the economic and administrative weakness of states, which affects all SADC’s forums and programmes. Nathan (2013;206) thus argues that the absence of common values, fear of losing sovereignty, and weak states tend to weaken SADC’s efforts in pursuit of an effective security community. He further asserts that contrasting visions of leadership and chasms in the definition of what it would mean to strengthen SADC as a vehicle for security collaboration and integration have fatally undermined the OPDS.

As Nathan (2013;197) sees it, the wide variances in the political landscape of SADC member states, where we have democratic regimes (Botswana, Mauritius, South Africa, Zambia Seychelles) and monarchs such as Swaziland demonstrates a lack of shared values and this undermines a collective sense of purpose and cohesiveness in SADC.

The research also noted that the SADC OPDS’s ability to strengthen weak states and contribute to the democratic transformation of authoritarian states is severely constrained because its capacity, orientation and mandate derive from these states. It was also discovered that the SADC organ cannot drive member countries’ transformation or attend to their domestic security problems, because it is a forum of states that will not permit it to do this arguing of concepts such as state sovereignty. Arguably, SADC can neither forge a genuine consensus on regional security and democratic governance, since major disputes relate to the primary political features as practiced within member states and are not susceptible to negotiation and compromise. Within this reality, the attainment of an effectively functioning security community in southern Africa becomes more problematic and remains a regional challenge. To achieve progress in regionalism Southern African countries will have to tackle one of the most important prerequisites for viable interstate cooperation, transparent and legitimate political rule.

Regional organisations like SADC which include unstable countries will in spite of instruments such as the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation not progress to the status of mature security communities, if they focus exclusively on interstate relations and rigidly adhere to the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs.
Ploch (2012:23) noted that with regard to SADC, there has been a palpable lack of capacity to support the mediation process. It has been proposed that a secretariat be established in Antananarivo to assist the transition, but perhaps more importantly, SADC’s rather ad hoc approach to mediation should be replaced by a more institutionalised approach. Certainly, the secretariat of SADC played relatively little role in the negotiations, which were left to political heads, with all the problems associated with this (for example, the personal position of the autocratic King Mswati III and his lack of credibility as an advocate for democracy). The establishment of a dedicated, professional, full time secretariat to assist in tracking crises, working out possible solutions and supporting mediation or negotiation efforts would be an important step forward. There was also little if no involvement of civil society in the process. A professional mediation unit could assist in involving civil society organisations, which could contribute a wide range of skills, expertise and credibility to the process, which was otherwise the preserve of the ‘club of heads of states’ and their ministers or senior officials. This, however, needs to be seen in the context of a generally weak civil society in Southern Africa, and it’s almost complete absence in Madagascar, apart from the churches.

Ploch (2012:23) recommended that SADC should also give some thought as to what role it could play in the future development of Madagascar and the consolidation of democracy in that country. Some respondents, indicated that the regional organisation could play a role in security sector reform and the consolidation of democracy. In this regard, the policy frameworks that SADC has developed, including the elections guidelines, will be important instruments.

It was also observed that SADC itself can play an important role in the supervision and monitoring of elections. Ploch (2012:23) also transcended that while the integrity and stability of the armed forces is fragile and important to maintain (on the basis of the ‘reconciliation’ agreement reached by the armed forces themselves) this does not obviate the need for a significant programme of security sector reform, in particular to ensure that democratic political control over the armed forces is secured. In this, SADC, or member states of SADC such as South Africa, Namibia or Mozambique, could also play an important role (there was considerable interest in training programmes put on in 2008 by the Southern African Defence and Security Management Network (SADSEM)).
Ploch (2012;23) disclosed that breaking the cycle of repeated constitutional crises and violations required the development and consolidation of much deeper forms of democracy, including the development of sustainable political parties based on principles of transparency and accountability, as well as the consolidation of civil society. With the notable exception of the Madagascar council of churches (especially the Archbishop of Antananarivo), civil society appears to have been unable to play any role in mediating or at least mitigating the crisis.

Many Malagasy people, at least based on the submissions of the informants in this study, regard the intervention of SADC and other external actors as violating Madagascar’s sovereignty. Ploch (2012;23), however, sovereignty has not been ‘God-given’ for some centuries: it has to be earned through support of the citizens through institutionalised democratic means, as well as the acceptance not only by other sovereign states but by multinational institutions. Pre-eminent amongst these is the UN, but subsidiary regional organisations – in this case the AU and SADC – play a vital role. If SADC is to find the strength to deal with endemic, cyclic, systemic crises like that in Madagascar, it really needs to improve its institutional, conceptual and mobilising potentials. Cawthra (2013;34) First it needs to actually bring Madagascar into the SADC community. Then there are thin lines between painting oneself into a corner, having the capacity to actually engage with realities on the ground and dealing with sometimes converging international interests, and maintaining and promoting common principles of good governance.

4.5 Conclusion

The SADC OPDS efforts to make mediation in Madagascar provided a test for the bloc’s capacity to use mediation as a constructive and non-violent tool of resolving conflicts. SADC embraces an attempt by the Southern African region in trying to protect mutual interests and objectives as provided for in Articles, of the regional body. Signatories of the regional body are given unforeseen opportunities by the SADC treaty and Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation Articles. The article has different core values including Peace, security, human rights, democracy and rule of law. Future mediation could be brought forth and informed by the Madagascar case. SADC made progress in its efforts of normalising the Madagascar crisis, especially in offering assistance in election holding framework crafting.
5.0 Introduction

The chapter will provide the summary of the whole research project. The chapter will also provide a conclusion based on the link between literature review and the key findings of the investigation. Recommendations based on the findings will also be provided in this chapter. The topic of the research read “The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Organ for Politics, Defense, and Security (OPDS) as a model in conflict resolution: A case study of Madagascar”. The objectives of the study were to; examine the genesis and evolvement of the Madagascar crisis from 2009, critically analyse the conflict resolution and management strategies employed by the SADC in its mediation efforts to solve the political impasse in Madagascar and to assess whether the SADC was successful in resolving the conflict in Madagascar.

5.1 Summary and Conclusions

Madagascar went through a period of political instability and uncertainty from 2009 to around 2014 following a coup d’état. Under the SADC democratic guidelines, the unconstitutional change of government in Madagascar called for regional intervention. SADC had to suspend Madagascar from taking part in any activities within the regional bloc. This suspension illustrated SADC as a unitary actor with functioning institutions and a coordinated foreign policy on regional security matters amongst its members. Despite the diplomatic sanctions, SADC indicated its unwavering desire to take a proactive role in the settlement of the Madagascan crisis and engaged in conflict management and mediation.

The research conducted concludes that despite the challenges that were involved in its conflict
resolution endeavour in Madagascar the SADC OPDS to a greater extent succeeded in bringing stability to Madagascar. The SADC efforts culminated to the return of the country to a more democratic path with the holding of elections in 2013. These elections marked the restoration of constitutional governance in Madagascar with Hery Rajaonarimampianina named President following the 2013 election, which were deemed fair and transparent by the international community. These developments were unanimously saluted as successes that have put Madagascar back on the map. An Extra-ordinary Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government also lifted the suspension on Madagascar and invited it to immediately resume its participation in all SADC activities and processes. The AU also lifted its suspension of Madagascar on 27 January 2014.

The research also gave a brief background of the SADC OPDS, which was launched on 28 June 1996 as a mechanism for resolving both inter, and intra-state conflicts in the Southern African Region. The research also revealed that the OPDS embodies two approaches to conflict resolution, namely force and persuasion. According to the research, the former suppresses conflict while the latter manages or transforms it by helping conflicting parties to achieve a negotiated settlement. It was however noted that the choice of any of these approaches is not a matter for the populations of member states but SADC heads of state. The SADC Protocol that gives legitimacy to the OPDS envisages no role for the national populations of member states in invoking or managing it.

The research further revealed that the OPDS also seeks to promote political co-operation among the member states of the SADC region and the evolution of common political values and institutions. Most significantly, under Article 2(f) the OPDS is mandated to consider enforcement action in accordance with international law and as a matter of last resort where peaceful means have failed.

During the research there was also a general consensus amongst most of those interviewed that the long-term causes of the conflict can be traced back to the post-independence history of Madagascar, which saw long periods of autocratic and authoritarian rule, periodic crises involving military intervention in politics (in 1971, 1991 and 2001/2) and a failure to establish a consolidated democracy or effective governance. The general conditions of poverty and
marginalisation were also identified as factors, and this was seen to have worsened under Ravalomanana’s rule.

The research also disclosed that there was an international dimension to the crisis. According to some scholars France has traditionally been the major international stakeholder in Madagascar. Ravalomanana was seen to be moving the country away from the French influence, advocating for stronger relations with the USA, South Africa, and the East. While no respondents believed that the French orchestrated the events of 17 March 2009, it is evident that the French government was quick to work with Rajoelina, and gave him some protection at crucial periods leading up to and immediately after the coup. Although France did not officially recognise Rajoelina’s de facto government and is publicly even-handed, most respondents (from all sides of the spectrum) believed that France has played a behind-the-scenes role in support of Rajoelina (Ravalomanana even labeling Rajoelina a ‘puppet’ of France). Therefore, a foreign hand was also observed in the issues involving the Madagascar crisis.

It was also noted that the 2009 Madagascar crisis negatively affected economic growth and development efforts and strained Madagascar’s relations with international donors. Foreign governments, including the U S, reacted to the coup by sanctioning the government in various ways such as via the suspension of membership in some multilateral bodies, restrictions on aid, personal sanctions on some individuals and removal of trade benefits.

5.2 Recommendations

It is also recommended that the process of breaking the repeated systems of constitutional crises and violations require the development and establishment of much more entrenched forms of democracy. These forms of democracy would include; the development of sustainable political parties based on principles of transparency and accountability, as well as the consolidation of civil society. With the exception of the Madagascar council of churches (especially the Archbishop of Antananarivo), civil society appears to have been unable to play any role in mediating or at least mitigating the crisis. The council of churches played an important role in Madagascar as the encouraged continued dialogue in the resolving of the crisis.
SADC has an important role to play in all these political transitions and transformations in the region. To achieve this, the regional body must strengthen and consolidate its institutional capacities in order to mobilise actors within the community’s member states that have undergone transformations from authoritarianism to democracy. There is an assumption that once a country has engaged in a democratic transition there is a linear process to consolidate perpetual democracy. However, the recent crisis in Madagascar demonstrated that this is untrue as the country continues to face similar issues of unconstitutional changes in the countries governance.

It is also important to note that many people in Madagascar, based on the submissions of the informants in this study, regard the intervention of SADC and other external actors as violating Madagascar’s sovereignty. The Malagasy people failed to justify the presence of foreigners in resolving their crisis. It is therefore recommended that if SADC is to find the strength to deal with endemic, cyclic, systemic crises like that in Madagascar, it must upgrade its institutional, conceptual and mobilising capacities. What was needed was to first create more diplomatic engagements with the government of Madagascar and also establishing diplomatic and trade relations between Madagascar and other SADC member states.

It is also recommended that SADC should desist from being simply a strategic diplomatic forum and must come up with mechanisms that make the decisions that it makes binding on member countries. This could be through reviving the now defunct SADC Tribunal that will adjudicate on issues in the region. There is also a need to fully capacitate the SADC Brigade so that it can move in to restore order and constitutional governance in the case of a coup or military takeover.

The researcher also recommends that SADC must be objective and transparent in how they select their mediators and avoid choosing mediators who are biased with any one of the conflicting parties. It is also recommended that SADC should also choose its mediator from a pool of experienced ones not just from former political leaders because they may have vested interest in the affairs of that country. The use of elderly statesmen is mostly viewed as important but, most of them cannot guarantee success. They have experience in negotiation as politicians and not as experienced mediators. Therefore, irrespective of how attractive and idealistic it appears to be, it is likely that the success is relatively low. Sir Ketumile Masire, deployed to mediate in the DRC
conflict on behalf of SADC, faced the same predicament. The former Mozambican President, Joaquim Alberto Chissano was the head of the SADC mediation team in Madagascar.

There is also a need for a coordinated and centrally controlled stability restoration efforts if more than one organisation is involved. For example, in the case of Madagascar the AU and other international actors were involved. This led to duplication of responsibilities amongst the various stakeholders.
REFERENCES


