

BINDURA UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE EDUCATION



**THE IMPACT OF ISLAMIC INSURGENCY IN CABO DELGADO IN MOZAMBIQUE
2017-2023**

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(B223064B)

**A Dissertation Submitted to the Department of Peace and Governance in partial fulfillment
for the requirements for the Master of Science in International Relations**

Supervisor: Dr. D Makwerere

Bindura, Zimbabwe

9 December 2022

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
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
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DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to all former and current SADC and United Nations Peacekeepers, be they military or civilian personnel who have labored and continue to do so for the attainment of Peace and Security in the World.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ASWJ	Ahlu Sunnah wal-Jamaa
AU	African Union
CT	Counter Terrorism
IED's	Improvised Explosive Devices
ISM	Islamic State Mozambique
Milob	Military Observer
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
SADC	Southern African Development Cooperation
SAMIM	SADC Mission in Mozambique
UN	United Nations
UNDPO	United Nations Department of Peace Operations
UNPKO	United Nations Peacekeeping Operation
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

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ABSTRACT

Cabo Delgado, the Northern Province of the Republic of Mozambique was attacked by an Islamic extremist group calling themselves Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'ah and the locals referred to as Al-Shabaab in 2017. The insurgency resulted in destruction of infrastructure, homesteads were destroyed, kidnappings, displacement and killing of innocent people among others. Therefore this research investigated the impact of the Islamic insurgency in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique. The research was guided by three objectives to; explored the evolution of Islamic insurgency; identified contributing factors to the rise in Mozambique and assessed the impact of Islamic insurgency in Cabo Delgado Mozambique. A qualitative research approach was used due to its confidential nature and pre-requisition to directly interact with society and the components under investigation. The study also employed a two-dimensional sample technique sequence including a snowball 'participants' sample and a purposive/judgmental sampling method. Data was collected using the interviews, observations and questionnaires. This was augmented with desktop approach. The theoretical framework underpinning the study is relative deprivation theory, a concept often used in sociology that helped to explain aggressive behavior associated with terrorist tendencies. Major findings includes that terrorism in Mozambique is caused by issues that borders around marginalization, poverty, high income inequality and underdevelopment of the province. In addition, the Northern Province lacked basic healthcare, education and jobs, with food insecurity triggered by the genesis of extraction of oil and gas triggered the uprising. It was also established that the insurgence group evolved out of fundamentalist forms of Islamic religion linked to disfranchised and marginalized youths who were motivated by complex political, economic, and social factors inclusive of disagreements with religious authorities in Cabo Delgado. The impact of the insurgency borders around socio-economic, political effects and displacement among others with potential of creating a resource curse on discovered oil and gas. The Islamic group has direct impact on the religious liberties as they impose strict Islamic fundamentals in areas that terrorist have attached and occupied. Major recommendations include issues to deal with development in the province, creation of employment, provision of social amenities such as hospitals, schools and sporting facilities. Resource nationalization focused on the province and religious tolerance as key in dealing with extremism.

Key Words: Mozambique, Cabo Delgado, Islamic, Insurgency, Impact

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION OF THE STUDY

1.0: BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

The rise of terrorism as a global security concern has brought with it also vibrant debate into the best ways to combat it. Terrorism has become a pressing global issue, with devastating consequences for affected communities and regions (Bussotti & Coimbra 2023). The insurgences have become a norm in International Relations in most countries which have rich natural resources (Oil, Gas, Water) and issues such as discontentment, ethical issues and change of Governments, with Lybia, Kuwait, Sudan, Palestine, Djibout and Iraq being influenced by oil factor, even though it is merited on civil war on human rights and it is believed to have the interests of external players thereby being named Arab Springs (De Maeseneer, 2021). In Southern Africa, one such region grappling with the menace of terrorism is Cabo Delgado, a province located in in the northern Mozambique. Cabo Delgado, known for its rich natural resources and potential for economic development, has witnessed a significant rise in terrorist activities since 2017 (Sithole, 2022). There is an extremist group called Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'ah, which the locals referred to as Al-Shabaab but not linked to Somali based group of fundamentalists. The Islamic Insurgency was responsible for raids, ambushes, kidnappings, and beheadings as they attempt to get attention of the Mozambique government and its security sector. The group's ideology is rooted in a distorted interpretation of Islam, and their activities have led to a severe humanitarian crisis in the region.

One of the more debated determinants of insurgency is poverty (Abadie, 2006; Feridun & Sezgin, 2008; Iheonu & Ichoku, 2021). Policy makers, together with some academics, often argue that eradicating poverty will lead to a world without terror, as people with their livelihoods secured are more difficult to radicalize (Abadie, 2006; Shinn, 2016; Yin, 2017). Empirical findings on the relationship, again, are mixed. Some studies find a positive relationship between oil and terrorism to exist as it is in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Nigeria and other oil and gas rich states, whilst many find no reliable relationship (Benmelech & Berrebi, 2007; Iheonu & Ichoku, 2021; Piazza, 2013; Yin, 2017). Benmelech and Berrebi (2007) even find evidence suggesting that terrorists in Palestine tend to come from relatively well-off backgrounds. A strand of literature building on the theoretical framework of Gurr (1970), argues that it is not absolute deprivation that drives people to terrorism,

but relative deprivation (Ross, 1993). Unexpected negative economic shocks and standards of living cause discontent, which can be turned into radicalization.

Cultural and ethnic divisions, institutional factors and historical contingencies play an important role in determining how natural resources such as oil and impacts terrorism in Northern Mozambique (Elu & Price, 2019). Thus, understanding about the push factors of terrorism and creating effective prevention policies require studies with regional and country-level possibilities. While the Southern African region has become a more common region of interest for researchers, few empirical studies have been carried out on the determinants of terrorism. This study aims to fill this gap in the literature. Building on the framework of Gurr (1970), this study sets to examine the linkage between relative deprivation and terrorism in the Southern African with special focus on Mozambique.

What is true is; the causes of the insurgency in the northeast province of Cabo Delgado in Mozambique are contested, or at least diverse (Morier-Genoud, 2020). They range from religion to poverty and marginalization in an area rich in natural resources (Oil and Gas) where state's legitimacy rather than its legality, also tends to be absent. Mozambican insurgency gained visibility first after the attacks in 2017 in Mocímboa da Praia and the complex attack in the town of Palma and coastal Macomia in March 2021 prior to the vast oil and gas discoveries. Despite an appropriation of the term al-Shabaab by what was considered a local sect dating at least from 2007, the movement pledged allegiance to the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in 2019. Hence, it integrates, at least formally, the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP).

There is no consensus among researchers on the real causes of the rising of Jihadist violence in Cabo Delgado, a context described by Rodrigues (2021) as “a low intensity civil war that is becoming an international conflict.” IBID (2021) notes that, the question that enquires the impact and root causes beneath the rising insurgency in the province, it is argued that; in advance that the views by authors and experts point out at least three different causes: social and economic factors; influence of radical preachers and “religious dynamics in Cabo Delgado even though oil and gas are being labeled that initial push factors to the insurgency sitting issues of ethnic based conflict vis-à-vis resource based conflict tantamount to the poor political will by the government of Mozambique and FRELIMO party”(Genoud,2021). The study entails the gives out a wide gap on

the impact of terrorism in SADC region and gives questions on what, when and how has the insurgency influenced regional peace and security or the global governance.

What is definite; is the effective response by the government, its regional and international partners require also a bottom-up strategy, while simultaneously recognizing the local dynamics and the trans-border nature of the conflict. Failure to do so may render the external intervention by SADC, Rwanda, EU and indeed the AU, including other bilateral partners, as futile. Therefore, it is vital that the lessons learned from Somalia and Mali's stabilization and counterinsurgency interventions become an integral part of the attempts being made to address the ongoing conflict in northern Mozambique.

1.1: PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The research intends to fill the gap of interconnected sections which attempt to explain the impact, rise and root causes of Islamic insurgency and its wide security implication to regional peace and security.

1.2: STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The disadvantaged politico – economic environment of the province Cabo Delgado is central to the rise of Al-Shabab (Bartlett, K. 2022). The Club of Mozambique (2021) is of the view that; province has been marginalized by the Mozambican government for the past decades. It further reiterates that, it being one of the poorest provinces in the country, it lacks basic healthcare, education and jobs, with food insecurity being one of the most pressing issues. According to World Bank Group (2018), over the years the ruling FRELIMO party has privileged the Christian population in the country and the capital Maputo, overlooking the Muslim dominated Cabo Delgado and coastal regions of other Northern provinces, in spite of the fact that President Nyusi himself was born in Mueda, Cabo Delgado. Severe feelings of collective discontent among the Northern locals have served as a fertile recruitment basis for the extremist group (The Business Year 2016). Since the first attack in October 2017, Mozambique has been confronted with an extremist insurgency called Ansar Al-Sunna Wa Jamma (ASWJ), also known as Al- Shabab (not to be confused with Al-Shabab in Somalia). The alleged Jihadists targeted the Mozambican coastline and have carried out indiscriminate attacks in the Northern Province of Cabo Delgado, with the capture of coastal towns Mocimboa Da Praia in 2020 and Palma in 2021 being important

markers for the insurgents. The intense five-year conflict has resulted in 4000 people dead and 800 000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDP), roughly half of the province. The identity of the insurgents has become subject for debate among policy makers and researchers, raising questions about whether the rising insurgency the group is primarily a local insurgency or whether there are tangible links to Jihadism in other areas of Africa and the Middle East (Bartlett, K. 2022). A clear view of the role played by these factors in determining the reform outcomes in Mozambique is very important. In this light, this study will be inspired by the need to ascertain the role terrorists, external factors and poor political will by the leaders in spear-heading the country into an unrecoverable warzone or terrorist insurgency quandary. Therefore the study will fill the gaps on the effects of poor socio-economic and political factors on the influence of Islamic insurgency vis-à-vis rise of terrorism in global peace and security.

1.3: ASSUMPTIONS OF THE STUDY

The research was based on the following assumptions

- The evolution of Islamic insurgency in Mozambique can be traced to the Allahabad terrorist group in Somalia due to ongoing operation by African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS)
- Underdevelopment, marginalization and religion are contributing factors to the rise in Mozambique. The extraction of oil and gas is just the spark that ignited the insurgency.
- The impact of Islamic insurgency in Mozambique includes deaths of innocent people especially women and children, displacement, damage to infrastructure and religious extremism.

1.4: JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

This research is going to analyze the possible need to ascertain the effects socio-politico economic factors which are at the epicenter the rise of terrorist attacks in society and how it can be addresses for global peace and security. The second is to detect possible socioeconomic and psychosocial risk factors. These topics are basic in social sciences because terrorism is growing both in rich and in developing nations (Devezas & Santos, 2006; Root causes, 2015; Li & Schaub, 2004; Norris et al., 2013; Reardon, 2015; Rosendorff & Sandler, 2005; cf. Park & Bali, 2017). Many studies analyze the direct and indirect determinants of terrorism (Abadie, 2005; Crenshaw, 1981;

Newman, 2006; Freytag et al., 2011; McAllister & Schmid, 2011), though predictors of terrorism tend to be often not equal between different societies over the course of time (Krueger & Malečková, 2009). Some sources of terrorism are explained with economic factors (Enders et al., 2016; Blomberg et al., 2004; Hertog, 2010; Krueger & Malečková, 2002; Von Hippel, 2010), political factors (Coggins, 2015), social factors (Burgoon, 2006; Krueger & Malečková, 2002). However, whether and how political factors cause and sustain terrorism is hardly known. The study here will confront this scientific problem trying to analyze and explain whenever possible, the role of political, economic and social factors associated with terrorist incidents. Findings can clarify one of the precipitating factors of the evolution of terrorism over time and space. This study may suggest that empirical and theoretical analyses should deeply investigate the effects of political factors on specific societies to understand why terrorism is growing in order to defuse the underlying principal causes. The results here can also support fruitful in-sights for a policy that ameliorates socioeconomic conditions of population and indirectly reduces drivers of terrorism in society. Overall, this research study aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the gaps left out on the impact of terrorism and the oil discoveries in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique. By examining the social, economic, and political dimensions, the study seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the challenges faced by the affected communities and the broader implications for the region and the country as a whole, and it will be; and can be used by scholars, policy makers, academia and students for future purposes.

1.5: RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The specific objectives of this research, however, are:

- To explore the evolution of Islamic insurgency in Mozambique
- To identify contributing factors to the rise in Mozambique
- To assess the impact of Islamic insurgency in Mozambique
- To ascertain recommendations on how to curtail the political turmoil in Mozambique

1.6: RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. How did the Islamic insurgency evolve in Mozambique?
2. What are the contributing factors to Islamic insurgency in Mozambique?

3. What is the impact of Islamic insurgency in Mozambique?
4. What are the recommendations on curtailing the political turmoil in Mozambique?

1.7: SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The effects of marginalization and poor governance in the Cabo Delgado province a Islamic majority state has remained poorly understood. No formal studies on the negative impacts of poor political will on the poorest of province of Cabo Delgado have been undertaken thus far. In this study the researcher had to put in contrast the effects marginalization by the FRELIMO government on the poorest province of Mozambique. The findings of this study will help improve the domestic policy formulation based on equality of all locals which is the base for the microcosm of the macrocosm of the Islamic insurgency. In this light, the findings of this study provide valuable insights for guiding and informing the government of Mozambique, analysts, academia and community at large on good governance which is well informed with less greed and avarice. The study therefor demonstrates that marginalization, political culturalism and the discoveries of vast natural resources of oil and gas are at the epitome of this insurgency and policies need to consider the potential causes and effects of this Islamic insurgency which in-turn has given birth to terrorism which is a global threat to peace and security in the region.

1.8: DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY

The study does not seek to outline and describe the causes and effects of poor economics within Mozambican politics. In contrast, the study examines the impact of Islamic insurgency in Mozambique vis-a-vis oil and gas discoveries.

1.9: LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The first limitation is on language being used by the research participants and the terrorist through their website thus Portuguese and Arabic respectively. The use of interpreter will be used to limit the challenge although it comes with additional cost to the researcher in some instances. The second financial constrains to attend the SADC OPDSC to capture latest information surrounding Islamic insurgency and the rise of terrorism in Mozambique. The third limitation is that the issue of terrorism in Mozambique and in the region is highly securitised and politicised making it difficult to access critical important information for the research. Thus the use of primary data from reliable institutions such as United Nations Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian

Affairs (OCHA) and Regional Organisations in African security that provides well researched information. In addition, to mitigate this, the researcher adopted a political stance and persuades the various participants that this is actually an academic study.

1.10: DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

- **Insurgency** means a rebellious acts, armed uprising, typically guerrilla in character, against the recognized government of a state or country. According to David (2003) insurgency is a violent, armed rebellion by small, lightly armed bands who practice guerrilla warfare from primarily rural base areas against a larger authority.
- **Impact** means the significant major effect on something
- **Terrorism** mean the use of intentional violence or threat of violence and fear against a government pursued by a group to achieve a political, or religious goal
- **Relative deprivation** is the lack of resources to sustain the diet, lifestyle, activities and amenities that an individual, society, region or groups are accustomed to or that are approved as entitlement by society.

1.11: ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

It is the duty of the researcher to ensure that no harm befell the research subjects and anyone else involved in the study. Thus, to ensure research ethics were observed, the researcher informed all the respondents in person and through the questionnaire about the purpose of the research what they were requested to do as part of the survey. In addition, the questionnaire responses will be anonymous thus ensuring the confidentiality of each participant's responses. Furthermore, the researcher will assure the respondents that their responses are never going to be used against them since the undertaking is for research purposes only.

1.12: SUMMARY

The chapter has been an exploration of the background sequence of the rise of terrorism vis-a-vis socio-economic inequalities and oil discoveries in the northern province of Cabo del Gado in

Mozambique. The chapter presented a justification of the platform that inspired this study. It highlighted the necessary data needed to premise the importance of this research and the overall significance of the area under investigation which will provide a sales piece for the relationship between mainstream politics and socio-economic transformation for any one-party dominant political system in the developing world. The chapter introduced the study and provided the bedrock upon which the research rests, hence providing the required research principles and processes followed by the researcher in conducting this study

CHAPTER TWO

2.0: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this section, the theoretical base of this study is presented. First, the definition of insurgency is discussed. Second, prior research on the determinants of terrorism is presented, followed by an overview of insurgency in the SADC region. Finally, the theoretical framework applied in this study is presented.

2.1: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.2: DEFINING INSURGENCY

An insurgency is a violent, armed rebellion by small, lightly armed bands who practice guerrilla warfare from primarily rural base areas against a larger authority (David D. 2003). The key descriptive feature of insurgency is its asymmetric nature: small irregular forces face a large, well-equipped, regular military force state adversary (Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006). Due to this asymmetry, insurgents avoid large-scale direct battles, opting instead to blend in with the civilian population (mainly in the countryside) where they gradually expand territorial control and military forces (Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006). Insurgency frequently hinges on control of and collaboration with local populations. James Fearon and David Laitin define insurgency as "a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas. Austin Long defines insurgency as "the use of political and military means by irregular forces to change an existing political order. These forces typically mingle with civilians in order to hide from the forces defending the political order. According to Matthew Adam Kocher, Thomas Pepinsky and Stathis Kalyvas, a central objective in insurgencies is to achieve control over civilians. To exercise control armed groups apply a variety of practices, including different types of violence, dispute resolution, taxation, regulation of movement, access to aid and services, and social strictures.

An insurgency can be fought via counter-insurgency warfare, as well as other political, economic and social actions of various kinds (Barbara 2014). Due to the blending of insurgents with the civilian population, insurgencies tend to involve considerable violence against civilians (by the

state and the insurgents) (Elisabeth (2003). State attempts to quell insurgencies frequently lead to the infliction of indiscriminate violence, whereas rebel control of territory frequently involves violence against the civilian population (Kermit L, 2008)

According to Weigand and Florian (2022), wherever a revolt takes the form of armed rebellion, it may not be viewed as an insurgency if a state of belligerency exists between one or more sovereign states and rebel forces which will then be led to terrorism. For example, during the American Civil War, the Confederate States of America was not recognized as a sovereign state, but it was recognized as a belligerent power, and thus Confederate warships were given the same rights as United States warships in foreign ports and at were then termed an act of terror.

2.3: DEFINING TERRORISM

Terrorism, despite its common usage in policy and everyday discussion, is often not a clearly defined term (Burgoon, 2006; Shinn, 2016). In academic studies, terrorism is considered as violence or threat of violence against civilians and non-combatants by non-state actors with a political, economic or religious motive (Elu & Price, 2019; Solomon, 2015a, pp.2–7). This study utilizes data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). The specific definition START uses for terrorism in the GTD is the following: threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation (Global Terrorism Database, 2022).

The earliest considerations of terror as a means of gaining or holding on to power go back to the first civilizations, but modern terrorism, as considered by Rapoport (2002), is divided into four phases: anarchist, anticolonial, new-left and religious. The common definitions of terrorism, and the phases of modern terrorism, only consider terror perpetrated by non-state actors (Solomon, 2015a, pp.2–7). Historically, however, terror has also been a common tool for authoritarian governments to hold on to power. Modern terrorism, on the other hand, is centred around revolution, though revolution has had different characteristics for different phases (Rapoport, 2002). The dominant phase during the time period considered in this study is the religious phase. However, a simplistic view of modern terrorism phases ignores the multidimensional reality of terrorist organizations. For example, while considered religious groups, the Taliban of Afghanistan

have a strong Pashtun nationalistic agenda and Ansar Dine of northern Mali dream of an independent Tuareg state (Solomon, 2015a, pp.15–19). Furthermore, radical Islamist terrorist groups are often presented as working towards a unified goal of a global jihad, which ignores the local nuances different groups operate within (Dowd & Raleigh, 2013). In fact, while cooperation between global terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda and local groups exist, the majority of Islamist terrorists' goals are to transform the political field of their respective country or region (Afriyie, 2019; Solomon, 2015a, pp.15–19).

2.4: DETERMINANTS OF INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM

The extent to which insurgency and terrorism can be explained by socioeconomic factors remains debated. An upsurge in attempts to explain why people turn to insurgency or terrorism has taken place since the start of the global war on terror in 2001 (Sanso-Navarro & Vera-Cabello, 2020). Gurr (1970) developed the relative deprivation theory to explain tendency for political violence. This theory states that when the material well-being expectations of people are not met, they become prone to radicalization and political violence. While Gurr (1970) developed his theory to explain mass political unrest and uprisings, it has been applied to specifically terrorism as well (Gleditsch & Polo, 2016; Piazza, 2013; Ross, 1993). Terrorism, according to Ross (1993) can be considered political violence and can sometimes be difficult to distinguish from guerrilla warfare. Because of this similarity, many of the factors established by Gurr (1970), like poverty, inequality and political disenfranchisement are commonly used to explain terrorism.

Ross (1993) divides the theories attempting to explain terrorism into three categories: structural, psychological and rational. Structural theories argue that terrorism can be explained through political, economic and environmental factors. Psychological theories attempt to explain the decision to join a terrorist organization through group dynamics within terrorist organizations and the dynamic between terrorism and the society at large. Rational theories try to explain joining a terrorist group through a cost-benefit choice.

The intuition behind explaining insurgency and terrorism through socioeconomic factors is easily understandable (Iheonu & Ichoku, 2021). Poverty or inequality creates an environment of injustice, which radicalizes people and drives them to seek to impact society through violent means. This intuition has also been popularized through frequent usage by politicians when outlining

antiterrorism policies (Shinn, 2016; Yin, 2017). The empirical evidence, however, has not established a conclusive relation between socioeconomic factors and terrorism. Ross (1993) finds that structural factors, including poverty, inequality and states' abilities among others, interact with each other in different ways, which may lead to terrorism. Abdel Jelil et al (2018) and Sanso-Navarro and Vera-Cabello (2020) find that a lack of economic prospects and unemployment predict a rise in terrorism. Piazza (2013) finds that cost of living and price volatilities increase the risk of terrorism, as economic uncertainty creates political grievances.

Contradicting evidence has also been found which show either no relation between socioeconomic factors and terrorism or in some cases higher socioeconomic stance related to increased terrorism. Yin (2017) finds no evidence for economic development hampering terrorism in China. The findings of Benmelech and Berrebi (2007) are often cited in the literature, as they find that terrorist organization members in Palestine tend to be more educated and have a higher standard of living than the general public. In these cases, it seems that the decision to pursue terrorism is only based on ideology. However, some arguments have been developed arguing that highly educated individuals join terrorist organizations because of greater opportunities for leadership roles (Ismail & Amjad, 2014; Yin, 2017). The findings on the impact of socioeconomic factors on terrorism vary depending on the region or country of interest. While studies have found that Middle Eastern terrorists tend to be more educated and from better off backgrounds than the general public, poverty and inequality seem to have a larger impact on terrorism in Africa (Asongu, Le Roux & Singh, 2021; Benmelech & Berrebi, 2007; Iheonu & Ichoku, 2021; Krueger & Malečková, 2003; Sageman, 2004).

The strong linkage between poverty, poor political, insurgency and terrorism in Africa has been argued to be related to the extreme level and widespread nature of poverty on the continent (Iheonu & Ichoku, 2021). Shinn (2016) argues that transnational terrorism tends to be tied more to strictly ideology, while socioeconomic factors are more important for domestic terrorism. The majority of terrorism in Africa targets local governments and population (Dowd & Raleigh, 2013). Thus, Shinn (2016) believes alleviating poverty is extremely important for curbing terrorism in Africa. Terrorist organizations have been reported to offer their fighters monthly wages that far exceed average incomes (Solomon, 2015b, p.66). For many people living in absolute poverty, joining a terrorist organization can be a rational choice. This view is supported by tentative success of

programs attempting to reintegrate Boko Haram defectors back into society in Nigeria (Foucher, 2021). Defectors are more likely to reintegrate successfully when economic opportunities are better. Especially radical Islamist terrorist organizations have been successful in establishing generous monthly compensation for fighters and separate governing apparatuses in their regions, with funds flowing in from various Salafist charities in the Persian Gulf countries (Solomon, 2015a, p.36).

The relationship between economic factors and terrorism are also debated in the literature on the determinants of civil conflict in general and other militant activities like piracy (Daxecker & Prins, 2013; Jablonski & Oliver, 2013; Djankov & Reynal-Querol, 2010; Justino, 2012; Kuhn & Weidmann, 2015). Justino (2012) explains that it has become a stylised fact that civil wars are likelier in poorer countries. Furthermore, the participation of the poorest and most disenfranchised people in said conflicts tend to be high. This, she explains, is commonly thought to be due to material incentives. The finding that the level of economic development being directly related to civil wars has been contested and a strand of literature argues that poverty loses its explanatory power in civil conflicts when country-specific characteristics are taken into account (Djankov & Reynal-Querol, 2010). The role of disenfranchised groups, both politically and economically, in civil wars has, however, been found to be meaningful in cross-country and panel studies (Kuhn & Weidmann, 2015). These findings suggest that relative poverty is a stronger source of discontent than absolute poverty.

Some overlap does exist in the mechanisms discussed in terrorism and piracy literature. Jablonski and Oliver (2013) find evidence suggesting that poor labour market opportunities are related to increased instances of piracy globally. The methodology and channels they consider are to a great extent related to those used in civil conflict and terrorism literature. Daxecker and Prins, (2013) are of the view that, the attraction of piracy is increased in regions with poor governance and rule of law. Poor economic opportunities and regions outside the reach of central governments are prevalent in the Sahel (Harmon, 2014). Thus, the findings on piracy offer some support for the relationship between economic factors on terrorism in the region, as is the case in Mozambique.

2.5: ECONOMIC SHOCKS AND CIVIL CONFLICT

The relationship between economic shocks and terrorism remains a relatively under researched topic. Some research looking into the impact of food prices suggests that a link exists (Piazza, 2013). The role of economic shocks has been examined more frequently in the literature on civil conflicts (Bazzi & Blattman, 2014; Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012; Hodler & Raschky, 2014; Miguel, Satyanath & Sergenti, 2004; Sandholt Jensen & Skrede Gleditsch, 2009). This strand of literature is largely based on the mechanisms and channels of the relative deprivation theory of Gurr (1970). The literature has found economic shocks to increase the likelihood of civil conflict arguing that unexpected decreases in income make it easier for militant groups to recruit new members. Bazzi and Blattman (2014) find that increasing food prices may lead to onsets of violence. Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004) find a similar relationship between negative agricultural shocks and civil conflict. Some evidence suggests that positive economic shocks increase the likelihood of conflict, as times of plenty increase the rewards of state capture (Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012). This mechanism, however, is not supported by all studies (Bazzi & Blattman, 2014; Hodler & Raschky, 2014).

Economic shocks tend to function as a trigger for smaller-scale conflicts and violence (Bazzi & Blattman, 2014; Miguel, Satyanath & Sergenti, 2004). Larger civil wars, Bazzi and Blattman (2014) argue, are often caused by severe political divisions, whereas small-scale violence can erupt due to unexpected economic shocks. Furthermore, economic shocks are only useful at predicting the onset of conflicts (Bazzi & Blattman, 2014; Miguel, Satyanath & Sergenti, 2004). The mechanisms underlying the duration of conflicts are determined by other factors.

Terrorism is commonly seen as a subset of civil conflict (Gurr, 1970; Ross, 1993). This suggests that similar mechanisms would be at play for terrorism. However, few empirical studies have examined the linkage. As terrorism includes ideological, political or religious motives, it may not erupt as spontaneously as other types of violence (Elu & Price, 2019). It is possible that the indoctrination and radicalization required for terrorist activity take more time and is not as responsive to temporary shocks.

Soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, a new enemy emerged to threaten the global liberal order transnational terrorism (Sandbrook & Romano, 2004). Prevention of terrorism, transnational and domestic, quickly became one of the most important security policy

issues for the international community (Abadie, 2006). Military interventions, spearheaded by the United States, in Afghanistan and Iraq were justified with the global war on terror and toppling “rogue” governments detrimental to world peace (Nchalla & Shirima, 2016). Much of the early attention in the media and policy circles was given to the terrorism plagued regions in the Middle East and Somalia. Over the past decade and a half, however, a new hot spot for terrorist organizations has arisen in the Sahel (Harmon, 2014; Middendorp & Bergema, 2019). Six countries in the region are among the 20 most impacted by terrorism in 2021, according to Global Terrorism Index (2021). Boko Haram, formed in northern Nigeria and operating in neighboring countries as well, became known as the deadliest terrorist organization in the world (Omotuyi, 2022). Northern Mali fell under the control of Ansar Dine, a group with a Jihadist and Tuareg nationalist ideology, in 2012, with the capital, Bamako, threatened to be overrun if not for a French and West African military intervention (Harmon, 2014). In the media and policy discussions, these kinds of events have brought the Sahel region international infamy as a center and source of global insecurity (Middendorp & Bergema, 2019).

Furthermore, there are signs indicating that the phenomenon is transnational with possible growing linkages with the ISIL and its local branch in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Inspired by Wahabism, members of the Mozambican radical group are mainly young local people who reject the secular state and advocate for a sharia-based political order, thus showing close ties with the movements in Tanzania and Somalia.

There are reportedly elements originating from Central and East African neighboring countries, namely the DRC, Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya (Matsinhe & Valoi, 2019; Habibe et al, 2019). Although disputed, the link between the Mozambican insurgency and ISIL in Somalia has been established by the UN, allegedly through a suggestion of the Mozambican local branch (along with DRC’s) being commanded by the Puntland center. Nevertheless, unlike ISIL or al-Shabaab in Somalia, there is no clear evidence of Mozambican Islamist movement having a political agenda of its own.

Given that there is a clear indication that the movement appears to be transnational, is or may become trans-regional, external intervention would normally be expected from the region itself within the framework of AU’s APSA, via the SADC, possibly in coordination with EAC. Delaying the start of a foreign intervention period, the Mozambican government prioritized the request for

EU's assistance, mostly in the form of training of special forces, towards its counterterrorism efforts, like the bilateral support being provided by the USA and Portugal. Nonetheless, the second half of 2021 was marked by the establishment and deployment of different external military interventions, from neighboring Rwanda, from SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), and from the EU in the form a new training mission (EUTM Mozambique, similar to the CSDP military training missions deployed in countries such as Somalia, Mali or the Central African Republic). Moreover, the revised EU strategy for the Horn of Africa released in May 2021 has a broader maritime dimension, expanding from the Red Sea to the Western Indian Ocean, in order to include the Mozambican coast (EC, 2021). Whereas similarities with the Somali and Malian case tend to be overstated, the current domestic counterinsurgency logic in northern Mozambique may follow the same pattern as the one pursued in Somalia, and in the Sahelian borderlands, most notably in Liptako-Gourma, with or without the active participation of external actors. For instance, recent developments include the internal ramification of the conflict to the northwestern province of Niassa, as well as the establishment of the so-called "local forces", a form of non-state/self-defense groups, operating in Cabo Delgado province.

2.6: CAUSES OF VIOLENT CONFLICTS AND THE POST-LIBERAL APPROACH

Regardless of who perpetrate them, violent conflicts have multiple causes with different sets of causes from each other, rooted in specific histories and processes of political economy. Further, during violent conflicts, the impact and dynamics of violence are complex given that they vary spatially, socially, and temporally, often at highly disaggregated levels. This perspective suggests that no conflict is an island which is why external actors or donors cannot read off best practice guidelines from a general blueprint for conflict analysis and response (Cramer, 2009).

Thus, in a causal chain leading to conflict, the idea of linking the unfolding extreme violence in northern Mozambique, as well as in Somalia and Mali, to poverty, socio-economic exclusion and generalized frustration is not farfetched. As matter of fact, Gurr's relative deprivation theory explains that political violence is the result of collective discontent arising from a discrepancy between expected and achieved welfare. Gurr's argument may also serve as a possible explanation for what motivates individuals to commit terrorist attacks (cited by Richardson, 2011). At the core of Gurr's theory, there are two mechanisms by which poverty might be claimed to operate as a

significant cause of conflict. First, poverty may generate bitterness and rage which, in turn, may cause poor people to protest. Protest may provoke repression and tensions may escalate into open armed conflict, completing the causal mechanisms of a frustration-aggression nexus (Guur, 1970). Second, poverty may cause conflict because violence is simply cost free, especially where there are incentives to engage in conflict. Put differently, because the poor have a comparative advantage in violence or simply because the opportunity cost of violence is low for the poor, they are likely to make conflict more likely. If poverty provokes violent resentment, then surely extreme poverty will intensify frustration and tip the balance even more easily towards conflict (Cramer, 2009).

Poverty is obviously not the sole factor that explains the conflicts in Somalia, Mali, and Mozambique. In both Somalia and Mali, contested state formation and lack of commitment to the federal projects jeopardize the state legitimacy, often along ethnical or clan lines with regional ramifications. This resulted in the privatization of state functions and generalized grievances. At the same time, external actors tend to prioritize state governance to the detriment of other forms of governance or informal social contract. Likewise, in Mozambique, several factors contributed towards exacerbating the tensions which existed for decades owing to engrained local perceptions of inequalities and injustices, along with complex ethnic, domestic, and regional issues. Those include religion, illicit trade, and narco-traffic, as well as the discovery and extraction of natural resources, such as oil and gas, without regard to the local context.

2.7: MODERN BORDERS AND TERRORISM

To further illustrate, research carried out by Nelson (2020) points out that a triangle of vulnerability for illicit trafficking is emerging as a key geographic space along Africa's seaboard the Swahili coast. At one apex of this triangle is Zanzibar which has been a major hub for illicit trade for decades, but one that is currently assuming greater importance. Further south, another apex is northern Mozambique which is experiencing significant conflict and instability and is increasingly considered as a key through route for illicit trafficking of heroin into the continent and wildlife products from the interior. The final apex of the triangle is out to sea: the Comoros islands. These three apexes are linked by illicit economies and trade routes which take little heed of modern political boundaries.

In a recent report, the International Crisis Group (ICG) noted that a security response to stem the insurrection in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province was needed but the government and its allies also needed to think carefully about how they could address the grievances underpinning a rapidly expanding challenge that in essence started as a local revolt (ICG 2021). At the heart of this assertion lies the question of the post-liberal approach to addressing violent conflicts.

2.8: POST-LIBERAL CONTEXT AND TERRORISM

The post-liberal context, there is a noticeable tendency for external actors to undercut other alternative forms of conflict resolutions, resorting instead to the prioritization of state governance. This effectively undermines the bottom-up approach which is crucial in order to deal with the root causes of violent conflict regardless of whether it involves state or non-state actors. This view is supported by Finkenbusch (2016) when he argued that post-liberal approaches demand that peacebuilding should begin from the local, the everyday.

More importantly, in their attempt to make the local and even the far deeper local-local the starting point of peace-building, 'post-liberals' encounter a very concrete problem: 'Who is the "local" and where is the "everyday"?' While post-liberal peace-builders acknowledge that peace must be negotiated locally, it is equally clear to them that this process must be prompted externally. Hence, identifying genuinely local counterparts becomes a top priority. For post-liberal peace-builders, this involves overcoming a double obstacle. Their methodological challenge is to confront the edifice of Western ontological assumptions and, at the same time, the epistemologies without resorting to new metanarratives of peace (Ibid.)

2.9: OIL AND ISLAMIC INSURGENCY

The case of the Sahel region is perhaps the best known. Indeed, a full-scale war by jihadist groups, such as Boko Haram, Al Qaeda, and the Islamic State, against the five states in the region (Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, and Burkina Faso) and in various circumstances among themselves, has been going on in that region since 2007. Often, local common criminality has used the banner of jihadism to cover its own interests and trafficking, in a logic of transforming local terrorist groups (Global Terrorism Index, 2022). The results of the fight against terrorism in the Sahel region have been bad, as evidenced by the fact that, during 2022, other countries, such as Togo

and Benin, became involved in the phenomenon, thus broadening the territorial base of operation of jihadist groups (D'Amato and Baldaro, 2022).

The same argument can be made for Mozambique. Here, the predominant group, Al-Shabaab, continued to carry out attacks against civilians, businessmen and local politicians, with a massive presence as they felt they needed to control the vast amount of oil and gas in the Northern province of Cabo Delgado (Global Terrorism Index, 2022). These two examples lead to the need to make a more general point: jihadist-motivated terrorism in Africa is growing stronger. It means that the strategies adopted to date have failed. A quick look at what has been done in these two areas of fundamental importance to contemporary terrorism can also help to understand the current scenario in Mozambique.

2.10: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework of this study utilized the relative deprivation (RD) theory. RD is a concept often used in sociology, helping to explain aggressive behaviour through psychological and societal conditions. It was applied to civil conflict by Gurr (1970) in his seminal work *Why men rebel?* The RD framework argues that people tend to grow frustrated to their conditions when their realized outcomes do not match their expectations. People are usually well equipped at weathering even harsh conditions without discontent, as long as it matches their expectations, Gurr (1970) explains. When there is no hope or expectation of better outcomes, people are less likely to be discontented and may even be happy to just hold on to what they have (Runciman, 1966). Outcomes lower than expected, however, lead to frustration and discontent, which can be politicized and realized in violent action under the right conditions (Gurr, 1970, pp.12–13).

According to Gurr (1970, pp.24–27), values drive our expectations and desires. The most relevant values for this study are welfare values, as explained by Gurr (1970). These values include food, shelter and health services. When people construct expectations of the levels of food and shelter that they anticipate attaining, they feel entitled to realize those expectations. Entitlement here means a justifiable and realistic expectation of outcome, not simply a faint hope of something to attain (Gurr, 1970, p.27). Expectations are usually based on the level of attainment reached in previous periods. Negative shocks in the level of attainment, relative to expectations, can lead to discontent among a collective, Gurr (1970) argues.

The causal mechanism of political violence in Gurr's (1970, p.319) theory starts from a motivational cause, discontent. How discontent progresses to violence is determined by the cognitive determinants, normative and utilitarian justifications for violence. Normative justifications for political violence are defined as the attitudes and beliefs people hold on the intrinsic desirability of taking violent actions (Gurr, 1970, p.157). Utilitarian justifications on the other hand represent the beliefs people hold of the extent political violence will help them achieve material rewards.

Gurr (1970, p.11) lists terrorism as a subset of political violence. Thus, the causes of political violence in general apply to terrorism in particular as well. His RD framework for political violence has been applied in prior studies on the determinants of terrorism (Ross, 1993; Suleiman & Aminul Karim, 2015). The similarity of terrorism to other types of political violence and conflict, especially in the Sahelian case, further supports the application of the RD framework in this study (Ross, 1993; Solomon, 2015a).

In this study the trigger for discontent arises from relative deprivation and ethnicity in the Northern Province of Mozambique. The cognitive determinants, normative and utilitarian justification, are shaped by surrounding conditions. Normative justification of terrorism may be nurtured by ethno-nationalist or religious causes or general dissatisfaction with the political status quo. Utilitarian justification can be met by the relatively generous wages distributed by terrorist organizations (Solomon, 2015b). A simple monetary cost-benefit calculation, however, is unlikely to be the most accurate. As Becker (1968) explains, criminal activity requires a payoff that matches the risks related to it. Terrorism entails risk, which in turn requires a higher payoff, especially if a person does not possess a strong normative justification for violence. This may explain why terrorist organizations offer such generous incomes. If discontent, arising from lower-than-expected agricultural product, is successfully politicized through cognitive determinants, people turn to terrorism as a manifestation of their grievances. From this theoretical framework, I derive the hypothesis of this study, even though political economic theory must be put to reduce discontentment which is tantamount to resource based conflict which has turned to be Islamic insurgency in Mozambique:

2.11: CONCLUSION

This chapter has been focused on revealing the conceptual frameworks that inspire this study. The chapter revealed the theories that centre on the two basic variables of this research, which are Mozambique's domestic policy in influencing Islamic insurgency. For the primary variable of domestic policy the chapter highlighted the Relative Deprivation theory which suggests that discontentment arising from a certain religious group has largely influenced Islamic insurgency. The chapter provided a chronological sequence of the development of the phenomenon which may lead to the ultimate destruction of the entire province, which in this case is believed to be the road which Cabo Delgado is following. Moreover the section concludes with the supply of a political economics theory which centres on developing government policy directions as important to national development and economic stability, which in this case has been failed by the struggling FRELIMO government which has shown mediocrity in socio-economic development initiatives.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0: INTRODUCTION

The principle reason of this chapter is to depict and justify the choice of research methods or techniques used in the study. It incorporates the research philosophy used as the basis for the research, the research approach, research paradigm, research choices, data sources, data collection techniques, data collection procedures, validity and ethical considerations and also the data presentation and analysis techniques used in the study. It is of foremost significance to identify the suitable research methodology so that the objectives are fully met and also to establish a complete study to deduce the impact of terrorism and the rise of insurgency vis-à-vis its influence on Political environment of Mozambique. Lincoln (1994) noted that whilst most researchers impulsively start pondering whether they would utilize a questionnaire or conduct interviews, these are of secondary importance to questions of which paradigm is applicable to the research. Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009) explain that paradigm refers to the basic belief system or worldview that guides the investigation, not only in choices of the method but in ontologically and epistemologically fundamental ways. As such, the particular methods of data collection (the techniques) are placed at the centre of the “research onion” coined by Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009) which can only be seen or revealed by stripping the external layers.




Fig 1. THE RESEARCH ONION

Source: Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009).

3.1: RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY

Hinkelmann and Witschel (2013) explain the research philosophy as the system of reasoning upon which the study depended on and there are two primary research philosophies that usually guide researchers in their work which are the positivist philosophy and the interpretivist philosophy. The positivist philosophy is based on the notion that knowledge is separate from human perceptions and behaviour thus it requires scientific methods akin to those used in the physical sciences to obtain as explained by Neuman (2011). On the other hand, De Vos et al., (2011) argue that the interpretivist view considers knowledge to be inherent in human perceptions and behaviour.

Secondarily the phenomenology philosophy was chosen to complement the weakness of the positivist philosophy. The researcher adopted a qualitative or phenomenology research paradigm in order to fully address the objectives of the study. Mazviona (2015) defines Phenomenology as the part of philosophy which considers the way in which things in the world give themselves to consciousness and the structures through which we experience that governs. Phenomenology studies pay attention to experiences, events, and occurrences with minimum regard for the external

and physical reality. Consequently, phenomenology in research studies is generated from the rich amount of information by means of induction and human interests. Phenomenology, however, is a variation of interpretivism. Gummesson (2003) argues that every research or exploration is interpretive. Interpretivists accept as true that the topic of research can be largely understood through subjective interpretation, which helps to gain real intuition and understanding of the subject. They further advocate that individuals understand innumerable situations through their practice, exposure, thinking, and expectations as suggested by Easterby-Smith et al., (2012). The justification in line with the application of phenomenology includes its aptitude towards the comprehension of the meanings attached by people and its contribution to the development of new theories.

This research prioritized the use of positivism over phenomenology as the researcher set out to objectively measure the impact terrorism in Mozambique and International Relations. The philosophy is primarily mainly chosen because scientific methods are regarded as objective in nature thus giving reliable findings free from human bias and subjectivity. In addition, in order to characterize more fully the relationship between terrorism and rich natural resources (Oil and Gas), there is need for the use of quantitative scientific methods to measure the magnitude of the influence and also to ascertain whether the influence is positive or negative. The researcher will also utilize interpretivism in order to capture the weaknesses of the positivism philosophy.

3.2: RESEARCH DESIGN

According to Kothari (2004) a research design “is a strategy specifying which approach will be used for gathering and analysing the data”. These include the exploratory design, descriptive design and explanatory design. The exploratory design is concerned about researching a poorly researched field area to get some initial impressions into the research phenomena while the descriptive research design is concerned about describing graphically a research phenomenon. On the other hand the explanatory design seeks to find out about the relationship between two or more variables within a given study as noted by Kothari (2004).

This study will employ an explanatory philosophy among residents who live within and around Northern Mozambique. The descriptive design enables the study to fully understand the impact of terrorism in Mozambique Cabo Delgado area and the use of descriptive statistics describing the

average perceptions of the responses. The researcher will employ a descriptive research design. Shields et al (2013) proposed that this type of design does not answer questions about how/when/why the characteristics occurred; rather it addresses the ‘what’ question (what are the attributes of the populace being studied). To obtain information relating to what exists on the ground, the researcher will employ this method and it is concerned with conditions that exist, opinions held, processes going on and impacts that are apparent.

3.3: RESEARCH CHOICES

The researcher often used quantitative or qualitative techniques or combinations of the two. Mason (2006) states that there are three fundamental research choices that can be used by a researcher in undertaking a study which include mono, mixed and multi choices. A mono choice is when a researcher selects a single research methodology be it quantitative only or qualitative only. Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) define a mixed choice as when the quantitative and qualitative methodologies are used to complement each other across all the research questions. On the other hand, Mason (2006) notes that a multi choice is when each research question is researched using its own peculiar research methodology with some research questions employing quantitative techniques only while others employ qualitative techniques only. The current study employed a mixed research choice since it was based on both quantitative and qualitative techniques only.

The researcher used a qualitative research model which is narrative in nature to gain a deeper understanding of individuals’ perspectives, suppositions and elucidations relating to the impact of terrorism, focusing on the insider view since reality are subjective. First-hand information was obtained from Government, United Nations panel on terrorism, NGOs, political analysts, military personnel and academia.

Qualitative research model was utilized in this research basing on the assertion that social phenomena can be evaluated, estimated and articulated numerically in this way making data liable to be analysed by statistical methods. Quantitative method is mainly centred on the collection and examination of numerical information and statistics (Crawford, 1990). Quantitative research model includes the counting and measuring of events and assumes that there is an objective truth existing in the world that can be measured and explained scientifically and this enabled for the description of social structures that are not directly perceptible. Quantitative information on the

challenges countries are facing in accessing economic and political gains of natural resources and perceptions of all the respondents is vital in the production of graphs and charts that will represent the research findings.

3.4: TARGET POPULATION


According to Rubin and Babbie (2010) the target population is all items or things that are of interest to the research subject. This is in this way the whole collection of respondents that meet the assigned arrangement of criteria. For this study, the researcher made inferences to the residents who live in the vicinity of Cabo Delgado and these were randomly selected since they are the ones who are directly affected by the Islamic insurgency. A target population of 50 people distributed questionnaires and some were interviewed and some had to participate in focus group discussions. The target population consisted of the Military personnel, academia, scholars, government officials, public and religious leaders.

Table 1: Target population

Stratum	Total Participants	Intended population
Government Officials	2	✓
United Nations	2	✓
Military Personnel	2	✓
Religious Leaders	2	✓
Academia	2	✓
People affected and displaced by terror	10	✓

The above can also be represented by a graph below:

Fig 2: Bar graph of the intended population and reasons



3.5: SAMPLING TECHNIQUES

A sample is a subset of the target population used to approximate population parameters (Neuman, 2011). There are two fundamental types of sampling techniques which include probability sampling (likelihood) and non-probability (non-likelihood) sampling. Probability sampling encompasses those techniques in which the probability of selecting a population element into the sample as well as the sampling error can be calculated while under a non-probability sampling technique the probability of selecting a population element into the sample and the sampling error cannot be ascertained (Cozby, 2009). The study employed non-probability sampling techniques to select the sample. The research concentrated on five respondents from governing bodies of state security, finance and economics, NGO's and religious leaders. Thus, firstly the researcher used convenience sampling technique and purposive sampling (key informants).

3.5.1: PURPOSIVE/ JUDGEMENTAL SAMPLING

Kumar (2011) writes that purposive or judgemental sampling is the judgement of the researchers as to who can provide the best information to achieve the objectives of the study. He alludes that this type of sampling is extremely useful when one wants to construct a historical reality, describe a phenomenon or develop something about which only a little is known (Kumar, 2011). In this case, not every member of the population was quantifiable for reasons of cost and time limit. This form of sampling was seen as the deliberate collection of an amount of participants who are to provide data since one had to magnet conclusion about some group.

3.5.2: SNOWBALL SAMPLING

According to Cohen (2011) snowball sampling relies on responded driven sampling, or the process by which each element in a population has an equal chance of selection of the hidden population and it is a process that includes researcher's bias and allows for statistical estimates of representatives. Snowball sampling uses a small pool of initial informants to nominate, through their social networks, other participants who meet the eligibility criteria and could potentially contribute to a specific study because within a designated population all hidden elements have an equal chance of inclusion, and this is considered fair and allows findings to be generalized (Cohen 2011). The aim of snowball sampling is that it can be used in both alternative and complementary research methodology (Heckathorn, 1997). As an alternative methodology, when other research methods cannot be employed, due to challenging circumstancing and when random sampling is not possible. As complementary methodology with other research methods to boost the quality and efficiency of research conduct and to minimize the sampling bias like quota sampling (Heckathorn, 1997). The study adopted a form of snowball sampling which had a wide Enumeration Area, within the political and economics' landscape of Mozambique.

3.5.3: JUSTIFICATION OF SAMPLE

With the use of a mixed research design the research covered places, considered times and persons that were to be sampled across the selected group using an appropriate criteria, such as organisation, position and experience. The research has a sample of 15 participants. This number allows a broad coverage for each sub-category within the research design and fits well within the recommended size for phenomenological samples Patton (1980).As shown by Bogdon et al (1975),

the participants who are chosen for the study must have experienced the phenomena under study. The participants are to be selected by the research after determining where they fit in the designed categories of the study to ensure that all ranges are filled.

3.6: DATA COLLECTION METHODS

The research used both primary and secondary data in order to obtain the research findings. Primary data is data that is collected directly from the field for the sole purpose of undertaking a study while secondary data is data that exist already for other purposes but it useful to the study. Secondary data was the main data used in the study to characterize the relationship between terrorism and oil discoveries in Northern Mozambique vis-à-vis human insecurities posed by the Islamic insurgency. This data was very useful because it enabled the triangulation of the primary data as well as comparisons of results thus producing more reliable research findings. Secondary data also encompassed journals, previous researches and other sources obtained from the internet. This helped in coming up with the theoretical framework of the study as well as comparing findings with those from previous researchers in relation to terrorism impact on the political and social landscape of any country. Primary data on the other hand was collected with the help of a questionnaire as the main research instrument.

3.7: SECONDARY SOURCES

The research had to implore the use Books related to insurgency in Africa and Mozambique, journal articles, previous researches, desktop and newspaper articles for the purposes of furthering the information at hand. Secondary sources in the form of thesis, books, journals and other publications will be used to gather information on the research topic which was accessed from the university library and other city libraries in order to enhance this project. The research also consulted written documents in the form of articles, evaluations and reports which have issues to do with foreign policy and development. Internet is another instrument which was used extensively to collect contemporary written materials.

3.7.1: ARCHIVAL RESEARCH

Since the year the topic in question has been extensively explored, especially by Mozambican and regional scholars. In this case, this study borrowed much from these articles. A stringent analysis

of some texts especially by Mozambican scholars was made to allow a diverse judgement of the issues concerned. In fact, Islamic insurgency has become a topical issue for most intellectuals and this has allowed the existence of a variety of documentation at the disposal of this study's writer.

3.8: PRIMARY SOURCES

Primary data on the other hand was used to collect findings with the help of interview and questionnaire as the main research instruments. Though to note observations inform of ethnographic field and documentary reviews will be used.

3.8.1: RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS

3.8.2: QUESTIONNAIRE

Monette et al., (2011) define a questionnaire as a document with a list of questions asking respondents to respond in order to give their insights in a research phenomenon. The questionnaire is the main data gathering tool used in the study. Pouline (2013), defines a questionnaire as a data collection instrument consisting of a series of questions for the purpose of gathering information from the targeted households. According to Pouline (2013), a well-structured questionnaire should meet the research goal and objectives, and minimise on unanswered questions. Questionnaires were ideal because they are flexible when used to gather information from a large group of people in a faster way. A total of 50 questionnaires were administered. A mixed questionnaire with both closed and open ended questions was used. Open-ended questions allowed collection of qualitative data which included experiences by people affected by Islamic insurgency due to oil discoveries. Closed-ended questions were used to obtain quantitative data. The questionnaire had two sections which were the demographic section for personal information of respondents and the other section containing questions covering each specific objectives of the study.

3.8.3: INTERVIEWS


According to Kirby (1997) an interview is similar to a conversation in that it involves interaction between at least two people. Aggies (1997) defined an interview as a formal meeting at which the interviewee is asked questions in order to find out his/her opinions about something. Purposive sampling was utilised in selecting candidates for interviewing stakeholders such as the Ministry of Defence and State Security focal person. Face to face interviews were undertaken so as to allow deep understanding of the phenomenon through further questioning and acquisition of some confidential data that could not be revealed through questionnaires.

Table 2: Sample Size: Key informants

Key Informants	Total participants	Intended to be interviewed
FRELIMO	10	✓
Min of defence and state security	10	✓
UN, AU, SADC	10	✓
Religious Leaders	5	✓
Affected and displaced people	10	✓
Academia	5	✓

This can also be illustrated by the pie chart below;

Fig.3 Key informers



3.8.4: ONLINE INTERVIEWS

These type of interviews are used to get more data from key respondents who might otherwise be out of the immediate reach of the researcher in this case, suppliers of military equipment to terrorists, regional terrorism pressure groups and the United Nations special panel on terrorism. AU is headquartered in Ethiopia, and UN in Geneva

Online interviews require different ethical considerations, sampling and rapport than practices found in traditional face-to-face interviews. In this case video calling and emails shall be employed. Online chat which happens in real time and asynchronous such as emails conducted in non-real time. The researcher intend to use it because it enables interaction with key informants in a wide spaced geographically dispersed population..

3.8.5: OBSERVATIONS

Participatory and non-participatory interpretation is to be done in this study. The emphasis was on discovering the meanings of the reactions exhibited by people towards actions of other people or change of situation.

3.8.5.1: Parameters to be observed/ factors to be observed

- I.** Activities done by the terrorists
- II.** Management of accessibility and availability of vital equipment
- III.** Demands and level of political dialogue

3.9: DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION

Sapson and Jupp (2008) indicated data presentation and analysis “is the process of changing crude information factors that can be analysed to construct the information found in results”. This study consisted of both qualitative and quantitative data which was presented and analysed differently. Quantitative or numerical data extracted from questionnaire and interview responses was analysed utilizing the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) and data presentation was done using various tables, charts, graphs and figures. Microsoft Excel was also essential in the production of other graphs.

3.10: ETHICAL CONSIDERATION

It was the duty of the researcher to ensure that no harm befell the research subjects and anyone else involved in the study. Thus, to ensure research ethics were observed the researcher informed all the respondents in person and through the questionnaire about the purpose of the research what they were requested to do as part of the survey. In addition, the questionnaire responses were anonymous thus ensuring the confidentiality of each participant's responses. Furthermore, the researcher assured the respondents that their responses were never going to be used against them since the undertaking was for research purposes only.

3.11: SUMMARY

In this chapter the research described the research design which was employed that will provide the overall strategy for answering the research questions for the project on the impact of terrorism on Mozambique's landscape vis-à-vis oil discoveries and the human security issues surrounding it. It highlighted the tools and techniques to be used in both primary and secondary data collection. A case study of Mozambique and the challenges of Islamic insurgency is to be used in this study as it was found most appropriate. The answers to the research questions and attainment of primary objectives were derived from these findings.

CHAPTER FOUR: DATA REPRESENTATION, DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

4.0: INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the main focus of this study, focused on answering the research questions and realizing the research objectives discussed earlier. The chapter discusses the two reference points presented by the chapter topic itself, which are, “data presentation, discussion and analysis.” In this case, data analysis has been defined by Holliday (2002:99) as the process of making sense of, sifting, organizing, cataloguing, selecting determining themes-processing the data. Data obtained was in its raw and complex state, hence it is the task of the researcher to juggle, organize and interpret the information. This is basically a shift from social reality to an act of interpretation. Responses and views obtained through questionnaires and interviews will be analysed and categorized accordingly. Most of the views will also be presented in form of graphs and charts to simplify and explain findings.

The chapter presents the research findings motivated by the previously provided qualitative methodology employed to gather the information that inspires the scientific provisions of this chapter. It highlights the employed sequence of data presentation and analysis. The chapter reveals the political culture endorsed by the FRELIMO government to the Northern Mozambique society. It describes every component of FRELIMO’s government domestic policy and the consequences on the prioritization of socio-economic development. The researcher’s aim was to present a unique appreciation and evaluation of poor policy initiatives which gave birth to the rise of insurgency and its land-marking effects on the free-flow of Mozambique’s socio-economy. This is clearly brought out in this chapter together with the basic provisions to mitigate political culturalism to state economic building. In this case, this chapter justifies the writer’s conclusions and recommendations, guided by the research exercise’s results presented hereby.


Table 3: Questionnaire Response Rate

Stratum	Administered questionnaires	Number of those who responded	Number of those who did not respond	%Response Rate
Active FRELIMO members and Religious leaders	15	9	6	60
Top Government Officials, UN, AU, SADC officials	20	14	6	70
Experts, Political Analysts, displaced people etc.	15	10	5	66.6
Total	50	33	17	66

Source: Survey

The above can also be illustrated by the pie chart below;

Fig 4: Response Rate



Source: Survey

The chart shows that a total of 50 participants responded to the research exercise out of an intended 15 participants. This means that a 66% response rate was achievable from the research exercise. This is a positive response rate considering the confidential or sensitive nature of the subjects under study. A majority of FRELIMO members were not available for questioning largely due to fear of being labeled unscrupulous in their respective political parties. Fortunately enough, the participative members of the civil service, academia and general public in this study's research exercise provided very helpful answers to the research questions, hence authenticating the findings of this research.

4.1: LOCAL GRIEVANCES AS THE FUNDAMENTAL REASON FOR THE UPRISING

The disadvantaged politico – economic environment of the province Cabo Delgado is central to the rise of Al-Shabab (Crenshaw, 2021, Ibid 2023). The province has been marginalized by the Mozambican government for the last decades. Being one of the poorest provinces in the country, it lacks basic healthcare, education and jobs, with food insecurity being one of the most pressing

issues. Over the years the ruling FRELIMO party has privileged the Christian population in the country and the capital Maputo, overlooking the Muslim dominated Cabo Delgado and coastal regions of other Northern provinces, in spite of the fact that President Nyusi himself was born in Mueda, Cabo Delgado. Severe feelings of collective discontent among the Northern locals have served as a fertile recruitment basis for the extremist group.

While the province has been ignored by local authorities, its natural gas fields, located on the Northern coastline, have attracted international attention. Since 2019, French oil company Total has operated a 20-billion-dollar LNG retraction project near the city of Palma, believed to be one of the biggest energy investment projects on the whole African continent (Conflict Barometer 2023). According to an economist El Quassif (2021), Exxon, an American oil company had a similar project south of the Total project. Total had to declare force majeure in April 2021 because of the degrading security situation. Expanding maritime control through the capture of coastal towns: Mocimboa Da Praia in 2020 and Palma in 2021, has been one of Al- Shabab's force multiplying strategies, empowering them in the maritime area, where the Mozambican navy is lacking capacity, totaling approximately 200 personnel (Rodrigues, "Cabo Delgado", p. 24). The local frustrations related to the dire socio-economic situation are further fuelled by this context, and thus facilitates recruitment strategies for Al-Shabab (Ibid, p. 31. 2023).

Finally, in addition to the deteriorating economic situation in the province, both Mozambican and foreign armed forces have worsened the conflict by corruption practices and human rights abuses. Official reports state that the Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique (FADM) have carried out indiscriminate interventions to fight the insurgents. The armed forces have also prevented tens of thousands from leaving the province, in direct violation with international humanitarian law, as the government has a legal obligation to protect civilians under their control. These incidents had important repercussions on the trust of local communities towards the administration and its (hired) security forces (Africa barometer on Insurgency and terrorism 2022).

4.2: EVOLUTION OF ISURGENCY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Terrorism and crime are alike (Rice, 2009) and are affected by geo-politics, socioeconomic and environmental features of particular locations (Cozens, 2008, p. 431). The scientific research shows that manifold factors support insurgency and terrorism (Enders et al., 2016; Coggins, 2015;

Crenshaw, 2021). On the basis of the argument presented in this paper, we can therefore conclude that, in average terrorism is also associated with marginalization, combined with poverty, high income inequality and subsistence stress in society, *ceteris paribus*. These problematic socioeconomic factors can disrupt the stability of societies or communities, generate relative deprivation and lead to terrorism as a result (*cf.*, Butler, 2015) as it is in Northern Mozambique.

According to a religious and government leader Refslund Hamming, T. (2021), “the study here can clarify, as far as possible, some important situational factors of the evolution of insurgency and terrorism in society which are tied with dirty linen cloth of poor governance and policy. In particular, when Islamist insurgents laid siege to the coastal town of Palma in gas-rich northeastern Mozambique on March 24, leaving dozens dead, including several foreigners, the story received international attention. The insurgency in Mozambique was being waged by a group that calls itself al-Shabaab not to be confused with the Somali group of the same name and is affiliated with the Islamic State’s (ISIS) Central Africa Province. Despite the recent flood of attention Al-Shabaab in Mozambique has received, the insurgency is not new.

According Human Rights Watch (2023) local religious group called Ahlu Sunnah wal-Jamaa (ASWJ) turned toward militancy around 2015, eventually renaming itself (in whole or in part) al-Shabaab. The militant group has engaged in insurgent fighting against Mozambique’s government since late 2017. Al-Shabaab has not been particularly outspoken about the goals of its insurgency, but it has articulated a desire to establish rule by a hardline version of Islamic law in Cabo Delgado (BBC News (2021). The group’s aims appear to center on undermining and degrading the Mozambican government’s military and political authority, gaining local support, and combating foreign interests in Cabo Delgado.

Religious and ethnic tensions, alongside poor regional economic conditions, are also reportedly prominent factors motivating the violence (Smith, E. 2021). The militants are believed by local leaders and community members to be primarily “disaffected youth motivated by complex political, economic, and social factors including feelings of marginalization and disagreements with religious authorities in Cabo Delgado,” according to the most recent U.S. Department of State Report on International Religious Freedom (*Ibid.*, p. 397).

Mozambique is a Christian-majority country, but around 18% of citizens are Muslim, primarily residing in the north, including in Cabo Delgado province, where most of the violence has occurred (Jentzsch, C. 2022). Fundamentalist forms of Islam have spread in the country over the past several decades and have largely been at odds with local political and religious authorities. Additionally, the Mwani ethnic group a Muslim-majority ethnic group that has a large presence in Cabo Delgado has long viewed itself as politically and economically marginalized by the Christian-majority Makonde ethnic group in the region (Institute for Security Studies, 2022). These religious and ethnic tensions have converged with low levels of economic opportunity in Cabo Delgado, which is considered one of the poorest regions in Mozambique.

Since insurgency arises out of an inability to cope effectively with problematic socioeconomic and political risk factors of specific regions, there is a clear need to focus on a long-run strategy of diplomacy and carefully economic aid for a conflict dissolution of this critical problem in society: “means to redesign either the society that has the problem or its environment in such way as to eliminate the problems or the conditions that caused it” (UN terrorism desk 2023).

4.3: POLICY RESOLUTION AND TERRORISM

The results here can also support fruitful insights for a policy of conflict resolution that ameliorates socioeconomic conditions of populace, and indirectly reduces terrorism, such as programs of economic aid directed to reduce income inequality, improve the standard of living and work opportunities of young people in poor societies (Spaniel, 2018). Put otherwise, this policy should provide education and socioeconomic opportunity for young people to contrast the anti-modernization advocated by fundamentalists in society (*cf.*, Krieger & Meierrieks, 2020, 2021). This socioeconomic policy can support wealth and wellbeing in populated and poor regions of the globe to reduce situational factors of terrorism and political violence (*cf.*, Rice, 2009). In particular, the rising economic prosperity of certain regions may help to lower economic deprivation and subsistence stress in the long run that are possible distal causes of terrorism in society. In fact, Krieger and Meierrieks (2010, p. 902) confirm that social policies ameliorate short-run and long-run socioeconomic conditions of population (for example; reduction of unemployment, poverty, income inequality, and social dissatisfaction), and indirectly can reduce relative deprivation of people and terrorism as a result. According to a responded in the Ministry of defence, in short, domestic, transnational and international terrorism may also be fought by higher social spending

in developmental programs and more generous welfare regimes for societies having poor economic conditions and subsistence stress as noted in Northern Mozambique. As a matter of fact, developmental programs can help to raise socioeconomic progress and wellbeing directed to lower growth rates of population, income inequality, poverty and relative deprivation that set the long-run stage for terrorism in society. Fajnzylber et al. (2002) also claim that economic growth and equal distribution of income reduce poverty, and the rate of poverty alleviation has a crime-reducing effect.

Jaime Bessa Neto, the country's minister of defense said that “we can *clarify whenever possible, one of the distal causes of terrorism and its impact that seems to be deprivation to control of resources and poverty with deteriorated socioeconomic conditions in society. However, the current study here is exploratory in nature and findings need to be considered in light of their limitations*”. According to FRELIMO news desk (2022), referring to the Neto's sentiments it is overall, then, that the conclusions of possible impact on the rise of insurgency and terrorism incidents due to poverty and poor political will, and of course, are tentative, since it is now known that manifold factors associated with terrorism are often not equal over time and space. Smith E (2021) is also of the same view noting that, while studies in this research fields have made considerable progress, many pressing issues remain, and authorities in the FRELIMO government are silent about some questions that will be analyzed in future studies, such as: what are the permissive conditions and the trigger factors of insurgency and terrorism in some developed regions? How to explain the presence of all causes discussed above in some (African) countries, but the absence of terrorism? How to explain the differences of terrorist attacks from one context to another?

According to the African Barometer on Peace and Conflict and Ibid 2022 terrorism is due to complex factors mainly linked to the question of what human beings truly need and how they seek to address and satisfy human desires in society. They further assert that, there is need for much more detailed research into the relations between insurgency, terrorism, societal, economic and psychosocial risk factors to explain how different conditions interact with each other and what role specific geographical, social and cultural contexts play for triggering insurgency and terroristic incidents as this influence its impact. However it is the view of this research to enlighten the possible factors of insurgency and its impact to the political economy of Mozambique which is

clearly important but not sufficient to understand the comprehensive reasons for and the general implications of terrorism in modern society of Northern Mozambique.

4.4: RELIGION AS A FACILITATING FACTOR

The current identity of Al-Shabab and the future of the conflict remain uncertain as religious syncretism has failed to be the main stumbling block to the rise of insurgency in Northern Mozambique (United States Embassy in Mozambique, 2022). The insurgents originally targeted government institutions such as police stations and army patrols and tried to antagonise foreign investors by making their gas extraction projects unworkable (Nhamirre, B. 2021). According to SAMIM (2023), the initial nature of the conflict resembled thus a major revolt, with insurgents waging war against the state and the lack of socio-economic opportunities in the province as they cite Christians to be the sole beneficiaries more than those associated Islamic religion. Since 2017, the insurgents incorporated Jihadi doctrine into the group's workings, becoming what observers have called Islamic State Mozambique (ISM). At that time, IS media vaguely confirmed that 'a contingent of the Mujahedeen' in Mozambique had joined the Islamic State Central African Province (ISCAP), a province that allegedly consisted of ASWJ in Mozambique and ADF in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Institute of Security Studies 2023).

Analysts like Smith. E (2021) agree that Al-Shabab operates very autonomously relative to the central structure of IS. Although Al-Shabab officially pledged allegiance to IS in 2019, the operational connection to Islamic State cannot be fully proven, and the command and control relationship between both is unclear. A photo posted by pro-IS telegram channels in May 2018 claimed that the Mozambican Jihadists would express an official 'bayah' a promise of loyalty to the leader of IS - Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, but no official pledge by ISM has ever circulated publicly.

The connection between Al-Shabab and IS seems to be mostly based on two factors (US department of Religion and Freedom 2023). On the one hand, military knowhow, such as the utilisation of sniper tactics, tactical military design, IED's (improvised explosive devices) and religious beheadings. On the other hand, the use of Islamic State propaganda and social media to recruit new fighters, with IS claiming Al-Shabab's attacks through online media and Al-Shabab using IS flags when attacking. Strategically, the 'IS-marketing' elevates the militants' status within the global Jihad movement and facilitates recruitment. Yet, while IS' support to Al-Shabab seems

clear, the ideological connection to the IS remains uncertain, with few foreign fighters recruited and an inconsistent use of Arabic, as well as proof of important economic incentives to join the group.

According to the Institute of Security Studies (2022), the latter aspects make it challenging to assess the extent of Islamic State's influence in Mozambique; and two preliminary conclusions were drawn, firstly being Al-Shabab pledging allegiance to IS in 2019 proved advantageous to IS's cause, since it has been trying to expand its presence in Africa to counteract the defeated caliphate in the Middle East. Nonetheless, because of the lacking 'bayah', the pledge remains uncertain. Secondly, the statements from IS media created opportunities for Al-Shabab, increasing its visibility and recruitment possibilities.

The complexity of the insurgent's identity and goals, both locally tinted and IS linked, have created divisions between, and within, circles of analysts. African experts tend to lean towards a local insurgency explanation, whereas terrorism experts approach the Mozambican conflict from a global Jihadism point of view (Ibid, p 91. 2021). Policymakers generally do seem to agree however, that the local grievances mentioned earlier remain the main cause for the uprising of Al-Shabab as an insurgency (Neto 2022).

4.5: NATURAL RESOURCES, SECURITY CAPACITY AND TERRORISM

From a regional perspective (SADC and AU focal personnel), *“the connections to the DRC and regional IS structures, and the attacks spilling over into Tanzania, show that Al-Shabab is not only a problem for Mozambique, but poses a threat to broader economic activities and stability in the East African region as a whole. Zooming out from the region, the natural gas fields on the Mozambican coastline are likely to attract further international attention in the near future, given the vast implications on the world's energy supplies resulting from the war between Ukraine and Russia. With Western countries looking for energy alternatives to substitute Russian gas, and Mozambique having 1,4% of the entire world's gas reserves, interest from external actors is likely to increase.⁴⁶ With all the risks and opportunities that it may entail, Cabo Delgado is prone to remain a location for foreign interventions for some time to come”* (SADC 2021)

According to a political economy expert Bamhirire, Security Force Assistance missions from the EU and US will entail the medium-to-long-term solution for countering the Mozambican conflict,

as these interventions are aimed at building up the country's resilience and capacity. EU and US influence in Mozambique, and Western influence at large, may decrease the risk of Maputo turning to the Kremlin or Beijing for support. However, as recent events in Mali have shown, SFA will remain a balancing act between imposing conditions and accepting local demands.

Beto is of the view that, until the Mozambican security apparatus is fully able to carry out effective CT operations autonomously, the Rwandan and the SADC military interventions remain important. Yet, although the Rwandan and the SADCs' counterterrorism strategy has pushed Al-Shabab into a defensive position, these successes are likely to be short-lived if the root causes of the insurgency are not addressed. Increasing good governance, diminishing poverty through educational and economic opportunities, and disseminating a moderate version of Islam are important measures to prevent the expansion of the insurgents' breeding ground. The (almost) exclusive focus on enemy centric military CT should be accompanied by a people centric approach for an effective overall strategy. Dialogue and contextually adapted approaches have so far been lacking ingredients in the Mozambican security response. The main strategy towards tackling the Jihadists should entail a mixture between increasing local governance and socio – economic opportunities on the one hand, and disrupting Al-Shabab's operations on the other hand.

Though much foreign interest in Mozambique is centered on Cabo Delgado's natural resources, outside interest also focuses on regional stability and spillover violence. SADC, an inter-governmental organization of countries in the Southern Africa region which includes Mozambique, has called for regional action on Mozambique since the insurgency poses "a serious threat to regional peace and stability." In September 2020, Mozambique asked the European Union for military training and other assistance which is hence a desperate move for a desperate state (SADC news desk 2021).

At various points, the insurgents have targeted contractors associated with liquefied natural gas projects, and have moved in recent months to close in on areas where these companies operate. There is the potential for foreign involvement, especially after recent attacks, and the United States has roughly a dozen Green Berets in country to train the Mozambican security forces. There is the possibility for a prolonged insurgency that could draw foreign fighters to the region, with the potential to spread into neighboring countries (SADC news desk 2021).

4.6: DISCUSSION

In this section I will link the findings of this study to the existing literature and discuss their limits and merits. The results find no significant relationship between poverty and terrorism in the SADC. Prior literature on oil, deprivation and conflict has generally found a relationship to exist (Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012; Miguel, Satyanath & Sergenti, 2004). However, the mechanisms and direction of the relationship have been debated. These studies were larger in scope, while this study aims to shed light on this relationship in a particular part of the world and on a particular type of violence. The prior studies studied civil conflict in a more general scope. The results of this study imply that civil conflict in general and terrorism should not necessarily be considered to be caused by the same factors. As this study finds no significant relationship, it implies that other drivers and determinants are apparent in Africa.

Before discussing the possible reasons for the findings of this study, the study first relate the findings to the theoretical framework and the hypothesis. The theoretical framework tested for the SADC case is the RD theory of civil conflict by Gurr (1970). The theory states that worse than expected economic outcomes act as triggers for civil unrest. Thus, the hypothesis was derived for this study that oil discoveries and the will to control natural resources lead to increased terrorism. As shown, this hypothesis is accepted, given the results of this study. The application of the theory relies on the proper estimation of deviations from the expected outcomes. This is, of course, difficult to do and requires assumptions to be made by the researcher. Thus, also the ability of the RD framework to explain terrorism in the SADC region is found to be weak only within these conditions.

Many of the previous studies focusing on the rising of terrorism include large country samples (Kis-Katos, Liebert & Schulze, 2011; Li & Schaub, 2004; Piazza, 2013). Some also consider country specific case studies (Adelaja & George, 2019; Benmelech & Berrebi, 2007; Yin, 2017). No prior quantitative studies on the socio-economic determinants of terrorism in the SADC exist, to the researcher's knowledge. Thus, the findings of this study act as a first estimation on the topic. Some parallels can still be drawn between this study and the previous literature on the subject. The results found in this study are perhaps most closely related to those found by Kis-Katos, Liebert and Schulze (2011), which also contradict theories finding relative deprivation as a determinant of

terrorism. From their extended findings some speculations can be made on the drivers of terrorism in the Sahel as well.

Kis-Katos, Liebert and Schulze (2011) find that failed states tend to cultivate terrorism instead of deprivation. Already existing conflict, anarchy and instability creates room for terrorist movements to develop and flourish. Most of the countries in the sample of this study are ranked near the top of the Fragile States Index in 2019, the most recent year included in this study (The Fund for Peace, 2022). The instability created by fragile states may be further increased by the clustered position of these countries around the Sahel. This has, as Harmon (2014) argues, created many largely ungoverned spaces for criminals, insurgents and terrorists to function in the Sahelian peripheries of the countries. The coup d'état indicator had no significant impact on terrorism in most model specifications of this study. This variable was meant to capture the impact of political turmoil on terrorism. While no impact is observed, this may not necessarily capture all ways that political instability surfaces. To properly study the impact of state failure on terrorism, better indicators should be considered. Because state failure is not properly considered in this paper, I do not claim it as an important determinant of terrorism in SADC, but simply present it as a possible factor.

Transnational influences may also be a major factor explaining the rise of terrorism in the SADC. For this, some tentative evidence is found in the results. The dummy variables indicating the post-2019 and post-2022 periods were highly significant in all model specifications. However, it must be admitted that these variables capture a lot more than just the impact of major transnational terrorist attacks. Much of the literature agrees that no proper global terrorist front exists, but some loose affiliations have been confirmed between the groups active in Africa and active in other terrorist hotspots of the world (Dowd & Raleigh, 2013; Solomon, 2015a). International linkages between terrorists tend to be strongest within the Salafist jihadist organizations. As Solomon (2015a) explains, financial support flowing from different Salafist organizations in especially the Persian Gulf countries has spread radical Salafist Islam in many African countries, including those considered in this study. This support, he claims, can also be linked to groups such as Boko Haram helping their recruitment efforts. Furthermore, transnational influences may not need to be formal cooperation between terrorist groups. Major attacks by terrorists abroad may provoke and embolden similarly minded groups' activities domestically. Especially the financial linkages between radical movements and their impact on terrorism across the globe require further research.

This study finds significant linkage between relative deprivation and terrorism. Does this mean that absolute deprivation is a more suitable determinant of terrorism in the SADC? According to the limited findings in the form of GDP per capita functioning as a control variable, a small link between economic development and terrorism exists. The general findings of previous literature on economic development and terrorism have found mixed results, ranging from negative to positive relationships (Burgoon, 2006; Li & Schaub, 2004; Yin, 2017). The findings of this study show some support for the arguments of higher GDP attracting terrorism, as supported by (Yin, 2017). These findings, however, were sensitive to sample restrictions and mainly driven by the economic development of Mozambique. Thus, this study can claim to add little or more concrete evidence to this existing debate depending on the geo-political space.

4.6.1: FACTORS HOSPITABLE TO INSURGENCY

Whether al-Shabaab in Mozambique will sustain its operational tempo remains to be seen, but several factors suggest that the conditions in Mozambique are favorable to a prolonged insurgency, including geography and terrain and weak security forces.

4.6.2: GEOGRAPHY AND TERRAIN

Mozambique is located on the southeastern coast of Africa, and Cabo Delgado is its northernmost province, bordering Tanzania. Forests and islands in Cabo Delgado offer valuable opportunities to an insurgency. The region is covered by dense forests and shrub-lands, which have provided the militants cover from counterterrorism operations and air raids. One media outlet reported that local residents who had been abducted by militants and later escaped described the base where they had been held as “located amid vegetation so dense that the place is always dark, necessitating the permanent use of lamps and lanterns, even during the day.” Cabo Delgado’s islands, many of which are thinly inhabited or even uninhabited, have reportedly served as training bases and points from which the militants can strategically position themselves against security forces.

4.6.3: COUNTER-TERRORISM AND SECURITY FORCES

The Mozambique Defense and Security Forces are largely incapable of countering the insurgency, lacking both adequate resources and the capabilities to contain militant activity or protect civilians. Given these deficiencies, the government of Mozambique has contracted private military

companies Wagner Group (Russia) and Dyck Advisory Group (South Africa) to provide paramilitary assistance, including aerial support. Self-defense militias have also reportedly tried to protect civilians. After the Palma siege, the African Union called for “urgent action” to quell the fighting

4.7: SUMMARY

The above discussed chapter revealed the researcher’s findings from the research exercise carried out to conclude this study and answer the research questions. The findings proved the writer’s hypothesis and led to the realization of the research objectives in question. In fact the research proved that it is illogical to argue that there is a universal understanding of what all Mozambican national interests are. Al-Shabab remains a fundamentally local Jihadi insurgency; with alleged connections to regional IS structures. Similar to other conflicts in the Sahel and the Middle East, local grievances seem to be the most prominent reasons for the militant’s initial revolt, with the Jihadi aspect being added to the conflict since 2017. The Mozambican insurgency thus entails heterogeneity, with both local and jihadi dimensions being part of its identity, function and structure. The flows of the government in failure to address the, weak and poor security and defense capacity, inequalities, poor political will, hence political culturalism, has been fueled and fueling terrorism there by influencing displacements, economic inefficiency and political instability within the region which a threat to Global peace and security.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0: INTRODUCTION

This chapter is the last of this study. It provides the study's conclusions and recommended solutions to the problems identified in the research exercise. This research focused on the impact of terrorism: Islamic insurgency in Cabo Delgado in Mozambique 2017-2023. This chapter suggests that the best solution is out rightly do away with poor governance and guarantee its political demise while establishing a standpoint of the countries everlasting National consultative dialogue which prohibits poor socio-economic structure based on favour to one religious sect which is therefor toxic Mozambican economic development peace and security. Definitely other views to building a resilient peace and security vis-à-vis socio-economy which is inclusive to all exist and this paper is meant not only to proffer potential ideas but is also meant to ignite debate on turning-around the political economy of this great nation through a better domestic policy which is basically developmental rather than it being divisive.

5.1: RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS

The impact and root causes of Islamic extremism and radicalization in Cabo Delgado are multidimensional. The crisis underlines the limited capacity of the central government to control its territory and protects its citizens from harm, poverty, unemployment, lack of opportunities for the young people, etc. These social and economic causes are important as they define the religious context in which young people give in to the enticement of radical preachers to embrace Jihad and reject state institutions in favour of the Sharia law.

While the insurgents have engulfed Cabo Delgado and the defense and security forces remained powerless to combat the Al-Shabaab group, the key to end the conflict should be multidimensional in its scope. The violent conflict in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province which emerged first as a revolt by the local population due to long held grievances caused by socio-economic exclusion and prevailing inequalities, is now overtaken by radical Islamist insurgents with possible albeit contested links to international terrorist networks such as ISIL and the Somali-based group Al-Shabaab. Like Somalia and Mali where jihadist movements expanded over the last decade, the situation in northern Mozambique attracted international attention and has galvanized both

regional and international partners who are supporting the government of Mozambique in its response to the threat posed by the movement.

As it turned out, the Somalia and Mali case have revealed that any external intervention cannot be isolated from socio-political and economic considerations including endemic poverty, nor from trans-border security governance issues. In the specific case of Mozambique, the tri-border area of Mozambique-Tanzania-DRC and its maritime dimension, may require further support from France and South Africa (as the only African naval power) through a holistic approach. The need for this approach is that it facilitates the linking of protection of civilians, security, and socio-economic development (particularly, targeting the youth) along with engagement in a political dialogue that promotes state-society relations and the state's legitimate authority.

An effective response by the government and its regional and international partners requires also a bottom-up strategy, while simultaneously recognizing the local dynamics and the trans-border nature of the conflict. Failure to do so may render the external intervention by SADC, Rwanda, EU and indeed the AU, including other bilateral partners, as futile. Therefore, it is vital that the lessons learned from Somalia and Mali's stabilization and counterinsurgency interventions become an integral part of the attempts being made to address the ongoing conflict in northern Mozambique.

5.2: RECOMMENDATIONS

This policy brief lays out the following policy recommendations that could be a step in the right direction toward addressing the root causes of the rise of Islamist insurgents in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado. The first and second are directed toward the Mozambican government; the third toward private companies; and the fourth and fifth toward the AU and UN policymakers.

More research must be done for academic purposes to fill the open gaps on Mozambique's domestic policy agenda which is at the epicenter of rising insurgency.

Mozambique's government should develop a fully integrated and comprehensive plan of permanent dialogue with those interested parties in its natural resources so as to understand, defend and address the aspirations, challenges and goals of the local youth.

Mozambique's authorities should prioritize a long-term solution to the country's security problems by investing massively and purposefully so as to strengthen the capabilities of the national armed forces and releasing the policy for its core law and order duties. The armed forces should focus on a few critical areas: elite combat; counter-insurgency units and the Navy; and well-equipped, paid and intelligence-led targeted operations.

Multinational companies with projects interested in natural gas and oil should be the government's critical partners in creating local decent jobs, infrastructures tailored to develop literacy programs, critical skills, accessible training and quality health services for the local people.

The AU and UN should try to organize a meeting between Mozambique's government and its regional allies from SADC and international partners to exploit the potential of multidimensional solution to the deep-rooted jihadi insurgency in Cabo Delgado.

Security and defense policy-makers should target a strategic and constructive partnership with transnational actors to respond in a more coordinated and effective way to organized crimes.

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APPENDIX 1: Letter of informed consent.

30 July 2023

The Permanent Secretary
Ministry Foreign Affairs and Economic Trade
Munhumutapa building
P.O Box
Causeway
Harare

Dear Sir/Madaam

RE: PERMISSION TO CARRY OUT RESEARCH ON THE ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM: ISLAMIC INSURGENCY IN CABO DELGADO IN MOZAMBIQUE 2017-2023.

Dear Sir/ Madam.

I am a Masters student in International Affairs Studies at Bindura University of Science Education in the Department of Peace and Governance. I am carrying out research on the “The impact of Islamic insurgency in Cabo Delgado in Mozambique 2017-2023” for my final year dissertation.

I am therefore asking for your permission to carry out interviews with directors and officers within your country from Ministry defense and security, religious leaders, political analysts, UN, AU and SADC personnel. For further information, please do not hesitate to contact the researcher on +263719380529; Email:enockchiropa@gmail.com or the supervisor Dr D Makwerere Email: _____@gmail.com .

Your assistance and cooperation will be greatly appreciated.

Yours Faithfully

Chiropa Enock

.....

SOCIAL SCIENCES, IMPACT OF TERRORISM, INSURGENCY, CABO DELGADO.



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APPENDIX 2: Research Questionnaire

Research Instrument 1: Open-Ended Questions

(45 minutes - 1 hour to complete)

My name is Chiropa Enock, studying for a Master in International Affairs (Honours Degree). I am conducting a research on the impact of terrorism: Islamic insurgency in Cabo Delgado in Mozambique 2017-2023. This study aims to establish the impact insurgency and rise of terrorism in Northern Mozambique province of Cabo Delgado policy and the influence to the national economic development agenda. This research in particular is crucial to the actual public opinion on Mozambique's economic standing.

This process is done in acknowledgement of the confidentiality clause agreed upon by the researcher and yourself. Your identification is not required but only your truthful and utmost cooperation are of significance. The information sought is purely for academic purposes. High levels of Confidentiality and Anonymity will be maintained by both me and the University. Please answer the questionnaire accordingly. You are also required to disclose your opinion by ticking in the space provided or commenting or describing where necessary.

RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE

APPENDIX 3: Interview questions presented to Government officials and other political players involved in policy making, and political analysts following the domestic policy in question.

Greetings to you Sir/ Ma'am how are you? My name is Chiropa Enock and I am a final year student at the Bindura University of Science Education. The purpose of my visit is my endeavour to carry out an interview with you for academic use. I assure you that whatever shall be discussed shall remain undisclosed no matter what circumstances. This research is aimed at identifying the perpetrators of domestic policy within FRELIMO's government and understanding the consequences of such poor political will to national socio-economic *vis-à-vis* the impact of terrorism and political stability.

1). Why did Mozambique and the FRELIMO government assume such radical foreign policy?

.....

2). How well did the domestic policy perform and, did it achieve the intended results?

.....

3). Do you have any appeal against the political environment in Northern Mozambique influenced the domestic policy at large?

.....

3). Who do you think could have orchestrated the poor socio economic of Northern Mozambique?

.....

5). Where does government and FRELIMO stand in the crafting of Mozambique's domestic policy?

.....

6). Are there any chances that the natural resources are captured on the basis of religion in Northern Mozambique?

.....

7).What is your opinion on religion role and domestic policy crafting?

.....

8). Do you think domestic policy has an economic development agenda in Northern Mozambique?

.....

9). Which main stakeholder groups with an interest in the country's economic and political reforms were consulted or are being consulted?

.....

10). To what extent did the representatives of these groups get involved in the policy formulation, implementation and evaluation processes?

.....

11). Is it true that adverse and often change resistant ideologies, socio-cultural and societal norms also explain the failure of meaningful domestic policy of Mozambique vis-à-vis poor political will?

.....

12). What role did regional politics influenced Mozambique's domestic policy?

.....

13). What best can be done to improve socio-economic policy in Mozambique?

.....

14). Can consultative dialogue work between FRELIMO government and other political players?

.....

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND COMMITMENT

APPENDIX 4: Questionnaire for the ordinary Mozambican citizens, academia, experts in politics and economics on the outlook of the country’s economy

My name is Enock Chiropa, studying for a Master of Science in International Affairs Degree). I am conducting a research on the average living standards for an ordinary Mozambican household. This study aims to establish the impact of terrorism on the national economic development. This research in particular is crucial to the actual experts in politics and economic, academia and public opinion on Mozambique’s geo-political standing.

This process is done in acknowledgement of the confidentiality clause agreed upon by the researcher and yourself. Your identification is not required but only your truthful and utmost cooperation are of significance. You are also required to disclose your opinion by ticking in the space provided or commenting or describing where necessary.

QUESTIONS

With special reference to the failed Mozambican Counter Terrorism efforts, answers will also be sought for the following specific additional questions:

1. What is the impact of terrorism and the influence of this radical domestic policy?
.....
2. How well did the domestic policy perform and, did it achieve the intended results?
.....
3. Is the executive more powerful than the institutions involved in domestic policy crafting?
.....
4. What is the role of religion in policy formulation?
.....
5. Where does oil and gas discoveries stand in the rise of terrorism and what where the main drivers of the insurgency in Mozambique?
.....
6. What is the relationship between politics and economics in Mozambique?
.....
7. Which main stakeholder groups with an interest in the country’s economic and political reforms were consulted or are being consulted?

.....
8. To what extent did the representatives of these groups get involved in the policy formulation, implementation and evaluation processes?

.....
9. What role did lack of information and awareness about the natural resources in Cabo Delgado result in lack of ownership and therefore poor participation by all the concerned stakeholders?

.....
10. Is it true that lack of political will and lobbying by certain interested groups, which saw their interests threatened by the government's policy explains Mozambique's insurgency?

.....
11. If the above is true, what should have been done or should be done in the future to minimize the resistance to the reform process by those interest groups that are bound to lose as a result of the reform process?

.....
12. Does the issue of religion play a role in the issue of Mozambique's?

.....
13. Is it true that adverse and often change resistant ideologies, socio-cultural and societal norms also explain the failure of meaningful Mozambican domestic policy?

.....
14. Is the role of stakeholders limited in the design, implementation and outcomes of the socio-economic programmes, as well as methods used to consult and ensure or not to ensure their participation in the reform process?

.....
15. What is the influence of Mozambican insurgency on regional politics?

16. What do you think must be done for better socio-economic mantra which has inclusivity in Mozambique?

.....

17. How well was the government ready to protect its citizens from terrorism and what are the flaws and success?

.....

18. Was the regional organ of politics and defence fruitful in Counter Terrorism for the safety of regional peace and security?

.....

THANK YOU SO MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND COMMITMENT

APPENDIX 5: INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM



MSc International Relations

The impact of Islamic insurgency in Cabo Delgado in Mozambique 2017-2023

Interview Consent Form

Participant Name

.....

Date

...../...../.....

- I confirm that my participation in this research is voluntary.
- I understand that I will not receive any payment for participating in this research interview.
- I understand that most interviews will find the discussion interesting and thought provoking, I have the right to decline to answer any question or to end the interview.
- I confirm that the research will last in a reasonable time.
- I understand the researcher will not identify me by my name in any reports using information from this interview and that my confidentiality as a participant in this study will remain secure.
- I have read and understood the explanation provided to me.
- I have been given a copy of the consent form.

- I wish to review the notes, transcripts, or other data collected during the research interview.
- I agree that the researcher may publish documents containing questions answered by me.

By signing this form, I agree to the terms indicated above

Participant's Signature

.....

Date Signed

...../...../.....

Researcher's Signature

.....

Date Signed

.../...../.....