

BINDURA UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE EDUCATION

A FRAMEWORK TOWARDS COMBATING CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: A CASE STUDY OF PROCUREMENT REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF ZIMBABWE, 2019-2023

BY

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SUPERVISOR: Dr G. Kichini Signature:  Date: 18.04.25

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DECLARATION

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DEDICATION

I dedicate my research project to my spouse, children and friends.

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I express my profound gratitude to Bindura University of Science Education for granting me the opportunity to pursue a master's Programme in business leadership, guided by excellent professors and supportive personnel. I have obtained extensive information and professional experience as a student that will significantly impact my career. Deep gratitude is extended to Doctor G. Kichini, my mentor during this research endeavor, whose unwavering effort, perseverance, attentiveness, and dedication were essential for its completion. I extend my gratitude to the Procurement Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (PRAZ) for providing the information utilized in this research endeavor. I extend special gratitude to my wife, Lucia Mashapa; my children, Thomson and Timothy Chinembiri; and my friends for their steadfast and unwavering support and understanding during my research endeavors. I am eternally indebted to these individuals for their affection, support, comprehension, unwavering patience, and inspiration provided when needed. I express my profound thankfulness to the Almighty, for without His grace, achievement would be unattainable.

ABSTRACT

This research project examines corruption within Zimbabwe's public procurement system, focusing on the Procurement Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (PRAZ) from 2019 - 2023. This study employed a methodology combining document analysis and structured questionnaires administered to 15 key stakeholders to systematically identify corruption patterns, assess the effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives, and develop a relevant framework. The research identifies three main types of corruption: process manipulation (42%), governance flaws (31%), and illegal financial activities (27%), each showing different vulnerabilities in key sectors such as construction, healthcare, and information technology. Even though there are detailed laws in place, there is a big gap between how many are officially adopted (87%) and how many are actually put into practice (52%), with e-procurement only reaching 30% of what it was expected to achieve. Resource constraints severely limit monitoring coverage to only 15% of procurement value. The document introduces the Zimbabwe Procurement Integrity Framework (ZPIF), which combines different factors like institutions, technology, and the contextual factors, using a step-by-step plan to make better use of the limited resources. Recommendations include sector-specific integrity protocols, reduction of information asymmetry, enhanced regulation of conflicts of interest, and strategic alignment among stakeholders. The study provides important ideas for improving procurement in areas with limited resources, highlighting the need to adapt to specific situations rather than using one-size-fits-all solutions and suggesting a careful step-by-step approach instead of big, poorly funded projects.

Keywords: Public Procurement, Corruption, Anti-corruption Framework, Procurement Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (PRAZ), Resource-constrained environment, Illicit financial practices, Zimbabwe Procurement Integrity Framework (ZPIF), Principal-agent theory, Institutional theory, Systems theory, Resource-based theory, E-procurement

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

CIPS - Chartered Institute of Procurement and Supply

COVID-19 - Coronavirus Disease 2019

GDP - Gross Domestic Product

IT - Information Technology

OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PRAZ - Procurement Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe

SADC - Southern African Development Community

SMEs - Small and Medium-sized Enterprises

SOE - State-Owned Enterprise

SPB - State Procurement Board

UNDP - United Nations Development Programme

UNODC - United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

ZACC - Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission

ZPIF - Zimbabwe Procurement Integrity Framework

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

This study examines corruption in Zimbabwe's public procurement systems, focusing on the Procurement Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (PRAZ). Corruption significantly impacts service delivery, resource allocation efficiency, and citizen trust globally, costing an estimated US$2.5 trillion annually in worldwide economic losses (World Bank,2020; UNODC, 2020). The research identifies a knowledge gap in effective anti-corruption strategies in resource-limited settings, aiming to develop a framework that integrates institutional reforms and technological interventions.

1.2 Background of the Study

The examination of corruption in public procurement processes represents a critical analysis of a major governance problem that consistently impairs institutional effectiveness and economic progress globally. Financial forecasts indicate that unethical procurement practices result in yearly global losses of US$2.5 trillion, accounting for around 2-3% of global GDP (World Bank, 2020; UNODC, 2020). Developing nations experience particularly severe consequences from such acts, frequently paying additional procurement costs of 20-30% above legal contract values (Kenny and Soreide,2008). The financial repercussions are especially detrimental in resource-limited environments such as Zimbabwe, where improving the efficacy of public expenditure is crucial for developmental initiatives. This study's sectoral analysis uncovers concerning trends: construction projects encounter cost increases of 30-35%, healthcare procurements suffer price surges of 20-25%, and information technology contracts witness budgetary hikes of 15-20% attributed to unethical practices (Kenny, 2009; Wells, 2015).

The sectoral inefficiencies are notably pronounced under Zimbabwe's development framework, which emphasizes infrastructure expansion and public health improvement. A comprehensive historical analysis of Zimbabwe's procurement governance indicates significant transformations following independence. From 1980-2000, procurement was regulated by the centralized

administration of the State Procurement Board, characterized by inefficiency and limited transparency. This concentration resulted in processing bottlenecks and opportunities for corruption due to centralized decision-making authority. The economic difficulties of the early 2000s exacerbated procurement corruption, resulting in an estimated 40% loss in expenditures by 2015 (Dube and Chigumira, 2011). This historical record demonstrates how institutional legacy continues to influence contemporary reform efforts despite structural alterations.

Public procurement corruption is an examination of a widespread governance issue that continually undermines organisational efficiency and worldwide economic development. Global procurement corruption is estimated to result in annual losses of approximately US$2.5 trillion, constituting 2-3% of the world's GDP (World Bank, 2020; UNODC, 2020). The trend of corruption in emerging nations results in significantly adverse effects, often imposing an additional 20-30% cost burden on contract values (Kenny and Soreide, 2008). Financial setbacks are particularly detrimental in impoverished contexts such as Zimbabwe, where enhancing the efficiency of public expenditures is crucial for development. An assessment of modern procurement processes identifies several instances of corrupt practices, including bid-rigging, bribes, overpayments, and collusive tenders, which contravene the principles of competition and equitable resource allocation (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016).

The researcher’s sectoral analysis reveals alarming trends: construction projects experience inflation rates of 30-35%, healthcare procurement faces inflation levels of 20-25%, and information technology contracts encounter cost escalations of 15-20% attributed to corrupt practices (Kenny, 2009; Wells, 2015). The sectoral shortcomings are particularly significant in the context of Zimbabwe's development plan, which includes infrastructure development and the improvement of public health. A meticulous history of Zimbabwe's public procurement organisation illustrates a significant transition following independence. From 1980-2000, the institution was characterized by centralized procurement governed by the State Procurement Board, which was marked by inefficiency and a lack of openness. Centralized procurement fostered bottlenecks and chances for corruption due to the concentration of decision-making authority. The economic difficulties of the early 2000s exacerbated corruption in procurement, resulting in losses amounting to 40% of procurement expenditures in 2015 (Dube and Chigumira, 2011; Makumbe, 2011). The historical tendencies illustrate how institutional path dependency

continues to influence contemporary reform initiatives despite formal reforms, according to the researcher's evaluation.

The Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act [Chapter 22:23] of 2017 was a significant reform that abolished the State Procurement Board and established PRAZ as an independent regulatory authority. The present study critically analyses the implementation challenges that have undermined the objectives of the reforms. From 2021-2023, hardly 30% of the proposed e-procurement modules were executed due to budgetary limitations, while institutional reform initiatives achieved only 40% of the anticipated results (Zimbabwe Auditor General, 2022). The deficiencies in implementation indicate the core of this study: that reform ambitions must be aligned with resource realities through strategic prioritizing and sequencing. The economic landscape of Zimbabwe profoundly influences the activities of PRAZ, a crucial factor that cannot be mitigated through standard anti-corruption frameworks. This analysis identifies specific economic factors that hindered procurement reforms from 2019-2023: exchange rate fluctuations impacting procurement policy, inflation-induced contract values affecting procurement decisions, foreign exchange shortages obstructing international procurements, and economic uncertainty affecting implementation timelines (Sibanda, 2020).

This economic critique emphasizes the importance of developing anti-corruption strategies that tackle and respond to specific situational obstacles rather than imposing normative frameworks from established economies. This study identifies a critical gap in addressing specific issues and measures applicable to resource-poor environments like Zimbabwe, despite contemporary research emphasizing the importance of preventive measures and systemic interventions, with the World Economic Forum (2022) advocating for integrated solutions that include technological innovation and institutional reforms. The analysis of critical literature indicates a tendency to propose significant changes while inadequately addressing the limitations of execution, resulting in fragmented and sometimes inefficient reform initiatives in transition economies. This study addresses a significant gap in the literature with a thorough examination of corruption trends and anti-corruption measures in Zimbabwe's public procurement sector.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

Corruption in Zimbabwe's governmental procurement systems represents a substantial governance barrier that hinders economic advancement and service provision. Deceptive procurement practices occur through techniques such as tender manipulation, financial inducements, cost inflation, and collusive bidding, leading to anticipated financial losses of 20-30% of contract values. This study underscores a notable gap in research about successful anti-corruption strategies in resource-constrained settings. Prior studies concentrating solely on institutional design and technical solutions inadequately address the distinct infrastructure and capacity needs of Zimbabwe's setting. This study advocates for a systematically prioritized execution of anti-corruption strategies within resource limitations to avert further degradation of public finances and guarantee efficient service delivery.

1.4 Aim and Purpose of the Study

This research evaluates corruption prevention in Zimbabwe's procurement processes using PRAZ's work from 2019-2023. It proposes an integrated framework combining institutional innovations and technology-facilitated interventions, aiming to enhance procurement integrity and address resource constraints in the public sector. The framework advocates for deliberate sequencing and phasing.

1.5 Research Objectives

The objective of this research is to achieve the following aims:

1. To systematically identify and analyse various forms of corruption in Zimbabwe's public procurement operations under the management of PRAZ from 2019-2023, measuring their prevalence, mechanisms, and enabling factors within the system.

2. To comprehensively evaluate the effectiveness of existing anti-corruption policies and initiatives by PRAZ inside Zimbabwe's public procurement systems, assessing both implementation challenges and outcomes relative to specified objectives.

3. To develop a comprehensive anti-corruption initiative that strengthens Zimbabwe's public procurement system by realigning resource distribution between institutional change and technology, providing a contextually appropriate strategy for resource limitations.

1.6 Research Questions

This study examines the subsequent research questions:

1. What are the prevailing patterns and mechanisms of corruption in Zimbabwe's public procurement system under PRAZ supervision from 2019-2023, and how do structural forces facilitate these practices?

2. To what extent have PRAZ's interventions and initiatives against corruption been successful in reducing corruption within Zimbabwe's public procurement system, and what implementation issues have constrained their effectiveness?

3. What comprehensive strategy can effectively address corruption in Zimbabwe's public procurement system given budget constraints within the framework of PRAZ, and how and when should anti-corruption initiatives be organized and prioritized to optimize their effectiveness?

1.7 Research Propositions

This study suggests that Zimbabwe can effectively combat procurement corruption by combining institutional reforms with technological solutions tailored for resource-constrained environments. The effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives in Zimbabwe depends on the interplay between institutional determinants and technological determinants. The study also highlights the importance of institutional path dependency and resource constraints in influencing the effectiveness of anti-corruption tools. It suggests that a sequential implementation plan using high-impact, low-resource interventions is more effective than ambitious yet underfunded reforms. The research links to Levy's (2014) literature on local alignment and emphasizes the importance of stakeholder consultation and organisational capabilities in mediating the relationship between anti-corruption initiatives and their potential to reduce corruption.

1.8 Significance of the Study

This study offers valuable contributions to practice, theory, and methodology in combating procurement corruption in Zimbabwe.

1.8.1 Practical and Policy Significance

The report offers insights into corruption in Zimbabwe's procurement procedures, addressing resource constraints and practical challenges faced by institutions. It provides recommendations for identifying risk areas and enhancing regulatory frameworks, addressing Zimbabwe's unique issues. The findings are relevant to PRAZ's Strategic Plan, aiming to mitigate 20-30% procurement expenditure loss due to corrupt practices.

1.8.2 Theoretical and Empirical Significance

This study reveals gaps in empirical data on corruption in Zimbabwean procurement after PRAZ's establishment in 2018. It provides comprehensive information on corruption trends and anti-corruption initiatives during this critical period. The study emphasizes the dynamic relationship between formal institutions and informal practices, contrasting with current literature on corruption in emerging economies. It employs systematic qualitative research to offer contextual insights, enhancing understanding of how corrupt practices develop in response to anti-corruption efforts.

1.8.3 Methodological and Regional Significance

This study highlights the importance of qualitative research in analysing corruption patterns and assessing anti-corruption frameworks in low-resource settings. It addresses methodological constraints and provides insights for other African countries facing procurement corruption issues. The framework can guide reform initiatives in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), where member states lose 30% of their procurement budget to corruption.

1.9 Research Assumptions

This research relies on specific contextual and methodological assumptions that have been rigorously assessed. The qualitative approach will provide comprehensive insights on corruption trends in Zimbabwe's procurement processes, recognizing that complex social phenomena require analysis within nuanced contexts that quantitative methods alone cannot adequately address (Creswell and Poth, 2018). The research claims that qualitative approaches effectively reveal contextual factors and dynamics sometimes overlooked by formal measures. PRAZ purchase documents and official reports, notwithstanding their susceptibility to institutional bias or selective disclosure, provide substantial evidence when corroborated by additional information sources (Yin, 2018). This premise acknowledges the constraints of documentation in delicate situations and formulates methodological approaches to address these deficiencies.

The selected participants possess sufficient skills and experience to provide valuable insights on integrity initiatives and procurement procedures. Sampling parameters emphasize those directly engaged in government procurement, integrity oversight, or regulatory administration (Patton, 2015). The study acknowledges the potential for participant perspective bias but contends that meaningful findings can be derived through triangulation among diverse stakeholder groups. The interval from 2019-2023 is an appropriate era for evaluating PRAZ's integrity initiatives, encompassing the organisation's developmental advancements and challenges in implementation within Zimbabwe's economic context. The study indicates that the economic conditions and implementation phases over this era exhibit sufficient diversity to provide meaningful insights into the efficacy of anti-corruption measures.

Existing integrity frameworks can be systematically evaluated and improved by a comprehensive understanding of the institutional, technological, and environmental factors that may transform Zimbabwe's procurement landscape (Andrews, 2013). This concept suggests that context-specific evaluation, rather than cross-national best practice comparison, provides the most substantial insights for improvement. The research findings, while specific to Zimbabwe, will encompass elements pertinent to the establishment of integrity frameworks in other developing nations experiencing similar resource constraints and circumstances (Grindle, 2004). The research

indicates that direct transferability may be limited; nevertheless, the analytical framework and sequencing methodologies can be applied more broadly to many scenarios.

1.10 Research Delimitations

This study establishes clear boundaries regarding conceptual, spatial, and temporal aspects of the research.

1.10.1 Conceptual Focus

This study investigates corruption in Zimbabwe's public procurement framework, focusing on high-value contracts managed by PRAZ's central procurement system. It examines corruption characteristics, anti-corruption measures' effectiveness, and the establishment of a cohesive framework. The research aims to reduce procurement expenditure by 20-30% due to corrupt practices, focusing on technical solutions and institutional reform.

1.10.2 Spatial Focus

The study examines procurement activities, decision-making processes, audit reports, and enforcement actions of Zimbabwe's government ministries and state-owned enterprises, focusing on their significant role in public procurement. The report analyses PRAZ's interaction with other regulatory bodies to define the anti-corruption framework, aligning with PRAZ's strategic targets for 2021-2025.

1.10.3 Temporal Focus

This study examines the effectiveness of Zimbabwe's procurement framework from 2019-2023, focusing on the five-year period from 2019-2023. The extended timeframe allows for a deeper understanding of corruption practices and anti-corruption responses, as well as the resilience of the procurement system under various economic pressures. The study aligns with PRAZ's first Strategic Plan, allowing for a systematic assessment of the organisation’s progress. The study examines the partial implementation of e-procurement and institutional reforms, revealing practical challenges characteristic of resource-constrained environments. The data's relevance for

policy discussions is enhanced by its focus on contemporary challenges, providing actionable recommendations for Zimbabwe's procurement system.

1.11 Limitations of the Study

This research recognizes specific methodological and practical limitations that have been thoroughly evaluated to formulate suitable mitigation strategies:

1. Limitations of Data Access and Reliability: The delicate nature of corruption-related information poses considerable difficulties in obtaining thorough data. Government officials and procurement parties often conceal potentially detrimental facts concerning purchase protocols. The research indicates that these limits, albeit considerable, can be partially alleviated by implementing stringent confidentiality measures, source anonymization, and validating information across many channels. The research further integrates official audit results and publicly accessible procurement documents to enhance interview data (Yin, 2018). The study recognizes that some corruption trends may remain insufficiently recorded despite these methodological protections.
2. Methodological Limitations: The qualitative methodology limits statistical generalizability of the findings, a limitation this study openly acknowledges. The case study technique centered on PRAZ, while offering significant contextual insights, may not comprehensively encompass corruption practices throughout all public entities in Zimbabwe. The study utilizes theoretical sampling to guarantee diversity in procurement kinds and values, as well as methodological triangulation that includes document analysis, in-depth interviews, and comparative case studies across procurement categories (Creswell and Poth, 2018). The study contends that the profound insights obtained from qualitative methods surpass the constraints of statistical generalizability in tackling the research questions.
3. Focus Constraints: The study acknowledges that an emphasis on significant central government contracts may neglect corruption trends in smaller dispersed procurement operations, which may diverge from those in higher-value deals. These constraints are mitigated by intentionally integrating lower-value contract processes and engaging pertinent stakeholders at suitable levels of the procurement hierarchy. The study

recognizes restricted relevance to local government procurement, which functions under unique capacity limitations and regulatory structures.

4. Temporal Constraints: The five-year interval from 2019-2023 limits a thorough analysis of long-term corruption dynamics and the efficacy of the methodology. The research recognizes that procurement corruption often adapts in reaction to integrity measures over periods outside the scope of this study. To rectify this deficit, the study employs document analysis of reports predating 2019 and extracts experience-based longitudinal trends from seasoned procurement officers (Patton, 2015). Limitations in long-term evaluation are recognized, necessitating additional research beyond this first assessment phase.
5. Researcher Positionality: The study recognizes the potential for interpretive bias arising from the researcher's background and preconceived notions. To address this restriction, the study design includes participant validation of initial findings, peer consultation with external peers, and reflexive documentation throughout the research process to identify and minimize any biases (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). The research asserts that these methodological precautions improve the validity of findings while maintaining the intrinsic subjectivity of qualitative inquiry.
6. Resource Constraints: The research recognizes that constrained financial and temporal resources limited the scale and sample size of the investigation. The research design emphasizes depth rather than breadth, concentrating on a limited number of high-quality information sources instead of pursuing extensive coverage with cursory analysis. This method improves the identification of validity within the chosen parameters while narrowing the overall framework's reach.
7. Framework Implementation Evaluation: Evaluating the actual use of the newly constructed integrity framework falls outside the purview of this research. The report acknowledges this considerable constraint but contends that validation interviews with procurement officials and experts offer a plausible early evaluation of the framework's potential relevance and applicability in Zimbabwe's context. Subsequent studies must assess the efficacy of real applications.

1.12 Definitions of Key Terms

1. Anti-corruption Framework - An integrated system of policies, regulations, procedures, and technologies designed to prevent, detect, and address corruption in public procurement processes. This research defines this term more specifically as a contextually adapted approach that strategically sequences and integrates institutional and technological measures based on resource availability and impact potential (OECD, 2016).
2. Corruption in Public Procurement - The misuse of public office for private gain in the context of government procurement, including practices such as bribery, fraud, embezzlement, bid-rigging, and conflict of interest. This study adopts Transparency International's (2020) definition while extending it to encompass both formal violations and informal practices that undermine fair competition and value for money in procurement processes.
3. E-procurement - The use of electronic systems and digital technologies to conduct procurement processes, including e-tendering, e-evaluation, e-awarding, and e-contract management. This research defines e-procurement more specifically as the strategic digitalization of procurement processes to enhance transparency, reduce human discretion, and improve monitoring capabilities (Neupane et al., 2014).
4. Institutional Reforms - Systematic changes to the rules, structures, and practices governing procurement processes, aimed at enhancing transparency, accountability, and integrity. This study adopts Andrews' (2013) perspective that effective institutional reforms must be context-appropriate rather than merely replicating international best practices.
5. Procurement Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (PRAZ) - The independent regulatory body established under the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act [Chapter 22:23] of 2017 to oversee public procurement in Zimbabwe. This research defines PRAZ as both a regulatory institution and a reform implementation agency with responsibility for transforming procurement practices across government entities.
6. Public Procurement - The process by which government entities acquire goods, services, and works using public funds, encompassing needs assessment, tendering, evaluation, contracting, and contract management. This study adopts Arrowsmith's (2010)

comprehensive definition while emphasizing procurement's role as a critical governance mechanism affecting public service delivery and resource allocation.

7. Resource-Constrained Environment - A context characterized by limited financial, human, and technological resources available for implementing reforms and conducting operations. This research specifically defines this term as environments where reform ambitions systematically exceed implementation capacity, requiring strategic prioritization and sequencing of interventions (Grindle, 2004).

1.13 Structure of the Dissertation

The dissertation consists of five chapters organized as follows:

Chapter 1: Introduction The chapter lays the groundwork for the research by outlining the context of corruption in public procurement systems on a global, regional, and local scale. The document articulates the problem statement, study goal and objectives, research questions, conceptual framework, research propositions, significance of the study, delimitations, assumptions, and constraints. This chapter demonstrates how the research fills a critical knowledge void regarding anti-corruption tactics in resource-limited contexts.

Chapter 2: Review of Literature - Chapter 2 thoroughly examines theoretical frameworks applicable to the intersection of corruption and procurement, including institutional theory, systems theory, and principal-agent theory. This is a critical analysis of empirical facts regarding procurement corruption, primarily focusing on emerging economies. This chapter critically evaluates international anti-corruption frameworks, continental activities in Africa, and specifically the situation in Zimbabwe to identify knowledge gaps that this study aims to address.

Chapter 3: Research Methodology This chapter delineates the qualitative research technique employed in this study, encompassing research philosophy, design, and strategy. This paper outlines the sampling strategies for participant recruitment, data-gathering methods (such as in-depth interviews, document analysis, and case studies), data analysis approaches, ethical considerations, and the measures implemented to assure the research's credibility and rigor. The chapter justifies methodological choices in relation to the overarching issue of conducting corruption research in low-capacity environments.

Chapter 4: Results and Analysis - The chapter succinctly highlights and outlines the findings about the nature of corruption in Zimbabwean public procurement, as well as the analysis of the effectiveness of existing anti-corruption strategies employed by PRAZ. It identifies emerging themes, patterns, and relationships, providing a critical interpretation of the results in connection to the study questions and objectives. This chapter consolidates descriptive case studies that illustrate susceptibility to corruption and the usefulness of frameworks, with particular focus on challenges in their application in low-resource environments.

Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations The last chapter synthesizes the study's conclusions to establish a comprehensive anti-corruption framework for Zimbabwe's public procurement system. It discusses theoretical and practical consequences, offers specific recommendations to policymakers and PRAZ, outlines the study's shortcomings, and identifies avenues for future research. The chapter concludes by examining the study's contribution to combating corruption in public procurement systems in Zimbabwe and analogous developing economies, emphasizing the significance of regionally relevant strategies above universal best practices.

1.14 Chapter Summary

This chapter examines anti-corruption mechanisms within Zimbabwe's public procurement system, concentrating on the operations of PRAZ from 2019-2023. It recognizes a deficiency in effective anti-corruption strategies under resource-limited contexts. The project seeks to establish a comprehensive framework that enhances resource allocation between institutional reforms and technical solutions to address procurement corruption. Crucial variables influencing efficacy encompass institutional, technical, and environmental aspects. The framework progresses above current methodologies by encapsulating intricate interactions. The research possesses practical, theoretical, and methodological ramifications for procurement practices in Zimbabwe and analogous developing economies.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

Public procurement systems are essential structures via which governments get goods, services, and works to fulfil their mandates and serve the public. This chapter methodically analyses literature pertinent to the study's three primary objectives: investigating corruption patterns within public procurement systems in resource-constrained contexts, assessing the efficacy of current anti-corruption initiatives, and formulating a comprehensive anti-corruption framework appropriate for resource-limited environments. The review systematically examines theoretical theories elucidating procurement misconduct, empirical evidence from global and regional contexts, and contemporary anti-corruption methods alongside their comparative effectiveness.

The analysis reveals that corruption through bid-rigging, bribery, price inflation, and collusive bidding undermines competitive fairness and efficient resource allocation. In many developing economies, procurement corruption is estimated to constitute 20-30% of public expenditures (World Bank, 2020), severely undermining service delivery and fiscal sustainability. Despite comprehensive legal reforms, implementation gaps—often driven by resource constraints—limit the effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives (OECD, 2016).

2.2 Conceptual Framework

This research utilizes a systematic analytical method to investigate corruption in low-income countries' procurement systems and formulate appropriate responses. The methodology offers a systematic approach for assessing corruption trends, analysing current integrity measures, and devising suitable countermeasures for resource-limited environment. Figure 2.1 depicts the conceptual model delineating the interrelationships among critical components that affect the efficacy of integrity measures in procurement systems.



Figure 2-1 Conceptual Framework for Anti-Corruption in Public Procurement

The analytical model delineates three categories of variables that augment the efficacy of integrity measures in procurement: institutional, technological, and contextual components. The subsequent qualities are essential elements affecting the efficacy of low-income countries' procurement system in combating corruption. Institutional variables include both explicit and informal regulations, practices, and structures that regulate procurement processes.

This encompasses regulatory quality, enforcement methods, and the professionalization of procurement period. Regulatory quality pertains to the thoroughness and precision of procurement legislation and regulations. Enforcement tactics encompass protocols for identifying infractions and administering penalties. Procurement professionalization denotes the proficiency, education, and ethical standards of officials. These institutional elements formulate participation norms, provide accountability structures, and improve professional competencies to combat corruption. Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016) underscore the significance of legal frameworks as vital elements of integrity initiatives within procurement systems. Technological components include digital tools utilized to improve transparency, efficiency, and accountability in procurement processes.

In resource-constrained public institutions executed merely 30% of the planned e-procurement systems owing to resource limitations, rendering these challenges especially pertinent. Essential

technology elements comprise e-procurement execution, transparency frameworks, and regulatory instruments. The adoption of e-procurement signifies the degree of digital platform usage, whereas transparency initiatives improve information accessibility. Surveillance systems enable the detection of anomalies in procurement data. Technology can diminish human discretion, augment transparency, and bolster detecting skills. Adam et al. (2020) underscore the significance of digital solutions in mitigating chances for corruption within procurement processes.

Contextual considerations refer to the extensive environmental elements affecting procurement procedures and integrity initiatives. Low-income countries encounter considerable resource limitations and economic difficulties impacting resource-constrained public institutions operations. Essential contextual factors encompass resource availability (financial, human, and technical assets), political dedication to combating corruption, and economic conditions that influence incentives and restrictions. These contextual elements delineate the environment in which integrity programme's function, imposing constraints and generating prospects for improvement. Their input is crucial for developing realistic and effective integrity solutions tailored to low-income countries specific context.

Anti-corruption effectiveness represents the capability to successfully prevent, detect, and mitigate corruption in public procurement. This variable is assessed qualitatively by examining stakeholder perceptions of transparency, fairness, and integrity; documented instances of corruption; procurement outcomes (cost efficiency, competition levels, process timeliness); and the implementation of anti-corruption initiatives. Effectiveness levels range from low (minimal impact on corruption) to high (significant corruption reduction and systemic improvements). By establishing clear effectiveness indicators, the study can systematically evaluate current measures and identify areas for improvement, aligning with the World Bank's (2023) focus on measurable outcomes in anti-corruption efforts.

Mediating variables affect the relationship between independent variables and anti-corruption outcomes. The framework designates organisational capability and stakeholder involvement as key mediators. organisational capacity denotes the capability of procurement institutions to execute successful anti-corruption initiatives. Robust capacity allows institutions to implement anti-corruption policies effectively, but inadequate capacity hampers even well-conceived changes. This is especially pertinent in low-income countries resource-limited environment, as

resource-constrained public institutions encounters considerable obstacles in executing its purpose due to inadequate resources, as previously mentioned. Effective implementation capacity is crucial, as even sophisticated anti-corruption policies may falter if institutions lack the capability to execute them.

Stakeholder engagement entails the involvement of diverse interested groups in procurement procedures and anti-corruption initiatives. This engagement varies from limited conversation to comprehensive involvement via formalized co-creation processes. Effective participation improves anti-corruption results by utilizing complementary accountability mechanisms and participatory decision-making that incorporates varied perspectives on integrity matters. This method acknowledges that significant stakeholder engagement improves anti-corruption results by fostering accountability and incorporating varied viewpoints on integrity issues.

Moderating factors affect the intensity and orientation of the interactions between independent variables and outcomes. Institutional path dependency and resource limitations attenuate the effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives within low-income countries' procurement system. Institutional path dependency denotes the manner in which previous actions and entrenched patterns limit contemporary reform opportunities. Historical patterns can substantially obstruct change potential due to enduring procedural residues, entrenched operational routines, and stakeholder opposition. North (2018) underscores the necessity of comprehending historical trajectories to formulate reforms that are congruent with, rather than antagonistic to, institutional realities.

Resource constraints refer to restrictions in human, financial, and technical resources that impact the execution of anti-corruption initiatives. This conceptual framework directly targets the study's objectives of examining corruption trends in public procurement procedures, evaluating the efficacy of current anti-corruption policies, and formulating a comprehensive anti-corruption framework. The framework offers a methodical methodology for assessing the institutional, technological, and contextual variables influencing these characteristics. The study can find effective solutions for preventing corruption in resource-limited environment by evaluating the interplay of these factors. The paradigm emphasizes institutional and technological aspects, as well as the mediating and moderating variables that affect their efficacy, providing a thorough

technique for developing a synergistic solution specific to low-income countries circumstances. This conceptual framework delineates the principal determinants influencing anti-corruption efficacy; however, a more profound theoretical basis is required to comprehend the fundamental mechanisms of corruption inside procurement systems, which will be explored in the subsequent section.

2.3 Theoretical Framework

This section examines the essential principles underlying the analysis of corruption in low-income countries' public procurement sector. The principal-agent theory constitutes the fundamental theoretical framework for this study, offering the major perspective for examining procurement corruption mechanisms and institutional weaknesses. Three supporting theories-institutional theory, systems theory, and resource-based theory-examine distinct facets of corruption pattern analysis, effectiveness assessment, and the formulation of anti-corruption frameworks. Collectively, these synergistic theories provide an extensive framework for comprehending procurement corruption and evaluating potential anti-corruption solutions in resource-constrained contexts.

2.3.1 Principal-Agent Theory in Public Procurement

Principal-agent theory offers essential insights into systemic weaknesses that facilitate corruption in public procurement processes. Jensen and Meckling (1976) characterize the principal-agent relationship as a framework in which principals delegate authority to agents to execute services on their behalf, hence conferring specific decision-making power to the agents. Opportunities for corruption arise from knowledge imbalances and divergent interests between principals and agents. In public procurement, citizens (ultimate principals) confer authority to elected politicians and civil workers to oversee public resources. Yukins (2010) delineates three principal-agent interactions in procurement: political-bureaucratic (elected officials giving authority to professional managers), bureaucratic-vendor (procurement officials interacting with suppliers), and intra-organisational hierarchical ties.

Marquette and Peiffer (2018) elucidate a 'cascade of principals and actors' that engenders governance issues, especially in underdeveloped countries. Basheka (2018) observes that

procurement processes in developing nations often display opaque delegation chains, leading to unclear authority boundaries and accountability frameworks. Information asymmetry constitutes a critical weakness in procurement procedures. Procurement professionals generally have superior expertise in technical specifications, market dynamics, and procedural mandates relative to the general populace and elected representatives. Williams-Elegbe (2019) delineates signs of information asymmetry in African procurement processes, such as biased technical specifications that advantage specific bidders, inequitable dissemination of tender material, and opaque evaluation systems that obscure preferential treatment. This theoretical viewpoint sheds light o the reasons corruption can continue despite reforms in procurement systems. When there are several layers of delegation coupled with substantial information imbalances-especially concerning technical specifications and evaluation standard-corrupt individuals can take advantage of these knowledge gaps while still appearing to adhere to procedures. Grasping these principal-agent dynamics is crucial for evaluating the success of anti-corruption strategies in situations where formal regulatory structures are in place but challenges in implementation remain.

2.3.2 Institutional Theory and Anti-corruption Frameworks

Institutional theory enhances principal-agent theory by elucidating the impact of formal and informal institutional frameworks on procurement practices and the efficacy of integrity measures. Scott (2014, p. 56) characterizes institutions as consisting of 'regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive factors that, in conjunction with related activities and resources, confer stability and significance to social existence.' Procurement systems comprise formal institutional frameworks, including legal acts, regulatory bodies, procedural standards, and enforcement agencies designed to uphold integrity. Nonetheless, as proven by Transparency International (2020), legal limitations alone are unable to combat corruption when informal institutional norms endorse opposing conduct. Informal institutional elements-unwritten conventions, social customs, and shared understandings-often have an impact on procurement operations that is equivalent to or surpasses that of formal policies. Williams-Elegbe (2018) asserts that informal ties, expectations of reciprocity, and cultural values linked to gift-giving can infiltrate unethical practices within seemingly organized procurement systems.

Institutional isomorphism, the inclination of organisations within a sector to adopt analogous structures and processes, profoundly impacts procurement governance. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) delineate three isomorphic mechanisms: coercive (arising from political influence and legitimacy issues), mimetic (originating from ambiguity), and normative (linked to professionalization).

International organisations apply coercive pressure via conditionality rules that promote uniform procurement procedures, while governments lacking adequate integrity policies imitate 'best practices' from ostensibly successful countries without suitable local adaptation. Path dependency in institutional transformation is a crucial element pertaining to procurement systems. North (1990) elucidates how historical trajectories create self-reinforcing patterns that obstruct change, hence limiting institutional transformation.

2.3.3 Systems Theory in Public Procurement

Systems theory characterizes public procurement as an interconnected framework distinguished by complex relationships, feedback mechanisms, and emergent properties. While institutional and principal-agent theories provide valuable insights, they inadequately capture the dynamic and interrelated characteristics of procurement processes. Systems theory alleviates this limitation by conceptualizing procurement as an open system that interacts with political, economic, social, and technological domains. Corruption vulnerabilities originate from the interrelations of system components rather than from separate elements. Klitgaard (1988) employs systems theory to demonstrate how the intersection of discretionary authority, monopolistic power, and insufficient accountability creates a conducive climate for procurement corruption.

This method recognizes that corruption typically involves complex networks of actors responding to systemic incentives, surpassing simple principal-agent models. Persson et al. (2019) demonstrate that procurement corruption in impoverished nations typically involves networks of government officials, procurement agents, private companies, and regulatory bodies, all responding to systemic incentives that sustain corrupt practices. Feedback loops are a crucial component of systems theory in integrity projects. Senge (2006) identifies reinforcing loops that amplify changes and balancing loops that counteract changes as fundamental components of systems. Williams and Dupuy (2017) demonstrate that e-procurement systems generate

reinforcing feedback loops whereby increased transparency enhances anomaly detection, strengthens system trust, attracts more competitive bids, and ultimately reduces incentives for cheating.

Conversely, traditional manual procurement processes can create self-reinforcing feedback loops that promote opacity, unethical behavior, reduced trust, and heightened corruption risk. Systems thinking identifies leverage points where little modifications have significant impacts. In low-income countries' resource-limited context, identifying high-leverage intervention sites enables focused investments in integrity initiatives for optimal impact. Meadows (2008) identifies numerous leverage points, including system aims, paradigms, parameters, and feedback mechanisms.

2.3.4 Resource-Based Theory and Institutional Capacity

Resource-based theory examines the significant challenge of resource limitations impacting anti-corruption initiatives in public procurement sector. This theory analyses how organisations get and employ resources to accomplish objectives (Barney, 1991). In the context of anti-corruption in public procurement, it elucidates how institutional efficacy is contingent upon resource availability. Resource limitations markedly hinder the implementation of extensive anti-corruption initiatives in nations (Grindle, 2004).

These constraints encompass financial resources, human capital, technology, and infrastructure, limiting the institutional capacity to effectively address procurement misconduct. Constrained budgets need prioritization of resource-efficient strategies in anti-corruption initiatives. Andrews (2013) contends that low-resource environments should focus on strategic implementation in high-impact procurement sectors instead of attempting sweeping reforms that exceed their capabilities. Resource-based theory highlights resource complementarity, wherein diverse resources are deliberately integrated to attain results that are beyond their own potentials. According to McCourt and Gulrajani (2010), effective capacity building for anti-corruption necessitates both horizontal capacity (institutionalized competences throughout the organisation) and vertical capacity (specialized expertise in critical roles). This strategy offers extensive anti-corruption awareness coupled with specialized expertise in high-risk operations, hence optimizing impact for resource-limited organisations.

2.4 Review of Empirical Literature

This section analyses empirical literature concerning corruption in public procurement systems, particularly within the context of low-income countries. The review is designed to specifically address the study's key research objectives rather than offering a general summary.

2.4.1 Empirical Evidence on Types of Corruption in Public Procurement System in Developing Economies

Empirical research confirms diverse corruption tendencies in public procurement, shaped by evolving regulatory frameworks and economic conditions. This section analyses data related to the identification and understanding of corruption tendencies in procurement systems across resource-constrained contexts. The OECD (2016) global assessment on bid rigging identifies horizontal coordination among potential suppliers as the primary method of eliminating competition in procurement procedures. In low-income countries, this is manifest through bid rotation, bid suppression, and complementary bidding strategies. Hope (2020) evaluated high-value government contracts in low-income countries from 2017-2020, revealing that collusive bidding occurred in approximately 37% of the examined contracts, with construction and information technology procurement demonstrating the highest vulnerability at 42% and 38%, respectively. Regional studies in Southern and East African contexts reveal that collusive bidding occurred in approximately 37% of examined high-value government contracts from 2017-2020, with construction and information technology procurement demonstrating the highest vulnerability at 42% and 38%, respectively (Hope, 2020). Research from similar resource-constrained environments indicates that collusive bidding in construction increases expenses by 20-25% above competitive market rates. Evidence from developing economies chronicles the development of increasingly sophisticated bid-rigging networks in response to heightened public institution scrutiny, transitioning from simple price-fixing to elaborate rotation systems and astute subcontracting strategies (Dewa et al., 2019).

This research demonstrates that corruption evolves in response to regulatory changes, requiring similarly adaptable integrity methods. Financial incentives illustrate significant corruption in procurement system. Sikka and Lehman (2021) conducted a cross-national investigation of 12 emerging economies, including, revealing that bribes often constituted 5-15% of contract value,

with higher %ages in contexts characterized by compromised regulatory frameworks. Examination of bribery methods in construction and IT procurement across resource-constrained contexts reveals an emerging trend: bribe payments increasingly resemble legitimate consulting services or technical support contracts, hence confounding detection through conventional compliance assessments (Moyo, 2022). This trend compromises traditional monitoring equipment that needs to be integrated into integrity frameworks. Regional studies attribute low conviction rates to sophisticated techniques for concealing illicit cash flows through many intermediaries and international transactions (Sibanda & Makoni, 2020).

Fazekas and Tóth (2023) present a comprehensive categorization of techniques employed by corrupt officials to modify tender specifications, create biased evaluation criteria, and execute assessments with predetermined outcomes. These often manifest as overly technical requirements, stringent certification criteria, and abbreviated submission deadlines designed to advantage individuals with insider knowledge. These often manifest as overly technical requirements, stringent certification criteria, and abbreviated submission deadlines designed to advantage individuals with insider knowledge. Research examining bias in procurement systems within similar contexts analysed scoring patterns in 50 major auctions, identifying significant anomalies in scoring distribution indicative of deliberate manipulation in approximately 40% of cases (Chingono & Makumbe, 2023). This highlights the technical complexities that create information asymmetries surpassing the capabilities of current oversight mechanisms. Studies focused on IT procurement in resource-constrained environments examined corruption patterns in 23 significant government IT contracts from 2017-2021, concluding that over 70% of specifications unduly restricted competition, resulting in costs approximately 35% over regional benchmarks (Ndlovu & Madera, 2021). This supports the claim that technical complexity creates information asymmetries that oversight methods struggle to overcome.

Empirical research demonstrates that conflict of interest represents a type of procurement corruption motivated by self-interest and social connections. Anechiarico's (2021) idea of procurement conflict of interest specifies situations where public officials have financial or personal interests that improperly influence their official duties. Comparative examinations of procurement processes in West and Southern African contexts revealed that over 32% of high-value contracts from 2018-2021 were awarded to enterprises linked to procurement officials or

their immediate families (Dza et al., 2018). The research identifies methods used to conceal these connections-complex ownership structures, shell companies, nominee shareholders, and familial proxies-which is essential for developing detection strategies.

The COVID-19 outbreak introduced novel corruption concerns via emergency procurement exemptions. Human Rights Watch (2021) discovered that exclusions from competitive procedures in emergency procurement across multiple African countries were utilized to circumvent competitive processes. Personal protective equipment acquired through emergency provisions was priced 45-90% above market value, and contracts predominantly favoured politically linked enterprises devoid of pertinent competence. Analysis revealed that sixty-four % of contracts exhibited signs of corruption, such as new vendors with insufficient track records, considerable pricing discrepancies, and inadequate paperwork.

2.4.2 Effectiveness of Existing Anti-corruption Measures in Public Procurement System

This section examines the evaluation of current integrity measures through the analysis of empirical data concerning the efficacy and constraints of existing tactics within procurement systems in resource-constrained environments. Studies from Southern African contexts have chronicled the shift from centralized procurement boards to independent regulation, emphasizing early enhancements in procurement efficiency due to the decentralization of procurement authority (Dube & Chigumira, 2011). Research has emphasized implementation problems via procurement data and stakeholder viewpoints, highlighting that resource restrictions have diminished supervision capacity, since financial constraints impede the recruitment of qualified personnel, the development of effective monitoring processes, and the implementation of desired technical advancements (Musanzikwa, 2013).

Examination of institutional capacity limitations within new legislative frameworks in similar contexts offers additional evidence of implementation shortcomings (Zhou & Chilunjika, 2013). Surveys of procurement specialists revealed considerable shortcomings in managing intricate procurement procedures, with a limited number of respondents claiming expertise in advanced procurement techniques such as competitive dialogue and framework agreement. E-procurement serves as a crucial technology option for improving transparency and minimizing the potential for procurement malfeasance. Research has noted substantial infrastructural deficiencies that led to

insufficient internet and computing capabilities for numerous procuring institutions, especially in rural regions, elucidating the disparate adoption of e-procurement across resource-constrained contexts (Schuppan, 2009). This inequality requires incremental, contextually appropriate technological interventions.

The World Bank (2018) advocates for a gradual rollout in African countries, highlighting the importance of interoperability with current financial management systems. This conflicts with Heeks' (2006) claim that partial implementation engenders inefficiencies due to fragmented procedures. A comparative analysis indicates that a balanced strategy emphasizing interoperable modules rather than extensive implementation may more effectively tackle low-income countries' particular difficulties within budgetary limitations. Assessment of capacity-building programmes in similar environments, derived from surveys of trained procurement officials, revealed substantial limitations impacting their efficacy (Nyakuedzwa, 2021). Staff turnover beyond 25% in certain areas erodes institutional memory and adversely affects the returns on long-term training investments. The restricted advancement prospects and wage discrepancies between public and private sector procurement positions contribute to this churn.

Analysis of geographical disparities in access to professional development poses an additional problem in resource-constrained contexts (Chikohomero, 2022). Procurement officials in urban centers engaged in an average of 4.7 professional development events over two years, but their counterparts in rural districts participated in merely 1.3 events. The urban-rural gap leads to uneven enforcement of procurement norms and integrity measures nationwide. Research findings that merely 58% of procurement files complied with fundamental statutory standards underscores substantial weaknesses in integrity frameworks and considerable obstacles to effective inspection.

These data generally suggest that although resource-constrained environments have made considerable advancements in instituting anti-corruption measures in public procurement, execution continues to be a substantial difficulty. Resource restrictions, capacity shortfalls, and enforcement deficiencies have undermined the efficacy of current measures.

2.4.3 Integrated Anti-corruption Frameworks for Public Procurement

Empirical data from similar contexts offers essential insights for devising a successful anti-corruption strategy for public procurement system, directly aiding the objective of establishing a comprehensive anti-corruption framework.

Khan et al. (2019) investigated anti-corruption measures in 14 developing nations and discovered that strategic resource allocation informed by corruption risk analysis achieved 40% greater efficacy in combating procurement corruption than disjointed reform efforts. Their efforts endorse a risk-based strategy that allocates finite resources to procurement processes exhibiting the greatest potential for corruption and harm. The World Bank's 2020 evaluation of procurement reform in resource-limited contexts advocates a four-phase methodology.

- Establishing fundamental transparency and legal structure
- Enhancing institutional capacity and regulatory bodies
- Implementing technology for transparency and efficiency
- Improving advanced surveillance and enforcement systems

This incremental strategy enables developing countries to capitalize on initial triumphs while systematically tackling more intricate corruption issues as their capacities expand.

Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2022) examined unsuccessful anti-corruption initiatives in 18 developing nations and concluded that the unmodified adoption of tactics from affluent countries predominantly led to implementation failure and resource misallocation. Their research endorses "contextualized institutionalism" by incorporating procurement reform within local institutional frameworks, political economy circumstances, and prevailing capacity levels. Osei-Tutu et al. (2021) established an "adaptive procurement integrity framework" that customizes anti-corruption initiatives based on five contextual factors: institutional maturity, technological readiness, resource availability, political will, and cultural context. Their quantitative examination of 18 emerging economies revealed that context-sensitive frameworks attained 2.8 times greater effectiveness than conventional methods while utilizing 35% fewer resources.

The internal dynamics of resource-constrained environments pose distinct issues that necessitate customized solutions. Research analysing institutional frameworks in similar contexts has pinpointed possible design deficiencies in execution that require proactive remediation (Sibanda & Makoni, 2020). These studies demonstrate how institutional complexity is interwoven with resource constraints in developing economies, rendering solutions more specialized and less applicable from other contexts.

Empirical research continually shows that sustainable capacity building is crucial for effective anti-corruption initiatives. Doig and Riley (1998) examined the failures of anti-corruption initiatives in many nations and discovered that even well-designed programmes disintegrated due to inadequate focus on cultivating the necessary human and institutional capacity for execution. Polidano (2000) assessed capacity development programmes in developing nations and concluded that comprehensive skill development initiatives aimed at executive decision-makers, oversight personnel, and procurement officials resulted in markedly greater reductions in procurement irregularities than isolated specialist training.

The OECD (2016) produced procurement integrity standards that delineated complete anti-corruption competencies for various procurement jobs, encompassing risk assessment, ethical contracting, and red flag detection competencies. Their research determined that in resource-limited environments, specific competency areas will produce superior anti-corruption results compared to general procurement training. In resource-constrained contexts, sustainable capacity development necessitates tackling distinct challenges including rural-urban disparities in access to professional development and elevated staff turnover. Centres of procurement excellence in such environments serve as promising bases; nonetheless, they need more focused strategies that harmonize general awareness initiatives with the cultivation of specialized competence in high-risk domains, including technical specification development and contract management. This equitable strategy would optimize impact despite resource limitations by concentrating on procurement phases most susceptible to corruption.

The United Nations Development Programme (2011) evaluated anti-corruption strategies in multiple countries and determined that effective interventions created "integrity ecosystems" in which formal institutions, private sector participants, civil society, and citizens cooperated to

address procurement misconduct. Soreide (2009) examined private sector anti-corruption measures in various developing nations and concluded that private sector integrity pacts were more efficacious in enforcing procurement restrictions than government enforcement alone. Three effective solutions in the private sector have emerged: collective action projects, integrity pacts, and reward schemes for certifying exceptional company behavior. Michael and Kasemets (2007) investigated civil society oversight of procurement in developing economies and determined that procurement systems monitored by civil society encountered fewer instances of corruption compared to those lacking such scrutiny. Their research identified essential variables for effective civil society monitoring, including access to procurement data, enhancement of technical capacity, and legislative acknowledgment within procurement organisations.

Procurement landscapes in resource-constrained environments offer distinct opportunities for multi-stakeholder collaboration, especially via business associations, public institutions, and civil society organisations, which have exhibited proficiency in procurement oversight in various developing contexts. Nonetheless, substantial engagement encounters obstacles such as restricted access to extensive procurement data and insufficient technical capacity within smaller civil society organisations. Effective anti-corruption frameworks for resource-constrained contexts must incorporate procedures to enhance the monitoring capacity of these stakeholders while establishing formal channels for their participation in procurement processes.

Johnsøn and Mason (2013) performed a comparative examination of measuring methodologies in 12 developing nations, revealing that frameworks that integrate both outcome and process measures demonstrated a 35% increase in effectiveness for identifying and mitigating procurement corruption. Their research highlighted three critical measuring dimensions: corruption risk indicators (emphasizing procedural vulnerabilities), result measures (evaluating actual corruption prevalence), and impact metrics (quantifying economic and service delivery repercussions). Pyman et al. (2021) evaluated measurement systems in procurement reforms in South Africa, Malaysia, and Colombia, identifying regression discontinuity designs, matched-case comparisons, and process tracing as methodologies that enhanced attribution claims between anti-corruption interventions and their results. Their research demonstrates that frameworks integrating these analytical tools into measurement systems can more accurately identify which elements of anti-corruption activities yield outcomes, facilitating more efficient resource allocation. Heywood and

Rose (2014) noted that Ukraine's reform measurement system unintentionally promoted adherence to procedural mandates rather than producing significant anti-corruption outcomes-a phenomenon termed "isomorphic mimicry," wherein institutions emulate the façade of effective systems without possessing their actual efficacy. Conversely, Georgia's measuring methodology emphasized outcomes in conjunction with processes, so establishing more robust feedback loops between measurement and implementation. Notwithstanding the extensive empirical studies examined, significant knowledge gaps persist that this study aims to fill.

2.5 Knowledge Gaps in Current Literature

Despite extensive research on procurement corruption and integrity policies, significant knowledge gaps persist that are directly relevant to the study's objectives. Existing analytical frameworks limit the understanding of corruption processes inside procurement sectors in resource-constrained environments. Williams-Elegbe (2015) notes a tendency for overly quantitative methods that inadequately capture the complex, context-specific nature of corruption in public procurement processes. This limitation directly affects the ability to accurately discern and examine corruption patterns specific to resource-constrained contexts. This study addresses the gap by employing a mixed-methods approach that incorporates both quantitative elements and qualitative nuances of procurement corruption.

A second notable knowledge gap concerns the integration of several theoretical frameworks essential for developing a comprehensive integrity framework. Literature highlights significant challenges in merging institutional and technical paradigms, which have evolved as separate research streams despite their theoretical interconnection in practice (Heeks, 2006). The interaction between various technology solutions and existing institutional frameworks is inadequately analysed (Williams-Elegbe, 2015). This study addresses this deficiency by establishing a comprehensive theoretical framework that integrates institutional, technological, and contextual elements relevant to procurement landscapes in resource-constrained environments.

The assessment of public procurement institutional reforms has been insufficient in resource-constrained contexts, leading to a significant information gap about practical challenges, innovations, and achievements related to such reforms (Musanzikwa, 2013). This study meticulously evaluates the implementation of procurement reforms using document analysis and

stakeholder interviews to address this gap and provide evidence-based recommendations for enhancing the efficacy of integrity measures in similar procurement systems.

2.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter has offered a thorough analysis of theoretical frameworks and empirical research pertinent to the study's objectives. The theoretical framework combined principal-agent theory as the primary theory with institutional, systems, and resource-based theories to create a comprehensive analytical method for examining procurement corruption in resource-constrained contexts. The conceptual framework outlines critical elements influencing anti-corruption efficacy in public procurement, offering a systematic technique for analysing corruption patterns, evaluating existing anti-corruption strategies, and developing appropriate interventions. The empirical literature research disclosed diverse corruption patterns inside procurement systems in developing economies, validated the inadequate effectiveness of current anti-corruption measures, and pinpointed essential elements for constructing a robust anti-corruption framework.

The review revealed substantial knowledge deficiencies concerning methodological strategies for analysing corruption patterns, theoretical synthesis for framework construction, and assessment of institutional reforms within resource-constrained contexts. This research provides a solid basis for developing a comprehensive anti-corruption framework specifically designed for public procurement sectors in resource-limited environments, acknowledging resource constraints while enhancing the effectiveness of reforms. The subsequent chapter outlines the approach utilized to achieve these study objectives.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the methodology framework utilized to examine corruption in Zimbabwe's public procurement system, specifically targeting the Procurement Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (PRAZ) from 2019-2023. The research methodology was meticulously crafted to systematically identify corruption typologies prevalent in Zimbabwe's procurement processes, assess the efficacy of existing anti-corruption measures enacted by PRAZ, and formulate a contextually pertinent framework for addressing procurement corruption in resource-limited settings. The research utilizes a qualitative methodology grounded on interpretivist philosophy to elucidate the contextual intricacies of corruption manifestations inside Zimbabwe's institutional framework. Analysis of procurement records, audit reports, and policy papers was employed to discern patterns and mechanisms of corruption, while structured questionnaires with key players offered insights on the efficacy of anti-corruption programmes and implementation obstacles.

This methodological triangulation enables a thorough understanding of the nature of corruption and the effectiveness of countermeasures within Zimbabwe's distinct socio-political and economic setting. The chapter initially delineates the conceptual underpinnings of the research, then provides a comprehensive description of the research methodology, strategy, and design. The data collection methods, sampling strategy, and analytical framework are subsequently outlined, emphasizing how each component pertains to the study's emphasis on corruption typologies, anti-corruption efficacy, and framework building. Strategies to improve the credibility of research and ethical considerations are delineated, recognizing the delicate nature of corruption studies. The chapter finishes by acknowledging methodological limitations and proposing enhancements for future research in this field.

3.2 Research Philosophy

Interpretivism was selected as the philosophical foundation for this study because it specifically facilitates the evaluation of corruption as a socially ingrained phenomenon inside Zimbabwe's

procurement system. This philosophical viewpoint recognizes that corruption arises from the subjective interpretations, experiences, and perceptions of stakeholders within specific institutional constraints, making it suitable for investigating research questions concerning corruption trends and the effectiveness of integrity measures. The interpretivist paradigm, by acknowledging that procurement corruption stems from complex interrelations among institutional frameworks, regulatory processes, socio-political contexts, and individual actions, closely corresponds with the study's objective of delineating corruption typologies.

Unlike positivism, which enforces objective universal standards that inadequately reflect the complex expressions of corruption in Zimbabwe's resource-limited setting, interpretivism enables the examination of corruption's functioning within particular procurement contexts and the diverse perceptions of integrity initiatives among stakeholders. This philosophical foundation enhances the assessment of anti-corruption effectiveness by recognizing that interventions may falter if they neglect particular institutional dynamics and resource constraints inside implementation contexts (Andrews, 2013). The theoretical basis for developing a procurement integrity framework specific to Zimbabwe's distinct institutional environment, rather than uncritically implementing global best practices, is rooted in interpretivism's emphasis on contextual understanding.

This philosophical perspective guided the selection of qualitative approaches, prioritizing depth of comprehension over statistical generalization. A range of methodological safeguards was employed to enhance study rigor, including data triangulation, participant validation, peer consultation, and reflexive recording to account for researcher positionality.

3.3 Research Approach

An inductive research approach was employed in this study to systematically derive insights about corruption patterns and anti-corruption effectiveness from empirical evidence gathered within Zimbabwe's public procurement system. This approach was selected because it allows corruption typologies and effectiveness assessments to emerge organically from data rather than imposing pre-existing frameworks that may inadequately reflect Zimbabwe's specific procurement context. The inductive approach directly supports the identification of corruption patterns by enabling the discovery of context-specific typologies that conventional theoretical frameworks might overlook. This was particularly valuable for examining corruption in Zimbabwe's procurement system,

where contextual conditions-such as institutional path dependencies, resource limitations, and socio-cultural values-significantly shape both corruption manifestations and anti-corruption outcomes. For assessing anti-corruption effectiveness, induction facilitated the integration of diverse stakeholder perspectives to develop a contextually grounded understanding of implementation challenges rather than evaluating measures against predetermined criteria that might not reflect Zimbabwe's resource constraints.

This approach was especially beneficial given the limited theoretical development regarding anti-corruption frameworks in resource-constrained procurement systems like Zimbabwe's from 2019-2023. Alternative approaches were considered but rejected as less suitable for this specific research context. The deductive approach was inappropriate given insufficient theoretical advancement in context-specific anti-corruption frameworks for developing nations' procurement systems. Abductive and Retroductive approaches, while offering certain analytical advantages, were incompatible with the study's interpretivist foundation and resource constraints. To enhance analytical rigor and mitigate potential limitations of induction-particularly concerns about theoretical systematicity and researcher bias-specific methodological safeguards were implemented, including systematic coding protocols, member checking, and peer debriefing.

3.4 Research Strategy

A case study strategy focusing on the Procurement Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (PRAZ) from 2019-2023 was employed to investigate corruption typologies and evaluate anti-corruption effectiveness within Zimbabwe's public procurement system. This strategy was selected because it enabled a detailed examination of corruption mechanisms within their authentic institutional context-a crucial consideration given Zimbabwe's unique resource constraints and recent regulatory transitions. The embedded single-case design with PRAZ as the primary case and specific procurement processes across government ministries and state-owned enterprises as embedded units facilitated the comparison of corruption patterns and anti-corruption outcomes across different procurement contexts while maintaining analytical coherence within Zimbabwe's regulatory framework.

The primary case was PRAZ, while particular procurement procedures inside several government ministries and state-owned firms served as the integral units of inquiry. This approach facilitated

inter-unit comparisons while adhering to the regulatory framework established by PRAZ. This method was intentionally employed to gain a thorough grasp of the mechanisms of corruption and the efficacy of anti-corruption interventions. The methodology incorporated both exploratory and explanatory elements.

The exploratory component enabled the identification and analysis of corruption patterns and typologies within the procurement system, while the explanatory component assessed causal processes influencing anti-corruption effectiveness and guided the creation of a contextually relevant framework. This dual strategy enabled the shift from mere description to the establishment of substantial causal relationships among institutional variables, technical interventions, and anti-corruption outcomes (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). The inherent limitations in generalizability associated with the case study technique were recognized. Stake (2005) asserts that case studies provide theoretical insights via analytical rather than statistical generalization. The study sought to offer insights relevant to analogous resource-constrained procurement settings by meticulously recording the contextual elements influencing PRAZ's anti-corruption efforts.

3.5 Research Design

This study employed a qualitative, cross-sectional design executed through three sequential and interconnected phases to investigate the research issues related to corruption patterns, anti-corruption efficacy, and framework development. The cross-sectional technique was chosen as it facilitated a thorough analysis of corruption manifestations and anti-corruption actions during the pivotal 2019-2023 period, when PRAZ was executing its inaugural strategic plan and first reform steps. The three-phase design-document analysis of corruption patterns, questionnaire evaluation of anti-corruption efficacy, and framework development-was precisely aligned with the research objectives while addressing the practical resource limitations associated with investigating sensitive governance issues in Zimbabwe's context.

The preliminary phase concentrated on discerning corruption typologies by meticulous analysis of procurement records, audit reports, and policy documents. This phase employed document analysis to identify patterns and processes of corruption in the procurement system. The second phase utilized questionnaire interviews with main procurement stakeholders to review current anti-corruption measures, examining their implementation issues and efficacy. The concluding step

incorporated these findings into a context-specific anti-corruption strategy designed for Zimbabwe's resource-limited setting, employing synthesis methods to create a thorough framework. This strategy prioritized methodological triangulation by integrating complementary document analysis and questionnaire-based interviews. The document analysis yielded objective historical and procedural data on corruption trends and institutional responses, while the questionnaires collected stakeholder perceptions and experiences related to the efficacy of anti-corruption measures. Bowen (2009) contends that this amalgamation alleviates the limitations associated with single-method approaches in the study of sensitive issues such as corruption. The procedures were systematically planned, employing document analysis to inform the creation of questionnaire instruments.

The design included flexible characteristics to support research in difficult conditions. Contingency plans were established for situations where primary data sources were inaccessible, encompassing alternative documentation and replacement interviews. This adaptability was crucial for maintaining research integrity while navigating the difficulties of procurement corruption study (Maxwell, 2013). The cross-sectional technique facilitated an extensive examination of procurement processes across many government ministries and state-owned firms throughout the institutional reform period subsequent to the founding of PRAZ. The design, while recognizing limits in illustrating longitudinal trends, effectively balanced depth of understanding with feasibility given the study's resource constraints and scope. Figure 3.2 depicts the tripartite

approach and methodological elements employed to achieve the research objectives.



Figure 3-1 Research Design for Investigating Corruption in Zimbabwe's Public Procurement System.

3.6 Data Collection Methods

The examination of corruption within Zimbabwe's public procurement system required a methodological framework adept at revealing both recorded evidence and stakeholder viewpoints regarding corruption trends and the efficacy of anti-corruption measures. To accomplish this dual objective, document analysis and structured questionnaires were utilized as complementary data-gathering approaches, each targeting distinct facets of the research emphasis.

3.6.1 Document Analysis for Identifying Prevailing Patterns and Mechanisms of Corruption.

Document analysis was utilized to rigorously uncover corruption typologies inside Zimbabwe's procurement system, assessing its manifestations, frequency, and enabling variables. This method entailed examining purchase data, audit reports, investigative findings, and policy documents from PRAZ and pertinent institutions spanning 2019-2023. The reviewed documents comprised:

- Annual procurement reports from the Public Procurement Authority of Zimbabwe (2019-2023) • Quarterly compliance monitoring reports
- Reports from the Zimbabwe Auditor General concerning public procurement
- Investigation reports from the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission
- Tender documentation and assessment reports pertaining to high-value contracts

The analytical procedure entailed creating organized coding sheets to record corruption episodes, their classifications (including bid rigging, bribery, specification manipulation, etc.), severity (financial repercussions), frequency, and contextual elements that enable corrupt behaviors. This extensive record facilitated the identification of patterns across sectors, procurement thresholds, and temporal spans. Document analysis was chosen to examine corruption patterns, as official records offer concrete proof of procurement anomalies that may be downplayed in interview settings due to the sensitive nature of corruption (Bowen, 2009). Flick (2018, p. 356) asserts that papers represent 'particular interpretations of reality built for certain reasons,' rendering them excellent resources for comprehending the expression of corruption inside institutional frameworks. The method especially seeks to identify prevalent corruption patterns inside Zimbabwe's procurement sector by providing actual proof of how structural aspects facilitate unethical practices.

3.6.2 Structured Questionnaires for Evaluating PRAZ's Anti-Corruption Interventions

Structured questionnaires were utilized to evaluate the effectiveness of PRAZ's integrity programme, implementation issues, and contextual factors affecting outcomes. The questionnaires focused on essential procurement stakeholders, including:

- PRAZ regulatory officials
- Procurement officers from government ministries and state-owned enterprises
- Representatives from oversight bodies (Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission and Auditor General's office)
- Private sector participants with public procurement experience

The questionnaire instrument comprised four sections addressing:

- Stakeholder perspectives on corruption typologies (validating document analysis findings)
- Implementation assessment of specific integrity measures (e-procurement, capacity building, monitoring systems)
- Evaluation of implementation challenges and contextual barriers
- Recommendations for enhancing integrity effectiveness

Each section had closed-ended questions utilizing Likert scales to assess perceived efficacy, with open-ended questions that facilitated elaboration and context-specific insights. The questionnaire employed indirect inquiry techniques to reduce social desirability bias in discussions on sensitive topics. This strategy was selected because stakeholder perspectives provide essential insights into the effectiveness of integrity measures that exceed official documentation (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill, 2019). The questionnaires aim to assess the effectiveness of PRAZ's efforts by gathering informed assessments from diverse stakeholders directly involved in or affected by procurement processes. Patton (2015) emphasizes the necessity of integrating diverse stakeholder perspectives to understand the challenges of implementation and the contextual factors influencing programme effectiveness.

The amalgamation of document analysis and surveys facilitated methodological triangulation, hence enhancing the dependability of findings through cross-validation from varied data sources. This triangulation is particularly advantageous for examining complex social issues, such as corruption, that resist singular methodological approaches (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). The sequential implementation-conducting document analysis before questionnaire development-enabled initial findings to guide the questioning, so ensuring focused and relevant data collection.

3.7 Sampling Strategy

A comprehensive sampling process was employed to identify appropriate data sources and respondents capable of providing high-quality insights on corruption trends and the effectiveness of integrity controls inside Zimbabwe's procurement sector. The strategy employed purposive sampling methods, especially selecting information-rich cases relevant to the study's focus on identifying corruption tendencies, evaluating integrity effectiveness, and developing a contextually appropriate framework.

3.7.1 Document Sampling Strategy for Examining Corruption Patterns in Zimbabwe's Procurement System

Criterion-based sampling was utilized to obtain pertinent procurement records for the examination of corruption typology and trends within Zimbabwe's procurement system. The chronological relevance of documents from 2019-2023 served as a primary selection criterion, augmented by institutional representation from PRAZ and essential procurement agencies, in addition to document classification, which included procurement reports, audit findings, investigation reports, and policy materials. This method yielded a document sample comprising:

- Temporal coverage: Documents from 2019-2023 to encompass the period subsequent to PRAZ's inception.
- Institutional representation: Records from PRAZ, governmental ministries, and state-owned enterprises. • Document types: Procurement reports, audit findings, investigation reports, and policy documents.
- Sectoral emphasis: The construction, health, and information technology industries have been designated as high-risk domains according to prior literature (Duri, 2021; Transparency International Zimbabwe, 2020).
- Value thresholds: Classification of high-value contracts (exceeding US$1 million), medium-value contracts (ranging from US$100,000 to US$1 million), and low-value contracts (below US$100,000)

The document sample method yielded procurement documents, including yearly procurement reports, quarterly compliance reports, Auditor General reports, investigation reports, and tender

and evaluation reports. Significant emphasis was placed on industries already recognized as susceptible to corruption, with construction, health, and information technology being the majority of sampled data, while additional sectors were incorporated for comparison analysis. This sample method primarily aims to identify widespread corruption patterns by offering comprehensive coverage across many aspects of Zimbabwe's procurement sector. The incorporation of diverse document kinds and sectors facilitated the detection of both universal corruption techniques and sector-specific weaknesses. Yin (2018) notes that purposive sampling enables researchers to choose information-rich cases that elucidate the phenomena under investigation.

3.7.2 Participant Sampling Strategy for Assessing the Effectiveness of PRAZ's Interventions

A stratified purposive sample method was utilized to choose interview participants, reflecting varied perspectives within Zimbabwe's procurement system, to assess the effectiveness of integrity measures and the problems of implementation. The sample framework guaranteed representation among essential stakeholder groups, particularly those with direct experience in procurement processes and integrity measures.

- Regulatory officials: Four PRAZ personnel tasked with compliance monitoring, capacity building, and e-procurement implementation.
- Procurement practitioners: Four procurement officers from government ministries (Finance, Health, and Transport) and state-owned enterprises possessing experience in managing procurement processes.
- Oversight entities: Two officials from the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission and the Auditor General's office engaged in procurement investigations and audits.

Private sector participants: five contractors and suppliers have expertise in bidding for public contracts.

The specific selection criteria implemented for each stratum encompassed

- Professional experience: At least three years of experience in procurement or similar fields
- Role significance: Active participation in procurement activities or integrity initiatives

- Sectoral representation: Representation across key procurement sectors (construction, health, IT)
- Hierarchical representation: Incorporation of both managerial and operational viewpoints

This participant sample method directly evaluates the effectiveness of integrity by incorporating varied stakeholder viewpoints on PRAZ's initiatives. The participation of regulatory officials, practitioners, oversight groups, and private sector entities enabled a thorough assessment of implementation issues from many viewpoints. Malterud, Siersma, and Guassora (2016) assert that the efficacy of information power in qualitative research is contingent upon the distinctiveness of participants' experience and knowledge, rather than the size of the sample. The final sample of 15 persons was determined by information power rather than statistical representation. This corresponds with the findings of Guest, Bunce, and Johnson (2006), which suggest that theoretical saturation generally occurs during the initial twelve interviews when utilizing purposive sampling with a homogeneous population on a particular subject.

3.7.3 Sample Size and Justification

The final sample consisted of 15 participants allocated among the four stakeholder categories. The sample size was established based on information power considerations rather than statistical representation (Malterud, Siersma, and Guassora, 2016). The uniqueness of the study's purpose, the theoretical framework regarding procurement corruption, participant quality, and the analytical methodology were evaluated to ascertain the suitable sample size. This distribution guaranteed equitable representation of viewpoints, with increased involvement from regulatory officials and business sector participants with direct operational competence in procurement procedures.

The sample size was adequate to achieve theoretical saturation, resulting in few additional insights from further interviews. Guest, Bunce, and Johnson (2006) illustrate that in purposive sampling of a homogeneous population on a single topic, saturation generally manifests within the initial twelve interviews, with fundamental components for meta-themes emerging as early as six interviews. This sampling method guaranteed that the research obtained insights from essential stakeholders capable of offering informed evaluations of anti-corruption efficacy within

Zimbabwe's procurement system, directly addressing the research question regarding the success of PRAZ's interventions and the implementation challenges limiting their effectiveness.

3.7.4 Sampling Limitations and Mitigation

The possibility of selection bias, arising from the sensitive nature of corruption research, was acknowledged, especially regarding self-selection among those eager to confront corruption. To alleviate this limitation, diverse strategies for participant recruitment were utilized, including official institutional avenues and professional networks, while highlighting the study's focus on systemic improvement rather than individual blame. Access limitations to specific top officials required the substitution with other participants who have equivalent expertise and experience. The restrictions were alleviated by triangulating documented evidence and including personnel from various organisational levels, thus assuring comprehensive coverage despite access constraints.

3.7.5 Measurement Framework for Variables

To ensure systematic analysis of corruption patterns and anti-corruption effectiveness, a comprehensive measurement framework was developed for the key variables under investigation. This framework establishes clear parameters for identifying, categorizing, and evaluating corruption in procurement and the effectiveness of counter-measures, as detailed below:

3.7.5.1 Corruption Typologies Measurement

Corruption in procurement processes was measured using a multi-dimensional framework that captures both type and severity:

3.7.5.1.1 Type Classification:

- Bid rigging (manipulation of tender specifications)
- Bribery (financial or non-financial inducements)
- Kickbacks (post-award remuneration)
- Collusion (coordinated bidding between suppliers)
- Conflicts of interest (undisclosed relationships)

- Process manipulation (procedural violations)

3.7.5.1.2 Severity Scale:

- Low impact (0-5%): Minimal financial loss, isolated occurrences
- Moderate impact (6-15%): Notable financial loss, occasional occurrences
- High impact (16-30%): Substantial financial loss, frequent occurrences
- Severe impact (>30%): Critical financial loss, systemic occurrences

3.7.5.1.3 Frequency Measurement:

- Rare: 1-2 instances per 100 procurement exercises
- Occasional: 3-10 instances per 100 procurement exercises
- Frequent: 11-25 instances per 100 procurement exercises
- Pervasive: >25 instances per 100 procurement exercises

3.7.5.1.4 Sectoral Distribution Indicators:

- Low vulnerability: 0-10% of sector procurements affected
- Moderate vulnerability: 11-30% of sector procurements affected
- High vulnerability: >30% of sector procurements affected

3.7.5.2 Anti-Corruption Effectiveness Measurement

The effectiveness of anti-corruption measures was evaluated using a comprehensive framework with multiple dimensions:

3.7.5.2.1 Implementation Fidelity:

- Low (0-30%): Minimal adherence to design specifications
- Moderate (31-70%): Partial adherence to design specifications
- High (71-100%): Substantial adherence to design specifications

3.7.5.2.2 Operational Effectiveness:

- Ineffective: No measurable reduction in corruption indicators
- Partially effective: Some reduction in corruption indicators (1-20%)

- Moderately effective: Significant reduction in corruption indicators (21-50%)
- Highly effective: Substantial reduction in corruption indicators (>50%)

3.7.5.2.3 Implementation Challenges Categorization:

- Resource constraints (financial, human, technological)
- Institutional resistance (procedural, cultural)
- Capacity limitations (skills, knowledge)
- Contextual barriers (economic, political)

3.7.5.2.4 Stakeholder Perception Scale:

- Very negative (1): Strong dissatisfaction with effectiveness
- Negative (2): General dissatisfaction with effectiveness
- Neutral (3): Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
- Positive (4): General satisfaction with effectiveness
- Very positive (5): Strong satisfaction with effectiveness

This measurement framework provides a systematic approach to identifying corruption typologies and evaluating anti-corruption effectiveness, ensuring consistency and rigor in data collection and analysis. The framework acknowledges both quantitative indicators and qualitative dimensions, aligning with the study's interpretivist philosophy while providing structured parameters for analysis.

3.8 Objective-Oriented Data Analysis

To comprehensively detect and define corruption within Zimbabwe's procurement system, thematic content analysis was utilized to scrutinize documentary evidence and stakeholder opinions about corruption tendencies. This analytical methodology was executed by the subsequent systematic procedure:

3.8.1 Analysis of Corruption Patterns and Enabling Mechanisms in Procurement

A thematic content analysis was utilized to comprehensively detect and define corruption within Zimbabwe's procurement system by examining documentary evidence and stakeholder perceptions on corruption patterns. This analytical method was executed via the subsequent systematic procedure:

- Data preparation: All procurement records, audit findings, and investigation reports were systematically indexed and organized chronologically by procuring entity. Each document was assigned a unique identifier and preliminary summary sheets were created.
- Initial coding: The documents were analysed to identify instances of corruption, irregularities, and procedural deviations. Each instance was coded according to a preliminary coding framework based on commonly recognized corruption types (bid rigging, bribery, kickbacks, collusion, conflict of interest, process manipulation).
- Theme development: Similar codes were categorized into potential themes, creating initial thematic maps to clarify relationships among corruption typologies. This process involved identifying underlying mechanisms and contextual enablers beyond surface manifestations.
- Theme refinement: The themes were validated against coded extracts and the complete dataset, constructing a thematic framework with internal consistency and external distinctiveness. This iterative process continued until theoretical saturation was reached.
- Quantification and pattern analysis: The frequency of identified corruption types was analysed across procurement sectors, value thresholds, and time periods to identify patterns and trends. This quantitative analysis of qualitative data facilitated understanding of sectoral vulnerabilities and temporal developments.

This analytical method was chosen to discern corruption trends as it facilitates a methodical investigation of intricate social phenomena while being attuned to contextual variables. According to Braun and Clarke (2019), thematic analysis offers the flexibility to discern patterns across various data sources while upholding analytical rigor. The method explicitly targets the necessity to comprehend existing corruption patterns by elucidating both the manifestations of corruption and the structural and contextual variables that facilitate these practices. Pattern matching

techniques were utilized to correlate findings from document analysis with questionnaire data, contrasting experimentally determined patterns with theoretical predictions grounded in the conceptual framework. This methodology improves internal validity by clarifying causal conditions and outcomes (Yin, 2018), facilitating a thorough comprehension of corruption mechanisms in Zimbabwe's procurement environment.

3.8.2 Evaluation of PRAZ's Anti-Corruption Interventions and Implementation Challenges

A multi-dimensional evaluative analysis approach was utilized to assess the efficacy of PRAZ's anti-corruption activities and the problems encountered during implementation, encompassing both process and outcome dimensions. This analytical methodology was executed by the subsequent systematic procedure:

- Implementation fidelity assessment: Each anti-corruption initiative (e-procurement, capacity building, monitoring systems) was evaluated against its intended design specifications through a structured matrix comparing planned versus actual implementation. This analysis revealed implementation gaps and adaptation patterns.
- Gap analysis: Identified implementation gaps were systematically examined to determine their causes, extent, and impact on anti-corruption outcomes. This process tracked departures from intended implementation, revealing delays, resource constraints, and operational modifications affecting effectiveness.
- Barrier analysis: Obstacles associated with each implementation gap were categorized into resource constraints (financial, human, technological), institutional resistance (procedural, cultural), capacity limitations (skills, knowledge), and contextual barriers (economic, political).
- Effectiveness assessment: Each anti-corruption measure was evaluated using the effectiveness matrix incorporating stakeholder perceptions, documented outcomes, and observed changes in procurement practices. This assessment placed initiatives on a continuum from ineffective to highly effective.

- Contextual analysis: Variations in effectiveness across institutional settings, procurement categories, and value thresholds were examined to identify contextual factors enhancing or diminishing effectiveness.

This analytical method was chosen as it recognizes the intricate causal pathways via which anti-corruption activities affect procurement processes. Andrews (2013) asserts that a thorough examination of institutional innovations necessitates consideration of both formal implementation and functional efficacy. The methodology primarily targets the assessment of anti-corruption efficacy by analysing both outcomes and the implementation procedures, as well as the contextual elements influencing results. The assessment matrix functioned as an essential analytical instrument for methodically appraising PRAZ's anti-corruption efforts, highlighting the discrepancies between formal frameworks and operational efficacy that frequently define institutional changes in developing nations. This thorough methodology offers pragmatic suggestions for improving anti-corruption efficacy within Zimbabwe's resource-limited context.

3.8.3 Development of a Comprehensive Strategy for Zimbabwe's Procurement System

To formulate a contextually suitable anti-corruption framework for Zimbabwe's procurement system, analytical synthesis methods were utilized to amalgamate insights on corruption trends and the efficacy of anti-corruption measures into a cohesive and pragmatic framework. This analytical procedure encompassed:

- Component identification: Key elements for the anti-corruption framework were identified through systematic analysis of effective practices, implementation challenges, and contextual requirements. These components were categorized into institutional measures, technological interventions, and contextual adaptations.
- Relationship mapping: Logical connections between framework components were established through relational analysis, identifying complementarities, sequencing requirements, and potential synergies among different anti-corruption measures.
- Cross-case synthesis: Patterns across different procurement sectors and institutional contexts were examined to identify widely applicable anti-corruption measures versus

context-specific interventions. This technique enabled identification of high-leverage intervention points with broad applicability.

- Comparative framework analysis: The emerging framework was systematically compared with existing models identified in the literature review, assessing similarities, differences, and adaptations required for Zimbabwe's specific context.
- Feasibility assessment: Each framework component was evaluated against implementation requirements and resource constraints, applying Grindle's (2004, 2007) "good enough governance" concept to ensure practical viability.

The feasibility analysis specifically assessed:

- Resource requirements for implementation (financial, human, technological)
- Institutional capacity needed for effective execution
- Political feasibility of proposed interventions
- Sustainability of framework components
- Adaptability to changing procurement contexts

This analytical method was chosen since it meets the necessity for formulating pragmatic anti-corruption strategies suited to resource-limited contexts. Grindle (2007) asserts that effective governance reforms in developing nations must be contextually suitable and pragmatically feasible due to resource constraints. This approach specifically aims to provide a comprehensive anti-corruption framework by incorporating empirical evidence into a structured solution that harmonizes efficacy with feasibility of implementation. A research journal was kept during the analytical process to record analytical judgments, emerging patterns, and methodological reflections. This reflective methodology improved analytical precision by clarifying the interpretation process and scrutinizing possible researcher bias (Maxwell, 2013), guaranteeing that the resultant framework was empirically substantiated and theoretically robust.

3.8.4 Research Focus and Methodological Alignment

To ensure methodological coherence and alignment between the research focus, data sources, and analytical techniques, a comprehensive methodological matrix was developed. This matrix,

presented in Table 3.1, provides a clear overview of how each research component is addressed through specific methodological approaches.

Table 3-1 Methodological Alignment Matrix for the Study of Corruption in Zimbabwe's Public Procurement System

Research focus	**Data type**	**Data source**	**Measurement approach**	**Data collection method**	**Data analysis technique**
Corruption Typologies	Qualitative (Document-based)	Procurement records, Audit reports, Investigation reports	Type classification, Severity scale, Frequency measurement	Document analysis	Thematic analysis, Pattern matching, matching, Frequency analysis
Corruption Typologies	Qualitative (Perspective-based)	Stakeholder experiences	Categorization of reported incidents, Perceived prevalence	Structured questionnaires	Content analysis, Cross-tabulation
Anti-Corruption Effectiveness	Qualitative (Document-based)	Policy documents, Implementation reports, Compliance audits	Implementation fidelity scale, Outcome metrics	Document analysis	Gap analysis, Process tracing
Anti-Corruption Effectiveness	Qualitative (Perspective-based)	Stakeholder assessments	Operational effectiveness scale, Stakeholder	Structured questionnaires	Effectiveness evaluation matrix, Barrier analysis

			perception scale		
Framework Development	Synthesized qualitative data	Analysis results from previous phases	Feasibility analysis criteria	Integration of findings	Cross-case synthesis, Comparative analysis

Note: This methodological alignment matrix demonstrates how different data types and sources are systematically employed to address each component of the research focus, ensuring coherence in the research approach

This matrix demonstrates how different data types and sources are systematically employed to address each component of the research, ensuring methodological coherence and comprehensive coverage of the research focus areas. It also illustrates the progression from data collection through analysis to framework development, highlighting the interconnected nature of the research methodology.

3.9 Reliability and Validity Considerations

Methodological integrity in all research dimensions was guaranteed through the stringent use of trustworthiness standards supported by computer-assisted qualitative data analysis. Analysing contemporary trends and causes of corruption in Zimbabwe's procurement system necessitated credibility criteria to enable precise identification of corruption typologies and facilitating factors. The criteria of reliability and confirmability were crucial for evaluating the effectiveness of PRAZ's integrity project and its implementation issues, facilitating consistent assessment of outcomes and constraints. Transferability considerations were essential in formulating a thorough integrity strategy for Zimbabwe's resource-limited procurement environment, guaranteeing that the resultant framework would be contextually relevant and transferable to analogous institutional contexts.

Conventional quantitative reliability and validity concepts were modified to align with the interpretivist paradigm and the intricate context of corruption study (Golafshani, 2003). The research employed Lincoln and Guba's (1985) four complementary criteria for trustworthiness: credibility (ensuring authentic representation of corruption phenomena), transferability (facilitating contextual application of findings), dependability (establishing consistency in data

collection and analysis), and confirmability (minimizing researcher bias in interpretation). To enhance analytical rigor and ensure systematic data management, NVivo 14 software was utilized throughout the analysis process, providing transparent documentation of analytical decisions and enabling verification of findings. Acknowledging the methodological limitations in investigating sensitive governance issues within Zimbabwe's procurement context, each criterion was rigorously implemented to improve the validity of findings across all facets of the research questions.

3.9.1 Credibility

To achieve transferability, synonymous with external validity or generalizability, a comprehensive description of the research context and methodological procedures was provided (Geertz, 1973). An in-depth examination of Zimbabwe's institutional structure, resource constraints, and socio-political landscape allows readers to assess the relevance of findings to similar contexts (Shenton, 2004). NVivo's case management features were employed to systematically document contextual information for each data source, creating case classifications with attributes such as procurement sector, contract value, institutional type, and temporal period. This systematic documentation enhanced transferability by providing readers with detailed information about the contexts in which specific findings emerged, enabling informed judgments about applicability to their own settings.

Maximum variation sampling under a purposive design was employed to gather diverse perspectives across procurement categories, institutional types, and stakeholder roles. Palinkas et al. (2015) assert that this methodology enhances transferability by identifying patterns that surpass varied traits. NVivo's matrix coding queries facilitated analysis of how corruption patterns and anti-corruption effectiveness varied across different contexts (e.g., sectors, regions, time periods), systematically documenting both common themes and contextual variations. The integrity framework was established with explicit transferability criteria specifying which components are relevant to other resource-constrained situations and which are unique to Zimbabwe, with NVivo's framework matrices used to organize and present these distinctions systematically.

3.9.2 Transferability

To achieve transferability, synonymous with external validity or generalizability, a comprehensive description of the research context and methodological procedures was provided (Geertz, 1973). An in-depth examination of Zimbabwe's institutional structure, resource constraints, and socio-political landscape allows readers to assess the relevance of findings to similar contexts (Shenton, 2004). Maximum variation sampling under a purposive design was employed to gather diverse perspectives across procurement categories, institutional types, and stakeholder roles. Palinkas et al. (2015) assert that this methodology enhances transferability by identifying patterns that surpass varied traits. The integrity framework was established with explicit transferability criteria specifying which components are relevant to other resource-constrained situations and which are unique to Zimbabwe.

3.9.3 Dependability

To improve dependability-an equivalent of reliability in qualitative research—a detailed audit trail of all methodological decisions, difficulties, and alterations during the research process was preserved (Nowell et al., 2017). NVivo software significantly enhanced dependability through multiple mechanisms. First, the software automatically logged all coding activities, including dates, times, and user identifications, creating a transparent record of the analytical process. Second, NVivo's project journal feature was used to document methodological decisions, analytical insights, and modifications to coding frameworks as the analysis progressed. Third, the software's codebook function maintained detailed definitions of each code, including inclusion/exclusion criteria and exemplar quotations, ensuring consistent application throughout the analysis.

The use of NVivo also facilitated intercoder reliability assessment. A random sample of 15% of documents and interview transcripts was independently coded by a second researcher with expertise in procurement governance. NVivo's coding comparison functionality was employed to calculate Cohen's kappa coefficient, which measured 0.84, exceeding the 0.80 threshold recommended for qualitative research with complex classification schemes (O'Connor and Joffe, 2020). Discrepancies in coding were discussed and resolved through collaborative review, with final coding decisions documented in the project journal.

Data collection instruments underwent comprehensive pilot testing with designated procurement professionals prior to extensive deployment. This methodology, as proposed by Castillo-Montoya (2016), enhanced questionnaire items to guarantee precision, pertinence, and efficacy in acquiring the requisite data prior to field implementation. Pilot test responses were coded in NVivo to assess whether the questions generated data relevant to the research objectives, leading to refinement of the interview guide before full-scale implementation.

3.9.4 Confirmability

To establish confirmability, the qualitative equivalent of objectivity, reflection diaries were systematically maintained throughout the investigation (Finlay, 2002). NVivo's memo function was extensively utilized to create reflexive memos documenting the researcher's background, assumptions, reactions to data, and potential biases that could influence interpretation. These reflexive memos were linked to relevant data segments, creating an integrated record that allowed examination of how researcher positionality may have shaped analytical decisions.

The report highlighted potential biases, assumptions, and positionality concerns that could influence data interpretation stemming from professional expertise in procurement systems. A thorough triangulation strategy was utilized, including methodological triangulation, data source triangulation, and theory triangulation via various theoretical frameworks in the interpretation of results (Denzin, 2017). NVivo's coding framework incorporated theoretical codes based on principal-agent theory, institutional theory, systems theory, and resource-based theory, enabling systematic examination of how different theoretical lenses illuminated various aspects of the data.

This multi-tiered strategy diminished the probability of interpretative bias from any singular viewpoint. In accordance with Lincoln and Guba's (1985) recommendations, a confirmability audit was performed, during which an impartial reviewer assessed the rationale linking raw data to the findings drawn. NVivo's export functions facilitated this audit by enabling the creation of comprehensive coding reports that displayed coded segments alongside their analytical classifications, allowing the external auditor to verify that conclusions were grounded in evidence rather than swayed by prejudices or subjective viewpoints.

3.9.5 Specific Validity Concerns in Corruption Research

Concerns regarding the validity of the corruption study were observed. Social desirability bias—participants' tendency to provide socially acceptable responses-was mitigated by the use of indirect questioning techniques suggested by Fisher (1993) and by ensuring anonymity in reporting. Respondent validation utilized methods to verify sensitive information from various sources before its integration into conclusions (Archibald, 2016). NVivo's matrix coding queries were employed to systematically compare accounts across different stakeholder groups, identifying areas of convergence and divergence that informed the interpretation of sensitive findings

The integrity of document analysis was enhanced by evaluating the legitimacy of official records. Documents were assessed for completeness, representativeness, and potential reporting biases, particularly in government corruption reports that may minimize the seriousness of procurement misconduct, employing Bowen's (2009) criteria. NVivo's document management system was used to create document attributes capturing these quality assessments, enabling analysis of how document characteristics (e.g., source, completeness, independence) related to reported corruption patterns.

To address the challenge of quantifying corruption-primarily a covert phenomenon-proxy indicators and inferential techniques were utilized as recommended by Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016). This included red flag indicators in procurement documents, pattern analysis in contract awards, and systematic identification of procedural compliance issues. NVivo's text search and coding query functions enabled systematic identification of these indicators across the document corpus, with frequency counts and pattern visualizations enhancing the rigor of corruption prevalence assessments.

3.9.6 Pilot Testing of Instruments

Prior to comprehensive deployment, thorough pilot testing of data collection instruments was performed to verify their efficacy in capturing data on corruption patterns, anti-corruption effectiveness, and framework requirements. The questionnaire was administered to six procurement specialists from several stakeholder groups, who were ultimately eliminated from the final sample. Pilot test data were imported into NVivo and subjected to preliminary coding to

assess whether the questions generated relevant, rich data addressing the research objectives. This technique, as advised by Malmqvist et al. (2019), enhanced the phrasing, sequence, and structure of questions to augment instrument validity.

The document analysis method underwent pilot testing using a sample of procurement data from 2018, which is outside the study period, to improve the classification system and coding framework. Initial coding of pilot documents in NVivo revealed overlaps and gaps in the coding framework, leading to refinement of code definitions and hierarchical structures. This iterative development process improved the instruments' capacity to gather pertinent data on corruption typologies and anti-corruption strategies (Castillo-Montoya, 2016).

All alterations implemented during pilot testing were documented as part of the audit trail in NVivo's project journal, ensuring transparency in instrument development. The software's version control features preserved earlier iterations of the coding framework, providing a complete record of how analytical tools evolved through the pilot testing process. This comprehensive strategy for improving trustworthiness, enhanced by systematic use of NVivo software, established a solid analytical basis for analysing corruption in Zimbabwe's procurement system, recognizing the intricate, sensitive, and contextually embedded nature of the phenomena under investigation.

3.10 Ethical Considerations

Participant protection was emphasized by targeted approaches that addressed the increased risks linked to corruption research in Zimbabwe. A thorough risk assessment was performed before fieldwork to identify potential vulnerabilities for various stakeholder groups. Interviews with regulatory officials and oversight bodies were conducted in secure, confidential places within respective institutions to reduce exposure. Neutral off-site sites were established for procurement practitioners and private sector partners to mitigate institutional pressure. Questions were meticulously designed to address systemic concerns rather than particular instances that could incriminate people, with delicate subjects tackled indirectly through hypothetical situations and generic discussions of processes. The protective measures were crucial due to the politically sensitive nature of corruption research in Zimbabwe's governance system, where information sharing could result in professional or personal consequences for participants

3.11 Research Methodology Limitations

This research acknowledges specific methodological constraints inherent in the examination of corruption within public procurement processes. The qualitative case study technique provides substantial contextual insights into corruption tendencies and the effectiveness of integrity measures, although it limits statistical generalizability beyond Zimbabwe's procurement framework. Access restrictions impeded the purchase of specific sensitive papers and engagement with certain high officials, perhaps omitting vital information. The cross-sectional era (2019-2023) provides just a superficial view of corruption dynamics, neglecting long-term evolutionary patterns in procurement processes. Social desirability bias undoubtedly influenced participant replies, despite anonymity safeguards, as corruption is a serious topic with professional consequences.

Document analysis faced limitations due to inadequate record-keeping and selective documentation in procurement files. The researcher’s positionality as an academic investigating a sensitive governance issue may have impacted participant transparency and data interpretation, as well as efforts at reflexivity. Resource constraints limited sample size and geographic scope, favoring central government procurement over local authorities. The limitations were thoroughly addressed through methodological rigor, triangulation, and a clear understanding of restrictions; yet, they continue to be key considerations in assessing the study's conclusions regarding corruption in Zimbabwe's procurement sector.

3.12 Recommendations for Improvement

Critical reflection on the implementation of this research methodology reveals numerous strategic enhancements that could improve future inquiries into corruption in public procurement processes. A mixed-methods approach using quantitative aspects, such as procurement data analytics, could enhance qualitative findings by uncovering statistical patterns of corruption indicators across many procurement types and institutional contexts. Longitudinal research designs would more effectively clarify the evolutionary processes of corruption and anti-corruption measures, illustrating how procurement players alter their behaviors over time. Future studies would benefit from enhanced stakeholder engagement, particularly from civil society organisations and international development partners, who could provide valuable external perspectives on procurement integrity. Collaborative research teams of academics and procurement practitioners

could mitigate access barriers and enhance analytical depth through diverse skill sets. Developing standardized corruption assessment tools designed for resource-constrained environments would facilitate more systematic cross-case analysis.

Technology-enabled study approaches, including safe digital platforms for anonymous reporting, may improve participants' willingness to provide sensitive information on experiences of corruption. Furthermore, comparative case studies among several African countries with analogous resource constraints would enhance the relevance of findings and frameworks. Implementing these methodological modifications would improve both theoretical comprehension and practical interventions in tackling the persistent issue of corruption in public procurement systems in Zimbabwe and other countries.

3.13 Chapter Summary

This chapter outlined the qualitative research methodology employed to investigate corruption in Zimbabwe's public procurement system under PRAZ from 2019-2023. Rooted in interpretivist philosophy, the study utilized document analysis to discern corruption patterns and employed structured questionnaires to assess the efficacy of anti-corruption measures, gathering data from 15 participants, comprising regulatory authorities, procurement professionals, oversight entities, and private sector representatives. The research strategy employed a case study methodology with purposive sampling, and a comprehensive, objective-oriented data analysis framework was developed to meet the research objectives. Reliability and validity were confirmed using triangulation, member verification, and rigorous ethical standards to protect participants addressing this delicate topic. The methodology encompassed a thorough measuring framework for rigorously classifying corruption typologies and assessing anti-corruption efficacy, employing multi-dimensional scales that encompass both qualitative and quantitative dimensions of these occurrences.

A methodological alignment matrix was created to maintain consistency among study emphasis areas, data sources, and analytical approaches, establishing a transparent and methodical approach to achieving the research objectives. Despite acknowledged limitations, the methodology established a robust basis for empirical study. Chapter 4 will delineate the findings from this methodological application, analysing corruption typologies within Zimbabwe's procurement

system, evaluating the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures, and laying the empirical foundation for the formulation of a comprehensive framework in subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER 4

DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF RESULTS

4.1 Introduction

Chapter four is all about data analysis and the presentation of results gathered from the findings on corruption in Zimbabwe's public procurement system under the leadership of the Procurement Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (PRAZ) from 2019-2023. The researcher applied the methodologies outlined in Chapter 3. The study employed theme analysis and assessment frameworks to identify trends, assess effectiveness, and develop contextually appropriate solutions. The analysis focused on three primary research objectives. Initially, the study delineated corruption patterns inside Zimbabwe's public procurement framework. Secondly, it evaluated the efficacy of current anti-corruption initiatives. Thirdly, it established a contextually pertinent framework adapted to Zimbabwe's resource-constrained environment. The methodological approach employed stringent coding protocols to examine document content and interview transcripts, facilitating the systematic discovery of corruption patterns and evaluation of anti-corruption efficacy.

4.2 Descriptive Statistics

This section defined the empirical basis of the study. This was done by specifying the research participants, analysed documents, and explored procurement procedures. These descriptive statistics furnish essential context for understanding the scope, significance, and representativeness of data. This laid done the ground work for future analysis of corruption trends and the efficacy of anti-corruption initiatives.

4.2.1 Profile of Research Participants

The strategy which was used to select participants utilized a systematic method to guarantee diverse perspectives while upholding scientific rigor. The research utilized purposive sampling to choose 15 critical stakeholders from Zimbabwe's procurement landscape. They were deliberately chosen as a way of offering varied insights on corruption typologies and the efficacy of anti-corruption measures. The sample size was established on the principle of "information power"

instead́ of statistical representation (Malterud, Siersma, and Guassora, 2016), with participants chosen for their direct engagement and expertise in public procurement processes. Table 4.1 delineated the demographic profile of research participants. This showcased the varied representation of main stakeholder groups.

Table 4-1 Demographic Profile of Research Participants

Stakeholder Group	**Number of Participants**	**Years of Experience (Range)**	**Professional Qualifications**
PRAZ Regulatory	4	3-8 years	Masters (3), CIPS certification (4)
Government & SOE Procurement officials	4	5-12 years	Bachelors (1), Masters (3), CIPS certification (2)
Oversight Body Representatives	2	7-15 years	Masters (2), Professional certification (1)
Private Sector Participants	5	4-18 years	Bachelors (3), Masters (2)

The sample composition included several procurement viewpoints. 27% of the respondents were from the regulatory bodies. While, 27% was from the programme-implementing organisations, of which 13% was from the monitoring institutions, and 33% from the private sector. The participants possessed experience across many procurement sectors, namely construction (40%), health (27%), and information technology (20%), which have been historically recognized as high-risk domains for corruption globally (OECD, 2016; Transparency International, 2020). The varied experience and knowledge enhanced the credibility of the conclusions by triangulating opinions among essential procurement stakeholders.

4.2.2 Characteristics of Analysed Documents

Document analysis served as a crucial element of the research strategy. This yielded data on official procurement procedures and possible evidence of corruption. The study examined 87 procurement papers from 2019-2023. These were carefully chosen to ensure a thorough range of document analysis institutional origins, time periods, and procurement sectors. Table 4.2 illustrates the distribution of papers according to institutional source and sector. It highlights the extensive coverage attained in the document sample.

Table 4-2 Distribution of Documents by Institutional Source and Sector

Institutional Source	**Construction**	**Health**	**Information Technology**	**Others**	**Total**
PRAZ	8	7	6	5	26
Government Ministries	12	8	6	4	30
State-Owned Enterprises	9	7	4	2	22
Oversight Bodies	3	3	2	1	9
Total	32	25	18	12	87

The sectoral distribution corresponded with areas recognized as high-risk in worldwide procurement corruption research, with construction (37%), health (29%), and information technology (21%) industries being predominant. This alignment enhanced the pertinence of the findings to recognized corruption risk patterns. The document sample presented diverse procurement value thresholds: high-value contracts beyond US$1 million (30%), medium-value contracts ranging from US$100,000 to US$1 million (45%), and low-value contracts under US$100,000 (25%). This distribution proved that the study identified corruption patterns across various procurement scales, recognizing that corruption strategies may alter according to contract value.

4.2.3 Overview of Procurement Activities

Analysing the volume, scope, and methodologies of procurement offers critical insight into the corruption risks present in Zimbabwe's public procurement system. The examined documents revealed insights into 189 procurement processes with a total value of approximately US$1.82 billion. This extensive dataset included a considerable segment of Zimbabwe's public procurement activity over the study period, hence augmenting the reliability of the findings.



Figure 4-1 Distribution of Procurement Methods Used in Zimbabwe (2019-2023)

Figure 4.1 illustrates the changing patterns in procurement methods utilized in Zimbabwe from 2019-2023. The graph depicts a significant increase in emergency procurement from 2020 to 2021, corresponding with measures enacted in response to COVID-19. The increase in emergency procurement has created more opportunities for corruption, as detailed in the subsequent sections of this chapter. Competitive bidding rose from 48.2% in 2019 to 57.6% in 2023, signifying a gradual shift towards the implementation of PRAZ competitive procurement policy practices. This graph indicates that a substantial proportion of procurement activities (42.4% in 2023) persisted in being executed using less competitive methods, hence posing potential opportunities for corruption.

Direct procurement, marked by increased corruption risks due to limited competition, decreased from 28.7% in 2019 to 19.8% in 2023, reflecting PRAZ's efforts to enhance competitiveness within

the procurement system. The value distribution of procurement reveals that large-scale infrastructure projects accounted for 63% of total expenditure, despite representing only 22% of procurement instances. The concentration of high-value procurement in specific industries increases corruption risks in these sectors, as confirmed by the previous corruption vulnerability research. The procurement activities data provides essential insights into the possible emergence and characteristics of corruption within Zimbabwe's public procurement system. The prevalence of less competitive procurement processes and the concentration of high-value contracts in specific industries provide potential vulnerabilities that will be examined in the next analysis of corruption typologies.

4.3 Analysis and Interpretation of Corruption Patterns in Zimbabwe's Public Procurement System

This section gave a comprehensive examination of corruption trends in Zimbabwe's procurement system from 2019-2023, after the establishment of the research foundation through descriptive statistics. The findings disclose a complex corruption typology, sector-specific vulnerabilities, and facilitating variables that cumulatively compromise procurement integrity notwithstanding regulatory improvements. This analysis directly targets the initial research purpose of systematically identifying and examining types of corruption inside Zimbabwe's public procurement processes.

4.3.1 Prevalence and Patterns of Corruption

This section analyses the primary categories of corruption identified through document analysis and stakeholder interviews, elucidating specific patterns that account for corruption in Zimbabwe's procurement systems. An examination of 87 procurement documents and interviews with 15 key stakeholders revealed three principal corruption typologies inside Zimbabwe's procurement system. Process manipulation was the most prevalent form of corruption, accounting for 42% of identified cases, followed by governance concerns at 31% and illicit financial practices at 27%. The coding scheme was created through the iterative coding process described in the methodology chapter, utilizing thematic analysis to systematically categorize instances of corruption from both documents and interview transcripts (Braun and Clarke, 2019).



Figure 4-2 Breakdown of Identified Corruption Instances by Source and Typology

Figure 4.2 depicts the distribution of corruption occurrences detected by document analysis and stakeholder interviews. The illustration depicts process manipulation as the predominant form of corruption, succeeded by governance issues and illicit financial transactions. Document analysis identified additional occurrences of process manipulation, whereas stakeholder interviews revealed an increased prevalence of illicit financial activities, underscoring the need for methodological triangulation in capturing many facets of corruption. The categorizing of corruption distribution corresponds with the principal-agent theory's emphasis on information asymmetry. The principal-agent relationship delineates a framework in which principals empower agents to execute services on their behalf, thereby delegating specific decision-making authority to the agents (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).

In Zimbabwe's procurement system, process manipulation often takes advantage of the technical competence held by procurement agents in relation to principals, including citizens and oversight organisations. Empirical evidence of information asymmetry in African procurement procedures illustrates how technical competence, assessment systems, and procurement protocols serve as conduits for corruption, enabling actors to exploit their informational advantage (Williams-Elegbe, 2019). The roughly balanced distribution across the three typology categories suggests that comprehensive integrity measures should tackle various corruption approaches instead of focusing

on a certain typology. The research substantiates the claim that successful integrity measures must tackle systemic corruption instead of treating it as individual occurrences (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016).

4.3.1.1 Process Manipulation

Process manipulation emerged as the primary corruption typology, representing 42% of corruption cases found through document analysis. This prevalence indicates the systematic exploitation of information asymmetries in procurement systems, where technical expertise serves as a means for unscrupulous advantage. This typology includes three interconnected mechanisms—bid rigging, specification manipulation, and biased evaluation—that cumulatively compromise competitive integrity. The Zimbabwe Auditor General reports (2019-2022) substantiate these trends, revealing that 35% of procurement grievances pertained to specifications intended to limit competition, illustrating that procedural manipulation has emerged as the favored mechanism for corruption due to its perceived legitimacy and technical justifiability.



Based on document analysis of 87 procurement records and audit reports (2019-2023)

Pattern	Sectors Most Affected
Bid Rotation	Construction, IT Infrastructure
Complementary Bidding	Health Equipment, Vehicle Procurement
Bid Suppression	Construction, IT Services
Market Division	Regional Infrastructure, Medical Supplies
Subcontractor Collusion	Large Construction Projects

Figure 4-3 Common Bid Rigging Patterns Identified in Document Analysis

Figure 4.3 illustrates the distribution of bid rigging patterns revealed by document analysis, with bid rotation comprising 38%, complementary bidding 27%, bid suppression 21%, and assorted

approaches constituting the remaining 14%. These developments indicate not only ways of corruption but also systemic adaptations to increased scrutiny, exemplifying what Klitgaard (2015) describes as "corruption equilibrium"-practices that evolve in response to regulatory interventions. The prevalence of bid rotation, in contrast to other methods, signifies a planned progression towards intricate collusion measures that mimic competition while being difficult to detect through traditional monitoring procedures. This distribution pattern exemplifies the adaptive characteristics of corruption, as individuals select techniques based on the likelihood of detection and prospective benefits. Analysis of the documents disclosed bid rotation schemes when ostensibly rival organisations conspired on proposal submissions to fabricate a façade of competition while predetermined outcomes were established.

An examination of Zimbabwean high-value government contracts from 2017 to 2020 revealed that collusive bidding transpired in approximately 37% of contracts, with the construction and information technology sectors demonstrating significant vulnerability at 42% and 38%, respectively, due to their technical complexity and considerable value (Hope, 2020). A senior procurement official remarked that "five years ago, bid rigging was primarily rudimentary-characterized by evident patterns of rotation or uniform pricing," which aligns with Williams-Elegbe's (2019) characterization of "second-generation corruption"-practices that exploit the letter of procurement regulations while violating their intended purpose. The shift from fundamental techniques to "highly advanced" systems "carefully designed to seem competitive yet structured to produce predetermined results" demonstrates how improved PRAZ inspections have paradoxically encouraged innovation in corrupt practices rather than eliminating them. This adaptive response clarifies why seemingly robust regulatory frameworks often fail to improve integrity outcomes.

This finding aligns with Rose-Ackerman and Palifka's (2016) claim that corrupt persons operate as strategic agents who continuously modify their methods in response to regulatory measures. In technical procurement industries, specification manipulation is evident, with 32% of IT requirements and 28% of medical equipment specifications featuring unduly demanding criteria, illustrating how knowledge asymmetries enable corruption through technical legitimization. The procurement officer's claim that technical specifications are "increasingly employed as the main conduit for corruption due to their semblance of legitimacy" underscores a critical vulnerability in

knowledge-intensive procurement: areas requiring specialized expertise create principal-agent discrepancies that corrupt individuals systematically exploit. This tendency suggests that traditional compliance-focused supervision is fundamentally insufficient for addressing corruption in technical sectors, requiring specialized oversight competencies designed for these specific vulnerability profiles.

4.3.1.2 Illicit Financial Practices

Illicit financial transactions, including bribery and kickback schemes, constituted 27% of the corruption instances identified by the coding method applied to the sample papers. The documentation of these transactions was particularly complex, necessitating the triangulation of financial data, procurement results, and informant interpretations, in accordance with the methodological framework for examining sensitive phenomena (Creswell and Creswell, 2018).

Table 4-3 Evolution of Illicit Financial Practices in Zimbabwe's Public Procurement (2019-2023)

Time Period	**Predominant Methods**	**Concealment Techniques**	**Detection Challenges**
2019-2020	Direct cash payments, Gift-giving	Basic offshore accounts, Personal relationships	Limited digital trails, Informal transactions
2021-2022	Inflated invoices, Consultant fees	Shell companies, "Technical advisory" contracts	Legitimate-appearing documentation, Complex ownership structures
2023	Subcontracting arrangements, Performance bonuses	Multi-layered corporate structures, Cross-border transactions	Multiple jurisdictional challenges, Sophisticated financial layering

Table 4.3 illustrated the progression of unlawful financial activities within Zimbabwe's public procurement system over the study period. The table shows that these tactics have evolved in sophistication, shifting from direct payments to intricate financial arrangements that are more challenging to identify and scrutinize. The methods for obscuring such payments became progressively complex during the research period, evolving from direct transactions to more elaborate frameworks that included consultant fees for vague "advisory services" and subcontracting arrangements. Analysis of bribery methods in Zimbabwe's construction and IT procurement revealed that bribe payments increasingly appear as seemingly legitimate consulting services or technical support contracts, hence complicating identification through standard compliance audits (Moyo, 2022). The 2022 Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission report corroborates the preceding assertions, indicating that 14 of the 87 examined cases of procurement corruption led to convictions, with 43% involving kickbacks or direct bribery.

The diminished conviction rate stems from sophisticated techniques employed to conceal illegal financial transactions, which involve several intermediaries and international dealings (Sibanda and Makoni, 2020), supporting the conclusions identified in the document analysis of this study. Interview data indicated that kickback %ages differed by sector, with construction contracts generally involving agreements of 15-20% of the contract value, whilst information technology procurement showed lower, nevertheless substantial, kickback rates of 8-12%. A private sector participant remarked, "The demanded %age is contingent upon the project's visibility and the number of officials engaged in the approval process." Prominent projects requiring numerous approval stages generally necessitate increased kickbacks allocated throughout the hierarchy.

4.3.1.3 Governance Issues

Governance issues, including conflicts of interest, nepotism, and the misuse of emergency procurement, accounted for 31% of the corruption cases recorded through systematic coding. These issues originated from institutional and structural deficiencies rather than explicit financial misconduct. The Auditor General's reports for Zimbabwe from 2019 to 2022 indicated that most procurement agencies had insufficient conflict of interest statements, with some only performing verification procedures.

Table 4-4 Conflict of Interest and Nepotism Concealment Mechanisms in Zimbabwe's Procurement

Concealment Mechanism	**Description**	**Frequency %**	**Detection Methods**
Complex Corporate Structures	Use of multi-layered companies with nominee directors to obscure beneficial ownership	42	Beneficial ownership verification, corporate registry cross-checking
Familial Proxies	Relatives or close associates serving as nominal owners or directors of companies	31	Background verification, social network analysis
Shell Companies	Establishment of non-operational companies specifically to secure government contracts	15	Business premise verification, operational history analysis
Cross-shareholding Arrangements	Intricate networks of companies with reciprocal shareholding structures	8	Comprehensive ownership mapping, visual network analysis
Offshore Registration	Registration of companies in jurisdictions with limited transparency requirements	4	International cooperation with registry authorities

Table 4.4 delineated the many strategies employed to obscure conflicts of interest and nepotism within Zimbabwe's procurement system. The table indicates that intricate business frameworks and familial intermediaries are the predominant concealment strategies, comprising of 73% of recognized instances. These findings suggest that detecting conflicts of interest necessitates advanced verification techniques that go beyond conventional disclosure obligations. A comparative review of procurement processes in Ghana and Zimbabwe revealed that more than 32% of Zimbabwe's high-value contracts from 2018 to 2021 were allocated to entities associated with procurement officials or their close relatives (Dza et al., 2018).

Their analysis revealed tactics used to conceal these connections-intricate ownership frameworks, shell companies, nominee shareholders, and family members serving as proxies-which were also evident in the purchase records analysed in our study. The improper use of emergency procurement emerged as a significant governance issue during the COVID-19 epidemic. Analysis of emergency procurement documents confirmed that exclusions from competitive procedures in Zimbabwe's emergency procurement were utilized to circumvent competitive processes, with personal protective equipment acquired through emergency provisions priced 45-90% above market value (Human Rights Watch, 2021). This pattern corresponds with data from Transparency International Zimbabwe (2021), which indicated that 64% of COVID-19 procurement contracts displayed signs of corruption.

4.3.1.4 Methodological Considerations in Corruption Assessment

The assessment of corruption trends presented numerous obstacles for methodological prudence to guarantee veracity. All procurement records were subjected to a three-tier authentication process assessing validity, trustworthiness, and representativeness prior to their inclusion in the analysis, in accordance with stringent document analysis methods (Bowen, 2009).

Table 4-5 Methodological Triangulation Approach in Corruption Assessment

Evidence Source	**Strengths**	**Limitations**	**Triangulation Method**

Procurement Documents	Provides official record, Contains technical details	May omit informal processes, Potentially sanitized information	Cross-referenced with audit reports and interviews
Audit Reports	Independent assessment, Systematic review methodology	Limited to documented procedures, Focus on procedural compliance	Compared with interview narratives and procurement outcomes
ZACC Investigation Reports	Detailed case analysis, Access to financial evidence	Only includes detected cases, Potential investigative bias	Verified against procurement documents and sectoral patterns
Stakeholder Interviews	Captures informal practices, Reveals undocumented processes	Potential recall bias, Subject to personal interpretation	Cross-checked against document evidence and other interviews

Table 4.5 outlined the methodological triangulation strategy employed in the corruption evaluation. The table demonstrates how each kind of evidence offers complementary insights, highlighting distinct strengths and limits. This method guaranteed that results were corroborated through several viewpoints, hence augmenting the reliability and thoroughness of the corruption evaluation. The concealed nature of corruption required triangulation among various data sources to validate conclusions, as advised for examining sensitive issues (Patton, 2015). Evidence of corruption in documents was frequently incomplete or obscured by technical jargon, necessitating cross-validation via stakeholder interviews and comparative research.

This approach corresponded with the methodological framework outlined in Chapter 3, which highlighted the significance of methodological triangulation in corruption research. An intercoder reliability process was established to reduce potential bias in coding corruption instances, with an independent procurement governance expert evaluating a subset of documents, resulting in a reliability coefficient of 0.84, surpassing the 0.80 threshold advised for qualitative research with intricate classification schemes (O'Connor and Joffe, 2020). This meticulous methodology for

evaluating corruption guarantees that the results precisely reflect the incidence and trends of corruption within Zimbabwe's procurement framework.

4.3.2 Sectoral Vulnerability Analysis

This study examines variations in corruption vulnerability among procurement industries, utilizing existing corruption typologies to provide essential insights for formulating targeted integrity legislation. The document delineates specific sectoral risk profiles necessitating tailored integrity interventions instead of standardized methods.

4.3.2.1 Sectors with High Corruption Risk.

Three sectors exhibited considerable susceptibility to corruption, each defined by unique characteristics that facilitate various corrupt practices. The sectoral analysis indicates that corruption risks are disproportionately allocated among procurement domains, predominantly concentrated in sectors possessing specific structural traits that facilitate potential for misbehavior.

4.3.2.1.1 Construction sector

The construction sector demonstrated the greatest susceptibility to corruption among all analysed procurement sectors. The sector's vulnerability arose from various structural attributes: intricate technical specifications facilitating manipulation; extensive subcontracting networks concealing beneficial ownership; substantial contract values generating considerable corruption incentives; and multiple project phases offering numerous opportunities for corruption. Analysis of documents revealed that 42% of construction contracts exhibited indicators of corruption, including unreasonable cost fluctuations, dubious subcontracting practices, and irregular assessment procedures. Interview data supported these findings, as a representative from the oversight agency remarked that 'building projects generate various potential for corruption, spanning from design specifications to execution and final payment, thereby obstructing effective oversight.' Corruption in construction often appears as collusive bidding, intentionally vague technical requirements that allow modifications, and significant subcontracting that obscures beneficial ownership. These tendencies require tailored monitoring techniques for the construction procurement sector, due to its unique structural vulnerabilities.

4.3.2.1.2 Health Sector

The health sector exhibited the second-greatest susceptibility to corruption, marked by unique patterns intrinsic to its specialized characteristics: the recurrent exploitation of emergency procurement regulations during COVID-19; the technical complexities of medical equipment allowing for specification alterations; information asymmetries concerning product quality; and heightened public demand leading to accelerated procurement that circumvents standard controls. An analysis of health sector procurement documents revealed that 38% of medical equipment contracts and 42% of pharmaceutical procurement processes exhibited indications of corruption. These are sometimes expressed through excessively high technical requirements, improper use of emergency procurement, and substantial price variances for comparable products. Interview participants highlighted that corruption in the healthcare sector often distorts the technical intricacies of medical devices, hence altering specifications and evaluation standards.

4.3.2.1.3 Information Technology sector

The IT sector exhibited considerable corruption vulnerabilities: swiftly evolving technology generating information asymmetries; intricate specifications enabling manipulation for tailored solutions; challenges in objectively assessing technical solutions; and service components offering avenues for fraudulent services and exaggerated billing hours. Analysis of documents indicated that 36% of IT procurement contracts exhibited corruption, predominantly associated with alterations in specifications, prejudiced technical assessments, and anomalies in service agreements. A PRAZ executive remarked in interviews that IT procurement has distinct issues, as specifications might be designed to seem lawful while effectively limiting competition to a sole vendor, and objectively evaluating outcomes proves to be challenging.

4.3.2.2 Comparative Sectoral Vulnerability Assessment

This comparative analysis assesses the prevalence of various corruption methods in procurement sectors, emphasizing sector-specific vulnerabilities to inform targeted anti-corruption strategies. The analysis delineates distinct corruption risk profiles that vary significantly by sector, with certain procurement domains demonstrating heightened susceptibility to particular types of corruption.

Table 4-6 Prevalence of Corruption Mechanisms by Sector (%)

Corruption	**Construction**	**Health**	**IT**	**General Goods**	**Education**
Specification Manipulation	High	Very High	Very High	Moderate	Low
Bid Rigging	Very High	High	High	Moderate	Moderate
Biased Evaluation	High	High	Very High	Moderate	Moderate
Kickbacks	High	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Low
Conflict of Interest	High	Moderate	High	Moderate	Low
Emergency Abuse	Moderate	Very High	Low	Low	Low

Table 4.6 illustrates the prevalence of various corruption strategies throughout procurement sectors. The table illustrates that corruption strategies are unevenly distributed among sectors, revealing various patterns that utilize the specific qualities of each industry. Specification manipulation is notably prominent in health and IT procurement, whereas bid rigging is predominantly observed in building procurement. By systematically identifying these sectoral weaknesses, procurement agencies can improve resource allocation for monitoring activities and develop customized integrity measures that target the specific corruption issues inherent to each business.

This sectoral vulnerability analysis corresponds with suggestions for sector-specific integrity policies (Transparency International, 2020) and establishes a basis for the formulated tailored anti-corruption initiatives. The unique corruption risk profiles revealed in many sectors require tailored monitoring and prevention measures instead of generic methods. Construction procurement necessitates diligent oversight of subcontracting agreements and variation orders, whereas IT procurement involves heightened examination of technical requirements and evaluation criteria. This discovery immediately influences the sector-specific components of the subsequent anti-corruption framework.

4.3.3 Structural and Contextual Enabling Factors

This section analyses the extensive institutional, regulatory, economic, and political aspects that foster a corrupt atmosphere within Zimbabwe's procurement system. These variables surpass particular corruption methods to examine the wider contextual factors that enable corruption to endure despite regulatory measures.

4.3.3.1 Institutional, Regulatory, and Resource Constraints

An analysis of documents and stakeholder perspectives uncovered substantial institutional and legal limitations that facilitate the potential for corruption. The Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act created a thorough statutory framework; nonetheless, its execution was insufficient during the research period. The assessment of implementation fidelity indicated that e-procurement systems accomplished only partial execution of specified modules, compliance monitoring encompassed a restricted procurement value, and standardized procedures were fully adopted by merely a minority of procurement businesses. The implementation challenges created an environment conducive to the continuation of corruption, despite nominal regulatory enhancements. Resource limitations proved to be a critical concern, with PRAZ obtaining roughly 45% of its anticipated budget allocation during the study period, as indicated by PRAZ Annual Reports from 2019-2023.

This underfunding severely limited monitoring coverage, with supervision operations covering just approximately 15% of the overall procurement value. A PRAZ official remarked in interviews, 'Our risk-based monitoring strategy demonstrates diminished strategic priority and improved optimization of constrained resources to address at least the highest-risk procurements.' Deficiencies in institutional capacities heightened susceptibility to corruption. An analysis of procurement entity employment data revealed that just 42% of procurement entities operated fully staffed procurement management units with suitably competent workers. The capacity shortfall hindered the efficient execution of integrity measures at the operational level.

4.3.3.2 Economic Conditions and Political Interference

The detrimental economic conditions in Zimbabwe from 2019-2023 directly impacted susceptibility to corruption. Currency volatility impeded price benchmarking due to substantial devaluation of the local currency over the study period. Significant inflation created severe pricing ambiguity, justifying heightened procurement expenses and confounding the identification of price inflation as a corruption signal. Political forces influenced procurement results via both formal and informal means. Analysis of the documents revealed that corporations with political connections were granted preferential treatment in 38% of high-value procurement processes, including diminished accountability. Interview data indicated that political connections were evident through several methods, such as accelerated approvals, diminished due diligence, and enhanced contract terms. A spokeswoman from the oversight body remarked in interviews, 'Political affiliations engender a form of tacit insulation from examination, leading to affiliated firms seeing less stringent evaluation in procurement and audit procedures.' This observation corresponds with studies on politically related procurement in underdeveloped countries, suggesting that political ties often undermine institutional accountability measures (Transparency International, 2020).

4.3.4 Corruption Impact Assessment

This assesses the complex effects of procurement corruption on Zimbabwe's public sector and economy, having recognized patterns of corruption and enabling factors.

4.3.4.1 Financial and Service Delivery Impacts

The examination of procurement data enabled the assessment of the financial repercussions of corruption across several industries. The projected financial repercussions of procurement misconduct from 2019-2023 accounted for roughly 22-30% of the overall assessed procurement spend, consistent with estimates indicating that corruption comprises about 20-30% of procurement expenditures in similar contexts (World Bank, 2020). The estimated financial impact of corruption-related price inflation in the examined procurement contracts ranged from US$364 million to US$546 million during the study period. This considerable resource reallocation had profound effects on Zimbabwe's budget limitations and service delivery capabilities, as corroborated by both documented evidence and stakeholder viewpoints.

In addition to direct financial detriments, corruption significantly impaired service performance. Analysis of infrastructure projects revealed that unethical procurement resulted in significant delays in completion, quality deficiencies, and a reduction in service scope to accommodate rising expenses within set budgets. In a sample of 18 construction projects, those with high corruption indicators had average completion delays of 14.3 months, whereas projects with low corruption indicators saw delays of 4.8 months. A procurement officer remarked in interviews, "When corruption escalates procurement expenses, a compromise must occur—either the project scope is diminished, quality standards are undermined, or supplementary funding must be obtained." Due to Zimbabwe's resource limitations, both quality and scope generally deteriorate.

4.3.4.2 Market Competition Effects

Corruption systematically distorted market dynamics by creating unfair competitive advantages and obstacles to entrance. Sectors more prone to corruption displayed much higher supplier concentration, with dominant suppliers obtaining a disproportionate share of contract value in high-corruption sectors compared to low-corruption sectors. An examination of supplier data indicated that in sectors characterized by high corruption, the leading three suppliers accounted for 62% of the contract value, but in areas with low corruption, the top three suppliers comprised only 34% of the contract value. This concentration effect establishes a self-perpetuating cycle wherein corrupt benefits facilitate market dominance, thereby amplifying opportunities for corruption. New market entrants and SMEs secured only a small portion of contract value in high-corruption industries, in contrast to a considerably bigger share in low-corruption sectors. New market entrants obtained merely 8% of contract value in high-corruption sectors, in contrast to 23% in low-corruption sectors. This entrance barrier adversely affects market competitiveness and economic development objectives.

4.3.5 Comparative Context: Zimbabwe's Procurement Corruption in Regional Perspective

This portion contextualizes the study's results by situating Zimbabwe's procurement corruption concerns within a broader regional framework, highlighting both commonalities and unique characteristics. This comparative analysis elucidates the corruption concerns that are prevalent in

developing nations and those that are unique to Zimbabwe's situation. Zimbabwe encounters numerous corruption difficulties akin to those faced by other Southern African Development Community (SADC) nations, such as inadequate monitoring capabilities, governance shortcomings, and significant resource limitations. Examination of regional procurement research indicates a comparable occurrence of bid rigging (30-40% of high-value contracts) and conflict of interest issues (25-35% of procurement entities) across several SADC nations (Transparency International, 2020). Nevertheless, Zimbabwe exhibits unique trends in three important domains. Initially, specification manipulation in Zimbabwe demonstrates more technical sophistication compared to neighboring nations, indicating the comparatively elevated technical capacity of Zimbabwe's procurement personnel despite limited resources.

Secondly, politically related procurement seems to be more widespread in Zimbabwe compared to several SADC neighbors, with the exception of Angola and Mozambique, which display analogous trends. Third, Zimbabwe exhibits a significant disparity between the legal acceptance and the functional implementation of anti-corruption measures, resulting in what Andrews (2013) describes as "isomorphic mimicry," wherein institutions adopt the appearance but not the efficacy of good governance. These comparative observations offer crucial context for the formulation of the anti-corruption framework in Section 4.5, emphasizing which elements necessitate Zimbabwe-specific remedies and which can leverage regional experiences. The subsequent part expands upon this comprehension of corruption typologies to evaluate the efficacy of current anti-corruption initiatives.

4.4 Analysis and Interpretation of the Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Measures in Zimbabwe's Procurement System

This section evaluates the effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives executed by PRAZ from 2019-2023, subsequent to a comprehensive examination of corruption patterns inside Zimbabwe's procurement system. This assessment directly pertains to the second research purpose by examining implementation obstacles, operational impacts, and stakeholder viewpoints to provide a comprehensive understanding of both successful and unsuccessful components, along with their foundational causes.

4.4.1 Regulatory Framework Implementation

This section analyses PRAZ's regulatory framework implementation established under the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act, evaluating both structural implementation and operational effectiveness. The analysis identifies substantial discrepancies between formal adoption and practical implementation that undermine integrity effectiveness.

4.4.1.1 Legal and Institutional Reform Implementation

The transition from centralized procurement supervision by the State Procurement Board to a decentralized regulatory framework under PRAZ represented a significant institutional transformation, highlighting contradictions between formal reform and practical change. Implementation data analysis indicated that from 2019-2023, PRAZ effectively produced critical regulatory frameworks, with 87% of required regulatory instruments developed and officially adopted. However, this apparent achievement conceals profound institutional resistance to transformation. The pronounced disparity between formal adoption and practical implementation (with complete deployment in only 52% of procurement units) exemplifies 'isomorphic mimicry'- a reform creating transformation illusion while preserving existing power structures and rent-seeking opportunities (Andrews, 2013).

Adoption patterns indicate a strategic implementation approach where readily observable elements (standard bidding documents and procurement thresholds) received priority, while components threatening established interests (conflict of interest procedures and evaluation committee reforms) encountered subtle opposition. This selective implementation reveals a reform calculus where political and bureaucratic actors endorse changes aligned with their interests while obstructing those threatening established patronage networks. The regulatory transition effectively achieved structural objectives of establishing PRAZ as an independent regulator; however, it significantly neglected addressing informal norms and practices perpetuating corruption, explaining minimal improvement in corruption metrics despite institutional restructuring.

4.4.1.2 Implementation Fidelity Evaluation

Implementation fidelity assessment identified substantial differences between regulatory design and actual operations. The disparity between official adoption and practical implementation has become a crucial factor hindering regulatory measure effectiveness in mitigating corruption.

Table 4-7 Implementation Fidelity Assessment of PRAZ's Regulatory Framework

Regulatory Component	**Formal Adoption Rate %**	**Operational Implementation Rate %**	**Implementation Gap %**
Standard Bidding Documents	96	74	22
Procurement Thresholds	100	92	8
Procurement Management Units	89	42	47
Conflict of Interest Procedures	78	31	47
Procurement Planning Requirements	83	56	27
Evaluation Committee Procedures	92	61	31

Table 4.7 delineates PRAZ's regulatory framework implementation fidelity assessment. The table illustrates significant implementation deficiencies across regulatory elements, with particularly pronounced discrepancies in procurement management units and conflict of interest protocols. These disparities suggest that while formal regulatory adoption has been predominantly successful, operational implementation significantly lags, compromising integrity measure effectiveness. These findings align with 'isomorphic mimicry' concept, where formal characteristics are emulated

without associated functionality (Andrews, 2013). This implementation approach created vulnerability to 'formal compliance corruption,' as procedural adherence conceals substantive misconduct (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016).

Interview data corroborated these findings, with one procurement officer stating, 'We possess comprehensive procedures that appear commendable on paper, yet in practice, we lack the capacity, resources, and occasionally the resolve to implement them as intended.' The implementation gap represents a significant barrier to PRAZ's integrity effectiveness, as formal regulatory advances have only partially translated into operational integrity improvements.

4.4.2 Modernization Interventions

Technology-driven efforts are a core component of PRAZ's anti-corruption approach. This subsection evaluates the execution and efficacy of e-procurement and monitoring instruments in improving transparency and diminishing potential for corruption. The investigation indicates a partial application of technology solutions, resulting in inconsistent transparency throughout the procurement process.

4.4.2.1 E-Procurement and Transparency Mechanisms

PRAZ's e-procurement initiative attained partial implementation between 2019 and 2023, with only 30% of the planned system capability operational, suggesting a purposeful prioritizing strategy rather than mere capacity limitations. This selective application created a dual transparency framework: increased visibility during pre-award phases while maintaining opacity in evaluation and contract administration stages where significant corruption transpires. This architecture effectively meets external reform mandates while preserving rent-seeking opportunities in less transparent procurement phases.

The implementation sequence prioritizes supplier registration (85% complete) and notification systems (72% complete) over evaluation (18%) and payment systems (10%), illustrating a logical progression in technical advancement and, crucially, a preference for reforms that present minimal risk to entrenched interests. The advanced module's absence for detection and mitigation in high-risk post-award phases leads to 'transparency without accountability'-a surface reform that reveals

process details without facilitating meaningful monitoring of outcomes (Rose-Ackerman, 2016). Implementation challenges signify more profound structural problems that transcend mere resource constraints.

PRAZ underscores connectivity issues, as 63% of rural organisations experience sporadic internet access; nonetheless, the selective deployment pattern suggests that political economy factors significantly influence the situation, resulting in 'design-reality gaps' between the theoretical advantages of e-procurement and the institutional interests guiding its execution (Heeks, 2006). This partial reform has facilitated 'corruption displacement'-the transfer of corrupt practices from newly transparent procurement phases to others that remain opaque (Martínez, 2019).



Figure 4-4 E-Procurement Implementation Status in Zimbabwe (2019-2023)

Figure 4.4 illustrates the implementation status of key e-procurement modules in Zimbabwe from 2019-2023. The %ages indicate the completion rates of each module, highlighting considerable discrepancies among system components. Fundamental modules such as supplier registration (85%) and notification systems (72%) attained significant implementation rates, whereas advanced components like assessment systems (18%) and payment systems (10%) were predominantly unimplemented.

The inconsistent execution results in transparency deficiencies during essential procurement phases, especially in post-award stages where the danger of corruption is significant. The implementation issues in Zimbabwe reflect observations from analogous resource-limited contexts. Investigations on e-government implementation in sub-Saharan Africa indicate considerable infrastructural limitations that often lead to insufficient internet and computing capabilities for many procurement entities, particularly in rural regions (Schuppan, 2009). The PRAZ Technical Assessment unequivocally shows that in Zimbabwe, 'connectivity represents a significant barrier for procuring entities outside major urban centres, with 63% reporting intermittent internet availability hindering the effective use of e-procurement systems' (PRAZ, 2022). The evaluation of Zimbabwe's e-procurement system indicated that the existing implementation status fosters an inconsistent transparency environment, marked by significant visibility in tender advertising but restricted transparency in evaluation and contract management, thereby facilitating the potential for corruption to shift to less visible procurement stages (World Bank, 2022).

This evaluation corresponds with research indicating that partial implementation may generate inefficiencies due to fragmented processes, introducing new vulnerabilities while mitigating others (Heeks, 2006). Throughout the study period, sophisticated e-procurement functionalities, such as e-evaluation, e-contract administration, and integrated monitoring systems, were not executed. These components are essential modules for identifying and addressing corruption in high-risk post-award procurement phases, as evidenced by a comparative review of digital integrity solutions in African procurement systems (Adam et al., 2020).

Their absence severely constrained the efficacy of technical interventions against corruption in Zimbabwe's procurement sector. The implementation strategy for PRAZ's e-procurement was shaped by resource limitations outlined in the organisation's strategic planning papers. The PRAZ Strategic Plan recognized that 'resource constraints require a gradual rollout of e-procurement, prioritizing essential modules to ensure immediate transparency while developing capacity for advanced features' (PRAZ, 2021). This pragmatic strategy corresponds with e-procurement implementation guidelines for African nations, highlighting a 'modular, incremental e-procurement approach that prioritizes interoperability with current systems over extensive but potentially unsustainable implementations' (World Bank, 2018).

4.4.2.2 Monitoring Tools Performance

PRAZ implemented various monitoring approaches throughout the trial period, demonstrating differing levels of execution and efficacy. The compliance checklist system was comprehensively developed across procurement entities, the red flag indicator system was partially executed, and performance metrics were marginally instituted. Data analysis of monitoring revealed that the compliance-focused strategy emphasized procedural conformity over outcome evaluation, with 78% of monitoring efforts concentrated on documentation thoroughness instead of procurement results. This emphasis may have engendered susceptibility to 'form over substance' corruption, when procedural compliance obscures substantive corruption through technically precise yet operationally inadequate methods.

Resource constraints significantly limited monitoring coverage, with oversight operations covering only 15% of the entire procurement value, as reported by PRAZ Annual Reports. This restricted coverage resulted in considerable monitoring deficiencies that undermined detection capabilities. A spokesperson from the oversight group remarked in interviews that the monitoring system serves mostly as a deterrent through the potential for supervision, rather than as a complete monitoring method, owing to resource limitations. The efficiency of the deployed monitoring techniques varied significantly. The monitoring report and subsequent action review revealed that the compliance checklist method efficiently identified procedural infractions but showed limited efficacy in detecting more complex corruption schemes. The partially developed red flag system showed potential in identifying suspicious patterns but lacked the analytical capacity for thorough application across all procurement procedures.

4.4.3 Capacity Building and Professionalization

Human capacity development serves as the third pillar of PRAZ's integrity policy. This section assesses the implementation and impact of training, certification, and professional development initiatives on procurement integrity. The analysis reveals notable accomplishments in professional development but with ongoing difficulties in retention and geographical dissemination.

4.4.3.1 Training Programmes and Certification Impact

PRAZ founded the Centre of Procurement Excellence in collaboration with the University of Zimbabwe and the Chartered Institute of Procurement and Supply Zimbabwe. From 2019-2023, 654 procurement officers obtained professional certification through this project, constituting almost 30% of public procurement officers, as stated in PRAZ's Annual Procurement Report (PRAZ, 2023). This implementation level surpasses analogous capacity-building initiatives in other regional procurement agencies, such as Zambia's Procurement Development Programme, which attained 22% certification coverage within a similar timeframe (World Bank, 2022).

Table 4-8 PRAZ Certification and Training Programme Analysis (2019-2023)

Programme Component	**Number of Participants**	**Completion Rate %**	**Implementation Challenges**	**Anti-Corruption Impact**
Basic Procurement Certification	654	78	High staff turnover (25%), Limited rural access	Moderate - Improved procedural compliance
Advanced Anti-Corruption Training	217	81	Limited specialized trainers, Equipment constraints	High - Reduced technical specification manipulation
Management Development Programme	73	92	Budget limitations, Institutional resistance	Moderate - Improved oversight effectiveness
Integrity Leadership Workshop	128	Political sensitivities, Limited follow-through		Limited - Cultural change challenges

Table 4.8 delineates the examination of PRAZ's certification and training programme during the study period. The table illustrates differing degrees of engagement, completion rates, implementation obstacles, and effects on integrity across various programme components. Specialized technical training demonstrated significant integrity impact despite moderate participation levels, underscoring the value of targeted capacity building in high-risk regions.

The impact of certification demonstrated diverse effects on integrity effectiveness, with qualified procurement officers exhibiting fewer procedural violations but only a marginal decrease in substantive corruption indicators. PRAZ's Certification Impact Assessment indicated that procurement units with certified officers demonstrated a 43% reduction in procedural breaches related to documentation and process compliance but only achieved a 12% decrease in outcome-based corruption measures, including price inflation and restricted competition (PRAZ, 2022). This discovery corresponds with studies of capacity-building programmes in developing nations, cautioning that 'procurement certification often improves procedural compliance without necessarily altering basic behaviors or outcomes' (Polidano, 2000). This pattern indicates that certification alone is inadequate to tackle informal norms and practices that foster corruption, necessitating additional interventions that address both formal skills and institutional culture. Staff retention has become a pressing concern, marked by substantial annual turnover of qualified procurement specialists, hence reducing the value of training investments.

An assessment of a capacity-building initiative in Zimbabwe, derived from a survey of 218 trained procurement officers, indicated that an annual turnover rate of 25% among certified officers resulted in significant institutional investment loss, as numerous certified officers transitioned to private sector positions with superior compensation (Nyakuedzwa, 2021). The study indicated that constraints in career growth opportunities and compensation discrepancies between public and private sector procurement roles contribute to employee attrition (Nyakuedzwa, 2021). This turnover challenge jeopardizes the sustainability of capacity-building investments and generates continuity gaps, thus heightening vulnerability to corruption. Geographic disparities in training access markedly reduced programme efficacy.

The PRAZ Regional Training Access Report revealed that urban procurement officers obtained an average of 4.2 training days per year, while their rural counterparts received only 1.6 training days,

resulting in significant capacity gaps within the procurement system (PRAZ, 2022). This finding corresponds with comprehensive research on geographical discrepancies in procurement capacity development, highlighting the urban-rural split in professional development opportunities (Chikohomero, 2022). Geographical differences result in inconsistent integrity capacity within the procurement system, rendering rural procurement organisations especially susceptible to corruption due to insufficient professional development.

4.4.3.2 Professional Development Outcomes

Professional development initiatives exhibited varied outcomes regarding procurement integrity throughout the study period. The professionalization project produced measurable enhancements in the consistency of the procurement process; nevertheless, the operational advantages did not align with specific integrity gains. An analysis of procurement corruption cases revealed that 'companies with certified procurement officers exhibited a 23% enhancement in procedural compliance, albeit only a 9% decrease in substantive corruption indicators' (Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission, 2022, p. 38). This pattern corresponds with research suggesting that professionalization initiatives in developing nations frequently face 'isomorphic mimicry,' when 'institutions replicate the look of effective systems without achieving genuine efficacy' (Heywood and Rose, 2014).

The gap between professional qualifications and corruption results demonstrates that technical skills alone cannot resolve the intricate difficulties of procurement misbehavior. Research on procurement integrity standards revealed that 'in resource-constrained situations, focused competency development in high-risk sectors yields better integrity outcomes than generic procurement training' (OECD, 2016). The evidence indicates that PRAZ's certification programme would improve with enhanced specialization, particularly in high-risk areas identified in the corruption typology study, including technical specification preparation, bid evaluation, and contract administration.

4.4.4 Multi-Stakeholder Perspectives on Effectiveness

The diverse assessments of anti-corruption effectiveness by stakeholders reveal not only differing perspectives but also intrinsic structural tensions within the procurement system. The significant

disparity in effectiveness ratings between PRAZ officials (3.8/5) and procurement officers (2.6/5) as well as private sector participants (2.2/5) exemplifies what Grindle (2004) describes as the "implementation gap"-the divergence between policy formulation and practical execution that determines the efficacy of reform. The inconsistencies in judgment highlight how institutional roles affect both perception and the consequences of change. Regulatory authorities, responsible for developing and advocating changes, evaluate effectiveness through compliance metrics and formal adoption rates, whereas practitioners assess reforms based on operational impact and cost-benefit evaluations. This perceptual gap significantly hinders the effectiveness of reform, as it undermines the mutual understanding necessary for joint action.

The strict evaluations from the business sector (2.2/5) indicate that more compliance rules have led to what Williams-Elegbe (2019) calls "procedural corruption"-processes that appear to follow the rules but actually hide ongoing corrupt activities. The agreement on implementation challenges (resource limitations, political interference, capability deficiencies) despite differing overall assessments underscores a vital observation: stakeholders in the procurement ecosystem recognize the same systemic barriers but attribute varying degrees of significance to them according to their institutional context and accountability demands. The evidence suggests that effective change requires both technological solutions and alignment mechanisms to harmonize differing institutional perspectives and incentive structures—an element often neglected in current anti-corruption efforts.

4.4.5 Comparative Effectiveness Assessment

This outlines anti-corruption programmes on overall effectiveness, factors affecting successful implementation, and resulting impacts. The evaluation offers a thorough comparison of several anti-corruption measures to ascertain the best effective strategies within Zimbabwe's resource-limited environment.



Figure 4-5 Comparative Effectiveness of PRAZ's Anti-Corruption Initiatives (2019-2023)

Figure 4.5 depicts the relative efficacy of PRAZ's anti-corruption actions during the study period. The data indicates that standardized bidding documents received the highest efficacy rating (3.8/5), succeeded by procurement officer certification (3.4/5) and compliance checklists (3.2/5). Conversely, integrity pacts (1.8/5), advanced e-procurement modules (2.0/5), and performance metrics (2.1/5) show lower effectiveness compared to other interventions. This tendency indicates that simpler, more established programmes attained better efficacy than sophisticated or resource-intensive attempts. Standardized bidding documents demonstrated the most efficacy, but integrity pacts exhibited the lowest overall effectiveness.

Analysis of implementation aspects indicates that initiatives with straightforward implementation needs demonstrate significantly higher resource efficiency than complex supervision processes, hence supporting the concept of "good enough governance" (Grindle, 2004). The evaluation of efficacy identifies three essential success elements for anti-corruption measures in Zimbabwe's resource-limited context. Initially, projects that leveraged existing institutional skills instead of

necessitating wholly new capacities showed greater implementation fidelity and efficacy. Secondly, treatments targeting specific high-risk areas produced a more significant impact than generalized measures.

Third, measures that harmonized procedural safeguards with realistic operational feasibility resulted in superior acceptance and efficacy. The findings reinforce the conceptual framework's focus on contextual adaptability, resource optimization, and institutional capacity as essential factors influencing anti-corruption success. The evaluation offers critical insights for the formulation of the anti-corruption framework in the subsequent section, emphasizing strategies that have proven effective within Zimbabwe's resource limitations.

4.5 Analysis and Interpretation of a Framework for Combating Corruption in Zimbabwe's Resource-Limited Procurement Context

This section introduces a contextually tailored approach aimed at improving procurement integrity in Zimbabwe, based on the examination of corruption trends and the efficacy of anti-corruption measures discussed earlier. The framework directly tackles the third research objective by amalgamating institutional, technological, and contextual components into a unified strategy that recognizes resource limitations while offering a feasible route to enhanced procurement integrity. The suggested framework is based on empirical evidence of effective strategies in Zimbabwe's setting, while also addressing the shortcomings of current anti-corruption efforts. It integrates insights from effective applications in similar resource-limited contexts while customizing strategies to address Zimbabwe's unique corruption issues, institutional framework, and resource constraints.

4.5.1 Framework Components and Integration

The essential components of the proposed integrity framework are outlined, along with their incorporation into a cohesive system designed to address specific corruption challenges within Zimbabwe's procurement sector. The framework employs a comprehensive approach that acknowledges the complex nature of procurement corruption and the necessity for cooperative efforts across all dimensions.

4.5.1.1 Institutional and Technological Elements

The institutional component establishes a three-tiered oversight framework consisting of (1) internal control units within procurement entities; (2) augmented PRAZ sectoral monitoring teams specializing in high-risk areas; and (3) an inter-agency coordination mechanism linking PRAZ with other oversight bodies. This stratified methodology is informed by studies on successful oversight frameworks in resource-limited contexts, indicating that 'concurrent yet separate accountability procedures establish a robust oversight network that mitigates individual system deficiencies' (Klitgaard, 2015).

Table 4-9 Institutional Components of the Proposed Anti-Corruption Framework

Institutional Level	**Key Components**	**Implementation Responsibility**	**Resource Requirements**
Internal Control Units	Risk assessment protocols, Segregation of duties, Pre-award clearance procedures	Procurement entities with PRAZ guidance	Medium-Requires re-organisation of existing resources plus limited new capacity
PRAZ Sectoral Monitoring Teams	Specialized expertise for high-risk sectors, Risk-based auditing methods, Standardized red flag protocols	PRAZ with support from sector ministries	High - Requires significant new technical expertise and monitoring capacity
Inter-Agency Coordination Mechanism	Joint investigation protocols, Information sharing platform, Coordinated enforcement strategy	PRAZ, ZACC, Auditor General, Financial Intelligence Unit	Medium - Requires formalization of existing relationships and information sharing systems

Table 4.9 delineates a three-tiered strategy, specifying implementation tasks and resource necessities at each level. This design establishes many levels of control while acknowledging the distinct resource requirements of different elements. The architecture of the internal control unit encompasses guidelines for strong primary defenses against procurement corruption, stating that 'procurement entities must operate as the major control point, with clear accountability for corruption prevention integrated into routine operations' (OECD, 2016). The sectoral monitoring technique illustrates that proficiency in high-risk procurement domains markedly enhances the identification of intricate corruption schemes that general oversight may overlook (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016).



Figure 4-6 The Integrated Anti-Corruption Framework for Zimbabwe's Public Procurement System

Technological components augment current institutional frameworks via a modular e-procurement strategy that emphasizes three important elements: (1) a centralized procurement data repository; (2) an automated red-flag system; and (3) a procurement performance dashboard. This targeted strategy is informed by research on digital integrity solutions in resource-limited settings, which revealed that 'specific technological interventions aimed at particular corruption risks produce a

more significant impact than broad but inadequately executed systems' (Adam et al., 2020). The unified procurement data repository supports improved openness and supervision, facilitating comprehensive data collection with little technical requirements. The automated red-flag system strengthens this foundation by delivering systematic risk identification concentrated on previously specified high-risk procurement sectors. The procurement performance dashboard enhances access to procurement data for oversight entities and the public, hence augmenting external monitoring capabilities.

4.5.1.2 Contextual Adaptation and Integration Mechanisms

The effectiveness of the framework depends on its adaptation to Zimbabwe's unique procurement environment and the integration of many components into a unified system. Contextual adaptation comprises three fundamental components identified through empirical analysis of corruption patterns in the previous section:

- Sector-specific calibration: Implementing integrity measures designed to address unique vulnerability patterns identified in high-risk sectors such as construction, healthcare, and information technology. This approach is supported by research demonstrating that 'strategic resource allocation guided by corruption risk analysis achieved 40% more effectiveness in addressing procurement corruption than fragmented reform initiatives' (Khan et al., 2019).
- Geographic adaptation: Adjusting implementation strategies to address significant disparities in institutional capability between urban and rural areas, as identified by the research. Geographical disparities in the analysis of procurement capacity development in Zimbabwe reveal empirical evidence, demonstrating that 'procurement officials in Bulawayo and Harare attended an average of 4.7 professional development events over two years, while their rural district counterparts engaged in only 1.3 events' (Chikohomero, 2022).
- Economic adaptation: Developing strategies to sustain effectiveness in Zimbabwe's challenging economic environment, particularly with currency volatility and inflationary challenges. This feature emphasizes that 'economic volatility substantially undermines the

effectiveness of conventional integrity procedures designed for stable economic environments' (Sibanda, 2020).

Integration techniques ensure coherence through three interconnected methodologies:

- Procedural integration: Embedding integrity measures inside standard procurement processes rather than creating distinct systems. This methodology is supported by research on institutional transformation in poor countries, demonstrating that 'reforms that follow established procedural frameworks rather than creating parallel systems show significantly higher implementation fidelity and sustainability' (Andrews, 2013).
- Informational integration: Creating data flows between institutional and technological components to ensure that decision-makers receive timely access to relevant information. Studies demonstrate that 'information integration establishes reinforcing feedback loops whereby increased transparency enhances anomaly detection, strengthens system trust, attracts more competitive bids, and ultimately reduces corruption incentives' (Williams and Dupuy, 2017).
- Organisational integration: Establishing clear responsibility frameworks and communication channels among various institutional players involved in integrity initiatives. Research on civil society oversight of procurement emphasized that 'clear accountability connections and established communication pathways among oversight entities' are essential for effective integrity coordination (Michael and Kasemets, 2007). The comprehensive plan employs an 'adaptive procurement integrity framework,' customizing integrity activities based on institutional maturity, technological readiness, resource accessibility, political dedication, and cultural context. Quantitative research of 18 emerging economies revealed that 'context-sensitive frameworks exhibited 2.8 times better efficacy than traditional methods while consuming 35% fewer resources' (Osei-Tutu et al., 2021), a conclusion particularly relevant to Zimbabwe's resource-constrained environment.

4.5.2 Implementation Strategy

This part outlines a staged implementation strategy that addresses the limitations of current anti-corruption programmes, optimizing resource use and establishing a feasible approach to improving procurement integrity.

4.5.2.1 Resource Optimization and Sustainability

The implementation strategy emphasizes resource optimization via asymmetric resource allocation (channeling resources to high-impact intervention points), capacity multiplication strategies (enhancing limited human resources through structural methods), and technology selectivity (favoring technological interventions based on cost-benefit analysis).

4.5.2.2 Phased Implementation

The implementation method employs a staged approach that organizes interventions according to urgency, resource needs, and interdependencies.

- Short-term phase (0-18 months): Establishing core components that yield immediate enhancements in integrity.
- Medium-term phase (19-36 months): Executing increasingly resource-intensive operations that tackle complex corruption systems.
- Long-term phase (37-60 months): Finalizing the implementation of the framework, encompassing the most resource-demanding and technically intricate components.

a. Implementation Case Examples from Comparable Contexts

The proposed phased implementation approach draws lessons from successful anti-corruption reforms in comparable resource-constrained environments: Georgia's procurement reforms (2004-2010), Rwanda's risk-based oversight model (2010-2018), and Ukraine's ProZorro system (2015-2019).

4.5.3 Stakeholder Coordination Approach

Successful anti-corruption necessitates synchronized efforts across all parties. This part delineates a systematic method for multi-stakeholder involvement that utilizes complementary oversight resources and addresses coordination problems.

4.5.3.1 Multi-stakeholder Collaboration and Public-Private Partnerships

The framework created a collaborative model involving multiple stakeholders via formal coordination mechanisms (Procurement Integrity Steering Committee, Technical Working Groups, and a Procurement Innovation Lab) and public-private partnerships (technology partnerships, integrity certification programmes, and market monitoring partnerships).

4.5.3.2 Civil Society Engagement Strategies

Civil society engagement is a crucial supplement to formal institutional monitoring via information access procedures, participatory frameworks, and capacity-building programmes for civil society organisations.

4.5.4 Performance Management Framework

Effective anti-corruption requires robust performance assessment and modification mechanisms. This article presented a systematic approach for evaluating anti-corruption effectiveness and implementing feedback systems for continuous improvement. The framework guarantees that the efficacy of execution is methodically evaluated and perpetually enhanced based on empirical data.

4.5.4.1 Indicators, Monitoring Mechanisms, and Adaptation Processes

The performance management framework utilizes a balanced scorecard methodology to assess anti-corruption efficacy across four dimensions:

- Process indicators: Assessing the fidelity of implementation and operational consistency of anti-corruption measures (e.g., %age of procurement entities possessing functional internal control units, compliance rates with conflict-of-interest protocols).

- Outcome indicators: Evaluating direct anti-corruption outcomes (e.g., reduction in single-bidder contracts, decrease in specification disputes, diminished contract price deviation from market benchmarks).
- View indicators: Assessing stakeholder evaluations of procurement integrity (e.g., supplier trust in procurement equity, public view of procurement openness).
- Impact indicators: Assessing the wider implications on procurement performance (e.g., increased value for money, heightened competitiveness, diminished procurement delays).

This comprehensive measuring strategy corresponds with the findings of Johnsøn and Mason (2013), which indicated that frameworks incorporating both outcome and process metrics show a 35% enhancement in efficacy for detecting and addressing procurement wrongdoing:

- Monitoring mechanisms: utilize a stratified approach that harmonizes extensive supervision with resource efficiency:

- First-tier monitoring: Self-evaluation by procurement entities utilizing standardized checklists, establishing baseline monitoring with minimal resource allocation.
- Second-tier monitoring: Risk-oriented supervision by PRAZ concentrating on high-risk procurement and entities exhibiting compliance issues.
- Third-tier monitoring: Independent validation via focused audits, stakeholder surveys, and outcome assessments.

- Adaptation processes: convert monitoring outcomes into strategy modifications:

- learning loops: systematic review cycles that integrate performance data into implementation modifications.
- Exception management systems: Swift response protocols for mitigating discovered corruption vulnerabilities.
- Innovation catalysts: Frameworks for evaluating and expanding effective anti-corruption strategies.

This performance management framework establishes a methodical way to evaluate anti-corruption efficacy and foster ongoing enhancement. It tackles the measurement problems outlined previously while establishing a basis for evidence-based modification during implementation.

4.6 Discussion of Results

This section situates the empirical findings within the broader scholarly discourse on public procurement corruption, anti-corruption reform, and institutional change in resource-constrained settings. Rather than treating the results in isolation, this discussion interprets them through the lens of established theoretical frameworks and comparative empirical evidence.

4.6.1 Theoretical Framework Integration

The dominance of process manipulation (42% of cases) strongly validates the principal-agent theory, particularly its emphasis on information asymmetry as a structural enabler of corruption (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Yukins, 2010). As Williams-Elegbe (2019) observes in the African context, technical complexity in procurement—especially in IT and health sectors—creates "legitimate-looking" avenues for bias that evade conventional oversight. This study confirms that agents (procurement officials) exploit their superior technical knowledge to manipulate specifications and evaluations, a pattern consistent with what Fazekas and Tóth (2023) term "second-generation corruption." Unlike overt bribery, such practices are harder to detect and prosecute, explaining the low conviction rate (14 out of 87 cases) reported by ZACC (2022).

The gap between formal adoption (87%) and operational implementation (52%) of PRAZ's regulatory framework resonates with institutional theory, particularly the concept of isomorphic mimicry (Andrews, 2013; Heywood & Rose, 2014). Institutions adopt international "best practices" to signal legitimacy but fail to internalize their functional logic. This mirrors findings from Georgia and Ukraine, where early e-procurement reforms also suffered from superficial compliance until deeper institutional and cultural shifts occurred (Johnsøn & Mason, 2013). In Zimbabwe, the persistence of informal patronage networks—despite formal decentralization from the SPB to PRAZ—illustrates institutional path dependency (North, 1990), where historical practices constrain present reform possibilities (Makumbe, 2020).

The partial rollout of e-procurement (30%) and its uneven module implementation align with systems theory insights. As Heeks (2006) warns, fragmented digital interventions can create "design-reality gaps" that displace rather than eliminate corruption. The current system enhances pre-award transparency but leaves post-award phases opaque—a pattern also documented in Kenya and Nigeria (Adam et al., 2020). This supports Senge's (2006) notion of balancing vs. reinforcing feedback loops: without integrated monitoring and enforcement, transparency alone fails to generate self-sustaining integrity.

Finally, the finding that resource constraints dictate reform sequencing directly supports resource-based theory (Barney, 1991) and Grindle's (2004) "good enough governance" thesis. The higher effectiveness of low-cost interventions (e.g., standardized bidding documents) versus high-cost ones (e.g., integrity pacts) confirms that strategic prioritization—not comprehensive reform—is key in low-capacity settings. This echoes Khan et al.'s (2019) finding that risk-based resource allocation yields 40% greater anti-corruption impact in similar contexts.

Table 4-10 Theoretical Framework Integration and Empirical Support

Theoretical Framework	**Key Insights for Understanding Corruption**	**Empirical Support from Findings**	**Implications for Anti-Corruption Framework**
Principal-Agent Theory	Information asymmetries enable technical manipulation of procurement processes	42% of corruption instances involved process manipulation exploiting technical knowledge advantages	Framework must reduce information asymmetries through transparency and specialized oversight
Institutional Theory	Formal rule changes without normative shifts yield limited impact	Regulatory reforms achieved high procedural compliance (87%) but limited outcome improvements (12%)	Both formal rules and informal norms must be addressed through professional socialization

			and values-based interventions
Resource-Based Theory	Implementation effectiveness depends on strategic resource allocation	Resource constraints most severely impacted monitoring (15% coverage) and e-procurement (30% implementation)	Framework must prioritize high-impact, resource-efficient interventions through strategic sequencing
Systems Theory	Corruption emerges from complex interactions rather than isolated factors	Corruption typologies showed distinctive patterns across sectors with interrelated enabling factors	Interventions must target system dynamics through complementary measures with reinforcing effects

Table 4.10 presents a systematic integration of theoretical frameworks with empirical findings from this study. The table aligns each theoretical perspective-Principal-agent theory, Institutional Theory, Resource-Based Theory and systems- Theory with specific empirical evidence and outlines the implications for the anti-corruption framework. This structured analysis demonstrates that a multi-theoretical approach is necessary to address the complexity of procurement corruption in Zimbabwe's context.

4.6.2 Practical Implications for Public Procurement Reform

The sector-specific vulnerability patterns (construction: 42%; health: 38–42%; IT: 36%) corroborate OECD (2016) and Transparency International (2020) global risk assessments, which identify infrastructure and emergency procurement as high-risk domains. However, Zimbabwe's sophisticated specification manipulation exceeds typical patterns in SADC countries, suggesting a need for specialized technical oversight—a gap noted in Williams-Elegbe's (2018) critique of generic capacity-building programmes.

Moreover, the urban-rural training disparity (4.2 vs. 1.6 days/year) reflects a broader challenge in public sector reform: geographic inequity in institutional capacity. Chikohomero (2022) and Schuppan (2009) similarly find that rural entities in developing economies are systematically excluded from digital and professional development initiatives, reinforcing centralised corruption networks.

4.6.3 Specific Recommendations for PRAZ's Strategic Planning

This study advances the literature by demonstrating that anti-corruption effectiveness in procurement is not a function of legal design alone, but of the dynamic interplay between institutional capacity, technological sequencing, and contextual adaptation. It challenges the "one-size-fits-all" transfer of global best practices (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2022) and instead supports contextualized institutionalism (Osei-Tutu et al., 2021), where frameworks are calibrated to local economic volatility, political economy, and administrative maturity.

4.7 Chapter Summary

This chapter examined corruption in Zimbabwe's public procurement system and evaluated the effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives implemented by PRAZ from 2019-2023. It identified three main corruption typologies: process manipulation, governance concerns, and illicit financial activities. Implementation challenges included resource restrictions, capacity deficiencies, and institutional opposition. The chapter introduced a contextually tailored anti-corruption approach that combined institutional reforms with technical interventions, focusing on resource optimization and strategic sequencing. The research offered insights for procurement reform in resource-limited environments and provided recommendations for strategic planning

CHAPTER 5

STUDY SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter synthesizes the research findings on corruption in Zimbabwe's public procurement system, overseen by the Procurement Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (PRAZ) from 2019-2023. The study aimed to achieve three main goals: to find and examine corruption trends in Zimbabwe's public procurement system, to assess how well current anti-corruption efforts are working, and to create a detailed anti-corruption plan suited for Zimbabwe's limited resources. This chapter integrates essential findings from the empirical investigation and aligns them with the theoretical frameworks discussed in Chapter 2. The chapter is structured so as to provide a methodical presentation of findings for each study objective, followed by evidence-based conclusions that integrate theoretical viewpoints with empirical facts. This chapter presented a series of pragmatic solutions, featuring a comprehensive anti-corruption framework specifically designed for Zimbabwe's procurement landscape.

The chapter concluded by suggesting directions for future research, acknowledging the limits of the current study, and identifying areas that need additional investigation. The results and recommendations of this chapter have significant implications for procurement policy and practice in Zimbabwe, offering PRAZ and other stakeholders a framework to enhance procurement integrity despite resource constraints. The chapter emphasized solution-oriented nature of the study, demonstrating how each component of the research contributes to addressing the critical issue of corruption in public procurement.

5.2 Summary of Research Findings

This section offers a comprehensive review of the key findings from the empirical research, organized according to the three primary research objectives that guided this study. These findings combine information from document analysis and opinions from stakeholders collected through structured questionnaires, giving a fact-based view of corruption problems in Zimbabwe's public procurement system. Each part focuses on a specific research goal, such as understanding

corruption trends, evaluating how well current anti-corruption strategies work, and creating a relevant framework for the situation.

5.2.1 Findings on Corruption Patterns in Zimbabwe's Public Procurement

The study identified three primary corruption typologies in Zimbabwe's public procurement system, each with distinct patterns and enabling mechanisms. Process manipulation became the primary kind of corruption, representing 42% of cases. This type was evident through bid rigging, specification modification, and biased evaluation procedures. Patterns of bid rigging comprised of rotation schemes (38%), complimentary bidding (27%), and bid suppression (21%), illustrating the intricate nature of collusive tactics. Specification manipulation was very common in technical purchasing areas, with 32% of IT requirements and 28% of medical equipment specifications having overly strict rules meant to benefit certain suppliers. These findings directly corresponded with the principal-agent theory's focus on information asymmetries, as technological competence generated chances for manipulation that oversight entities found challenging to identify.

The second significant pattern discovered was governance difficulties, including 31% of corruption occurrences. These arose from institutional and structural deficiencies, evident in conflicts of interest, nepotism, and the misuse of emergency procurement. The research revealed that conflicts of interest were obscured via intricate organisational frameworks (42%) and familial representatives (31%), while 32% of high-value contracts were awarded to organisations associated with procurement officials. The COVID-19 epidemic generated further potential for corruption, with 64% of emergency contracts exhibiting indications of fraudulent practices. These governance difficulties illustrated the emphasis of institutional theory on the disparity between formal regulations and informal conventions. Illicit financial practices constituted the third significant corruption pattern, covering 27% of occurrences.

These activities developed in sophistication over the research period, ranging from direct cash payments and gift-giving (2019-2020) to inflated invoicing and consultancy fees (2021-2022), and lastly to subcontracting arrangements and performance bonuses (2023). The increasing intricacy of these schemes rendered identification ever more difficult, with kickback rates varying by sector (15-20% in construction, 8-12% in IT procurement). These evolutionary patterns indicated the adaptive nature of corruption in response to increasing oversight. The sectoral study indicated

diverse susceptibility patterns across different procurement domains. Construction is the most affected by corruption, with 42% of contracts showing signs of it, followed by healthcare, where 38% of medical equipment contracts and 42% of pharmaceutical contracts were impacted, and information technology, with 36% of contracts involved. Each industry had distinct corruption risk profiles: construction was sensitive to bid rigging and subcontracting manipulation; healthcare was susceptible to emergency procurement abuse and specification manipulation; and IT procurement was prone to technical specification bias.

These sectoral disparities underscored the necessity for customized anti-corruption strategies instead of universal remedies. Several factors were found to contribute to the problem, such as poor enforcement of regulations, lack of resources that reduced oversight ability (with PRAZ getting only 45% of the expected budget), and tough economic conditions that made it hard to set fair prices and allowed corruption to thrive. The economic conditions in Zimbabwe posed specific obstacles, as currency volatility and inflation compromised traditional anti-corruption measures intended for stable economic contexts. The corruption patterns found relate to principal-agent theory, which looks at differences in information, as 42% of the corruption cases involved manipulating processes by taking advantage of the skill gaps between procurement agents and oversight bodies. The findings show the relevance of institutional theory, pointing out a big gap between the use of formal rules (87%) and how well they are actually followed (52%), which is an example of what Andrews (2013) calls "isomorphic mimicry" changes that look good on the surface but keep the same old interests in place.

5.2.2 Findings on the Effectiveness of PRAZ's Anti-Corruption Measures

The evaluation of PRAZ's anti-corruption measures revealed mixed effectiveness, with significant implementation challenges limiting impact. The analysis of how well the regulatory framework was put into action showed that PRAZ created important regulatory tools effectively (with an 87% development rate), but there were major delays in actually using them. Implementation gaps varied across regulatory components, with conflict-of-interest procedures and procurement management units showing the largest discrepancies (47% gap). This selective implementation pattern prioritized visible but less threatening reforms while delaying more consequential changes that threatened established interests. The disparity between formal adoption and practical execution

exemplifies what Andrews (2013) describes as "isomorphic mimicry"-a reform that generates an illusion of transformation while maintaining existing power structures and opportunities for rent-seeking.

Technology-based interventions achieved only partial implementation, with e-procurement reaching merely 30% of intended system capability and substantial variation across modules. Supplier registration (85% complete) and notification systems (72% complete) achieved high implementation rates, while advanced modules for evaluation (18%) and payment systems (10%) remained largely unimplemented. This selective deployment created uneven transparency across the procurement process, with enhanced visibility in pre-award phases but persistent opacity in evaluation and contract administration stages where substantial corruption occurs. Resource constraints and connectivity issues affected implementation, with 63% of rural entities reporting intermittent internet access. This pattern of partial implementation led to what Rose-Ackerman (2016) terms "transparency without accountability"-disclosure of process details without enabling substantive oversight of outcomes. PRAZ's capacity building and professionalization efforts showed significant achievements in professional development but faced challenges in retention and geographical distribution. Between 2019 and 2023, 654 procurement officers (30% of public procurement officials) received certification through PRAZ's Centre of Procurement Excellence. However, staff turnover of 25% undermined training investments, while geographical disparities were evident, with urban procurement officers receiving 4.2 training days annually compared to 1.6 days for rural counterparts.

The impact assessment revealed that certified procurement units showed a 43% reduction in procedural violations but only a 12% decrease in outcome-based corruption metrics. This disparity suggests that technical training alone is insufficient to address the informal norms and incentive structures driving corruption. Multi-stakeholder perspectives on effectiveness varied significantly, with PRAZ officials rating effectiveness more favorably (3.8/5) than procurement officers (2.6/5) and private sector participants (2.2/5). This perceptual gap exemplifies what Grindle (2004) terms the "implementation gap"-the divergence between policy formulation and practical execution that determines reform effectiveness. These divergent assessments highlight how institutional roles affect both perception and the consequences of change, undermining the mutual understanding necessary for joint action. The comparative assessment of anti-corruption measures showed that

standardized bidding documents (3.8/5), procurement officer certification (3.4/5), and compliance checklists (3.2/5) achieved the highest effectiveness ratings, while integrity pacts (1.8/5), advanced e-procurement modules (2.0/5), and performance metrics (2.1/5) scored lowest.

This pattern suggests that simpler, less resource-intensive measures achieved greater effectiveness than complex interventions requiring substantial resources and technical capability. The analysis showed that projects that were easy to carry out used resources more efficiently than those needing complicated oversight, backing the idea of "good enough governance" (Grindle, 2004). These findings confirm resource-based theory\'s relevance, demonstrating how resource constraints fundamentally shaped implementation possibilities. The difference between the improvements in the following procedures (43%) and the improvements in results (12%) showed what Heywood and Rose (2014) call "isomorphic mimicry"-organisations looking like they have effective systems but not actually having them.

5.2.3 Findings on Developing a Comprehensive Anti-Corruption Framework

The research established a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy specifically designed for Zimbabwe's resource-limited environment. This concept combined institutional, technological, and contextual components into a cohesive system aimed at preventing, detecting, and mitigating corruption while recognizing resource constraints. The institutional components were internal control units inside procurement entities, PRAZ sectoral monitoring teams possessing specialized expertise in high-risk areas, and an inter-agency coordination mechanism connecting PRAZ with other oversight agencies. These components were engineered to establish various layers of accountability while maximizing the utilization of constrained supervision resources. The technology elements included a consolidated procurement data repository, an automated red-flag system targeting high-risk locations, and a procurement performance dashboard.

This targeted strategy was based on research regarding digital anti-corruption solutions in resource-limited settings, which indicated that "focused technological interventions addressing specific corruption risks produce a more significant impact than comprehensive but partially executed systems" (Adam et al., 2020). The components were sequenced to create fundamental transparency prior to including more advanced analytical capabilities. Contextual adaptation components encompassed sectoral calibration aimed at the distinct susceptibility patterns in

construction, healthcare, and IT; geographic adaptation focusing on capacity gaps between urban and rural regions; and economic adaptation considering currency volatility and inflation. These features guaranteed that the framework would address the particular corruption concerns highlighted in Zimbabwe instead of enforcing generic best practices. Integration strategies encompassed procedural integration by incorporating anti-corruption safeguards into standard operations, informational integration by generating data flows between components, and organisational integration by defining explicit accountability links.

These methods-maintained consistency within the system, averting the fragmentation that frequently diminishes anti-corruption efficacy. The framework integrated three implementation principles derived from the study's findings. Initially, resource optimization via asymmetric resource allocation focused on limited resources on high-impact intervention points. Secondly, strategic sequencing utilized a phased implementation strategy that arranged interventions based on urgency, resource needs, and interdependencies. Third, stakeholder cooperation instituted formal collaboration frameworks to utilize complementary supervision resources. The performance management framework employed a balanced scorecard methodology to evaluate anti-corruption effectiveness across four dimensions: process indicators measuring implementation fidelity, outcome indicators assessing direct anti-corruption results, perception indicators gauging stakeholder evaluations, and impact indicators analysing overall procurement performance.

This thorough strategy tackled the measuring difficulties recognized in existing anti-corruption strategies, prioritizing significant outcomes over mere procedural adherence. This idea aligns with systems theory, which looks at corruption as a result of complex interactions instead of just one factor, and with resource-based theory, which highlights the importance of how resources are strategically used. The methodology illustrates what Grindle (2004) refers to as "good enough governance," emphasizing attainable, high-impact reforms above extensive yet unsustainable changes.

5.3 Conclusions of the Study

This section outlines the primary conclusions derived from the research findings, systematically organized according to the study's objectives. These results integrate empirical evidence with

theoretical frameworks, offering interpretations that go beyond simple descriptive findings to provide profound insights into the nature of corruption in Zimbabwe's public procurement system. The conclusions are the highest point of this research, laying the groundwork for more practical suggestions and enhancing the overall understanding of procurement corruption in areas with limited resources.

5.3.1 Conclusions on Corruption Patterns in Zimbabwe's Public Procurement

The investigation of corruption patterns within Zimbabwe's procurement system yields several significant findings. The corruption inside Zimbabwe's procurement system illustrates adaptive strategies that develop in reaction to regulatory changes. The transition from explicit corruption methods to sophisticated process manipulation exemplifies 'corruption equilibrium'-strategies that evolve to maintain illicit revenues despite official measures (Klitgaard, 2015). This adaptability explains why seemingly robust regulatory systems frequently fail to improve integrity outcomes, as corrupt persons continuously alter their tactics in response to integrity initiatives. Secondly, information asymmetry constitutes a substantial flaw in Zimbabwe's procurement system, particularly in technological sectors where specialized knowledge creates vulnerabilities that corrupt individuals exploit. The prevalence of specification manipulation (32% of IT needs, 28% of medical equipment) demonstrates how technical complexity conceals corruption, making it appear legitimate while compromising competitive integrity.

These dynamic highlights the importance of principal-agent theory in understanding the mechanisms of procurement misconduct. Third, sector-specific corruption profiles display diverse patterns that require targeted interventions. The pronounced variation in corruption techniques among sectors-from bid rigging in construction to specification manipulation in IT procurement-illustrates that overarching integrity tactics are insufficient. The distinctive technical characteristics, market dynamics, and institutional frameworks of each business create specific opportunities for corruption that require tailored oversight strategies. Fourth, institutional reform that neglects informal norms produces little effect on corruption outcomes. The persistent existence of corruption, despite official regulatory changes, highlights the discrepancies among the regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive components of institutional theory (Scott, 2014).

Formal constraints are insufficient when informal norms support conflicting behaviors, necessitating treatments that address both formal frameworks and underlying value systems. Fifth, economic factors profoundly affect corruption trends and the effectiveness of integrity programmes. The economic volatility, financial instability, and resource limitations in Zimbabwe have created challenges for price benchmarking and complex procurement planning and severely restricted oversight capability. These circumstances have produced what Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016) describe as 'corruption of desperation'-practices arising from systemic economic constraints that exceed individual ethics.

The findings validate the study's conceptual framework, demonstrating the interplay of institutional variables, technological elements, and contextual factors in shaping corruption patterns and vulnerabilities in Zimbabwe's procurement system. The findings enhance principal-agent theory by illustrating the presence of information asymmetry in complex procurement situations and contribute to institutional theory by emphasizing the gap between legal standards and actual practices in procurement governance.

5.3.2 Conclusions on the Effectiveness of PRAZ's Anti-Corruption Measures

The evaluation of PRAZ's integrity initiatives produces numerous significant conclusions. The principal difficulty impacting the efficacy of Zimbabwe's procurement integrity arises from execution shortcomings rather than design defects. The significant disparity between formal adoption (87%) and operational implementation (52%) illustrates the 'capacity trap'-organisations adopting reforms beyond their implementation capacities, leading to surface conformity rather than meaningful transformation (Andrews, 2013). This pattern augments institutional theory by demonstrating how implementation capability influences the connection between formal regulations and operational outcomes. Secondly, technology-driven interventions have been selectively executed, resulting in inconsistent transparency across the procurement process.

The focus on pre-award transparency is shown by an 85% supplier registration rate and a 72% notification system rate, which starkly contrasts with the post-award control rates of 18% for assessment and 10% for payment systems. This has resulted in 'transparency without accountability'-the revelation of procedural details without facilitating significant oversight of outcomes (Rose-Ackerman, 2016). This conclusion indicates that the use of e-procurement

signifies not just technology advancement but also political and economic considerations that sustain rent-seeking opportunities. Third, capacity building has enhanced procedural compliance without significantly impacting corruption results. The large gap between the enhancement of procedural compliance (43%) and result metrics (12%) underscores shortcomings in technical training that overlook informal norms and incentive frameworks perpetuating corruption. This discovery corresponds with Andrews' (2013) notion of 'form over function,' which pertains to modifications that transform methods without affecting fundamental behaviors or results. Fourth, resource limitations have profoundly influenced implementation options, necessitating challenging priority decisions. PRAZ's attainment of merely 45% of the anticipated budget allocation, coupled with monitoring coverage restricted to 15% of procurement value, illustrates how resource constraints have engendered capacity deficits that undermine integrity effectiveness.

This outcome corroborates the resource-based theory's claim that strategic resource allocation is essential for institutional advancement. Fifth, views of stakeholder efficacy constantly differ based on institutional roles and accountability obligations. The notable disparities in effectiveness assessments among PRAZ officials (3.8/5), procurement officers (2.6/5), and private sector participants (2.2/5) illustrate the 'implementation gap'-the discrepancy between policy design and actual execution that impacts reform efficacy (Grindle, 2004). This perceived discrepancy weakens the mutual understanding essential for joint integrity initiatives. These findings augment resource-based theory by illustrating how resource limitations influence the extent and type of integrity initiatives, necessitating strategic decisions that match with institutional aims rather than expansive reform aspirations. The results augment systems theory by demonstrating how feedback loops among resource constraints, implementation choices, and efficacy results generate patterns that resist simplistic treatments.

5.3.3 Conclusions on Developing a Comprehensive Anti-Corruption Framework

The establishment of an integrity framework in Zimbabwe's procurement industry produces numerous notable effects. Effective integrity solutions must amalgamate institutional, technological, and contextual components into a cohesive framework. The study illustrated how many elements, including internal control units and automated red-flag systems, might collaboratively establish 'reinforcing feedback loops' (Senge, 2006), enhancing the overall efficacy

compared to the operation of individual components. This concept recognizes corruption as a systemic problem necessitating coordinated solutions across all levels. Secondly, resource-constrained settings require strategic prioritization and sequencing rather than exhaustive execution. The recommended phased implementation approach in this study corresponds with Grindle's (2004) notion of 'good enough governance,' prioritizing pragmatic, high-impact reforms above extensive but unsustainable alterations.

The method optimizes impact within current resource limitations instead of pursuing enhancements beyond implementation capabilities. Third, contextual calibration is crucial for the success of the framework, especially with sectoral, geographical, and economic factors. The framework's adjustment to distinct corruption challenges across various sectors, capacity differences between urban and rural regions, and economic volatility in Zimbabwe exemplifies 'problem-driven iterative adaptation'-formulating solutions that tackle specific local problems instead of employing generic models (Andrews, 2013). This approach acknowledges that the effectiveness of integrity efforts fundamentally relies on the alignment with local conditions. Fourth, stakeholder coordination mechanisms are essential yet frequently neglected components of an effective integrity regime. The multi-stakeholder framework approach illustrates that effective efforts establish 'integrity ecosystems' in which governmental bodies, enterprises, civil society organisations, and individuals cooperate to tackle procurement corruption (UNDP, 2011).

This collaboration utilizes many supervision resources to address the limits of any singular institutional perspective. Fifth, performance evaluation must equilibrate process and outcome indicators to avert isomorphic mimicry. The balanced scorecard methodology integrated within the framework responds to Heywood and Rose's (2014) apprehension that measuring systems may promote procedural compliance at the cost of substantive outcomes. This holistic approach guarantees that integrity initiatives prioritize substantial outcomes over bureaucratic procedures. These insights augment systems theory by illustrating that focused interventions at critical leverage points can yield substantial system-wide enhancements, even with constrained resources. The findings augment resource-based theory by demonstrating that strategic resource allocation informed by corruption risk can yield a more significant impact than uniform distribution of integrity investments.

5.4 Recommendations of the study

This section translates the research findings and conclusions into actionable recommendations designed to enhance integrity within Zimbabwe's public procurement system. This study's empirical data presents pragmatic ideas that address the resource constraints and contextual realities of Zimbabwe's procurement environment. First, this section presents a comprehensive anti-corruption framework designed for Zimbabwe's needs, followed by suggestions for future research to augment and elaborate on the current study's findings. These ideas offer a pragmatic strategy for safeguarding procurement integrity, recognizing the limitations inherent in Zimbabwe's socio-economic context.

5.4.1 Recommended Model/Framework

The Zimbabwe Procurement Integrity Framework (ZPIF), acknowledges resource limitations by providing a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy for public procurement that integrates institutional, technological, and contextual elements into a consistent system designed to fight corruption. This approach maximises constrained monitoring resources and establishes many levels of responsibility.

Three institutional pillars underpin the structure, which creates a multi-layered defense mechanism. Internal control units within procurement entities offer the main line of defense by way of risk assessment methods, division of tasks, and pre-award clearance procedures. PRAZ sectoral monitoring teams specifically oversee high-risk areas like construction, healthcare, and IT procurement through risk-based auditing approaches and implement red flag mechanisms.

An inter-agency coordination system ensures consistent oversight across institutions by means of cooperative investigation processes, information exchange platforms, and coordinated enforcement strategies. Admitting boundaries of connectivity, technological enablers develop systematic corruption prevention techniques. A consolidated procurement data repository sets a foundation for transparency by means of consistent data collection and acquisition analytics. An automated red-flag system detects risk using scoring algorithms and anomaly detection for high-risk patterns. By means of public access interfaces and visualization technologies, a procurement performance dashboard offers civil society monitoring, thereby facilitating data availability.

Contextual adaptation elements ensure a reaction to Zimbabwe's specific concerns. Using sector-specific integrity indicators and tailored monitoring techniques, sectoral calibration addresses susceptibility patterns.

Geographic adaptation addresses capacity variations through mobile training courses and rural procurement support units. Integration systems prevent component fragmentation. These are done through integrity checks and decision documents, and procedural integration which places anti-corruption in traditional processes. Standards of information sharing and reporting procedures enable data to flow between components by means of informational integration. organisational integration produces clear responsibility by means of defined roles and coordination policies. Recognising constrained resources, the implementation technique is tiered. Running the data repository and establishing internal control units in high-risk firms, the short-term phase (0-18 months), along with the automated red-flag system, and the medium-term phase (19-36 months) establishes sectoral monitoring teams.

The long-term phase (37-60 months) completes implementation across all entities and promotes a mature integrity culture. This includes measures to check how well the implementation is going and by revealing the direct effects of anti-corruption efforts, and feedback from stakeholders, and the overall performance in procurement management system. This approach ensures that anti-corruption efforts remain focused on important results rather than bureaucratic processes. This strategy accommodates Zimbabwe's limited resources and establishes systematic instruments to stop, find, and manage corruption throughout the public procurement sector, hence creating a sensible path to enhanced procurement integrity.

The following components of the ZPIF specifically address the corruption challenges identified in this study:

- Internal Control Units- These units within procurement entities serve as the first line of defense by implementing risk assessment methodologies, ensuring separation of duties, and conducting pre-award reviews. This component directly addresses the process manipulation corruption pattern (42% of cases) by establishing preventive controls at the source of procurement activities.

- PRAZ Sectoral Monitoring Teams - Specialized teams with expertise in high-risk areas like construction, healthcare, and IT procurement implement risk-based audit approaches and red flag mechanisms. This component addresses the sectoral corruption profiles identified in the study (construction 42%, healthcare 38-42%, IT 36%) by providing targeted oversight tailored to each sector's unique corruption vulnerabilities.
- Inter-Agency Coordination Mechanism - This ensures consistent oversight across institutions through collaborative investigation processes, information sharing platforms, and coordinated enforcement strategies. This component addresses the 31% of cases involving governance challenges by strengthening institutional coordination and reducing fragmentation in anti-corruption efforts.
- Consolidated Procurement Data Repository - Establishes a foundation for transparency through standardized data collection and procurement analytics. This component addresses information asymmetries that facilitate corruption by creating a central repository of procurement information accessible to oversight bodies.
- Automated Red-Flag System - Detects risk using scoring algorithms and anomaly detection for high-risk patterns. This component addresses the evolving sophistication of corrupt practices by implementing automated detection mechanisms that can identify subtle patterns of corruption.
- Procurement Performance Dashboard- Enables civil society monitoring through public access interfaces and visualization technologies. This component enhances transparency and external oversight, addressing the 27% of cases involving illicit financial practices by subjecting procurement data to public scrutiny.
- Sectoral Calibration - Addresses vulnerability patterns using sector-specific integrity indicators and tailored monitoring approaches. This component recognizes the diverse corruption risk profiles across sectors and implements targeted measures to address sector-specific corruption risks.
- Geographic Adaptation - Addresses capacity variations through mobile training initiatives and rural procurement support units. This component addresses the geographical disparities in anti-corruption capacity, with urban procurement officers receiving 4.2 training days annually compared to 1.6 days for rural counterparts.

- Tiered Implementation Approach- Recognizes resource constraints with a phased implementation strategy: short-term (0-18 months), medium-term (19-36 months), and long-term (37-60 months). This approach addresses the challenge of PRAZ receiving only 45% of its expected budget by prioritizing high-impact interventions within available resources.
- Balanced Scorecard Performance Management - Measures implementation fidelity, direct anti-corruption outcomes, stakeholder perceptions, and overall procurement performance. This component addresses the gap between procedural compliance (43% improvement) and outcome-based measures (12% improvement) by ensuring that anti-corruption efforts focus on meaningful results.

Each component of the ZPIF works synergistically to create a comprehensive anti-corruption framework that addresses the specific corruption patterns, implementation challenges, and resource constraints identified in Zimbabwe's public procurement system. The framework emphasizes strategic resource allocation, contextual adaptation, and multi-layered accountability to maximize anti-corruption effectiveness within Zimbabwe's resource limitations.

5.4.2 Recommendations for further studies

The research on corruption trends and the effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives in Zimbabwe's public procurement system has yielded substantial insights; yet, other critical areas necessitate further investigation. Longitudinal studies are crucial for research since they track the progression of corrupt practices in response to anti-corruption initiatives over prolonged durations, providing deeper insights into the fluid nature of corruption and facilitating the prediction of future adjustments. Developing quantitative effect assessment methodologies would strengthen the empirical foundation for anti-corruption policy decisions. This involves creating detailed criteria for evaluating corruption reduction, employing statistical techniques to ascertain the effects of specific initiatives, and doing economic modeling for cost-benefit evaluations across multiple factors.

This study would enhance evidence-based allocation of resources in constrained environments. Comparative research of SADC nations would uncover regional trends and transferable practices,

facilitate knowledge exchange and enhance the contextual relevance of anti-corruption initiatives beyond Zimbabwe. This study will meticulously examine procurement procedures and assess the influence of varying economic and institutional conditions on the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures. Improving technology accessible in rural areas requires targeted initiatives to address the urban-rural gap in procurement capacity. Research should investigate technology barriers affecting rural organisations, develop solutions for low-connectivity environments, and assess mobile-based approaches for procurement transparency to ensure digital solutions do not exacerbate existing inequalities.

The behavioral economics perspective offers significant insights by analysing the decision-making processes that contribute to corrupt behaviors, assessing interventions to promote integrity, and investigating non-monetary incentives for ethical behaviour. This approach would improve institutional practices by addressing informal norms that perpetuate corruption, despite changes in statutory regulations. The study of implementation science seeks to close the substantial gap between reform design and practice by investigating factors that affect implementation fidelity, developing support tools for procurement entities, and assessing change management techniques. This would enhance understanding of the implementation of reforms in resource-constrained environments. Sector-specific integrity frameworks would utilize vulnerability findings to develop tailored strategies for high-risk industries, like construction, healthcare, and information technology.

This research identified significant variations in corruption risks across several procurement sectors and sought to develop specific monitoring mechanisms and regulatory frameworks. Ultimately, research on resource optimization would provide empirical guidance for the strategic distribution of limited anti-corruption resources. This includes a comparative examination of resource allocation in oversight systems, the creation of risk-based monitoring models, and the assessment of the relationship between resource levels and the effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives. These research directions addressed the limitations of the current study and future challenges in procurement anti-corruption, thereby strengthening the informational basis necessary for effective solutions in resource-limited environments. Figure 5-1 illustrates the Zimbabwe Procurement Integrity Framework (ZPIF) model, highlighting the key components and their relationships in a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy for public procurement in Zimbabwe.



Figure 5 1 Zimbabwe Procurement Integrity Framework (ZPIF) Model

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APPENDICES

Appendix A Questionnaires for PRAZ staff



BINDURA UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE EDUCATION

FACULTY OF COMMERCE

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS

MASTER OF BUSINESS LEADERSHIP

A Framework Towards Combating Corruption in Public Procurement: A Case Study of Procurement Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe, 2019-2023

BY

THOMAS TOM CHINEMBIRI

(0773436379)

tchinezy@gmail.com

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PROCUREMENT REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF ZIMBABWE (PRAZ) OFFICIALS

INTRODUCTION

Dear Respondent,

This questionnaire is part of a research study examining corruption in Zimbabwe's public procurement system and evaluating the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures implemented by PRAZ from 2019-2023. Your expertise and experience are invaluable to understanding the challenges, successes, and opportunities for improvement in Zimbabwe's procurement regulatory framework. Your responses will be treated with strict confidentiality in accordance with research ethics guidelines. The information collected will solely be used for academic purposes and to inform recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures in public procurement.

Thank you for your participation and contribution to this important research.

SECTION A: RESPONDENT INFORMATION

1. Position at PRAZ: _____
2. Department/Unit: _____
3. Length of service at PRAZ:
   □ Less than 1 year □ 1-3 years □ 4-5 years □ More than 5 years
4. Professional qualification(s) in procurement or related field:
   □ Certificate □ Diploma □ Bachelor's degree □ Master's degree
   □ Professional certification (CIPS, etc.) □ Other (please specify): _____
5. Area of expertise within procurement regulation (select all that apply):
   □ Compliance monitoring □ Capacity building □ E-procurement implementation
   □ Policy development □ Other (please specify): _____

SECTION B: CORRUPTION PATTERNS IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT

6. Based on your experience, rank the following procurement corruption typologies in order of prevalence in Zimbabwe's public procurement system (1 being most prevalent, 6 being least prevalent):

___ Bid rigging (manipulation of tender specifications) ___ Bribery (financial or non-financial inducements) ___ Kickbacks (post-award remuneration) ___ Collusion (coordinated bidding between suppliers) ___ Conflicts of interest (undisclosed relationships) ___ Process manipulation (procedural violations)

7. For each of the following procurement sectors, indicate the level of vulnerability to corruption:

Sector	Low vulnerability	Moderate vulnerability	High vulnerability
Construction			
Health			
Information Technology			
Transportation			
Education			

8. In your assessment, how has the prevalence of procurement corruption changed since the establishment of PRAZ in 2018? □ Significantly decreased □ Somewhat decreased □ Remained the same □ Somewhat increased □ Significantly increased

9. What are the primary structural or institutional factors that enable corruption in Zimbabwe's public procurement system? (Select the THREE most significant factors)

□ Weak enforcement mechanisms □ Inadequate transparency in procurement processes □ Limited technical capacity of procurement officers □ Insufficient resources for effective oversight □ Political interference in procurement decision □ Complex and bureaucratic procurement procedures □ Inadequate whistleblower protection □ Poor record-keeping practices □ Other (please specify): _____

10. What specific patterns of corruption have you observed emerging in response to PRAZ's oversight and regulatory efforts?

_____

_____

_____

11. How do economic constraints (e.g., inflation, exchange rate fluctuations) influence corruption risks in Zimbabwe's procurement system?

_____

_____

_____

SECTION C: ASSESSMENT OF ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES

12. Rate the effectiveness of the following PRAZ anti-corruption initiatives implemented between 2019-2023:

Initiative	Very ineffective	Somewhat ineffective	Neutral	Somewhat effective	Very effective	Not implemented
E-procurement systems						
Procurement officer certification						
Compliance monitoring framework						
Standardized bidding documents						
Procurement audits						
Debarment of corrupt suppliers						
Integrity pacts						

13. What %age of the intended e-procurement system has PRAZ successfully implemented to date?

□ 0-20% □ 21-40 □ 41-60%

□ 61-80% □ 81-100%

14. What have been the primary challenges in implementing e-procurement? (Select all that apply)

□ Inadequate budget allocation □ Limited technical infrastructure □ Resistance from procurement entities □ Insufficient technical capacity □ Interoperability issues with existing systems □ Rapid changes in technology

□ Other (please specify): _____

15. How would you rate the implementation fidelity of PRAZ's anti-corruption measures (i.e., the degree to which they were implemented as designed)?

□ Low implementation fidelity (0-30% adherence to design) □ Moderate implementation fidelity (31-70% adherence to design) □ High implementation fidelity (71-100% adherence to design)

16. What %age of procurement entities consistently comply with PRAZ's reporting and transparency requirements?

□ 0-20% □ 21-40% □ 41-60 □ 61-80% □ 81-100%

17. How has PRAZ's capacity building programme affected the professionalization of procurement officers?

□ Significantly improved professionalization □ Somewhat improved professionalization □ No noticeable change □ Somewhat decreased professionalization □ Significantly decreased professionalization

18. What coordination mechanisms exist between PRAZ and other anti-corruption bodies (e.g., Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission, Auditor General's Office)? How effective are these mechanisms?

_____

_____

_____

SECTION D: IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES AND CONTEXTUAL BARRIERS

19. Rate the significance of the following resource constraints on PRAZ's anti-corruption efforts:

Resource constraint	Not significant	Slightly significant	Moderately significant	Very significant	Extremely significant
Financial resources					
Human resources					
Technical infrastructure					
Information systems					
Training capacity					

20. Approximately what %age of PRAZ's requested budget was allocated in the following years?

Year	0-20%	21-40%	41-60%	61-80%	81-100%
2019-2020					
2020-2021					
2021-2022					
2022-2023					

21. What specific institutional resistance has PRAZ encountered when implementing anti-corruption measures? (Select all that apply)

□ Resistance from procurement entities□ Reluctance to adopt new systems and procedures

□ Political interference□ Lack of cooperation from other government agencies □ Cultural resistance to transparency initiatives □ Other (please specify): _____

22. How has Zimbabwe's macroeconomic environment between 2019-2023 affected the implementation of PRAZ's anti-corruption initiatives?

_____

_____

_____

23. To what extent has institutional path dependency (i.e., the persistence of old procurement practices from the State Procurement Board era) hindered PRAZ's reform efforts?

□ Not at all □ To a small extent □ To a moderate extent □ To a large extent □ To a very large extent

24. What strategies has PRAZ employed to overcome implementation barriers? How successful have these strategies been?

_____

_____

_____

SECTION E: FRAMEWORK DEVELOPMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

25. Based on PRAZ's experience, which anti-corruption measures provide the highest impact relative to resource investment?

_____
_____
_____

26. What sequencing of anti-corruption interventions would you recommend for a resource-constrained environment like Zimbabwe's?

_____
_____
_____

27. How could the balance between institutional reforms and technological solutions be optimized to enhance anti-corruption effectiveness in Zimbabwe's procurement system?

_____
_____
_____

28. Rate the potential effectiveness of the following procurement system components in reducing corruption:

Component	Not effective	Slightly effective	Moderately effective	Very effective	Extremely effective
Enhanced regulatory framework					
Full e-procurement implementation					
Comprehensive capacity building					
Strengthened enforcement mechanisms					
Multi-stakeholder engagement					
Data analytics for monitoring					
Performance-based incentives					

29. What stakeholder engagement strategies would be most effective in enhancing procurement integrity in Zimbabwe?

_____
_____
_____

30. Given PRAZ's resource constraints, which anti-corruption initiatives should be prioritized in the next strategic plan (2024-2028)?

_____
_____
_____

31. What adaptations to international best practices in procurement regulation are necessary to fit Zimbabwe's specific context?

_____
_____
_____

SECTION F: ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

32. Please provide any additional insights on corruption in Zimbabwe's public procurement system or recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures that were not covered in this questionnaire.

_____

_____
_____
_____
_____

Thank you for your valuable contribution to this research. Your insights will help inform the development of a comprehensive anti-corruption framework for Zimbabwe's public procurement system.

Appendix B Questionnaires for other stakeholders



BINDURA UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE EDUCATION

FACULTY OF COMMERCE

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS

MASTER OF BUSINESS LEADERSHIP

A Framework Towards Combating Corruption in Public Procurement: A Case Study of Procurement Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe, 2019-2023

BY

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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PUBLIC PROCUREMENT STAKEHOLDERS (EXCLUDING PRAZ)

Dear Respondent,

This questionnaire is part of a research study examining corruption in Zimbabwe's public procurement system and evaluating the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures implemented from 2019-2023. As a key stakeholder in the procurement ecosystem, your perspectives and experiences are invaluable to understanding the challenges, successes, and opportunities for improvement in Zimbabwe's procurement regulatory framework.

Your responses will be treated with strict confidentiality in accordance with research ethics guidelines. The information collected will solely be used for academic purposes and to inform recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures in public procurement.
Thank you for your participation and contribution to this important research.

SECTION A: RESPONDENT INFORMATION
1. Which stakeholder group do you represent?
□ Government ministry procurement officer □ State-owned enterprise procurement officer
□ Oversight body (Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission, Auditor General's Office, etc.)
□ Private sector supplier/contractor □ Civil society organisation
□ Other (please specify): _____
2. ORGANISATION: _____
3. Position/Role: _____
4. Years of experience in procurement or related fields:
□ Less than 2 years □ 2-5 years □ 6-10 years □ More than 10 years
5. Professional qualification(s) in procurement or related field:
□ Certificate □ Diploma □ Bachelor's degree □ Master's degree □ Professional certification (CIPS, etc.) □ Other (please specify): _____

SECTION B: CORRUPTION PATTERNS IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
6. Based on your experience, rank the following procurement corruption typologies in order of prevalence in Zimbabwe's public procurement system (1 being most prevalent, 6 being least prevalent):
___ Bid rigging (manipulation of tender specifications) ___ Bribery (financial or non-financial inducements) ___ Kickbacks (post-award remuneration) ___ Collusion (coordinated bidding between suppliers) ___ Conflicts of interest (undisclosed relationships) ___ Process manipulation (procedural violations)
7. For each of the following procurement sectors, indicate the level of vulnerability to corruption:

Sector	Low vulnerability	Moderate vulnerability	High vulnerability
Construction			
Health			
Information Technology			
Transportation			
Education			

8. In your assessment, how has the prevalence of procurement corruption changed since the establishment of PRAZ in 2018?
□ Significantly decreased □ Somewhat decreased Remained the same □ Somewhat increased □ Significantly increased
9. What specific examples of corruption have you observed in procurement processes? (Please describe without identifying specific individuals or ORGANISATIONs)
_____
_____
_____
10. In your view, at which stage of the procurement process is corruption most prevalent?
□ Needs assessment and planning □ Preparation of bidding documents □ Bidding process
□ Bid evaluation □ Contract award □ Contract implementation and management
□ Payment process

11. What are the primary structural or institutional factors that enable corruption in Zimbabwe's public procurement system? (Select the THREE most significant factors)

□ Weak enforcement mechanisms □ Inadequate transparency in procurement processes

□ Limited technical capacity of procurement officers □ Insufficient resources for effective oversight □ Political interference in procurement decisions □ Complex and bureaucratic procurement procedures □ Inadequate whistleblower protection □ Poor record-keeping practices □ Other (please specify): _____

12. How do economic constraints (e.g., inflation, exchange rate fluctuations) influence corruption risks in Zimbabwe's procurement system?

_____

_____

_____

SECTION C: ASSESSMENT OF ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES

13. Rate the effectiveness of the following anti-corruption initiatives implemented between 2019-2023:

Initiative	Very ineffective	Somewhat ineffective	Neutral	Somewhat effective	Very effective	Don't know
E-procurement systems						
Compliance monitoring framework						
Procurement officer certification						
Integrity pacts						
Procurement audits						
Standardized bidding documents						
Debarment of corrupt suppliers						

14. How would you rate the current level of transparency in Zimbabwe's public procurement system?

□ Very low transparency □ Low transparency □ Moderate transparency

□ High transparency □ Very high transparency

15. How would you rate the fairness of the current public procurement system in Zimbabwe?

□ Very unfair □ Somewhat unfair □ Neither fair nor unfair

□ Somewhat fair □ Very fair

16. How has the quality of procurement outcomes (value for money, contract performance, service delivery) changed since the establishment of PRAZ?

□ Significantly improved □ Somewhat improved □ No change

□ Somewhat deteriorated □ Significantly deteriorated

17. How would you assess the level of professional knowledge and skills among procurement officers?

□ Very inadequate □ Somewhat inadequate □ Adequate

□ Somewhat advanced □ Very advance

18. Based on your experience, how accessible is procurement information to relevant stakeholders?

□ Not accessible at all □ Difficult to access □ Moderately accessible

□ Easily accessible □ Very easily accessible

19. How would you evaluate the efficiency of the current procurement complaint and review mechanism?

□ Very inefficient □ Somewhat inefficient □ Neither efficient nor inefficient

□ Somewhat efficient □ Very efficient

20. What has been your organisation's experience with PRAZ's regulatory approach?

_____

_____

_____

SECTION D: IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES AND CONTEXTUAL BARRIERS

21. Rate the significance of the following barriers to effective anti-corruption in Zimbabwe's procurement system:

Barrier	Not significant	Slightly significant	Moderately significant	Very significant	Extremely significant
Inadequate legal framework					
Limited institutional capacity					
Insufficient financial resources					
Technological limitations					
Corruption networks					
Political interference					
Economic instability					

22. To what extent has institutional path dependency (i.e., the persistence of old procurement practices from the State Procurement Board era) hindered procurement reforms?

□ Not at all □ To a small extent □ To a moderate extent

□ To a large extent □ To a very large extent

23. Has your organisation faced any specific challenges in adapting to PRAZ's regulatory requirements? If yes, please describe.

_____

_____

_____

24. How has Zimbabwe's macroeconomic environment between 2019-2023 affected procurement processes and integrity?

_____

_____

_____

25. What specific capacity limitations have you observed among procurement entities in implementing anti-corruption measures?

_____

_____

_____

SECTION E: PUBLIC-PRIVATE INTERACTION

26. For private sector respondents: What challenges do you face in participating in public procurement processes in Zimbabwe?

_____

_____

_____

27. For private sector respondents: Have you observed or experienced pressure for illegal payments or other corrupt practices when participating in public tenders? If comfortable sharing, please describe the nature of such experiences (without identifying specific entities).

_____
_____
_____

28. For private sector respondents: What would make public procurement processes more attractive for legitimate businesses to participate in?

_____
_____
_____

29. For oversight body respondents: What are the primary challenges in effectively investigating and prosecuting procurement corruption cases?

_____
_____
_____

30. For government procurement officers: What pressures or challenges do you face in maintaining procurement integrity within your organisation?

_____
_____
_____

SECTION F: FRAMEWORK DEVELOPMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

31. Based on your experience, which anti-corruption measures would provide the highest impact in Zimbabwe's context?

_____
_____
_____

32. What sequencing of anti-corruption interventions would you recommend for a resource-constrained environment like Zimbabwe's?

_____
_____
_____

33. How could the balance between institutional reforms and technological solutions be optimized to enhance anti-corruption effectiveness in Zimbabwe's procurement system?

_____
_____
_____

34. Rate the potential effectiveness of the following procurement system components in reducing corruption:

Component	Not effective	Slightly effective	Moderately effective	Very effective	Extremely effective
Enhanced regulatory framework					
Full e-procurement implementation					
Comprehensive capacity building					
Strengthened enforcement mechanisms					
Multi-stakeholder engagement					
Data analytics for monitoring					
Performance-based incentives					

35. What specific role should your stakeholder group play in enhancing procurement integrity in Zimbabwe?

_____
_____
_____

36. How can stakeholder engagement and cooperation be improved to combat procurement corruption more effectively?

_____
_____
_____

37. What adaptations to international best practices in procurement regulation are necessary to fit Zimbabwe's specific context?

_____
_____
_____

38. How can Zimbabwe balance the need for corruption prevention with the need for procurement efficiency in a resource-constrained environment?

_____
_____
_____

SECTION G: ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

39. Please provide any additional insights on corruption in Zimbabwe's public procurement system or recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures that were not covered in this questionnaire.

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

Thank you for your valuable contribution to this research. Your insights will help inform the development of a comprehensive anti-corruption framework for Zimbabwe's public procurement system.

Appendix C Research Request Letter

BINDURA UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE EDUCATION

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GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS

Where Great Minds Meet

6 March 2025

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

REF: REQUEST TO CARRY OUT RESEARCH: CHINEMBIRIR TOM T. [B231068A], MASTER OF BUSINESS LEADERSHIP (MBL), PART 2.2 STUDENT

This letter serves to confirm that Chinembiri Tom T. [B231068A], is a Master of Business Leadership student in the Graduate School of Business at Bindura University of Science Education.

The student is in the final stage of study which requires him to carry out a research. His dissertation is titled *"A Framework towards Combating Corruption in Public Procurement: A Case Study of Zimbabwe Public Procurement Authority, 2019-2023."*

We would be grateful if you could give him any assistance he may require.

For more details, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Yours faithfully,

Mwenje

COORDINATOR
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS
FACULTY OF COMMERCE
PRIVATE BAG 1020, BINDURA
OFFICIAL

Dr. J. Mwenje
Director, Graduate School of Business

" Promoting Science for Human Development"

Appendix D Research Letter



3 April 2025

Dr. J. Mwenje
Director Graduate School of Business
BINDURA UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE EDUCATION

Dear Dr. Mwenje

REQUEST TO CARRY OUT RESEARCH: CHINEMBIRI TOM [B321068A] MASTER OF BUSINES LEADERSHIP (MBL) PART 2.2 STUDENT

We refer to your letter dated 6 March and received by us on 13 March in the above and would apologise for the delay in responding thereto.

Having considered the request, we are inclined to advise your student to engage the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission, the Office of the Auditor General as well as the courts of Zimbabwe. Our suggestion is premised on the following considerations:

a. As a matter of practice, in the event that we deem corruption to have been perpetrated we escalate such cases to the said entities for further investigation and handling;
b. Matters that are still with us would likely be pending before the courts hence would be *sub judice*;
c. Cases referred to the aforementioned entities would likely be already reported and in the public sphere; and
d. We are wary of breaching amongst other laws the Official Secrets Act *[Chapter 11:09]*.

We do however recognize and appreciate that Mr. Chinembiri's research may greatly assist in combating corruption in public procurement. To this end we wish him well in his chosen research topic and would request that he favour us with a copy once he has completed his research.

Yours sincerely,

PROCUREMENT REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF ZIMBABWE
C.E.O.'S OFFICE
03 APR 2025
P.O. BOX CY 408, CAUSEWAY
ZIMBABWE

Dr. C. Ruswa
Chief Executive Officer
PROCUREMENT REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF ZIMBABWE

cc: Mr. T. T. Chinembiri

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All communication should be addressed to:
The Auditor-General
P. O. Box CY 143, Causeway, Harare
Telephone 263-242-793611/3/4
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E-mail: oagzimbabwe263@gmail.com
Website: www.auditorgeneral.gov.zw

OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR-GENERAL
5th Floor, Barrowdale House,
48 George Silundika Avenue,
Harare

OAG ZIMBABWE

Ref. AUD4.1.31

April 14, 2025

JZM Air force Base

P Bag 791 Kadoma

tchinezy@gmail.com

Dear Mr. Chinembiri,

RE: RESPONSE TO RESEARCH ACCESS REQUEST

Thank you for your inquiry regarding your research on "A Framework Towards Combating Corruption in Public Procurement: A Case Study of PRAZ, 2019-2023." I appreciate your interest in this important topic.

I am pleased to inform you that you may access the audit reports related to public procurement that have already been tabled and published on our website. Additionally, you are welcome to request for hard copies of these reports from my office, subject to their availability.

However, I must inform you that access to financial records and interviews with officials of the Office of the Auditor-General, as well as discussions regarding current audit work, cannot be permitted. This is in accordance with the provisions of the Official Secrets Act, which emphasizes the preservation of sensitive data and information.

Thank you for your understanding and we wish you success in your research.

Best regards,

MUKWENGA B
DEPUTY AUDITOR-GENERAL

Galaxy Note20 Ultra
16 April 2025 13:36

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