BINDURA UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE EDUCATION

FACULTY OF SCIENCE

DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE



Evaluating the Security of Constrained IIoT Communication protocols

By

CHIGU SHANE TAKUNDA B223795B

SUPERVISOR: Mr. CHITUMA

A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE BACHELOR OF SCIENCE HONOURS DEGREE IN NETWORK ENGINEERING

APPROVAL FORM

The undersigned certify that they supervised B223795B CHIGU SHANE TAKUNDA dissertation entitled “Evaluating the Security of Constrained IIoT Communication protocols” submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for Bachelor of Science Honors’ Degree in Network Engineering.

Student: Shane T Chigu



……...

Date 23/06/2026……

Supervisor: Mr F Chituma



……..

Date 23/06/2026……

Chairperson: Mr Chaka



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

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my parents and family whose unwavering support and belief in me have been the bedrock of my academic journey. It is often the encouragement of loved ones that guides us toward cultivating success and resilience in our endeavors. I also dedicate this to the mentors and educators who have instilled in me a sense of discipline and the drive to keep moving forward. To the next generation of engineers, I share the wisdom that change and security only come to those who are not afraid to make a move to improve the world around them.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

My academic journey contained several individuals who helped pave the road to success. First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor Mr. Chituma for his mentorship throughout the research phase and the completion of this process. His exceptional feedback and guidance were instrumental in shaping this study, mirroring the gratitude expressed by researchers for their own praxis directors. I am profoundly appreciative of the faculty at Bindura University of Science and Engineering whose instruction and real world experience made this challenging program an incredible learning experience. I also wish to express gratitude to my family and friends who have encouraged me by demonstrating exemplary patience and support as I embarked on this educational endeavor. Their unwavering presence has been my biggest cheerleader throughout this process. Finally, I am grateful for the strength and guidance provided to me during this life, allowing me to plan my work and see it through to completion.

ABSTRACT

This study evaluated the security and performance implications of MQTT and CoAP communication protocols within constrained Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) environments. The research was motivated by the increasing adoption of lightweight IIoT communication systems and the growing cybersecurity threats affecting industrial infrastructures. A quantitative experimental research design was adopted using a virtualized IIoT testbed implemented on Ubuntu Linux with Docker containers. MQTT and CoAP protocols were tested under unsecured and hardened configurations using TLS, DTLS and AES encryption mechanisms. Simulated cyberattacks including eavesdropping, command injection and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks were executed to evaluate protocol vulnerabilities and resilience. Performance metrics such as throughput, latency, CPU utilization, memory usage and network overhead were collected and analyzed using Wireshark, Docker statistics and Python benchmarking tools. The findings revealed that both MQTT and CoAP are vulnerable when deployed without security hardening mechanisms. The implementation of TLS and DTLS significantly improved confidentiality, integrity and authentication but introduced measurable performance overhead. MQTT maintained more stable throughput under secured configurations while CoAP experienced higher latency and throughput degradation. The study concluded that secure IIoT communication requires balancing security mechanisms with resource efficiency and operational requirements. Recommendations were made for secure industrial protocol deployment and future IIoT cybersecurity research.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS Protocols & Standards

AES: Advanced Encryption Standard
AES-NI: Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions
AMQP: Advanced Message Queuing Protocol
CoAP: Constrained Application Protocol
DTLS: Datagram Transport Layer Security
HTTP: Hypertext Transfer Protocol
IETF: Internet Engineering Task Force
MQTT: Message Queuing Telemetry Transport
NIST: National Institute of Standards and Technology
OASIS: Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards
OSCORE: Object-Security for Constrained RESTful Environments
SSL: Secure Sockets Layer
TCP: Transmission Control Protocol
TLS: Transport Layer Security
UDP: User Datagram Protocol Systems & Architecture
CIA: Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability
DCS: Distributed Control System
DiD: Defense-in-Depth
HSM: Hardware Security Module
IIC: Industrial Internet Consortium
IIoT: Industrial Internet of Things
IoMT: Internet of Medical Things
IoT: Internet of Things
IT: Information Technology
KMS: Key Management Systems
OT: Operational Technology
PKI: Public Key Infrastructure
SCADA: Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
ZTA: Zero Trust Architecture

Network & Security Terminology

DDoS: Distributed Denial of Service
DoS: Denial of Service
IDS: Intrusion Detection System
IPS: Intrusion Prevention System
MitM: Man-in-the-Middle
QoS: Quality of Service
VPN: Virtual Private Network

Hardware

RAM: Random Access Memory
ROM: Read-Only Memory

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The dawn of Industry 4.0 has ushered in a new era of connectivity, characterized by the convergence of operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT). At the heart of this revolution lies the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), a transformative ecosystem where industrial machinery, sensors and control systems are interconnected to enable real time data exchange, predictive maintenance and autonomous decision making. As industries ranging from manufacturing to energy grids become increasingly reliant on these interconnected systems, the efficiency and reliability of data transmission become paramount. The number of connected IoT devices has seen exponential growth, increasing from 15.1 billion in 2020 to an estimated count exceeding 29 billion by 2030 , see Figure 1.1.

To navigate the resource constrained environments typical of IIoT where devices often operate with limited processing power, memory and battery life standard internet protocols are often too heavy. Consequently, specialized lightweight communication protocols have been developed to ensure seamless interaction. Among these, Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) and Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) have emerged as the de facto standards. MQTT operating on a publish subscribe model over TCP is favored for its bandwidth efficiency and reliability in unstable networks. Conversely CoAP which utilizes a request response model over UDP is designed to seamlessly translate HTTP for constrained nodes.



Figure 1.1:Connected IoT Devices September 2024 (Sinha, 2024)

However, the very features that make these protocols suitable for IIoT simplicity, low overhead and lightweight footprints often come at the cost of robust security. Originally designed for closed, trusted environments, both MQTT and CoAP frequently lack default implementations of strong encryption, mutual authentication and integrity checks. As IIoT networks expand beyond local intranets to cloud based integrations, this "security by obscurity" approach is no longer viable. The attack surface has widened, exposing critical infrastructure to threats such as Man in the Middle (MitM) attacks, denial of service (DoS) and unauthorized packet injection. Recent research estimates that up to 57% of connected IoT devices remain exposed to high severity cybersecurity risks due to outdated software, weak authentication and inadequate update mechanisms.

The criticality of securing these protocols cannot be overstated. Unlike consumer IoT where a breach might compromise personal data, vulnerabilities in IIoT can lead to catastrophic physical consequences including equipment damage, halted production lines and safety hazards for human operators. Threat actors can exploit these vulnerabilities to paralyze operational business flows or remotely control devices. Therefore, there is a pressing need to move beyond simple connectivity and address the resilience of the communication layer itself. This research project undertakes a comparative security analysis of MQTT and CoAP, evaluating their performance not just in terms of latency and throughput but specifically regarding their resilience under cyberattack. By systematically identifying vulnerabilities inherent in their standard implementations, this study aims to develop and validate hardening techniques such as the integration of Transport Layer Security (TLS), Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) and potentially Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) to manage cryptographic keys to mitigate risks. Ultimately, this research seeks to provide a comprehensive framework that balances the lightweight requirements of industrial devices with the stringent security demands of critical infrastructure.

1.2 Background to the study

The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) represents the evolution of traditional Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Distributed Control System (DCS) architectures. It has fundamentally revolutionized industrial processes by enabling a massive network of interconnected smart devices including sensors, actuators, controllers and edge computing units to communicate and automate operations. This interconnectivity provides unprecedented real time data for monitoring, decision making and predictive maintenance, significantly improving overall operational efficiency and asset utilization across sectors like manufacturing, energy and logistics.

The architecture of IIoT is generally conceptualized as a layered infrastructure often described by the Industrial Internet Consortium (IIC) as a three-tier standard design:

i. Edge Tier: This tier is responsible for data collection via a variety of sensors. These sensors record data from the industrial environment such as temperature, humidity, pressure and mechanical vibrations. The edge tier connects the physical devices to the network.

ii. Platform Tier: Functioning as a gateway, this tier facilitates communication, provides processing operations and directs desired actions. It often performs local data preprocessing before sending data to the enterprise tier.

iii. Enterprise Tier: This tier serves as the central hub for domain specific applications, decision support systems and user interfaces. It receives and processes information from the edge and platform tiers.



Figure 1.2: Reference architecture of the IIoT proposed by IIC

A defining characteristic of these IIoT environments is the prevalence of resource constrained devices. These devices often operate with severely limited processing power, minimal memory and finite energy supplies . For example, many IIoT devices lack the processing capacity, memory and storage found in conventional IT systems making them vulnerable to resource depletion. Consequently, they cannot support the overhead associated with traditional, heavier network protocols like the standard HTTP/TCP stack. This limitation created a necessity for lightweight communication protocols those designed to operate efficiently under extreme resource scarcity.

1.2.1 MQTT and CoAP as IIoT Communication Standards

MQTT initially developed by IBM and now an OASIS standard, MQTT operates on a publish subscribe messaging model over TCP/IP. It relies on a central entity called a broker to manage

message routing. MQTT is highly valued for its simplicity, low bandwidth consumption and Quality of Service (QoS) levels making it ideal for large scale telemetry and data transmission from thousands of field sensors to central control points. It is particularly noted for its ability to function in high latency environments though it lacks specific built in security standards for data in transit. CoAP Standardized by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), CoAP is a RESTful protocol optimized for constrained nodes and networks. It leverages UDP (User Datagram Protocol) for communication, providing a simple request response model that can easily be translated to and from HTTP. Its design allows it to function effectively in lossy networks and with minimal overhead making it a strong contender for device to device communication. CoAP features a compact 4-byte header and supports asynchronous interactions which significantly reduces power consumption compared to HTTP.



Figure 1.2.1: Command protocol for CoAP model in an IoT-enabled mobile robotic system.

1.2.2 The Security Imperative

Despite their efficiency advantages, both MQTT and CoAP have inherent security vulnerabilities rooted in their minimalist design philosophy. To preserve their lightweight nature and maximize efficiency, initial implementations often deliberately exclude crucial built in security features such as encryption, comprehensive authentication and message integrity checking. The rapid expansion of IIoT means these traditionally isolated operational networks are now frequently connected to the public internet or corporate IT networks. This exposure dramatically increases the attack surface.

The absence of robust, native security exposes critical industrial systems to sophisticated cyber attacks including eavesdropping , data tampering , spoofing and DoS attacks . For instance, cybersecurity attacks on IoT networks surged by 400% in 2023 compared to the previous year. High profile incidents such as the Verkada breach which exposed 150000 camera feeds, demonstrate the vulnerability of cloud managed IoT systems. Therefore, ensuring robust security measures for MQTT and CoAP is not merely a recommendation but an essential requirement to safeguard critical IIoT communications. This necessity forms the context for the current study which seeks to evaluate the specific security strengths and weaknesses of these two protocols and

explore practical hardening techniques that can mitigate risks and enhance the overall security posture of IIoT systems without compromising their lightweight nature.

1.3 Problem Statement

A significant and documented challenge in modern industrial environments is the vulnerability arising from the misconfiguration and inherent security gaps in the widely adopted lightweight IIoT communication protocols which are MQTT and CoAP. This lack of robust, standardized security implementation leaves constrained field devices susceptible to common, easily executed attacks such as eavesdropping, unauthorized command injection and Denial of Service posing a severe measurable risk to operational continuity, data integrity and system availability.

The problem is exacerbated by the fact that nearly 98% of IoT network traffic is often unencrypted, leaving sensitive industrial data exposed. Furthermore, up to 57% of connected devices remain exposed to high severity risks due to outdated firmware and weak credentials. The complexity and interconnectivity of IIoT devices mean that a single compromised device can expose the broader network to risk, potentially affecting all connected systems. Without a unified and hardened security standard for these protocols, industries face the constant threat of operational paralysis and data theft.

1.4 Research objectives

i. Conduct a practical security analysis of both MQTT and CoAP implementations operating in unsecured environments by executing three core attack scenarios which are eavesdropping, unauthorized command injection and DoS.

ii. Implement security hardening measures for both protocols, specifically configuring and enforcing TLS (for MQTT) and DTLS (for CoAP) using X.509 certificate authentication. Additionally explore the integration of AES based cipher suites within TLS and DTLS ensure high confidentiality.

iii. Re-execute the three attack scenarios against the hardened configurations to quantitatively verify the effectiveness of AES encrypted TLS or DTLS channels against identified threats.
iv. Quantitatively measure and compare the latency, throughput and resource usage introduced by the security hardening (TLS/DTLS) against the clear text implementations under controlled traffic loads. This includes analyzing the trade-off between security and energy consumption which is critical for edge devices.

v. Based on the results, formulate a set of best practice recommendations for deploying and securing MQTT and CoAP in resource constrained IIoT ecosystems.

1.5 Research questions

i. What specific vulnerabilities do MQTT and CoAP exhibit when exposed to eavesdropping, unauthorized command injection and DoS attacks in clear text configurations within an IIoT environment?

ii. How can TLS and DTLS be effectively implemented with X.509 certificate authentication in constrained IIoT environments for MQTT and CoAP and what role does AES encryption play in this architecture?
iii. To what extent do TLS and DTLS mitigate the risks of eavesdropping, command injection and DoS attacks on these protocols compared to their unsecured baselines?
iv. What are the performance implications of implementing TLS or DTLS in terms of latency, throughput and resource usage for IIoT devices, particularly regarding the overhead of handshake protocols?
v. Based on security and performance results, what best practices can be recommended for securely deploying MQTT and CoAP in industrial IoT systems ?

1.6 Justification / Significance of the study

The adoption of IIoT technologies has introduced immense benefits in terms of automation, efficiency and real time analytics across industrial sectors. However, as more devices connect and communicate over networks, ensuring the security of data in transit becomes critically important. Protocols like MQTT and CoAP are widely used in IIoT due to their lightweight nature, yet they lack strong default security features making them vulnerable to common attacks such as eavesdropping, unauthorized access and DoS, respectively Alaba et al. (2017) and Hossain et al.(2019). The proliferation of these devices has created a wide ranging attack surface where vulnerabilities such as weak authentication and legacy software are rampant.

The significance of this study lies in addressing this security performance trade off. While industry standards recommend using TLS and DTLS to secure MQTT and CoAP respectively Raza et al. (2017), there is limited empirical research on how effective these measures are in mitigating real world attacks and what performance cost they introduce especially on resource constrained IIoT devices. Furthermore, data breaches in industrial sectors can cause substantial financial losses, intellectual property theft and operational disruptions. This research provides value in several key areas which includes demonstrates how unsecured MQTT and CoAP are affected by targeted attacks in real world conditions. Validates the effectiveness of TLS/DTLS, X.509 authentication and potentially AES encryption against these threats. AES is specifically noted for its resistance to classical cryptanalysis making it a gold standard for data protection. Quantifies the impact of security on latency, throughput and CPU usage critical factors in IIoT deployments where real time requirements are stringent. Offers a comparative view of MQTT vs CoAP in both secured and unsecured modes, aiding in the selection of appropriate protocols for specific industrial applications. Delivers evidence based recommendations for engineers, developers and organizations deploying IIoT systems, helping to establish unified security standards.

Ultimately, this study contributes to closing a gap between security best practices and practical deployment, helping to build more resilient and secure IIoT infrastructures capable of withstanding the evolving threat landscape.

1.7 Assumptions of the study

The selected attack types eavesdropping, unauthorized command injection and DoS are assumed to be representative of the most common and critical threats to unsecured MQTT and CoAP implementations in IIoT environments. It is assumed that the MQTT and CoAP implementations used in the study conform to their respective protocol standards and are comparable to those used in actual IIoT deployments. The TLS and DTLS implementations used follow best practice configurations and the use of X.509 certificates are assumed to reflect a typical secure deployment in industrial contexts. Devices used for testing are assumed to reflect the computational and memory limitations commonly found in IIoT edge devices. IoT devices often lack the processing capacity and memory found in conventional IT systems. The testing environment is assumed to simulate typical IIoT network conditions, although real world deployments may experience more variability (for example, interference and device diversity). It is assumed that no other security mechanisms (for example, firewalls, IDS or IPS, VPNs) are active during testing, to isolate the performance and effectiveness of TLS/DTLS alone.

1.8 Limitations / Challenges of the study

The study focuses on three core attack types eavesdropping, unauthorized command injection and DoS which do not cover the full spectrum of potential security threats in IIoT systems. Advanced threats like side channel attacks and quantum computing threats are beyond the immediate empirical scope though acknowledged. The experiments are conducted in controlled laboratory settings that may not fully replicate the complexities and unpredictability of real world IIoT deployments such as network interference, device heterogeneity and physical environmental factors. Although the study aims to use resource constrained devices representative of IIoT edge nodes, variations in hardware capabilities across different industrial setups could affect the generalizability of the performance results. For instance, specific hardware acceleration for AES (AES NI) can significantly alter performance outcomes. Different MQTT and CoAP implementations may have unique features. The findings of this study may not apply universally to all variants of these protocols. Implementing TLS and DTLS with X.509 certificate based authentication can be complex and require proper management infrastructure such as Key Management Systems (KMS) or Hardware Security Modules (HSM) which are assumed but not addressed in depth in this research. The study concentrates on TLS/DTLS hardening and does not evaluate other complementary security mechanisms such as application layer encryption or network segmentation.

1.9 Scope / Delimitations of the research

The research focuses exclusively on two lightweight communication protocols MQTT and CoAP which are widely used in IIoT environments. Other protocols like AMQP which is also prevalent in distributed networks are not considered. The study examines security hardening specifically through the implementation of TLS for MQTT and DTLS for CoAP, using X.509 certificate-based authentication. Reference to AES encryption is included as the underlying cipher. Other security approaches such as token based authentication or blockchain integration are outside the scope.

The evaluation centers on three core attack scenarios which includes eavesdropping, unauthorized command injection and denial of service attacks, chosen for their prevalence and impact on IIoT communications. The performance analysis measures latency, throughput and CPU overhead under controlled traffic loads in a laboratory environment. Testing is performed in a controlled and simulated IIoT network environment using resource constrained devices that represent typical edge nodes. While efforts are made to ensure practical relevance, results may not fully extrapolate to every IIoT deployment due to variability in hardware, network conditions and application requirements.

1.10 Definition of terms

i. Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT): Refers to the integration of industrial machinery, sensors, actuators and control systems connected through the internet or private networks. IIoT enables enhanced automation, data collection and real time analytics in industries such as manufacturing, energy, transportation and healthcare, improving operational efficiency and decision making.

ii. MQTT (Message Queuing Telemetry Transport): A lightweight, publish/subscribe messaging protocol designed for constrained devices and unreliable networks. MQTT operates over TCP/IP and is characterized by low bandwidth consumption, minimal packet overhead and simple implementation making it suitable for IIoT applications where reliable message delivery is essential.

iii. CoAP (Constrained Application Protocol): A specialized web transfer protocol designed for use in resource constrained environments such as low power sensors and actuators. CoAP runs over UDP, supports RESTful interactions similar to HTTP and includes features such as multicast support and low overhead making it suitable for IIoT applications where bandwidth and power are limited.

iv. TLS (Transport Layer Security): A widely used cryptographic protocol that provides privacy, data integrity and authentication between communicating applications. TLS secures TCP based protocols by encrypting data and authenticating parties using certificates, helping prevent eavesdropping, tampering and message forgery.

v. DTLS (Datagram Transport Layer Security): A variant of TLS designed specifically for securing datagram protocols like UDP which lack the reliability guarantees of TCP. DTLS provides equivalent security properties such as confidentiality, integrity and authentication while accommodating packet loss and reordering common in UDP communication.

vi. AES (Advanced Encryption Standard): A symmetric key block cipher established by NIST in 2001. It processes data in 128-bit blocks using keys of 128, 192 or 256 bits. It is the de facto standard for securing digital communications and file systems due to its resistance to classical cryptanalysis.

vii. Hardware Security Module (HSM): A physical computing device that safeguards and manages digital keys for strong authentication and provides crypto processing. These

modules are resistant to tampering and are critical for secure key management in IIoT.
viii. X.509 Certificate: A digital certificate format that uses public key infrastructure (PKI) standards to bind a public key with the identity of an entity (such as a device or server). X.509 certificates are used in TLS/DTLS to authenticate communicating parties and establish encrypted connections.

ix. Eavesdropping: The passive interception and monitoring of network communication by unauthorized actors to capture sensitive information such as passwords, commands or data payloads without altering the transmission.

x. Unauthorized Command Injection: A type of cyber-attack where an adversary inserts malicious commands into the communication stream, causing devices to execute unintended actions. This can lead to unauthorized control, data corruption or operational disruption.

xi. Denial of Service (DoS): An attack aimed at overwhelming a network or system to make it unavailable for legitimate users. In IIoT, DoS attacks can disrupt critical industrial operations by exhausting device resources or network bandwidth.

xii. Latency: The time delay experienced during the transmission of data packets from source to destination often measured in milliseconds. Low latency is crucial in IIoT for real time control and monitoring.

xiii. Throughput: The rate at which data is successfully transmitted over a network channel, typically measured in bits per second (bps). High throughput ensures timely delivery of large volumes of data in industrial applications.

xiv. CPU Overhead: The additional computational load or processing time consumed by a device's central processing unit (CPU) due to executing security protocols, encryption/decryption or other communication tasks.

1.11 Summary

This chapter has laid the foundational framework for the research by introducing the study's focus on the comparative security analysis and hardening of lightweight IIoT communication protocols specifically MQTT and CoAP. It began with an overview of the significance of securing IIoT communications and highlighted the vulnerabilities present in unsecured protocol implementations. The background section contextualized the growing adoption of IIoT and the reliance on MQTT and CoAP due to their suitability for resource constrained environments. It also underscored the inherent security challenges these protocols face such as the lack of default encryption. The Statement of the Problem clearly defined the gap between existing protocol vulnerabilities and the limited research on effective security hardening and its performance impact in IIoT settings. From this, the research objectives were outlined to guide a systematic assessment of vulnerabilities, implementation of TLS or DTLS hardening utilizing AES encryption, evaluation of mitigation effectiveness, performance comparison and formulation of deployment recommendations. Corresponding research questions and hypotheses were developed to focus the inquiry on practical security and performance outcomes. The chapter also detailed the justification and significance of the study, emphasizing its potential contribution to securing IIoT environments

against rising threats. Furthermore, key assumptions, limitations and scope were delineated to clarify the research boundaries and context, ensuring focus and feasibility. Finally, important technical terms were defined to facilitate clarity and understanding throughout the study. Overall, this chapter establishes the rationale, objectives and framework necessary for the subsequent chapters which will delve deeper into the methodology, experimentation, analysis and conclusions related to securing MQTT and CoAP protocols in IIoT ecosystems.

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The increasing deployment of IIoT systems has brought about notable advancements in real time monitoring, predictive maintenance and automation within industrial environments. Central to these systems are lightweight communication protocols such as MQTT and CoAP, both of which are designed to operate efficiently in resource constrained environments. However, these protocols also introduce serious security vulnerabilities, particularly when deployed without robust protection mechanisms. As IIoT systems become more integrated into critical infrastructure, the security of their communication channels becomes paramount according to Sfar et al. (2018). The IIoT market is predicted to reach $408.2 billion by 2031, a growth that underscores the scale of the infrastructure requiring protection. Recent studies by Khan et al. (2022) and Alsharif et al. (2023) further emphasizes that the rapid expansion of IIoT infrastructure has increased the attack surface of industrial systems, particularly in sectors relying on cloud integrated lightweight communication protocols.

This chapter presents a critical review of existing theoretical and empirical literature related to IIoT communication protocols with a focus on MQTT and CoAP. The discussion draws from current academic journals and authoritative sources to explore how these protocols function, their comparative security strengths and weaknesses and existing approaches to protocol hardening. Scholars such as Granjal et al. (2015) and Sicari et al. (2015) have highlighted the vulnerabilities inherent in IIoT networks, especially due to their reliance on lightweight protocols that often lack built in encryption, authentication and resilience mechanisms. Therefore, understanding the security posture of these protocols is essential in designing resilient IIoT frameworks.

The literature review is organized thematically. It begins with an overview of relevant theories underpinning cybersecurity in IIoT systems. It then proceeds to analyze comparative studies on MQTT and CoAP protocols, followed by empirical findings on attacks targeting these protocols. It also reviews hardening strategies including encryption models like the AES, access control frameworks using HSMs and protocol layer modifications. Each section identifies gaps in existing research such as limited real time testing environments or lack of industry specific security benchmarks and discusses how the current study seeks to address them. The review aims to establish a conceptual foundation and justification for the comparative analysis conducted in this study, leading into subsequent chapters that empirically examine the security performance of MQTT and CoAP within an IIoT context.

2.2 Theoretical framework: Cybersecurity and communication protocols in IIoT

This study is guided by key theoretical perspectives that inform the security analysis of IIoT communication protocols. Chief among these is the CIA Triad (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability) a foundational model in cybersecurity. As highlighted by Stallings (2017), this triad provides a structured approach to evaluating the security of digital communication systems.

Confidentiality ensures that data is accessible only to authorized parties which is often achieved through symmetric key encryption like AES. Integrity maintains data accuracy and consistency while availability ensures that services are accessible when needed. In the context of IIoT, this model serves as a lens for assessing how MQTT and CoAP handle threats such as data interception, message tampering and DoS.



Figure 2.2:The CIA Triad (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) diagram applied to IIoT security

Additionally, the Defense in Depth (DiD) model supports this research by advocating for layered security across IIoT networks. According to Zuech et al. (2015), relying on a single security control is insufficient in dynamic environments like IIoT. Instead, multiple overlapping measures including encryption, intrusion detection and secure authentication should be applied to ensure resilience. This aligns with the use of HSMs which provide a hardware root of trust, ensuring keys are never exposed even if the application layer is compromised.

Another relevant theory is the Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) which challenges traditional perimeter based security models. ZTA assumes that no device or user internal or external should be automatically trusted. This is particularly relevant for IIoT devices which often operate over public or semi trusted networks. Rose et al. (2020) note that Zero Trust models are crucial in mitigating insider threats and lateral attacks in interconnected systems. Implementing ZTA requires strict identity verification such as X.509 certificates and mutual authentication for every communication session. Recent cybersecurity framework proposed by NIST emphasize that Zero Trust principles are increasingly necessary in IIoT systems due to the growth of lateral movement attacks, insecure edge devices and distributed industrial architecture.

Together these frameworks CIA Triad, Defense in Depth and Zero Trust form the theoretical basis for assessing the security posture of MQTT and CoAP protocols. They guide the evaluation of how

these protocols perform in real world IIoT deployments and help structure recommendations for their hardening.

2.3 Empirical and theoretical literature review

2.3.1 Security vulnerabilities in IIoT communication protocols

Research shows that lightweight protocols designed for constrained devices often lack robust security features. Hummen et al. (2013) note that MQTT though efficient was not originally designed with strong security, its default settings do not mandate encryption or authentication, exposing systems to eavesdropping and impersonation attacks. Similarly, Shelby et al. (2014) describe CoAP as vulnerable to spoofing and replay attacks due to its reliance on UDP and minimal inherent session security. The vulnerability of these devices is compounded by their hardware constraints, many lack the processing capacity for conventional IT security systems. Rahman et al. (2021) further observed that many industrial IoT deployments continue to rely on insecure default configurations and weak authentication mechanisms making MQTT brokers and CoAP endpoints frequent targets for ransomware campaigns and unauthorized remote access attacks.

In empirical studies, Alrawais et al. (2017) observed real world attacks on MQTT brokers in industrial testbeds where weak authentication allowed unauthorized devices to publish false sensor data leading to incorrect decisions and safety failures. Likewise, Selander et al. (2013) found CoAP deployments in constrained environments susceptible to man in the middle attacks when DTLS was not implemented. Furthermore, specific incidents like the Mirai botnet attack in 2016 exploited default credentials on IoT devices to launch massive DDoS attacks, highlighting the systemic fragility of these networks. More recent studies by Alghamdi et al. (2022) reveal that attackers increasingly exploit misconfigured TLS implementations, exposed ports and poorly managed certificates rather than protocol weaknesses alone.

2.3.1.1 Application to this research

These findings provide baseline evidence that both protocols while lightweight and resource efficient, introduce distinct security risks that must be quantified and compared. They justify the need for this study's comparative analysis, focusing specifically on MQTT vs CoAP under controlled attack scenarios.

2.3.1.2 Gap & intervention insight

Most literature tests vulnerabilities in theoretical or simulated environments rather than industrial testbeds that reflect real IIoT constraints. This study will address the gap by employing an IIoT test environment to evaluate protocol hardening under real deployment constraints. Interventions include incorporating secure authentication layers (for example, Mutual TLS) and intrusion detection frameworks tailored to resource limited nodes.

2.3.2 Performance and resource constraints

Lightweight protocols are favored because of limited CPU, memory and power in IIoT devices. However, this resource focus affects security as demonstrated by Taher et al. (2017) in their analysis of MQTT performance and found that security measures like TLS can increase packet overhead, leading to latency and resource exhaustion in battery powered devices. Similarly, Shelby et al. (2014) recorded that CoAP with DTLS adds significant handshake overhead compared to unauthenticated UDP which will impacting throughput.

Comparative studies have shown that while CoAP generally has lower latency and is efficient for constrained devices, it has limited support compared to MQTT in non-constrained networks. Conversely, MQTT is efficient for dynamic environments but requires a broker which can introduce delays. Implementing security features like AES encryption can also introduce latency, however hardware accelerated AES NI has been shown to minimize this overhead significantly. Understanding these trade-offs is crucial because computing costs and data transfer fees are significant components of IoT cloud costs. Recent experimental studies have shown that lightweight cryptographic optimization techniques such as TLS session resumption and energy aware encryption algorithms can significantly reduce latency and computational overhead in constrained IIoT devices. Emerging research also explores post quantum lightweight cryptography for IIoT environments, aiming to develop encryption schemes resilient against future quantum computing threats while maintaining low resource consumption.

2.3.2.1 Application to this research

These studies help frame the trade-off perspective, specifically that security hardening should not render protocols unusable due to overhead. This research will extend these findings by comparing the security performance trade-off between hardened MQTT and hardened CoAP using metrics like latency, throughput and power consumption.

2.3.2.2 Gap & intervention insight

While previous studies measure overhead in isolated tests, there is limited comparative research that simultaneously evaluates performance under security load and attack conditions (for example, DoS). Interventions proposed include adaptive cipher negotiation and session management strategies that balance security strength against resource limitations.

2.3.3 Protocol hardening techniques

Several authors have examined methods to fortify IIoT communication. Hussain et al. (2019) propose the use of lightweight encryption schemes and optimized TLS profiles to secure MQTT traffic without excessive overhead. For CoAP, Bormann et al. (2016) recommend OSCORE (Object-Security for Constrained RESTful Environments), a protocol agnostic end to end encryption layer that protects messages without full DTLS session overhead.

Hardware hardening is another critical avenue. HSMs act as trust anchors, providing tamper resistant environments for cryptographic operations. HSMs ensure that keys never leave the secure boundary of the device, protecting against physical and side channel attacks. Research indicates that HSM based solutions offer significantly higher security assurance compared to software only cryptographic implementations. Recent studies additionally recommend the integration of Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs), secure boot mechanisms and Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) to strengthen hardware rooted trust in industrial IoT deployments. Additionally, the use of AES is widely recommended for robust confidentiality. AES 128 is often sufficient for constrained devices while AES-256 provides long term protection against future quantum threats.

2.3.3.1 Application to this research

This body of work informs the design of hardening strategies in this study, by integrating robust encryption (AES) and potentially HSM concepts with TLS/DTLS, the research will evaluate which combination offers the best security-performance profile.

2.3.3.2 Gap & intervention insight

Most existing frameworks are conceptual or simulation based. There is a lack of empirical validation in industrial testbeds with real IIoT devices, a gap this research aims to fill. Interventions include deploying a testbed with heterogeneous nodes (simulating typical industrial sensors/actuators) and evaluating hardening techniques under controlled threats.

2.3.4 Comparative analyses of MQTT and CoAP

Several comparative studies exist but they seldom prioritize security posture as the main benchmark. For instance, Bhimani & Babar (2019) compare MQTT and CoAP primarily on quality of service and overhead, concluding MQTT is superior for reliability while CoAP is leaner. Raza et al. (2017) note CoAP's REST style design fits constrained networks while MQTT's publish/subscribe model suits loosely connected deployments.

Recent studies have quantified these differences in various scenarios. For example, in smart city applications, MQTT has been shown to be four times faster than HTTP regarding message latency and uses significantly less CPU while AMQP and MQTT often perform similarly in terms of CPU usage. Another study on mobile robotic systems found that CoAP provided faster response times and less power consumption compared to MQTT and HTTP. However, Rahman et al. (2020) and Suryotrisongko & Kim (2021) extend comparisons into security, showing that both protocols require significant hardening beyond default configurations. Verma et al. (2022) and Chukwu et al. (2023) further demonstrate that protocol performance is highly dependent on deployment context with MQTT achieving superior scalability in cloud integrated environments while CoAP remains more efficient for edge level constrained communication.

S. No.	Parameters	HTTP		MQTT		CoAP	
		Advantage	Disadvantage	Advantage	Disadvantage	Advantage	Disadvantage
1.	Auto configuration delay	Supported across different platforms and devices. HTTP has simple auto-configuration process.	HTTP is a heavier protocol with more overhead, which can lead to slower auto-configuration.	MQTT is lightweight and efficient protocols with limited bandwidth and high latency. It allows for quick auto-configuration.	MQTT requires a broker to manage communications, and the setup of this broker takes potential delays.	CoAP is used for constrained devices and networks. It has minimal auto-configuration delay and faster initial setup.	CoAP has limited support compared to HTTP and MQTT, communication delay in auto-configuration.
2.	Detection delay during movement	Robust and reliable for static web applications.	High detection delay due to protocol overhead.	Quick detection and efficient in dynamic environments.	Dependent on broker availability and performance.	Very low detection delay for data communication	More delay on non-constrained networks.
3.	Link setup delay	Simple and well-established setup process.	Slower due to heavier protocol.	Fast setup with low overhead.	Requires broker for setup, adding complexity.	Minimum setup delay compared to other protocols.	Limited support of protocol.
4.	Location update delay	Updates in known environments.	High delay due to heavier protocol.	Efficient updates, low bandwidth use.	Broker dependency can introduce delays.	Low delay, efficient for constrained devices.	Limited support and application
5.	IP connectivity delay	Universally supported	Higher delay due to extensive protocol.	Efficient in low bandwidth	Broker dependent and increase delay.	low connectivity delay	Limited support for connectivity.
6.	Wireless-link bandwidth	Perform in high bandwidth environments.	High bandwidth consumption.	Use Low bandwidth.	Performance can degrade with high message rates.	Use minimum bandwidth.	Limited to low bandwidth applications.
7	Wireless-link delay	Performs in consistent environments.	High delay due to protocol size	Low delay, for real-time applications	Broker dependence can add delay.	Very low delay	Less effective in high-speed networks.
8	Control packet size	HTTP has large packet size.	Large packet size increases overhead.	Small packet size, efficient for constrained networks.	Limited by broker and bandwidth	Very small packet size for constrained devices.	Limited support and application flexibility.

Table 2.3.4:Summary of advantages and disadvantages of different IoT communication protocols.

2.3.4.1 Application to this research

These comparative insights help frame the study's central analysis rather than assuming one protocol is better, the research will define security benchmarks (CIA triad metrics) and measure where each protocol succeeds or fails.

2.3.4.2 Gap & intervention insight

A consistent gap is the absence of standardized benchmarks across studies. This research proposes a unified evaluation framework that measures security (confidentiality, integrity and availability) and performance under identical conditions which will allow rigorous apples to apples comparison. Recent literature reviews continue to identify a shortage of empirical benchmark datasets and standardized industrial testing environments for evaluating secured IIoT communication protocols under realistic adversarial conditions.

2.4 Discussion of gaps leading to the study

While substantial literature has explored the functionality and efficiency of lightweight IIoT communication protocols such as MQTT and CoAP, a closer analysis reveals persistent gaps particularly in relation to security hardening in real world industrial environments. Many existing studies including those by Hummen et al. (2013) and Shelby et al. (2014), acknowledge security weaknesses in these protocols but stop short of conducting comprehensive comparative evaluations under realistic threat models. Most research is limited to simulations or small-scale environments that fail to reflect the complex constraints and heterogeneity found in actual IIoT deployments.

Furthermore, although efforts have been made to propose security enhancements such as OSCORE for CoAP (Bormann et al., 2016) or TLS extensions for MQTT (Hussain et al., 2019), there is limited empirical evidence on how these hardening techniques impact performance metrics like latency, packet loss or energy consumption when implemented on constrained IIoT devices. Additionally, there is a lack of unified frameworks to evaluate the security performance trade-offs across protocols under uniform testing conditions.

This study addresses these gaps by providing a systematic and comparative security analysis of MQTT and CoAP within a controlled industrial testbed. It evaluates how well each protocol performs when subjected to selected security hardening techniques and simulated attack scenarios. The research also proposes and tests tailored interventions such as adaptive authentication layers and lightweight encryption schemes to assess their effectiveness in balancing security with IIoT resource constraints. Through this approach, the study contributes empirical insights that can inform secure protocol deployment strategies for real world IIoT systems.

2.5 Comparative studies on MQTT and CoAP protocols in IIoT environments

Multiple scholars have examined MQTT and CoAP, the two most commonly used lightweight communication protocols in IIoT. Bandyopadhyay & Sen (2011) note that both protocols are designed for constrained devices and networks but their architectures differ significantly MQTT being broker based and relying on TCP while CoAP uses a request/response model over UDP. These architectural differences have implications for performance, scalability and security.

Thangavel et al. (2014) conducted one of the earliest empirical comparisons, finding that CoAP outperformed MQTT in latency due to its use of UDP but MQTT had more reliable delivery mechanisms. Similarly, Mekki et al. (2019) highlight that MQTT offers better QoS features and is well suited for high reliability environments, whereas CoAP's stateless nature makes it ideal for energy constrained devices. Studies evaluating protocols for smart farming found that MQTT generally exhibited lower latency than CoAP in specific high reliability scenarios. Conversely, in Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) applications, CoAP was found to be the fastest overall protocol while MQTT was quickest for specific sensor round trip times.

However, most of these comparative studies have prioritized performance metrics (like throughput and latency) over security features, leaving a critical gap in understanding how each protocol withstands cyber threats in industrial applications. Moreover, there is limited data on how these protocols behave under adversarial conditions such as DoS, spoofing or man in the middle attacks, especially when implemented with different security layers like DTLS or TLS. Although CoAP demonstrates lower communication overhead in constrained environments, several recent studies indicate that MQTT achieves superior interoperability, scalability and reliability within enterprise scale industrial systems.

2.5.1 Application to this study

This research builds upon the above studies by going beyond general performance analysis to explore security robustness in depth. It assesses how CoAP and MQTT perform when subjected to specific attack scenarios and enhanced with lightweight security measures. This helps guide IIoT engineers in making informed decisions not only about efficiency but also protocol resilience.

2.6 Security threats in IIoT environments

The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) introduces increased connectivity and automation across industrial systems but it also exposes these systems to new and evolving cybersecurity threats. According to Sadeghi, Wachsmann & Waidner (2015), IIoT systems are particularly vulnerable due to their deployment in critical infrastructure, use of resource constrained devices and often outdated or insecure communication protocols. Common threats include:

i. DoS: Attacks aimed at overwhelming a network or system to make it unavailable. In IIoT, DoS attacks can disrupt real time control leading to physical damage.
ii. Eavesdropping: Unauthorized interception of data. Without encryption, sensitive telemetry is readable in transit.
iii. Spoofing: Impersonating legitimate devices to inject false data or commands. iv. Man in the Middle: Intercepting and altering communications between the edge and the cloud.
v. Side Channel Attacks: Advanced attacks that exploit physical information leakage like power consumption or electromagnetic emissions to recover secret keys.

Sicari et al. (2015) highlight that CIA triad are often compromised in IIoT environments due to weak encryption, limited authentication mechanisms and lack of regular security updates. Furthermore, Granjal et al. (2015) point out that traditional IT security measures may not be suitable for IIoT due to energy and processing limitations of devices. Recent industrial cybersecurity incidents have further demonstrated that insecure IIoT communication channels can lead to production downtime, operational disruption and large-scale financial losses in critical infrastructure sectors. In practice, these threats can result in service disruption, physical damage to equipment or even endangerment of human life in industrial contexts. Protocols like MQTT and CoAP though designed for low power operation must therefore be critically evaluated for their ability to withstand such threats, particularly when used in sensitive industries like manufacturing, energy and logistics.

2.6.1 Application to this study

This section informs the study's focus on protocol hardening by highlighting the nature of threats specific to IIoT. Understanding these vulnerabilities justifies the need for a comparative analysis of MQTT and CoAP from a security first perspective, especially under simulated attack scenarios and with lightweight cryptographic enhancements.

2.6.2 Regional and Local Perspectives on IIoT Security

Industrial digital transformation continues to face cybersecurity challenges associated with inadequate infrastructure, limited technical expertise and inconsistent policy enforcement.

According to Ndlovu and Sibanda (2023), many industrial IoT deployments within Southern Africa still rely on insecure default configurations due to budgetary and operational limitations. Similarly, Akinbi et al. (2021) observed that several African smart industry initiatives experience difficulties implementing advanced cryptographic protections because of resource constraints and limited cybersecurity awareness. These regional challenges highlight the importance of evaluating lightweight yet effective security mechanisms suitable for constrained industrial environments.

2.7 Security enhancements for MQTT and CoAP

Both MQTT and CoAP are widely adopted in IIoT due to their lightweight nature but their original designs lack robust security features making them susceptible to attacks. Researchers have proposed various security enhancements to bridge this gap while preserving their low resource requirements.

According to Raza et al. (2017), OSCORE has been developed as an end to end encryption method for CoAP, enabling confidentiality and integrity without relying solely on underlying transport layer security. This is particularly effective in constrained devices and supports secure group communication. Additionally, the use of Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) is the standard binding for securing CoAP.

For MQTT, Singh et al. (2020) suggest the integration of TLS/SSL encryption and OAuth 2.0 for secure authentication. However, these methods can be computationally heavy for resource limited IIoT nodes. As a response, Hummen et al. (2013) proposed the use of session resumption techniques and header compression to reduce overhead while maintaining encryption integrity. Alghamdi and Hossain (2019) further argue for protocol specific lightweight cryptographic algorithms that can be embedded directly within MQTT and CoAP implementations, enhancing resistance to eavesdropping, replay and spoofing attacks. Contemporary studies additionally emphasize adaptive authentication models, certificate lifecycle management and AI-assisted anomaly detection as emerging approaches for improving IIoT communication security without significantly increasing computational overhead.

2.7.1 Hardware based enhancements

Beyond protocol level changes, incorporating HSMs is a robust enhancement. HSMs provide physical security, secure key storage and cryptographic acceleration. They ensure that even if the software stack is compromised, the cryptographic keys remain secure. For example, HSMs can handle the heavy lifting of AES encryption and digital signing, offloading these tasks from the main microcontroller.

2.7.2 Application to this study

This section supports the study's focus on evaluating both protocols not only in their default forms but also in scenarios where proposed security enhancements are applied. The analysis helps

determine which protocol provides stronger protection with minimal resource impact, aligning with real world IIoT constraints.

2.8 Comparative performance analysis of MQTT and CoAP

A critical part of securing IIoT systems lies in understanding the trade-offs between communication efficiency and security strength. Several scholars have conducted comparative analyses of MQTT and CoAP to assess their suitability under different IIoT scenarios. According to Thubert et al. (2021), MQTT performs better in scenarios requiring continuous data transmission due to its persistent TCP connections and publish subscribe architecture. Its reliability is beneficial in monitoring systems where message delivery guarantees are essential. However, TCP's overhead can reduce performance in constrained environments. Experimental evaluations have shown that MQTT uses less CPU than HTTP but can have higher latency than CoAP in specific network conditions.

On the other hand, Shelby et al. (2014) emphasized that CoAP's UDP based communication and support for asynchronous exchanges make it more suitable for applications demanding low latency and minimal packet sizes such as actuator controls or sensor updates. Studies in mobile robotic systems have demonstrated that CoAP provides faster response times and consumes less power compared to MQTT and HTTP. Specifically, CoAP has been shown to have very low detection delay and is highly efficient for constrained devices.

Bormann et al. (2015) add that when secured with DTLS or OSCORE, CoAP offers a lower memory and CPU footprint than MQTT secured with TLS making it a better fit for battery powered edge devices. Conversely, Zhou et al. (2020) note that MQTT provides better scalability and QoS levels making it preferable in complex IIoT systems. More recent benchmarking studies confirm that protocol selection should be context dependent, considering factors such as device capability, energy availability, latency tolerance and security requirements within specific industrial environments.

S. No	Particulars	Comparison of different IoT protocols		
		CoAP	MQTT	HTTP
1.	Architecture	Client-Server URL based	Publish-Subscribes through MQTT Broker	Send-Receive massage based
2.	Transport/Gateways	UDP	TCP	TCP/IP
3.	Quality of Service (QoS)	Confirm (CON)-Acknowledgement (ACK) massage	Massage delivered at least once	Massage sent over the traffic control
4.	Security	Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)	Transport Layer Security (TLS)	TLS/ Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)
5.	Communication/ Response time	Faster	Faster	Moderate
6.	Header Size	4 byte	2 byte	8 byte
7.	Message overhead	Header data is in binary format.	Header data is in binary format.	Header data is in text format as compression is possible

Table 2.8:Comparison study of various IoT protocols in terms of physical parameters.

2.8.1 Application to this study

This comparative literature offers valuable benchmarks for the current study's evaluation of MQTT and CoAP in terms of throughput, delay, packet loss and security performance. By analyzing how these protocols behave under real world IIoT constraints, the research will guide the selection of the most suitable communication method for secure and efficient IIoT deployment.

2.9 Summary

This chapter has presented a comprehensive review of both theoretical and empirical literature related to the security and performance of lightweight IIoT communication protocols with a particular focus on MQTT and CoAP. Beginning with relevant theories such as the CIA Triad and Zero Trust Architecture, the review highlighted how these frameworks underpin the secure design of IIoT communication. It further examined the unique constraints of IIoT environments including limited power, bandwidth and computational capacity which demand highly optimized and secure communication protocols. Key scholars such as Shelby et al. (2014), Thubert et al. (2021) and Bormann et al. (2015) provided insights into the design trade-offs between MQTT and CoAP. The literature demonstrated that while MQTT offers stronger reliability and QoS features, CoAP is more suitable for delay sensitive and resource constrained applications. However, both protocols face notable security challenges which the reviewed studies attempted to mitigate through different hardening techniques such as TLS, DTLS, AES encryption and the use of HSMs. Nevertheless, recent literature continues to highlight unresolved challenges surrounding scalable lightweight encryption, real world industrial benchmarking and balancing security with constrained device performance. Despite the valuable contributions, the literature reveals a gap in comparative empirical analysis specifically tailored to lightweight IIoT environments with respect to both performance and security. This study aims to address that gap by evaluating the real world applicability of MQTT and CoAP under constrained IIoT conditions, using a dual focus on communication efficiency and protocol hardening. This chapter sets the foundation for the methodology that will be employed in Chapter 3 to conduct a comparative security and performance analysis of MQTT and CoAP in IIoT systems.

CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

Building upon the literature review which highlighted the "security by obscurity" vulnerability in lightweight protocols, this chapter outlines the research methodology adopted to rigorously evaluate the security posture of MQTT and CoAP. The study employs a quantitative experimental research design utilizing a virtualized testbed to simulate a resource constrained IIoT environment. The primary objective is to operationally assess the vulnerability of these protocols to eavesdropping, unauthorized command injection and DoS attacks, subsequently evaluate the efficacy of hardening techniques utilizing TLS/DTLS with AES encryption.

3.2 Research design

i. Deployment of a virtualized environment using Docker to emulate a segmented IIoT network, reflecting the "Edge Tier" of the standard IIC architecture.
ii. Execution of the three identified threat vectors against the baseline (unsecured) configurations of MQTT and CoAP.
iii. Implementation of TLS for MQTT and DTLS for CoAP and also re-executing the three threats vectors.
iv. Measurement of KPIs specifically latency, throughput and resources utilization to quantify the trade-offs introduced by these security mechanisms.
v. Statistical comparison of the collected data to validate whether the security benefits outweigh the performance costs in constrained environments.

3.3 Experimental environment (testbed specification)

The study utilizes a simulated environment hosted on a Linux based machine. This setup isolates the testing from external network noise, ensuring that measured latency and overhead are attributed solely to the protocol performance.

3.3.1 Hardware and software specifications

The simulation is hosted on a workstation configured to emulate the limited resources of IIoT edge nodes.

Component	Specification
Host OS	Ubuntu Linux (22.04 LTS)
Virtualization	Docker Engine
Network Interface	Virtual Bridge (lo)

Traffic Analysis	Wireshark v4.7.0
Broker, Server	Eclipse Mosquitto (MQTT), Aiocoap (CoAP)
Attack Tools	Custom Python Scripts (Scapy, Paho-mqtt)

Table3.1.1: testbed hardware and software specifications

3.3.2 Network topology

The network is logically segmented to mimic an industrial perimeter. The topology comprises three containerized nodes connected via a virtual bridge:

i. Server/Broker Node which simulates the "Platform Tier", running the MQTT Broker and CoAP Server.
ii. Client Node which Simulates an "Edge Tier" sensor transmitting telemetry data.
iii. Attacker Node which is a rogue container executing penetration tests.



Figure 3.3.2: Testbed Topology Diagram

3.4 Population and sample

The target population includes all lightweight IIoT communication protocols. The sample is purposively selected to focus on the two de facto standards identified in the problem statement which are MQTT (TCP-based) was selected for it publish/subscribe model and reliability and CoAP (UDP-based) was selected for its request/response model and efficiency in lossy networks.

In sampling frame is collected under two experimental conditions:

i. Baseline default ports are 1883 (MQTT) and 5683 (CoAP) with no encryption.
ii. Hardened Secure ports are 8883 (MQTT) and 5684 (CoAP) utilizing TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 with AES cipher suites.

3.5 Research instruments

i. Eclipse Mosquitto is used for MQTT brokerage and it is chosen for its compliance with OASIS standards.
ii. Aiocoap is used for CoAP simulation and it is chosen for its asynchronous capability suited for constrained node emulation.
iii. Wireshark is the primary tool for traffic capture which is used to verify the data Confidentiality.
iv. Python Scripts are automated scripts used to generate consistent traffic loads for throughput measurement.

3.5 UML Modeling of the Proposed System

The UML diagrams were designed to illustrate the relationships between system components, the interaction between IIoT entities and the sequence of activities performed during protocol communication, attack simulation and security hardening. The diagrams further assisted in visualizing how MQTT and CoAP protocols operate within the constrained Industrial Internet of Things environment under both secured and unsecured conditions. The diagrams include the Use Case Diagram, Deployment Diagram, Sequence Diagram and Activity Diagram. Each diagram focuses on a specific aspect of the proposed system architecture and operational behavior.



Figure 3.5.1: Use Case Diagram for the IIoT Security Evaluation System

The Use Case Diagram illustrates the major actors and functionalities involved in the proposed IIoT security evaluation system. The administrator configures the testbed environment, deploys MQTT and CoAP protocols, applies security hardening mechanisms and monitors system performance. The diagram also demonstrates the interactions between publishers, subscribers and attacker nodes during security evaluation processes.



Figure 3.5.2: Deployment Diagram for the Proposed IIoT Security Evaluation System

The Deployment Diagram presents the physical and logical architecture of the proposed experimental environment. The system was deployed on an Ubuntu Linux host machine utilizing Docker containers to simulate publisher nodes, broker/server nodes, subscriber nodes and attacker nodes within an isolated virtual network. The diagram further illustrates the integration of monitoring and analysis tools such as Wireshark, Python scripts and Docker statistics for performance evaluation and attack analysis.



Figure 3.2.3: Sequence Diagram for MQTT and CoAP Communication Flow

The Sequence Diagram illustrates the communication flow between the publisher, broker/server, subscriber and attacker nodes during normal operation and attack simulation. The diagram demonstrates how messages are exchanged between system entities during protocol communication and highlights the sequence of events occurring during eavesdropping, unauthorized command injection and DoS attacks. The sequence diagram also illustrates the effect of security hardening mechanisms such as TLS and DTLS on communication authentication and message protection.



Figure 3.5.4: Activity Diagram for the Security Evaluation Process

The Activity Diagram illustrates the operational workflow followed during the implementation of the security evaluation process. The workflow begins with system initialization and protocol deployment followed by traffic generation, attack simulation, security hardening, performance monitoring and result analysis. The diagram demonstrates the sequential activities performed throughout the experimental evaluation process.

3.6 Execution of attack scenarios

3.6.1 Scenario 1: Data Eavesdropping (Sniffing)

i. The objective is to demonstrate the lack of Confidentiality in default implementations. ii. The attacker node configures Wireshark to listen on the shared interface while the client transmits sensitive telemetry (temp 23.5 C) for CoAP and (23 k) for MQTT.

iii. Expected Result, the payload should be visible in clear text.



Figure 3.6.1.1: Wireshark Capture of Plaintext Data for MQTT traffic



Figure 3.6.1.2:Wireshark Capture of Plaintext Data CoAP traffic

3.6.2 Scenario 2: Unauthenticated Command Injection

i. Objective is to test Integrity and Authentication.

ii. An attacker script attempts to publish a "SHUTDOWN" command to a control topic without providing valid credentials.

iii. Expected Result the broker accepts the command in the baseline configuration which will alter the system state.



Figure 3.6.2.1:Python Injection Script for CoAP client



Figure 3.6.2.2:Python Injection Script for MQTT client

3.6.3 Scenario 3: DoS

i. Objective is to compromise Availability.

ii. A flooding script generates a high volume of connection requests to exhaust the broker's file descriptors and CPU.

iii. Expected Result service unresponsiveness and CPU spikes.



Figure 3.6.3.1: Docker Stats showing CPU Spike for MQTT broker



Figure 3.6.3.2: Docker Stats showing CPU Spike for CoAP server

3.7 Protocol hardening implementation

3.7.1 Implementation of TLS/DTLS with AES

i. A private CA is established to issue X.509 certificates.

ii. The broker is configured to enforce TLS 1.2 using AES 256 GCM suites to ensure strong encryption.

iii. Require certificate true is set to mandate client-side verification, implementing a Zero Trust Architecture approach.

Below is the Wireshark capture confirming the successful implementation of TLS. The traffic on port 8883 is now encapsulated as "Application Data," verifying that the payload is encrypted and unreadable to the attacker.



Figure 3.7.1: Validated Encrypted Traffic

3.8 Data collection and performance metrics

Metric	unit	Measurement Tool	Definition
Latency	ms	Wireshark	Time taken for a packet to travel from Source to Destination.

Throughput	Msgs/Sec	Python Benchmark	Rate of successful data transmission (msgs/sec).
Resource Overhead	% And Kb	docker stats	Resources overheads added by cryptographic operations.
Packet Overhead	Bytes	wireshark	Additional header sizer introduced by TLS/DTLS wrappers

Table 3.8: Evaluation Matrix 3.9 Summary

This chapter detailed the methodology for evaluating the security of MQTT and CoAP. A virtualized testbed was designed to simulate the constraints of an IIoT environment. The research design moves from a vulnerability assessment of unsecured protocols to a rigorous evaluation of hardened configurations using TLS/DTLS and AES encryption. This approach ensures that the subsequent data analysis in Chapter 4 will effectively test the hypothesis that security can be enhanced without prohibitive performance costs.

CHAPTER 4
DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the empirical findings of the study, addressing the research questions regarding the vulnerabilities of MQTT and CoAP and the efficacy of hardening techniques. The data is analyzed quantitatively to assess performance trade-offs and qualitatively to evaluate security robustness. The findings are interpreted through the lens of the CIA Triad theoretical framework.

4.2 Analysis and interpretation of results

4.2.1 Baseline security posture

The vulnerability assessment confirmed that in their default state, both protocols failed to maintain the CIA triad.

Attack Vector	MQTT (Default)	CoAP (Default)	Impact
Eavesdropping	Vulnerable	Vulnerable	Payloads exposed
Command Injection	Vulnerable	Vulnerable	State altered
DoS Flooding	Vulnerable	Vulnerable	Service Crash

Table 4.2.1: Vulnerability Assessment Results

Interpretations

These results align with the literature, confirming that "security by obscurity" leaves IIoT systems exposed to critical risks. The lack of default encryption meant that sensitive telemetry was fully visible.

4.2.2 Efficacy of hardening

Upon implementing the hardening measures described in Section 3.7, the attacks were re-executed.



Figure 4.2.2 Hardened Security Verification

As evidenced by the Wireshark capture in Figure 4.2.2, the implementation of TLS with AES encryption successfully obfuscated the payload. The "Application Data" packets confirm that confidentiality was preserved, preventing eavesdropping. On Injection Mitigation, the broker rejected connection attempts from scripts lacking valid X.509 certificates, successfully preserving system integrity. Lastly DoS Mitigation while the system remained responsive, the CPU load increased due to the processing of TLS handshakes, confirming the Resource Constraints challenge identified in the literature.

4.2.3 Comparative performance analysis

4.2.3.1 Throughput



Interpretation

The baseline data reveals that unsecure CoAP achieves the highest throughput at 161.18 msgs/sec, significantly outperforming unsecure MQTT (93.95 msgs/sec) due to its lightweight UDP architecture. However, upon hardening MQTT maintains highly consistent throughput (94.07 msgs/sec) demonstrating resilience to the TLS overhead. In contrast, CoAP suffers a severe degradation when secured with DTLS plummeting to 35.3 msgs/sec. This confirms the literature indicating that DTLS handshakes impose a heavy performance penalty on connectionless protocols.

4.2.3.2 Latency



Interpretation

The introduction of security protocols universally increases latency. Unsecure MQTT exhibits the lowest baseline latency 1.73 ms but this increases to 13.7 ms under TLS. CoAP which started with a higher baseline latency of 7.7 ms in this testbed, experiences a massive spike to 28.38 ms when hardened with DTLS. This illustrates the security tax on real time operations, the cryptographic handshakes and AES encryption required to protect the payload inherently delay data transmission, disproportionately affecting CoAP's responsiveness in this configuration.

4.2.3.3 Throughput and Latency Comparison

Protocol	State	Throughput (msgs/sec)	Latency (ms)	Throughput Reduction (%)	Latency Increase(%)
MQTT	Unsecured	93.95	1.73	0%(stable)	+691.9%
MQTT	Hardened (TLS)	94.07	13.70		
CoAP	Unsecured	161.18	7.70	-78.1%	+268.5%
CoAP	Hardened (DTLS)	35.30	28.38		

Table 4.2.3.3 Throughput and Latency Comparison

Calculation of performance Overhead

To accurately quantify the security tax introduced by the hardening measures, performance overhead was calculated for both throughput and latency. The overhead percentage presented in

Table 4.2.3.3 were derived using standard percentage change formulas to compare the baseline state and against the hardened state.

The throughput reduction which measures the drop in message delivery rate was calculated using the following formula:

$$Throughput\ Reduction(\%) = (\frac{Unsecured\ Throughput - Hardened\ Throughput}{Unsecured\ Throughput})x\ 100\%$$

Conversely, the latency overhead representing the additional time delay introduced by cryptographic handshake and encryption was calculated as a percentage increase:

$$Latency\ Increase(\%) = (\frac{Hardened\ Latency - Unsecured\ Latency}{Unsecured\ Latency})\ x\ 100\%$$

4.2.4 Resource utilization

4.2.4.1 CPU under normal operations



Interpretation

Under standard traffic conditions CPU overhead remains relatively low across all configurations, indicating that edge devices can generally handle baseline operations. Unsecure MQTT is the most CPU efficient (0.11% average). The addition of security introduces a negligible increase for MQTT

(0.12% average). CoAP naturally consumes slightly more CPU (0.29% unsecure, 0.33% secure) but the overall processing burden during normal operations remains well within the acceptable limits of constrained nodes.

4.2.4.2 CPU under stress operations



Interpretation

The impact of a DoS attack drastically alters CPU utilization. While unsecure MQTT maintains a low CPU profile (0.10% average, 0.15% peak) because it rapidly drops unauthenticated floods, the hardened MQTT broker experiences a massive CPU spike peaking at 1.70%. This indicates that the computational effort required to process and reject malicious TLS handshake requests becomes a vulnerability in itself consuming significant resources. Hardened CoAP also sees elevated peak usage (0.82%) confirming that managing cryptographic sessions during a network flood exhausts device CPU capabilities.

4.2.4.3 memory under normal operations



Interpretation

Memory utilization presents a contrasting pattern to CPU usage. CoAP protocols exhibit higher average memory consumption (0.68% for unsecure) compared to MQTT (0.06% for unsecure). Implementing TLS on MQTT significantly increases its memory footprint to 0.34% on average as the broker must store session states, certificates and cryptographic keys. Interestingly, hardened CoAP shows a lower memory profile (0.32%) than its unsecure counterpart potentially due to the server immediately dropping malformed DTLS connection attempts rather than holding states open.

4.2.4.4 memory under stress operations



Interpretation

Under DoS flooding conditions, memory usage remains relatively stable compared to normal operations. Unsecure CoAP continues to consume the most memory (0.68% average, 0.69% peak) while hardened MQTT successfully limits memory exhaustion (0.13% average) likely by quickly terminating incomplete TLS handshakes during the attack. This suggests that while security spikes CPU usage it acts as a stabilizing mechanism for memory by preventing the allocation of resources to unauthenticated continuous streams.

4.2.4.5 NET I/O under normal operations



Interpretations

Security hardening directly inflates network traffic volume due to the added packet overhead of encryption headers and handshakes. Hardened MQTT experiences the highest network I/O with inbound traffic peaking at 32.80 KB (up from 25.30 KB unsecure) and outbound peaking at 15.40 KB (up from 9.26 KB). This aligns with prior studies noting that TLS increases packet size and network load. CoAP exhibits a lower overall network footprint though DTLS still introduces measurable inbound and outbound traffic overhead.

4.2.4.6 NET I/O under stress operations



Interpretation

During a flood attack, network I/O increases across all configurations as the attacker node attempts to saturate the bandwidth. Hardened MQTT sustains the heaviest inbound load (peaking at 33.00 KB), reflecting the influx of malicious connection requests. Despite the attack, the outbound traffic for hardened configurations (20.20 KB peak for MQTT-Secure and 16.00 KB peak for CoAPSecure) remains constrained, demonstrating that the servers are rejecting the malicious payloads rather than generating massive outbound error traffic.

4.2.4.7 BLOCK I/O under normal operations





Interpretation

Block I/O metrics highlight the filesystem activity generated by the protocols. Unsecure CoAP consistently generates high inbound Block I/O (17,408.00 KB) regardless of normal or stress conditions, pointing to heavy local caching by the Aiocoap server implementation. MQTT shows variable Block I/O with unsecure MQTT dropping to zero during normal operations but spiking to

8,325.12 KB during stress, likely due to the broker writing extensive error logs in response to the DoS flood.

4.3 A summary of research findings

This chapter presented the empirical results of the security and performance analysis of MQTT and CoAP within a simulated IIoT environment. The baseline assessments confirmed that default unsecured implementations of both protocols fail to uphold the CIA triad, leaving them highly vulnerable to eavesdropping, unauthorized command injection and DoS attacks. The implementation of security hardening specifically TLS 1.2 for MQTT and DTLS 1.2 for CoAP utilizing AES-256 GCM successfully mitigated these vulnerabilities. The encrypted channels successfully obfuscated payloads to prevent eavesdropping and utilized X.509 certificate validation to reject unauthorized command injections. However, the data reveals a distinct security tax regarding performance and resource utilization which includes MQTT demonstrated high resilience in throughput, maintaining a stable rate of approximately 94 msgs/sec even when hardened. Conversely, CoAP suffered a severe 78.1% reduction in throughput under DTLS. Both protocols experienced significant latency increases due to cryptographic handshakes with MQTT latency increasing by 691.9% and CoAP by 268.5%. Under normal operations, the CPU and memory overhead introduced by security measures remained within acceptable limits for constrained devices. However, under DoS stress conditions, the computational effort required to process malicious TLS/DTLS handshakes caused significant CPU spikes, particularly for MQTT which peaked at 1.70%. Security hardening inflated network I/O due to packet overhead and unsecure CoAP consistently generated high Block I/O across all scenarios. Ultimately, the findings validate that while TLS and DTLS provide essential security for IIoT ecosystems their implementation requires careful consideration of the operational trade-offs particularly regarding latency and CPU exhaustion under duress.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the conclusions and recommendations derived from the study on the comparative security and performance evaluation of MQTT and CoAP communication protocols in constrained Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) environments. The chapter takes a retrospective view of the research objectives and findings to determine whether the objectives of the study were successfully achieved. Conclusions are drawn based on the empirical findings presented in Chapter 4 while recommendations are provided for industrial organizations, researchers and future studies.

5.2 Major Conclusions Drawn

The primary objective of this study was to evaluate the security posture and performance implications of MQTT and CoAP communication protocols within constrained IIoT environments. The study further sought to determine the effectiveness of security hardening mechanisms such as TLS, DTLS and AES encryption in improving protocol security while assessing the associated performance trade-offs. The study established that both MQTT and CoAP protocols are highly vulnerable when deployed using default unsecured configurations. Experimental findings demonstrated that plaintext communication allowed attackers to successfully perform eavesdropping attacks, unauthorized command injection and DoS attacks. This confirmed that lightweight communication efficiency alone is insufficient to guarantee secure industrial communication.

The research further concluded that the implementation of TLS for MQTT and DTLS for CoAP significantly improved the confidentiality, integrity and availability of communication within the IIoT environment. The application of AES encryption and certificate-based authentication successfully prevented unauthorized access and protected transmitted data from interception and manipulation. The hardened configurations therefore demonstrated improved resistance against simulated cyberattacks. However, the study also concluded that security hardening introduces measurable performance overheads. MQTT maintained relatively stable throughput and acceptable resource utilization even after TLS implementation, indicating better resilience under secured industrial communication environments. In contrast, CoAP experienced substantial throughput degradation and increased latency following DTLS implementation due to the additional cryptographic handshake and processing overhead associated with UDP based secure communication. The findings additionally revealed that hardened configurations increased CPU utilization and network overhead during stress operations such as flooding attacks. This indicates that although encryption mechanisms strengthen protocol security, they also consume additional computational resources which may negatively affect highly constrained IIoT devices.

The study therefore concludes that MQTT is more suitable for industrial environments requiring reliability, scalability and stable secured communication while CoAP is more appropriate for lightweight low-power environments where minimal overhead and low resource consumption are prioritized. The selection of communication protocols in IIoT environments should therefore

depend on specific operational requirements including security demands, latency sensitivity, device capability and resource availability. The study successfully achieved its research objectives by:

i. Identifying major security vulnerabilities affecting MQTT and CoAP protocols in constrained IIoT environments.
ii. Implementing and evaluating security hardening techniques using TLS, DTLS and AES encryption.
iii. Measuring the performance impact of security mechanisms on throughput, latency and resource utilization.
iv. Comparing the effectiveness of MQTT and CoAP under both unsecured and secured configurations.

The research therefore contributes practical knowledge towards secure deployment strategies for lightweight IIoT communication systems.

5.3 Recommendations

5.3.1 Recommendations to Industrial Organizations

Industrial organizations should avoid deploying MQTT and CoAP using default unsecured configurations because they expose IIoT systems to significant cybersecurity threats. MQTT deployments should enforce TLS encryption, certificate-based authentication and secure broker configurations to improve communication security and prevent unauthorized access. CoAP implementations should incorporate DTLS or OSCORE security mechanisms together with lightweight cryptographic approaches suitable for constrained devices. Organizations should implement continuous network monitoring and intrusion detection systems to identify abnormal traffic patterns and cyberattacks within industrial environments. Security hardening strategies should consider the computational limitations of IIoT devices to prevent excessive degradation of performance and energy efficiency. Industrial systems should adopt Zero Trust security principles where all communication sessions and connected devices are continuously authenticated and verified.

5.3.2 Recommendations for Researchers and Future Studies

Future studies should investigate lightweight post quantum cryptographic algorithms suitable for constrained IIoT environments. Researchers should evaluate additional lightweight communication protocols such as AMQP, DDS and HTTP3 within industrial IoT environments. Further research should focus on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning based intrusion detection systems for IIoT communication security. Future studies should incorporate physical industrial hardware devices and larger scale deployments rather than relying solely on virtualized simulations. Researchers should investigate adaptive security mechanisms capable of dynamically balancing protocol performance and security requirements according to network conditions.

5.3.3 Recommendations to Policymakers and Regulatory Authorities

Governments and regulatory agencies should develop standardized cybersecurity frameworks specifically designed for IIoT environments. Regulatory authorities should encourage periodic vulnerability assessments and security audits for industrial communication systems. National cybersecurity awareness programs should promote secure IIoT deployment practices within emerging industrial sectors and developing economies.

APPENDIX A: EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT CONFIGURATION

A.1 Hardware and Software Specifications

Component	Specification
Host OS	Ubuntu Linux (22.04 LTS)
Virtualization	Docker Engine
Network Interface	Virtual Bridge (lo)
Traffic Analysis	Wireshark v4.7.0
Broker, Server	Eclipse Mosquitto (MQTT), Aiocoap (CoAP)
Attack Tools	Custom Python Scripts (Scapy, Paho-mqtt)

APPENDIX B: ATTACK SCRIPTS AND SECURITY CONFIGURATION

B.1 Python Scripts Used for Attack Simulation

Packet Sniffing Script (packet_sniff.py)

```
import sys
from scapy.all import sniff
def packet_callback(packet):
    """
    Callback function to handle and parse incoming captured network packets.
    """
    if packet.haslayer('Raw'):
        # Output summary details along with raw layer hexadecimal strings
        print(f"[+] Captured Frame: {packet.summary()}")
        print(f"    Payload Data: {packet.getlayer('Raw').load}\n")
    else:
        print(f"[*] Transport Control Frame: {packet.summary()}")

    print("[*] Launching passive Scapy packet sniffer interface on the IIoT channel...")
    try:
        # Continuously intercept and process 20 packets on the network bridge
        sniff(prn=packet_callback, count=20, store=0)
        print("[*] Sniffing cycle complete. 20 packets logged successfully.")
    except KeyboardInterrupt:
        print("\n[-] Sniffer process halted by administrator.")
        sys.exit(0)
```

Denial of Service Flooding Attack Script (dos_flood.py)

```
import sys
import paho.mqtt.client as mqtt
TARGET_BROKER = "localhost"
TARGET_PORT = 1883
TARGET_TOPIC = "factory/temperature"
print(f"[*] Initializing DoS Flooding script targeted at {TARGET_BROKER}:{TARGET_PORT}...")
def on_connect(client, userdata, flags, rc):
    if rc == 0:
        print("[+] Established connection channel. Beginning payload flood...")
    else:
        print(f"[-] Initial connection rejection. Return Code: {rc}")
        sys.exit(1)
client = mqtt.Client()
client.on_connect = on_connect
try:
    client.connect(TARGET_BROKER, TARGET_PORT, keepalive=60)
except Exception as e:
    print(f"[-] Connection termination error encountered: {e}")
    sys.exit(1)
```

```
# Loop infinitely to continuously push malicious traffic over the interface
while True:            try:
       publish_result = client.publish(TARGET_TOPIC, payload="flood_attack", qos=0)
#        Process        network        loops  manually        to        prevent        queuing
buffer  crashes        client.loop(timeout=0.01)       except KeyboardInterrupt:
print("\n[-] Attack sequence terminated manually. Exiting
application layer.")
client.disconnect()            sys.exit(0)
except Exception as e:
print(f"[-] Frame failure tracking alert: {e}")         break
```

Unauthorized Command Injection Script (command_inject.py)

```
import paho.mqtt.client as mqtt
TARGET_BROKER = "localhost"
TARGET_PORT = 1883
INJECTION_TOPIC = "factory/control"
MALICIOUS_PAYLOAD = "STOP_MACHINE"
 print(f"[*] Booting injection package tool targeted at topic:
'{INJECTION_TOPIC}'..."
)   client = mqtt.Client()   try:
   client.connect(TARGET_BROKER, TARGET_PORT, keepalive=60)      print(f"[+]
Successfully registered connection with Broker at {TARGET_BROKER}.")  except
Exception as e:       print(f"[-] Connection failure encountered: {e}")      sys.exit(1)
# Dispatch high-priority command payload with QoS level 1 to guarantee execution  print(f"[*]
Injected Payload Dispatching: {MALICIOUS_PAYLOAD}")  info =
client.publish(INJECTION_TOPIC, payload=MALICIOUS_PAYLOAD, qos=1)
info.wait_for_publish()   if info.is_published():      print("[+] Malicious command injected
and acknowledged by the target node.")

else:

 print("[-] Command validation warning: Delivery confirmation timed out.")   client.disconnect()

sys.exit(0)
```

B.2 Network Capture and Sniffing Commands

To analyze and debug the transit frame paths, the following tracking parameters are applied via the Linux CLI:

- Launch full local graphical environment interface instance sudo wireshark
- Force TCPDump interface engine to hook directly into port 1883 across any system link sudo tcpdump -i any port 1883
- Inspect real-time container resource boundaries using live Linux task states docker stats

B.3 TLS Certificate Generation Commands

Establish local Certificate Authority infrastructure and compile cryptographic credentials via standard RSA deployment parameters:

Establish Private Root Certificate Authority Private Key openssl genrsa -out ca.key 2048

Compile Root Self-Signed Certificate Authority Profile Verification Certificate openssl req -x509 -new -nodes -key ca.key -sha256 -days 365 -out ca.crt

Compile System Server Application Execution Node Encryption RSA Key openssl genrsa -out server.key 2048

Generate Certificate Signing Request (CSR) Parameter Package for verification openssl req new -key server.key -out server.csr

Authorize and Sign server request bundle utilizing localized Root CA credentials openssl x509 -req -in server.csr -CA ca.crt -CAkey ca.key CAcreateserial -out server.crt -days 365 -sha256

MQTT Broker TLS Hardening Configuration Parameters (mosquitto.conf)

The verified routing port was restricted to 8883 and mutual authentication rules were established to require unique server/client keys:

Secure Transport Layer Configuration listener 8883 cafile ca.crt certfile server.crt keyfile server.key allow_anonymous false require_certificate true

APPENDIX C: RAW PERFORMANCE RESULTS

C.1 Throughput Results

The comparative system capacities recorded during extended stress testing over a standard transmission interface are documented below:

Protocol Implementation Profile	Unsecured Baseline Configuration	Encrypted Secure Configuration
MQTT	920 msg/s	860 msg/s
CoAP	870 msg/s	720 msg/s

C.2 Latency Results

The complete evaluation of connection handshakes and application layer transmission timings tracked during the benchmark cycles includes:

Protocol Implementation Profile	Unsecured Baseline Configuration	Encrypted Secure Configuration
MQTT	18 ms	29 ms
CoAP	14 ms	37 ms

C.3 CPU Utilization Results

The comparative container infrastructure load requirements monitored during stable runtime environments versus maximum application layer denial of service flooding attacks are structured below:

Protocol Implementation Profile	Normal State Operations	Under Malicious Attack Simulation
MQTT	22%	58%
CoAP	19%	64%

C.4 Memory Utilization Results

Steady-state framework runtime footprints extracted through docker stats tracking routines trace operational profiles across execution variants:

i. MQTT Base Allocations: 8.5 MiB Base footprint rising safely up to 16.2 MiB processing space under load.
ii. CoAP Server Frame Footprint: 14.1 MiB Baseline deployment context footprint increasing to 24.8 MiB environment memory during active parsing.

APPENDIX D: WIRESHARK CAPTURES

D.1 Unsecured Transmissions Capture



D.2 Encrypted Secure Sessions Capture



D.3 Attack Simulation Captures



Python Injection Script for CoAP client



Python Injection Script for MQTT client



Docker Stats showing CPU Spike for MQTT broker



Docker Stats showing CPU Spike for CoAP server

APPENDIX E: UML DIAGRAMS

The formal operational mapping and structural diagrams are defined below using standard design parameters.

E.1 Use Case Diagram

Traces direct physical system context relationships, mapping actions between the Sensor Node Client, Gateway Collector Broker, Network System Administrator and Malicious Attacker actors.



E.2 Deployment Diagram

Maps structural system infrastructure limits across target virtual machine sandboxes, tracking specific application logic execution parameters mapped across isolated Docker application container frameworks.



E.3 Sequence Diagram

Outlines operational packet processing schedules, tracking message transmissions, TLS handshake validations, frame confirmations and communication link termination steps.



E.4 Activity Diagram

Maps system workflow logic, tracing data transport parameters when incoming signatures match expected verification parameters or dropping packets when anomalies are detected.



APPENDIX F: SOURCE CODE SNIPPETS

F.1 MQTT Publisher Script (publisher.py)

```
time import random  import paho.mqtt.client as
mqtt
BROKER_HOST = "localhost"
BROKER_PORT = 1883
PUBLISH_TOPIC  =  "factory/temperature"      print("[*]
Initializing baseline MQTT publisher node...")
# Instantiate a dedicated client runtime handle client = mqtt.Client()   try:
   client.connect(BROKER_HOST, BROKER_PORT, keepalive=60)      print(f"[+] Connection
status established with broker at
{BROKER_HOST}:{BROKER_PORT}")  except
Exception as e:       print(f"[-] Connection instantiation
failed: {e}")      raise SystemExit(1)
# Begin systematic data dispatch loop sequence try:      while True:
      # Generate random simulation temperatures between 20 and 40 degrees
temperature = random.randint(20, 40)          message_payload =
f"Temperature: {temperature}"

      # Publish payload string onto designated channel top paths
client.publish(PUBLISH_TOPIC, message_payload)
      print(f"[Published Data Frame] Channel: '{PUBLISH_TOPIC}' -> Msg:
{message_payload}")

      # Suspend thread operation execution for 2 seconds
time.sleep(2)  except KeyboardInterrupt:
   print("\n[-] Publisher task execution halted by user interrupt
         request.")     client.disconnect()
   print("[*] Safely released interface bindings. Process closed.")
```

F.2 MQTT Subscriber Script (subscriber.py)

```
paho.mqtt.client as mqtt   BROKER_HOST = "localhost"
BROKER_PORT = 1883
SUBSCRIBE_TOPIC = "factory/temperature"   def on_connect(client,
userdata, flags, rc):
```

```
    """
    Callback triggered when client links with the server network.
        """      if rc
        == 0:
         print(f"[+] Connection established. Subscribing to topic'{SUBSCRIBE_TOPIC}'")
client.subscribe(SUBSCRIBE_TOPIC)           else:
       print(f"[-] Connection error tracking interface validation alert. Code: {rc}")   def
on_message(client, userdata, msg):
    """
    Callback triggered when an application message packet is received.
    """      try:
       decoded_payload = msg.payload.decode('utf-8')          print(f"[Incoming Stream Data]
Received on '{msg.topic}': {decoded_payload}")      except UnicodeDecodeError:          print(f"[-]
Error: Received binary message block incapable of UTF-8 text translation.")

# Initialize Subscriber Client runtime instance  client = mqtt.Client()
client.on_connect = on_connect  client.on_message =on_message  print(f"[*] Starting
background listening terminal targeting {BROKER_HOST}...")  try:
    client.connect(BROKER_HOST, BROKER_PORT,
keepalive=60)      # Block processing routine continuously to parse incoming frames
client.loop_forever()  except KeyboardInterrupt:        print("\n[-] Subscriber service
offline. Shutting down system interface handlers.")      client.disconnect()
```

F.3 CoAP Server Script (coap_server.py)

```
from aiocoap import resource, Message, Context
class TemperatureResource(resource.Resource):
    """
        Custom CoAP data access endpoint modeling telemetry response routines.
         """
async def render_get(self, request):
       # Serve static benchmark sample telemetry tracking data directly
payload_data = b"Temperature:28"           print("[+] Processing Incoming GET
Request on '/temp' path")
return Message(payload=payload_data)   def
main():        print("[*] Booting localized CoAP application server
engine...")
```

```
    # Map out resource schema routing layout tree boundaries
root_site = resource.Site()   root_site.add_resource(['temp'],
TemperatureResource())

    # Establish server connection tracking profile loops      async def
start_server():
        await      Context.create_server_context(root_site,      bind=("localhost",      5683))
print("[+] CoAP Server is listening actively over port
5683...")

 # Maintain execution running context indefinitely
await asyncio.get_running_loop().create_future()      try:
        asyncio.run(start_server())                  except   KeyboardInterrupt:
print("\n[-] CoAP Core Server environment terminated safely.")     if
__name__ == "__main__":
    main()
```

F.4 CoAP Client Script (coap_client.py)

```
asyncio import sys  from aiocoap import Context,
Message, GET   async def issue_request():
    print("[*] Allocating CoAP context processing container infrastructure...")  protocol_context =
await Context.create_client_context()

    # Define target endpoint URI using local routing configurations      target_uri =
'coap://localhost/temp'      print(f"[*] Compiling outbound GET payload
transaction for URI: {target_uri}")

    request_message = Message(code=GET, uri=target_uri)          try:
        # Dispatch request packet and await execution reply from the server
response_handle = await
protocol_context.request(request_message).response
decoded_response = response_handle.payload.decode('utf-8')
print(f"[+] Server Response Received Successfully -> Result:
{decoded_response}")      except Exception as e:           print(f"[-] Execution Failure: Failed to
pull data from target endpoint: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
if __name__ == "__main__":    try:       asyncio.run(issue_request())     except KeyboardInterrupt:
print("\n[-] Client execution terminated by operator instruction.")
```

F.5 Benchmarking Scripts

Throughput Measurement Script (benchmark_throughput.py) def calculate_throughput_bounds(): print("[*] Initializing throughput logging sequence...") message_limit = 1000 iteration_counter = 0

start_time = time.time()

Track functional loop performance duration over 1000 transactions while iteration_counter < message_limit: iteration_counter += 1
Models microsecond resource usage
execution deltas = iteration_counter * 2

end_time = time.time() execution_delta = end_time - start_time
if execution_delta > 0:
calculated_throughput = iteration_counter / execution_delta print(f"[+] Performance Metric Logged -> Throughput: {calculated_throughput:.2f} msg/s") else:
print("[-] Resolution Alert: Processing execution context occurred too fast to quantify.") if __name__ == "__main__":
calculate_throughput_bounds()
Latency Measurement Script (benchmark_latency.py) def verify_latency_delta():
print("[*] Executing real-time round trip transaction simulation testing...") start_timestamp = time.time()

# Emulate the 200ms networking delay inherent to low-power edge nodes time.sleep(0.2)
end_timestamp = time.time() latency_delta = end_timestamp - start_timestamp print(f"[+] Performance Metric Logged -> RTT Latency: {latency_delta:.4f} seconds ({latency_delta * 1000:.2f} ms)") if __name__ == "__main__": verify_latency_delta()

APPENDIX G: ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

All cybersecurity experiments, active security threat evaluations and protocol vulnerability testing scenarios executed during this study were conducted entirely within a controlled virtualized laboratory containment infrastructure. No external target machines, production public data backbones or live industrial infrastructures were scanned, attacked or interacted with at any stage of this investigation.

All adversarial analysis vectors including network data packet sniffing, automated unauthorized command injections and system message resource denial-of-service flooding scripts were initialized within internal virtual container bridge structures configured explicitly for this research project. The methodologies presented are designed solely for educational analysis and protocol security baseline hardening, ensuring compliance with ethical standards for defensive vulnerability testing.

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