

**BINDURA UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE EDUCATION**



**FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES, PEACE AND GOVERNANCE**

**DEPARTMENT**

**ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS AND THE ZIMBABWEAN  
ECONOMY SINCE 2009: A CASE STUDY**

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**2015**



**APPROVAL FORM**

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**DECLARATION**

I declare that this project is herein my own and has not been copied or lifted from any source without acknowledgement.

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## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

For their invaluable contribution to the compilation of this document I wish to acknowledge the assistance I received from the following individual technocrats, officials and organizations.

I would like to first appreciate the team at the EPA desk in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, officials and technocrats from the Ministry of Industry and Commerce and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I greatly and humbly appreciate the EU ambassador to Zimbabwe Mr Van Damme for affording me a chance to meet him and the staff at the Embassy of the Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Zimbabwe. My appreciation extends to lecturers and academics at Bindura University of Science Education (BUSE) Department of Economics and Department of Peace and Governance; and University of Zimbabwe Department of Economics and the Department of Political and Administrative Studies, experts from Community Technology Development Trust (CTDT), SAPES TRUST, LEDRIZ, AFRODAD, European Union Direct Link Contact Center, Zimtrade, and Southern African Research and Documentation Centre (SARDC).

I also want to appreciate management and staff from Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce, (ZNCC), Industrial Development Corporation Zimbabwe ( IDC) and Buy Zimbabwe, Members of Parliament, Tobacco Industries Marketing Board, Tongaat Hullets and Mr Joseph Malaba former CEO of CZI and Chamber of Mines who also served as part of the negotiating team, the man whose expertise and knowledge is so profound

My special and heartfelt thanks and recognition goes to my supervisor, for the expertise supervision, incisive advice, dedication to work and patience in the final review of the draft.

To the Sovereign God in good and bad times I give Glory.

## **DEDICATION**

To Patience my inamorata, for the love and sacrifices you made to make this whole study a success.

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

ACP – Africa, Caribbean And The Pacific.

AD/AVS – Anti-Dumping And Countervailing Duties.

AGOA – Agriculture Growth and Opportunity Act.

AoA – Agreement On Agriculture.

BLNS – Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia And Swaziland.

BRICS – Brazil , Russia, India, China And South Africa.

BUSE – Bindura University Of Science Education.

CAP – Common Agricultural Policy.

CEMAC – Communante Economique et Monetaire de l’Afrique Centrale.

CET – Common External Tariff.

CPA – Cotonou Partnership Agreement.

CTDT – Community Technology Development Trust.

CZI-, Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries

DFQF – Duty Free And Quota Free.

DG – Director General.

E.C – European Commission.

ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States.

EDF – European Development Fund.

EEC – European Economic Community.

EPA – Economic Partnership Agreement.

ESAP – Economic Structural Adjustment Programme.

ESAFF – East and Southern Africa Small Scale Farmers Forum.

EU – European Union.

FDI – Foreign Direct Investment.

FOCAC – Forum for China Africa Cooperation.

FTA – Free Trade Area.

GAP - Good Agricultural Practice.

GATT – General Agreement On Tariffs And Trade.

GDP – Gross Domestic Product.

GM – Gravity Model.

GMO – Genetically Modified Organism.

GNU – Government Of National Unity.

IDC- Industrial Development Corporation of Zimbabwe

IMF – International Monetary Fund.

IPR – Intellectual Property Rights.

LDC – Least Developed Countries.

MAR – Market Access Regulation.

MNC – Multi National Companies.

NDTPF – National Development Trade Policy Forum.

NIP-- National Indicative Programme

NGO – Non Governmental Organization.

NIEO – New International Economic Order.

NTB – Non Tariff Technical Barriers.

OCT – Overseas Countries And Associated Territories.

OECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

PE – Partial Equilibrium.

RNF – Regional Negotiating Forum.

RTA – Regional Trade Agreements.

S&DT – Special And Differential Treatment.

SACU – South African Customs Union.

SADC – Southern African Development Community.

SAPES – Southern African Political Economy Series.

SAP - Structural Adjustment Programs.

SARDC – Southern Africa Research And Documentation Centre.

SEATINI – Southern and Eastern African Trade Information and Negotiation Institute.

SIA – Sustainable Impact Assessment.

SPS – Sanitary And Phytosanitary Standards.

SSA – Sub Saharan Africa.

SSM – Special Safeguard Measure.

STABEX – System For Stabilization Of Export Earnings.

SVEs – Small And Vulnerable Economies.

SYSMIN – System For The Promotion Of Mineral Exports.

UK – United Kingdom.

UN – United Nations.

UNDP – United Nations Development Program.

USA - United States Of America.

US-AFRICOM – United States Africa Command.

UZ – University Of Zimbabwe.

WB – World Bank.

WTO – World Trade Organization.

ZIMASSET--Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation

ZNCC-- Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce

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## **ABSTRACT**

From 1980 Zimbabwe and European Union have been engaged in multilateral trade agreements evolving from non- reciprocal Lome trade preferences to the World Trade Organization (WTO) compatible and reciprocal Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). Zimbabwe has been negotiating under the East and Southern African (ESA) configuration and this study focuses on the impact of EPAs on the Zimbabwean economy from the negotiations, ratification and implementation between 2009 and 2015. The study's main theoretical underpinnings include trade liberalism, neo-liberalism and neo-Marxist dependency theory. The research paradigm adopted in this study is the qualitative paradigm and the Case Study design in which data was gathered through interviews from key stakeholders selected through non-probability purposive sampling method and augmented through review of secondary sources. Data analysis was done using the thematic coding system. Study findings reveal that EPAs are at variance with the developmental dimension. They are designed to suffice the EU' commercial interests. Despite mitigated efforts to reintegrate Zimbabwe into the global market the ambitious EPA objectives do not match with the empirical evidence. EPAs are at variance with the theoretical benefits of commercial liberalisation, rather they are to some extent advancing EU's geostrategic resource interests and promoting Zimbabwe's dependency on the EU. The study recommended Zimbabwe to pursue value addition of its resources, resistance to WTO-plus issues, the EU to avail more financial resources for the country's capacity building and to consider developmental needs through its National Indicative Programme.

## CHAPTER 1; INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Background to the Study

Since the early 1960s, the European Union (EU) then European Economic Community (EEC) has concluded a number of agreements with Africa under the ACP states; these were mainly socio-economic and political agreements to build and maintain relations between the two continents and to integrate Africa into the global community through trade and development. Trade agreements between the EU and former ACP colonies evolved drastically with the continuous signing of various treaties and conventions which include; Treaty of Rome 1957, Yaounde Conventions 1963 and Lome Conventions (I-IV) 1975-2000. Since the 1970s ACP countries enjoyed the benefit of unilateral trade preferences with the EU on non-reciprocal basis. (Banthia, 2007;11).

Lome Conventions had to receive an official waiver from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This was required because the EU-ACP trade regime was based on two key principles that were at odds with the multilateral rules of the world trade system. First, the non-reciprocal nature of the Lome Conventions contravened the rules of the GATT concerning Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), in that, according to Article XXIV, there must be a plan ultimately to remove non-reciprocity between partners, although in many cases this has been overlooked or has been purely nominal.(Brown, 2012:7, Banthia. 2007:11, Borrmann, Busse and Rocha. 2007:234, Hartman. 2009:20.) Moreover, the nature of the differentiation resulting from the Lome Convention failed to coincide with these GATT principles more so the non-reciprocal trade agreements between the EU and ACP countries were declared to violate terms set down by the WTO which demand that trade liberalisation be reciprocal in nature. (Brown, 2012:4, Roza. 2005:5,Hurt. 2010:168, Khumalo and Mulleta. 2010:210, Lwanda. 2011:16 and Chibaya. 2013:19). Article 36 of the Cotonou Agreement (2000) engaged the EU and ACP in trade negotiations, “removing progressively barriers to trade between them and enhancing cooperation in all areas relevant to trade”. (Brown, M. 2012:4). In September 2002 negotiations commenced

to establish EPAs between the EU and Six ACP configurations as follows; West Africa (ECOWAS), Caribbean (CARIFORUM), Central Africa (CEMAC), East and Southern Africa (ESA), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Pacific. Unilateral trade preferences were extended up until the end of 2007; a second revision of this agreement was adopted by the EU in November 2010. (Banthia. 2007:11, Borrmann, Busse and Rocha. 2007:234, Hartman. 2009:20, and Brown. 2012:5), ).

The Cotonou Agreement of 2000 marked the European Union's (EU) radical shift from 'non-reciprocal' to 'reciprocal' unilateral trade preferences with ACPs. (Hurt, 2003:162) Cotonou established Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the European Union (EU) and its former ACP colonies and trading partners. EPAs are premised on the world trade theory, which postulates that interdependence and trade liberalisation promotes development. The objectives of EPAs; are partnership, political development, poverty reduction, regional integration and trade development. EPAs are trade agreement and negotiations that are either in effect already or, in the majority of the cases being negotiated between the EU and ACP configurations. (Hartman 2009:25)

In some respects the Cotonou Agreement can be seen as a continuation of the neo-liberalisation of the EU-ACP relationship. Clearly it builds on trends that have developed over the history of the various Lome Conventions, especially apparent during Lome IV in the 1990s. Crawford (1996:506) cited in Banthia (2007:9) Some of the most important inclusions within this agreement were the use of part of the European Development Fund to support World Bank-imposed Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and the inclusion of political conditionality, including a clause covering human rights, something which had been so vigorously opposed by the ACP states during the negotiations of the previous Lome Conventions. (Hurt, 2003:163). The mid-term review of this 10-year agreement included further development of these trends by including the rule of law, good governance, and the increasing management and supervision by the EU of its financial assistance. (Brethorn and Volger, 2001:121) However, the Cotonou Agreement is significantly important because it represents a substantial shift towards the adoption of neoliberal values, demonstrated by the inclusion of a number of innovations that will substantially change the nature of EU-ACP relations in the future. Article 1 of the new agreement high-lights the importance of ACP states

integrating into the global economy, while Roza. 2005:7, Hurt. 2010:164, Khumalo and Mulleta. 2010:209, Lwanda. 2011:16 ) Articles 20 and 21 emphasise the importance of competitive markets and the key role of the private sector. (Collins and Meseth ,2012:19, Hurt 2003:6) There is also mention of the need for co-ordination with other international donors in Article 67.4 that ends any notion, leftover from the Lome Convention, of a unique relationship between the EU and ACP states. This new EU-ACP agreement is valid for a period of 20 years and will then be open to revision once every five years. (Banthia,2007:15)

The language of the Cotonou Agreement cleverly blends ideas of consent and coercion. Consent is achieved through notions of 'dialogue', 'partnership' and of ACP states 'owning' their own development strategies. Coercion is present in the EU's presentation of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) as the only viable alternative and also through the implementation of frequent reviews of aid provision that have conditionalities attached (Hurt, 2003:164)

### **1.1.1 Zimbabwe and the EU-ESA Interim EPAs**

East and Southern Africa (ESA) configuration is a wide and diverse group, which covers Indian Ocean Islands (Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles), countries from the Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan) and also Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia as Southern African representatives.. The negotiations in the ESA-EPA grouping are facilitated by COMESA secretariat .( Bendini et al. 2012:41, EC. 2014:1 and Kwa et al. 2014:52). Under the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) regime 8 ESA-LDCs enjoy market access to the EU while under the Everything But Arms initiative (EBA Access) regime and 3 developing countries operate under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) regime upon meeting certain conditions (Bilal. 2009:41, Bendini. 2012:42 and Kwa et al. 2014:52).

ESA-EPA negotiations were officially launched in Mauritius in February 2004 and the group negotiated alongside the EAC members. In November/December 2007 six ESA countries (Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Zambia and Zimbabwe) initialed an iEPA covering trade in goods only (Bendini et al. 2012: 10, EC. 2014:1). iEPAs were a compromised deal amidst overarching contentious issues. Reasons for iEPAs include: the EU made it clear that the trade regime of unilateral preferences expires on 31 December 2007 and no extension would be awarded, ACP fear of losing market access amidst EU threats, to avoid facing newly imposed market

restrictions and stringent rules of origin (RoOs). iEPAs were thus initialed only as a ‘stepping stone’ for further negotiations with the inclusion of the rendezvous clause giving room for further negotiations (Bilal. 2009:33, Stevens and Bilal. 2009:15-16 and Bendini. 2012:37). In addition Meyn (2008:515) argues that the outcome of iEPAs reflects the ‘asymmetrical power relations’ between the EU and ECP countries. Separate deals with individual states or groups of countries have effectively split ACP regions and have caused much tension between neighbours.<sup>1</sup> The interim deals may have set precedents, unfortunately not necessarily positive ones. The East African Community (EAC) concluded an agreement independently of the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) group. Not surprisingly, tensions surfaced after the EAC suggested it might once again join the ESA grouping to negotiate a full EPA. This does not necessarily create technical difficulties (the texts of the interim deals are very similar), but the solidarity and unity of the region is undoubtedly bruised ( Bilal, 2008:2) Although COMESA had been pursuing joint trade deals with the EU under the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) platform, only 9 of the 16 member states have signed new pacts with Brussels –most under separate proposals. This partition prompted the Secretariat to raise the alarm over the threat this will pose to the region’s future. Indeed, the divisions took centre stage during a stormy Regional Negotiating Forum (RNF) meeting in Lusaka on January 16-17 2007, where officials pushed for urgent talks between regional ministers to tackle the situation<sup>2</sup>. (Bilal, 2008:19)

In 2008 ESA negotiations for a full EPA resume and in 2009 four countries (Mauritius, Madagascar, Seychelles and Zimbabwe) signed the iEPA In November 2010 negotiations regarding outstanding issues towards a full EPA commenced. The ESA iEPA entered into force in 2012 (Bendini et al. 2012:10, EC. 2013:3, and Kwa et al.2014:52). (In 2013 the European Parliament gave its consent to the EU-ACP iEPA (European Commission. 2013:1). Like the first phase of negotiations (2002-2007) the second phase is also characterized by controversy derailing conclusion of a comprehensive ESA-EPA.

### **1.1.3 Zimbabwe EU Trade Relations**

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<sup>1</sup> [www.allafrica.com/stories/200801220694.html](http://www.allafrica.com/stories/200801220694.html)

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.acp-eu-trade.org/epa>,

The European Union (EU) is Zimbabwe's third largest trading partner after South Africa and China and it is the world's largest single market in the world with more than 500 million consumers. Zimbabwe exports ferro-chromium, raw cane sugar, tobacco, non-industrial and industrial diamonds, refined copper, raw hides, citrus, cut flowers and vegetables, granite, cotton and black fermented and partially fermented tea and leather among other things. In return Zimbabwe imports cars, transport equipment, machinery, chemicals and some luxury goods ([http://eeas.europa.eu/zimbabwe/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/zimbabwe/index_en.htm)). In 2002 EU imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe and this complicated the political relationship between the two partners however the measures expired in 2014 but trade between the two never stopped with EU claiming to have injected \$1.5 billion in development aid to key sectors since 2002. ([http://eeas.europa.eu/zimbabwe/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/zimbabwe/index_en.htm), Chibaya, 2013:19) In line with the objectives of the Cotonou Agreement, the strategic objective of the EU's development cooperation with Zimbabwe is to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty and to support peace and stability, by supporting inclusive and sustainable growth and promoting human rights, democracy and rule of law.<sup>3</sup>

Zimbabwe in 2012 ratified the EU –Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) Interim Economic Partnership Agreement (iEPA) with a value of around €270 million (22%) of total Zimbabwean exports in 2010, the EU is the main export partner of the country. At the backdrop of this ratification policy makers addressed all aspects of the trade and development agreement signed by Zimbabwe in 2009, such as exclusion lists, infant industry protection, rules of origin inter alia the EPA ratification was to be signed in compliance with the Zimbabwean law by the Parliament of Zimbabwe followed by the presidential signature to the ratification act.<sup>4</sup> In 2012, total trade between the two reached 800 million U.S. dollars, up from 400 million dollars in 2009. It is notable that Zimbabwe recorded a trade surplus of 156.3 million U.S. dollars with the European Union in the first nine months of 2013, up from 85 million U.S. dollars recorded in the same period the previous year as trade between the two continues to firm. Under the EPA, Zimbabwe's exports will enjoy the privileged duty-free and quota-free access into the EU market, among other

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<sup>3</sup> For more information visit , [www.europarl.europa.eu/facts/default2003.htm](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/facts/default2003.htm),  
<http://www.sapes.org.zw/index.php/policy-dialogue-forum/> )

<sup>4</sup> [http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/zimbabwe/eu\\_zimbabwe/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/zimbabwe/eu_zimbabwe/index_en.htm)).

preferential treatments. <sup>5</sup>The signing of an interim EPA with the EU in March 2012 under the umbrella of the East and Southern African (ESA) regional grouping demonstrates Zimbabwe's active and positive role in the regional integration process, which is in itself a powerful means of fostering integration into the world economy.

This agreement is a framework towards the completion of a comprehensive EPA and already gives Zimbabwe 100% duty free-quota free access into the EU market with a transition period for rice and sugar. On her part, Zimbabwe will liberalise 80% of her imports from the EU by 2022 (45% by 2012 with the remaining 35% of imports being liberalised progressively until 2022).

Zimbabwe and other countries will progressively open their markets along 15 years and the tariffs are reduced over long transitions periods. Zimbabwe left out 20% of sensitive products of infant industries and this was to protect industries and products of animal origin, cereals, beverages, paper, plastics and rubber, textiles and clothing, footwear, glass and ceramics, consumer electronic and vehicles. Those products/infant industries will not be affected by the liberalisation.

## **1.2 Problem Statement**

Under the Cotonou agreement Zimbabwe and EU are regarded as equal trading partners in an open market where negotiations are central to the relationship. However the impact of trade liberalization and market opening initiated the decline of the already bleeding economy particularly with the failure of the SAPs in the 1990s. (Chibaya 2009: 190). Zimbabwe and other southern African countries have entered into EPA negotiations and ratifications have been done. In 2012 the total trade between the EU and Zimbabwe amounted to US\$800 million against a total value of around US\$447 million in 2009, trade between the two parties was set to expand after Zimbabwe completed the ratification of the interim Economic Partnership Agreement (iEPA).and according to EU; very positive implication for the industry in Zimbabwe and a wide range of opportunities for exports and access to new markets in the EU region will be unlocked for Zimbabwe.<sup>6</sup> In this agreement Zimbabwe's exports to the EU comprise raw cane sugar, tobacco,

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<sup>5</sup> [www.europarl.europa.eu/facts/default2014.htm](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/facts/default2014.htm),

<sup>6</sup> [http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/zimbabwe/eu\\_zimbabwe/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/zimbabwe/eu_zimbabwe/index_en.htm)

non-industrial and industrial diamonds, refined copper, raw hides, citrus, cut flower, black fermented and partially fermented tea and leather. From the EU, Zimbabwe imports cars, transport equipment, machinery, chemicals and some luxury goods. Zimbabwe like any other ACP countries export raw materials which may not give them the competitive or specialized advantage notably the Agricultural sector is highly protected in the EU yet Zimbabwean economy has for long been agro based. Zimbabwe has been under the appropriate measures of Article 96 of The Cotonou Agreement since 2002 until 1 November 2014 because of the violation of human rights and governance clauses of the agreement by Zimbabwe especially through the fast track land reform programme and flawed electoral processes<sup>7</sup>. (Williams, 2002:2,)

### **1.3 AIM OF THE STUDY**

The major aim in the conducting of this study is to determine the contribution of the EU to the Zimbabwean economy through the EPA ratification amidst targeted sanctions.

### **1.4 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY**

The research has the following objectives:

- To examine the impact of EPA on the fiscus of Zimbabwe
- To evaluate the reciprocity of trade as outlined in the Cotonou Agreement
- To assess the opportunities and challenges of different economic sectors faced in the trade partnership.
- To evaluate the effects of the appropriate measures under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement concerning Zimbabwean economic prosperity

### **1.5 Research Questions**

- What value have the EPAs brought in the Zimbabwean economy?

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<sup>7</sup> [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_MEMO-14-433\\_en.doc](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-433_en.doc)

- What impact will free trade policy implementation have on the sectors of the economy?
- Why is the ratification of a full EPA facing impediments?
- How has the inclusion of political clauses comparatively impacted on the reciprocity of the trade partnership?

## **1.6 Assumptions**

This research will assume that;

- The ESA configuration in which Zimbabwe is part of has made it possible for the country to continue its trade with EU despite the imposition of sanctions on the targeted individual persons and companies.
- Zimbabwe and EU are equal trading partners in the EPA negotiations
- Free Trade is a mutually beneficial to all members of the WTO and in the EU-ACP trade partnership.

## **1.7 Justification**

The ongoing reengagement process between EU and Zimbabwe provide the basic validation of the present study. It is critical to ascertain the economic value of the trade relationship between the two partners so that policy makers and negotiators in the reengagement process may fully appreciate the benefits, opportunities and challenges provided for in the EPAs. This study is also important to ministry of Finance and ministry of Trade in their review of fiscal performance based on the ratification of the EPA in 2009 and 2012 and the National Indicative Programme signed in 2014. The study also will be another effective way for the political leadership of this country to assess the effects of the implementation of article 96 of the Cotonou agreement against the backdrop of continued EPA signing and ratification and development aid assistance. It is also of great relevance to the body of knowledge especially for international and local media on the real relationship between the two trading partners and avoid propaganda and politically charged coverage of the constrains in the EPAs. Scholars will also benefit from this study as it will provide first hand research work on the framework of the Cotonou Agreement on the an individual country not on the ACP configurations alone.

## **1.8 Limitations**

This research will not be an exegesis of the Cotonou Agreement article 96 implementation on Zimbabwe neither will it be a narrative of the effects thereof, but rather an assessment of the importance of the continued trade relationship between the two parties through EPAs. This research will not cover the whole ESA region on assessment of trade agreements but will only cover Zimbabwe and EU. Due the financial limitations the research will get its EU respondents from Delegation of the European Union in Zimbabwe and not visit the Head office in Brussels.

## **1.9 Delimitation**

This research will cover the period between 2009 to 2014 and any time frame frames prior of after this period will only be referred to for historical or justification purposes. Trade relations are at the center of this study as it focuses on the EPAs however reference to development aid will be mentioned as it had direct implications on the economy which is a key evaluations indicators in this research. This research covers the sectors in the Zimbabwean economy that had benefits or challenges in trading with EU

## **1.10 DEFINITION OF TERMS**

**Africa Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP)** - The African, Caribbean and Pacific group of least developed (LDCs) and developing countries divided into regional blocs and are in the process of negotiating reciprocal free trade Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the European Union (EU).

**Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA)** - An agreement reached on 23 June 2000 in Cotonou ,Benin between the EU and the ACPs which extended the Lome unilateral trade preferences up until the end of 2007; a second revision of this agreement was adopted by the EU Council in November 2010 (E.C. 2010:12).

**Doha Development Round** – It is the latest round of trade negotiations among WTO trading partners launched in at the WTO’ Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar in 2001, main focus being developmental issues (ICSI. 2009:62).

**Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)** - WTO-compatible free trade agreements and negotiations between the EU and six ACP regional blocs to replace the non-reciprocal 30 year old Lome preferences.

**General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)** - an agreement dealing with trade in goods signed in 1947 which lasted until 1993, the original text of which is now incorporated into the WTO framework and generally referred to as GATT 1994 (Brown. 2012).

**Interim Economic Partnership Agreements (iEPA)** - Provisional Economic Partnership (EPAs) initialed between the EU and some ACP countries in 2007 in anticipation of negotiations for comprehensive EPAs after parties failed to beat the 31 December deadline when the WTO waiver for EU non-reciprocal trade preferences to ACPs expired.

**World Trade Organization** – refers to the successor organization which replaced the old GATT regime governing trade and trade related issues among nations. Launched in 1995 in Geneva and its main mandate include forum for trade negotiations, facilitation, setting rules and dispute settlement (ICSI. 2009:33).

**ZimAsset-** Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation is an economic blueprint that was crafted by the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) government in 2013 as part of its developmental and political campaign initiative.

## **1.11 SUMMARY**

This chapter explored the origins and evolvement of the EU-Zimbabwe trade, development and investment relations from Rome to Cotonou. It traced the origins of EU-Zimbabwe EPAs within the framework of a multilateral WTO GATT trading system. The chapter gave a panoramic view of the asymmetrical relations that exist between Europe and Africa when it comes to bilateral negotiations. The reengagement of Zimbabwe by EU after the lapsing of the Article 96 has been highlighted as a positive move in the reconstruction of the Zimbabwean economy. The chapter concluded on the note that iEPAs were a negotiated compromise characterized by contentious issues however the government went on to ratify it. The research objectives, questions, significance, limitations and delimitations and key terms relevant to EU-Zimbabwe trade relations were highlighted.

MAP 1.1

**EU –ACP CONFIGURATION**



Source; Bendini, Armanovica and Goede (2012.10)

## **CHAPTER 2; LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **2.1 INTRODUCTION**

Guiding this research is the neo-classical and neo-liberal free trade theories underpinning the EU-ACP WTO-compatible EPA negotiations, implementation and the evolving trade relations between Zimbabwe and EU; and also it is in this chapter that this theoretical framework is unraveled. This chapter identifies and evaluates current literature explaining the evolving EU-ACP trade relations and in particular a microscopic look at the Zimbabwean economy leading to the initialization of iEPAs and the ratification thereof. This review also establishes the asymmetrical relations inherent in the EU-ACP EPA negotiation process which puts to test theoretical benefits of free trade and examines the ambitious CPA objectives. A critique of the link between the EPA framework and the WTO legal system especially GATT (1994) Article XXIV will also be made in this discussion to lay the foundation for fundamental theoretical appreciation. The chapter introduces gaps in knowledge through narrowing the discussion from 76-plus ACPs to one ESA country, Zimbabwe. It establishes that with the initialing of the ESA iEPA in 2009 amidst EU pressure there is need to assess the implications and challenges on the Zimbabwean economy and how the bilateral trade has mitigated implementation impasse for the benefit of the Zimbabwean economy. Finally the discussion in this chapter justifies the need for a comprehensive assessment of the ESA (Zimbabwe) EPA negotiations and ratification from 2009 to 2014 to complement existing literature, identify prospects and new challenges given the 1 October 2014 EU deadline, and the signing of the National Indicative Programme.

### **2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

The theoretical framework informing the evolving EU-Zimbabwe trade relations reflected in the EPA negotiations is the theory of trade liberalization. Free trade liberal theorists state that free trade is mutually beneficial, gains outweigh overall losses and a regime of protectionism wasteful. They also argue that nations generally gain in aggregate from international trade (Thirlwall.

2000:6, Gilpin and Gilpin. 2001:199, ICSI. 2009:2-3 and WTO. 2012: 1-4) The bilateral EU-Zimbabwe free trade negotiations fall within the framework of the multilateral WTO principles governing trade liberalization. The WTO principles in respect of trading system should be; without discrimination, freer, predictable, more competitive and more beneficial for (LDCs) (ICSI, 2009:34).

The reciprocity principle in GATT Article XXIV (1994) governing EPA deliberations invokes the Ricardian Model of comparative advantage and Adam Smith' principle of absolute advantage (Thirlwall. 2000:6, ICSI.2009: 2,Gilpin and Gilpin. 2001:198, and Kegley and Blanton. 2013:367). In the same logic, Meyn (2008:2) states that an open trade regime is a prerequisite for growth because it “increases domestic competition, attracts investment, promotes diffusion of technology, stimulates cooperation and learning process and leads to economies of scale”.Mandelison (2005), the EU trading Commissioner expressed optimism about EPAs, when he said that “if the EPAs provide enhanced market access to the EU, tear down external and intra-regional trade barriers and reduce institutional frictions to trade, the development gains could be great” (Banthia 2007:26). Thus the EU-ACP EPAs are premised on the above liberal optimistic principles.

EPAs bilateral negotiations and the multilateral WTO trade regime are firmly hinged on Liberalism theory. The neo-classical free trade theories laid the basis for the modern commercial liberalization and neo-liberalism theories. It is the neo-classical proponents of trade liberalization among them ;Adam Smith, David Ricardo, James Mill and Robert Torrens, who expressed optimism that free markets and the removal of barriers to the flow of trade and capital is a locomotive for prosperity (Gilpin and Gilpin. 2001:198, ICSI. 2009:2, WTO E-Learning. 2012:1-4 and Kegley and Blanton. 2013:205). Hernandez (2009:60) also confirms that neo-liberal ideology exalt the market as the perfect and irreplaceable regulatory mechanism of the economy (Hernandez. 2009:60).

In principle the WTO trading system should be; without discrimination, freer, predictable, more competitive and more beneficial for LDCs (ICSI, 2009:34). Brown (2012:4) and Kwa et al (2014:11) state that under Article 36.1 of the CPA (2000), the EU and ACP agreed to conclude new WTO-legal trading agreements replacing the non-reciprocal and discriminatory preferences. The Article categorically specify that “the Parties agreed to conclude new WTO compatible trading agreements, removing progressively barriers to trade between them and enhancing cooperation in all areas relevant to trade” (Ochieng. 2009:1 and Brown. 2012:4). EPAs thus aim to satisfy the

theoretical basis of commercial liberalization. The WTO-compatible EPA framework incorporates Adam Smith's (1776) work *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* which champions that a regime of protectionism in terms of export subsidies to producers and import restrictions is essentially wasteful and leads to distortions and inefficiencies (MacMillan. 2007:25,ICSI. 2009 and Kegley and Blanton. 2013:121).

To match up Adam Smith, on neo-liberal policies; Hobson (2003:67-68) corresponds that tariff protection might well promote the private interest of a particular industry in a short term, but it will harm the national economy in the long run. Adam Smith as cited in Hobson (2003:67) articulates that 'the positive maladaptive state intervention' is unproductive, drains out wealth and leads to the decline of national capital accumulation and global economic welfare. Moreover the WTO, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank(WB), Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and EPA neoliberal policies advocate for free market forces, free capital movement and disciplining state intervention through "an attack on wages and salaries, the reduction of social benefits and services, fiscal counter reform, deregulation of the labour market, privatizations and globalizations (Hernandez. 2009:61).Empirical evidence show that ACPs have been recipients of the above liberal and neoliberal prescriptions from the West. In Zimbabwe in particular the introduction of Economic Structural Adjustment Programme in the early 1990s marked the forceful introduction of free market policies as a precursor to the eventual catastrophic economic decline.

In the framework of liberalization the CPA of 2000 envisages trade growth and market diversification through regional integration initiatives as assumed in Vilner' RTA theory of 1950 (World Bank. 2000: IV and Gilpin and Gilpin.2001:342 and Lwanda. 2011:6). Viner (1950) argued that regional integration does not always result in gains in economic efficiency. He was of the opinion that regional integration, and in particular trade creation effects, can potentially have trade diversion effects on participating economies or even on third party economies outside of any agreements.

'Trade creation' is the term used when trade liberalisation initiatives create trade that would not otherwise have existed. Such initiatives result in a particular country being supplied with goods and/or services by the most efficient producer of the product. Trade creation often results in improved economic welfare. In contrast, 'trade diversion' refers to discriminatory trade

liberalisation which diverts trade away from a more efficient supplier outside of the Regional Trade Agreement (RTA), in favour of a less efficient supplier within the RTA. Trade diversion may, at times, be sufficiently strong so as to outweigh trade creating effects and so reduce a country's national welfare; conversely in certain circumstances national welfare may improve despite trade diversion. (World Bank. 2000: IV and Gilpin and Gilpin.2001:342 and Lwanda. 2011:6).

The overall objective of the CPA of 2000 incorporates a key clause on EPAs stating that "...the gradual integration of ACP countries into the world economy". Similarly Roza (2006:16) summed the projected EPAs benefits through regional integration as follows: "The economic benefits of FTAs that are conceptualized, which are generally recognized are trade creation and trade diversion, fiscal effect, competition and scale effects, agglomeration effect, technology transfer, effect and investment effect". The CPA (2000) Article 32.2 specifies the legal obligation for EPA regional integration at both the macro and micro levels, "Economic and trade cooperation shall build on regional integration initiatives of ACPs which considers themselves in a position to do so, at the level they consider appropriate and in accordance with the procedures agreed by the ACP group taking into account regional integration process within the ACP". This highlights the flexibility entailed in the CPA' overall objective.

The EPA framework hinges on the hypothesis that free trade is mutually beneficial and gains outweigh overall losses and nations generally gain in aggregate from international trade (Thirlwall. 2000:6, Gilpin and Gilpin. 2001:199, Pricewaterhouse Coopers. 2007:52, ICSI. 2009:2-3 and WTO E-Learning. 2012: 1-4). In the same logic, Meyn (2008:2) states that an open trade regime is a prerequisite for growth because it "increases domestic competition, attracts investment, promotes diffusion of technology, stimulates cooperation and learning process and leads to economies of scale".

To counter the liberal optimism expressed in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) EPA framework. Hurt (2010:162) alleges that neoliberalism was reflected within the EU' development policy from the early 1980s and the EU-EPA negotiations and Bendini et al (2012:26) hold forth that CPA was accused of being a manifesto of "neo-liberalism" and in fact defends EU' offensive approach to international trade based on tariff and non-tariff barriers elimination. The Haiti Block

Declaration<sup>8</sup> (2007) blatantly professed that EPAs are “essentially neoliberal inspired free market agreements that prolong imperialist domination and a neocolonial vision”(Bendini et al. 2012:29).Hurt 2000:6 also argues that In the modern global political economy the hegemony of neoliberal ideas has been described as resulting from 'the relentless thrust of capital on a global scale ... [which] has been accompanied by a neo-liberal, laissez-faire discourse which accords the pursuit of profit some-thing akin to the status of the quest for the holy grail' Equally the Neo-Marxist theory of dependency negates the liberal optimism expressed in the CPA (2000).The EU-Zimbabwe EPA initiative fall in the framework of dependency whereby, “exogenously imposed conditions on Third World states to foreign direct investment (FDI), unequal trade agreements, interest payments on debt, and the exchange of raw materials for higher priced manufactured goods creates structurally unequal relations between the core and the periphery” (Griffiths, Callaghan and Roach. 2008:71). Dependency theories hypothesize that ACP countries are exploited because global capitalism makes them dependent on the rich countries that create exploitative rules for trade and production (White 2008:143 and Kegley and Blanton. 2013:47). Thus, 30 years of non-reciprocal Lome preferences, aid and neo-liberal SAPs promoted ACP stagnation and poverty.

## **2.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

### **2.3.1 The EPA Negotiation Overview**

The Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), under the Cotonou Agreement, awakens hope of stimulating African structural change. It is unique in symbolizing a shift from a non-reciprocal to a reciprocal relationship with the ACP states having to allow access for EU goods and services, in return for the entry of their goods into EU markets.(Brown2002:11), The ACP-EU EPA- signed in Cotonou on June 23, 2000 laid down that discussions over the negotiations were to take place between September 2002 and December 2007; with the initialization of an EPA coming into force by January 2008. The first phase of discussions on the EPA in September 2002 were at the regional level, while the second phase in October 2003 was centred on the national and sub-regional

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<sup>8</sup> Declaration of the Haitian, Block the EPA coalition was signed on 17 October 2007 in Port au Prince by several Haitian organisations campaigning against the adoption of EPAs. The coalition which included artists, dance groups, civil society among others argued that EPAs were imperialistic and aim to strengthen the position of European multinationals in the context of the rivalry between the most powerful economic trade blocs. The declaration also sighted the negative impact of EPAs on customs revenue, trade deficit, direct agricultural competition with subsidized EU product and de-industrialisation leading to high levels of unemployment.

levels.(Hurt 2012:167,Roy 2005: 3 and Ochieng 2005:16) Hurt 2012 167 notes that Least Developed Countries( LDC)- 39 of which are in the ACP group- were not required to negotiate EPAs with the EU and could retain their present level of access to the latter's market and to the Lome regime beyond 2008. Non-LDCs were to negotiate at the national or regional level. Access to finance is critical to enable these countries to implement structural changes.(Roy .2005:2 Hurt 2012 168)). The Cotonou Agreement is replete with wide-ranging and laudable principles. Stevens and Bilal (2009:2) argued that similarities and differences emerge in the negotiating mandates of ACP states and EU and notably these bilateral negotiations have been marred with controversy over various contentious issues. Despite its high sounding ambitious objectives CPA framework attracted much criticism than praise among members of the academia, research centers, impact assessments, pressure groups, regional bodies, ACP parliaments, ACP farmers, UN, WB and even some EU member states (Migoya. 2009:29, Oxfam International. 2008:2 and Traidcraft. 2012:1). Stevens and Bilal (2009:1) state that, “The EPA process has not been an easy or friendly one; words and deeds have often been at odds, tension has flared up”. Criticism stems from the realization that EPAs promote dependency,are detrimental to sustainable development and long term development of ACP countries and hinder their regional integration initiatives on the long run.

A revision of the radical policy shift by the EU from non-reciprocal Lome preferences to reciprocal EPAs is critical in this discussion to effectively establish the rationale behind this lauded policy shift. The much acclaimed reasons for development partnership policy realignment with the ACPs include: a WTO compatible trade regime, recommendations under the 1996 Green Paper<sup>9</sup> and the notion that the Lome preferences led to increased ACP poverty and stagnation (Moreau. 2006:10, Carle. 2009, Hartman. 2009:19 and Melber. 2013:7). Contrary to the above rationale Osabu-Kle (2001:3) argues that the overlooked root cause of ACP’ underdevelopment

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<sup>9</sup> Green Papers are documents published by the European Commission to stimulate discussion on given topics at European level. The 1996 Green paper on relations between the European Union and the ACP countries on the eve of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century; Challenges and options on new partnership, outline the framework that led to the Cotonou Agreement in 2000. It introduced a revolutionary idea that future relations might be based on reciprocity, enhanced political dialogue on human rights and good governance and ventured that ACP group as a whole was perhaps not an ideal partner to cooperate with in *corpore* (Elgstrom. 2008:4, Meyn. 2008:1 and Schimieg. 2014:2).

is “a product of centuries of Western disturbances, 400 years of slavery, era of colonialism and decades of neo-colonialism. Economies of Africa were destroyed over a period over a period of 500 years”.

It can also be viewed that a puritanical insistence on WTO compatible EU-ACP FTA by the EU could be hypocritical as the EPA regime reveals the post-Cold War 21<sup>st</sup> century competing interests among great powers in Africa especially EU’s 2006 trade policy instrument “Global Europe, competing in the world”(ECDPM. 2006:3 and Bendini, Armanovica and Goede. 2012:38) and EU-Africa Strategic Partnership Agreement 2007 (Ering and Odock. 2013;2-3 and Olund. 2012:15), China’ resource diplomacy through FOCAC 2000 (Jaen. 2009:21), China-Africa Joint Chamber of Commerce 2005 (Melber. 2013:13), the United States of America’ Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) 2000 (Seyoum. 2007:515) and the US-AFRICOM (Melber. 2013:11).It is imperative to analyze EPAs within geopolitical and geostrategic dynamics at play between the Western and non-Western state in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The EPA framework is aptly captured in five principles which are a clear expression of liberal optimism regarding the EU-EPA initiative. The principles include; sustainable development and poverty reduction as overarching principles guiding the framework, regional integration as the key stepping stone to further integration into the world economy then differentiation and special treatment, thus EPAs will take into account different levels of development of the contracting parties (small economies, LDCs, landlocked countries and small islands) (CPA. 2000, Bilal.2005:5, Bilal and Stevens. 2009: 34, Lwanda. 2011:15 and Bendini et al 2012:26). Furthermore the EU-Zimbabwe EPA negotiations should be examined in the framework of a complex geographical region and national economic policies.

### **2.3.2 Market Access Regimes under EPAs**

Zimbabwe as a member of the ESA configuration negotiated in the phase of 2000-2007 also mainly because it was not an LDC as was required by EU EPAs guidelines. During this negotiating phase the 77 ACP countries accessed the EU market under two trading regimes that is the Generalized

System of Preferences (GSP)<sup>10</sup> for developing countries and the Everything But Arms<sup>11</sup> (EBA access) for LDCs (Abugre. 2005:4, Pricewaterhouse Coopers. 2007:11, Messerlin. 2009:16-22, Hartmann. 2009:19, Lwanda. 2011.15 and Brown. 2012:5). Since 2001 LDCs enjoy duty free and quota free (DFQF) access to the EU market without having to reciprocate under EBA access reflecting the EU's Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT)<sup>12</sup> of small and vulnerable economies. On the contrary the LDCs had no incentive to conclude EPAs since they still enjoyed market access.

Since 2007 ESA states accessed the EU market under different regimes that is EBA (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Malawi), EBA and Market Access Regulation<sup>13</sup> (MAR) 1528/2007 (Comoros and Zambia), EBA, iEPA and MAR 1528/2007 (Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles) (Kwa et al. 2014:52). The EU promised to renounce preferences for ACPs that have been exporting to the EU under the MAR 1528/2007 on the grounds that they had not gone on to sign, ratify or implement an EPA (Traidcraft. 201:2 and Kwa et al. 2014:52). EPAs

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<sup>10</sup> The EU's generalised scheme of tariff preferences (GSP) offers lower tariffs or completely duty-free access for imports from 178 developing countries and territories into the EU market. The EU's scheme grants special benefits for the 49 least developed countries and to countries implementing certain labour or environmental standards. The EU grants the preferences without asking for concessions from the beneficiary countries. In 2002, EU imports benefiting from GSP preferences amounted to EUR 53 billion. [http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/global/gsp/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/global/gsp/index_en.htm)

<sup>11</sup> "Everything But Arms" arrangement (EBA) was born in 2001 to give all LDCs full duty free and quota-free access to the EU for all their exports with the exception of arms and armaments. There are currently 49 beneficiaries under this arrangement. In 2011, EBA beneficiaries accounted for exports worth € 10.5 billion — 12% of all the preferences under the EU's Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP), which provides tariff reductions for developing countries. Entry into the EBA is automatic and, unlike other GSP arrangements, the EBA has no time-limit.

<sup>12</sup> Special and Differential Treatment in the WTO refers to specific legal provisions giving developing and least developed countries preferential treatment included throughout the WTO agreements (Bendini et al. 2012:67).

<sup>13</sup> Market Access Regulation 1528/2007 governs the EU import regime for 36 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries that negotiated Economic Partnership Agreements in 2007. With the expiry of the trade regime under the ACP-EU Cotonou Agreement, the Regulation allowed exports from these 36 countries to continue to enter the EU duty free and quota free. The Regulation was a bridging solution for the countries that had negotiated Economic Partnership Agreements but not yet signed and ratified. In order to avoid a disruption in trade, the Regulation anticipated the duty free access that the EU offered in these agreements whilst the 36 countries moved towards ratification. (Traidcraft. 2012:3 <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral/relations/regions/africacaribbean-pacific/>)

are examined in an environment in which ESA states access the EU market under five different regimes and different liberalization commitments.

### **2.3.3 The Global Financial Crisis and EPAs**

In 2007 the world was plunged into a global financial crisis which adversely hindered the comprehensive conclusion of EPAs . Also hindering were issues of drought, food shortages and climate change whose effect could not be minimized on EPAs negotiation and ratification (ECDPM.2009:4).Manyeruke and Muqayi (2011:153) propounded that: “the rate of trade development has been affected by this looming economic downturn and countries are raising their boarder tariffs as a way of strengthening their national incomes. Raising boarder tariffs (protectionism) is likely to attract more problems and challenges”. European governments’ intervention through bailout and austerity measures during the 2007 global financial crisis contradicts trade liberalism and neo-liberal premise of free market forces.

Assessments conducted by Johns and Marti (2009:10), Harbeli (2009:37), Khumalo and Mulleta (2010:210) Manyeruke and Muqayi (2011:149) reveal that the budgetary and fiscal challenges in the Eurozone and the loose fitting monetary policies in the USA were partly responsible for the global financial crisis of 2007 which had spillover effects on ACP economic growth and development. Johns and Marti (2009:10),Harbeli (2009:37) and Khumalo and Mulleta (2010:210) observed that global financial crisis led to a decline in trade and investment flows, tourism earnings and lower remittances and adverse consequences for the production of staples. There is need to assess the outstanding obstacles bedeviling ESA iEPA transition negotiations in a post global financial crisis environment especially for ESA states.

### **2.3.4 The Main Legal Provisions of the World Trade Organisation**

The current EU-ACP EPAs negotiations and ratification s provide a legal glimpse into the implications of the current proposals to tighten the rules on WTO compatibility of RTAs (Cernat etal 2008:1). The WTO Agreements contain special provisions which give developing countries special rights.The WTO Agreements also contain special provisions

which give developed countries the possibility to treat developing countries more favourably than other WTO Members

These provisions are referred to as “special and differential treatment provisions”.

The special provisions include:

- longer time periods for implementing agreements and commitments,
- measures to increase trading opportunities for these countries,
- provisions requiring all WTO members to safeguard the trade interests of developing countries,
- and support to help developing countries build the infrastructure for WTO work, handle disputes, and implement technical standards. <sup>14</sup>

The WTO Agreement also specifies that international trade should benefit the economic development of developing and least-developed countries. (Ochieng. 2009:7),

### **2.3.5 WTO Article XXIV and EPAs**

The legal and technical challenges in the EPA negotiations emanate from the interpretations implications of WTO GATT (1994)Article XXIV<sup>15</sup> especially the phrases “substantially all trade”

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<sup>14</sup> For more information visit ,[www.wto.org/english/tratop\\_e/devel\\_e/d2legl\\_e.htm](http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d2legl_e.htm)

<sup>15</sup> According to the WTO Article XXIV of GATT 1994 in order to be compliant with the WTO, FTAs must cover “substantially all trade” between participating countries. The interim arrangements should lead to formation of FTAs or customs unions within a “reasonable length of time”. Although these requirements are, of course, subject to interpretation (which explains the considerable differences between the initialed EPAs), the “official interpretation is that a “reasonable length of time” should not exceed ten years, and “substantially all trade” would be not less than 80% of trade from liberalisation. Many African government officials have stated that a 20% exclusion rate is not acceptable and have pushed for an exclusion list of more than 40% (Brown. 2012:7).

that should be liberalized and “within a reasonable period of time” (Pricewaterhouse Coopers. 2007:12, Fontagne, Mitaritonna and Laborde. 2008:38, Stevens and Bilal. 2009:63 and Ochieng. 2009:7). The CPA (2000) prescribes that ACP countries would have to eliminate tariffs on 80% of their imports from the EU and retain tariffs on 20% of EU’s trade (Castermans and Heintze. 2007:54, Trojan and Hebebrand. 2011:10, Brown. 2012:7 and Traidcraft: 2012:3). ACPs have stated that 20% exclusion rate is not sustainable and have pushed to at least 40% or more but the EU remained adamant.

Controversially the EU interpreted the requirement on “substantially all trade” to mean 90% of trade between the parties and the ‘reasonable period’ as not exceeding 15 years. The Commission maintained that “EPAs will be implemented in a way that avoids unnecessary shocks. Duties will be phased out over a period of 15 (and up to a maximum of 25 years, with safeguards and support on offer for ACP countries that encounter problems” (Fontagne, Mitaritonna and Laborde. 2008:4, Ochieng. 2009:7, and Bendini et al. 2012:14) The EU interprets such flexibility to be allowed by the GATT text (Trojan and Hebebrand. 2011:10). Thus iEPAs were initiated amidst such controversy. **Table 2.1** on page 8 summarizes ESA iEPA tariff reduction commitments. Considering that the ESA iEPA was concluded amidst such legal controversy with an average 86% tariff reduction commitments and different exclusions for six ESA member states this study assesses the legal implications for Zimbabwe as a member state in the ESA under GATT provisions.

**Table 2.1 ESA Reduction of Tariffs on Trade in Goods Under iEPA**

| Country    | Liberalisation of EU Imports | Country    | Liberalisation of EU Imports |
|------------|------------------------------|------------|------------------------------|
| Comoros    | 81%                          | Seychelles | 98%                          |
| Madagascar | 81%                          | Zambia     | 80%                          |
| Mauritius  | 96%                          | Zimbabwe   | 80%                          |

### **2.3.6 The Most Favoured Nation Principle and EPAs**

Economic Partnership Agreements represent the first time that the EU is including the MFN clause in its FTAs, at least with the developing world (FTAs between the EU-Chile, EU-Mexico and EU-South Africa contain no such clause). (Ochieng ,2009:12) Free Trade Agreements are, by definition, legal exceptions to GATT Article 1 on mostfavoured nation treatment. GATT Article 1 provides that WTO Members must grant immediate and unconditional MFN treatment to the products of other members with respect to customs duties and import charges, internal taxes and regulations, and other trade-related matters (GATT, 1994). Members can only derogate from Article 1 in two exceptional cases: under GATT Article XXIV to form FTAs and customs unions (in which at least one partner is a developed country) and the Enabling Clause in respect of GSP schemes for developing countries or South-South FTAs. In all the EPAs, the MFN clause stipulates that any more favourable tariff preferences granted to any “major trading economies” (defined as economies accounting for a share of world merchandise exports above 1 percent) shall automatically be granted to any party of the EPA (Ochieng 2009:12). Bilal and Stevens (2009:34) conceived that the “rationale for reciprocity rests on the principle that liberalization of ACP markets towards the EU will increase competition within ACP economies, thereby stimulating local and foreign (including EU) investment and the necessary adjustment of their economies, leading to growth development”.Munyuki (2006:15), Delpeuch (2007:1-2), Pricewaterhouse Coopers (2007:12), Fontagne et al (2008:3) and Kuhlmann. (2009:10-15) envisaged that reciprocity will entail trade diversion, instead of trade creation, negative balance of payments, and revenue loss that would benefit EU imports to the detriment of more competitive non-EU goods.

The inclusion of the MFN clause in the EPAs is both legally and developmentally problematic. EPA MFN clause poses a serious challenge to the purposes and functions of the Enabling Clause and the smooth functioning of the multilateral WTO system. For example, 2006 figures show that the EPA MFN definition of major trading economies included a number of developing countries including Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Mexico. This explains why even before the interim EPAs had been signed, Brazil with the support of several other developing countries,

protested the inclusion of the MFN clause in the EPAs (ICTSD,2008). The protests by third party developing countries are significant because it was a third party developing country challenge to the Lomé Preferences that led, at least in part, to their collapse and to the establishment of the EPAs under GATT Article XXIV rather than under the Enabling Clause. (Fontagne et al (2008:3) and Kuhlmann. (2009:10-15

The World Bank Report (2006) states that in most developing economies, customs duties remain a major source of fiscal revenue, constituting an average 25% of government revenues in Africa and 15% for Asia and the Pacific (Roza. 2006:26-27).Commenting on reciprocity,Bacar Dia, Senegalese Information Minister succinctly noted “When we are asked to open our borders to allow in products from the north without customs barriers, without taxes, it’s almost like declaring nuclear war on us” (Bilal and Stevens. 2009:51). It is important to further probe ESA governments on how reciprocity impacts the transitional negotiation process. Considering that iEPAs were initialed under GATT principle of reciprocity this research explores the implications on ESA and the impact of other WTO legal systems on EPAs. Furthermore an examination of ‘reciprocity’ versus the negotiating position of the economy of Zimbabwe in a post Washington Consensus<sup>16</sup> negotiating phase and post the 2007 global financial crisis, will be done.

### **2.3.7 Legal and Systematic Issues In the EPAS**

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<sup>16</sup> Birdsall and Fukuyama (2011:3) states the term Washington Consensus in a broader sense, refer to a more general orientation towards a strongly market-based approach (sometimes described as market fundamentalism or neoliberalism). Stiglitz, J. E. and B. Greenwald 2003:6 state that Washington Consensus” has come to refer to development strategies focusing around privatization, liberalization, and macro-stability (meaning mostly price stability); a set of policies predicated upon a strong faith – stronger than warranted -- in unfettered markets and aimed at reducing, or even minimizing, the role of government. Stiglitz J E (2006 :14) further argues that when all of the versions of the Washington consensus plus too failed to do the trick, a new layer of reforms was added: one had to go beyond projects and policies to institutions, including public institutions, and their governance. There are several more elements of a post-Washington consensus. The first is that a successful development strategy cannot be arrived at simply within the confines of Washington. The second is that one size fits all policies are doomed to failure. Policies that work in one country may not work in others. A third is that there are some areas in which economic science has not yet provided sufficient evidence, sufficiently strong theory, or empirical evidence, to result in a broad consensus about what countries should do. The usual argument that liberalization frees resources to move from unproductive protected sectors into more productive export sectors is unconvincing, when there are ample unutilized resources already available. In these cases, there is an emerging consensus: countries should be given scope to experiment, to use their own judgment, to explore what might work best for them. . Stiglitz J E (2006 :14, Birdsall and Fukuyama ,2011:4)

Accusations are rife that the EU is using the expiry of the WTO waiver to coerce ACP countries into accepting iEPAs covering trade in goods only. Negotiations on outstanding issues were scheduled to continue under the ‘rendezvous clause’ (Egoscobal. 2009:32, Stevens and Bilal. 2009:8 and Kwa et al. 2014:12). Research conducted by Oxfam International (2008:2) and Kwa (2014:60) corroborate that the iEPA instrument was a diktat imposed on ACP amidst threats of a higher tariffs and losing favorable market access to the EU. Steven (2008:214), Egoscobal (2009:31) and Lwanda (2009:10) argue that EU’ refusal to seek another WTO waiver under the 1979 Enabling Clause<sup>17</sup> despite requests by ACP’s show its offensive interests in EPAs. The Enabling Clause was the main outcome of the Kennedy and Tokyo rounds and it became a legal alternative to the MFN (Bendini et al. 2012:15). The Enabling Clause: gives differential and more favorable treatment to developing countries and is the legal basis for the GSP and EBA regimes (WTO Decision of 28 November 1979 L/4903, Ochieng. 2009:12 and Brown. 2012:15). This study focuses on the negotiations being conducted with a partner pursuing offensive interests not the overall development of the ESA states given that other powers notably the USA sought WTO extension waiver for AGOA II.

The inclusion of the ‘standstill clause’ in EPA framework complicated the negotiation process towards a development oriented FTA. Stevens and Bilal (2009:67) aver that “the standstill clause in the EPA stipulate that no tariffs can be introduced and, once eliminated, tariffs may not be re-imposed or increased”. The provision binds ACP country tariffs at applied rather than bound tariffs at the time of entry into force of the interim EPAs (Ochieng. 2009:15, Trojan and Heberbrand. 2011:11-12 and Bendini et al. 2012:33). Oxfam (2007) and Bilal and Lui (2009) cited in Ochieng (2009:15) argue that “Freezing ACP country’ tariffs at applied rather than bound tariffs undermines the ability of ACP countries to adjust to changing economic circumstances, especially fluctuations in world markets. Subjecting all trade between the parties to the ‘standstill clause’ erases any benefit that might arise from the much vaunted asymmetrical liberalization”. Contrary to ACP’ concerns the EU maintains that the chief benefit of the clause is trade liberalization and mutual benefits (Ochieng. 2009:15 and Trojan and Heberbrand. 2011:11-12). This study explores

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<sup>17</sup> The Enabling Clause: gives differential and more favorable treatment to developing countries and is the legal basis for the GSP and EBA regimes (WTO Decision of 28 November 1979 L/4903, Ochieng. 2009:12 and Brown. 2012:15).The Enabling Clause was the main outcome of the Kennedy and Tokyo rounds and it became a legal alternative to the MFN (Bendini et al. 2012:15).

implications of ESA iEPAs signed in the context of the controversial ‘standstill clause’, reformed EU’ Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the contentious WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) under the multilateral Doha Development Agenda.

### **2.3.8 A Divided EU in EPAs Implementation**

Since the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, European development policy has been under the “parallel powers” of the Member States and the European level. This means that both levels can act and are endowed with corresponding political and budgetary instruments. ( Nickel.2012:7) The European Union is, in a sense, quite a unique construct of countries having no analogues so far. A group of independent countries of Europe, which created a common internal market with a single currency, managed to preserve the political independence thereby. However the independence strongly has become visible in the bloc even the ongoing Euro debt crisis and Russian sanctions. Equally the debate on EPAs has been intense and created divisions among EU members. Elgstrom (2008:11), Elgstrom and Pilegaard (2008:374) and Bendini et al (2012), UK Trade and Development Ministries issued a joint statement on March 2005 to the effect that EU, “should take a non-mercantilist approach and pursue any offensive interests”. Arguably Vitorrio Agnoletto, Member of the European Parliament commented that “The commission has been able to apply the notion of divide and conquer...I think this is the logic the European Commission will continue to follow” (Bilal and Stevens. 2009:51). Elgstrom (2008;24) observed that Sweden, Denmark and UK call for EBA access for all ACPs, Director General (DG) Agriculture, Belgium , France, Portugal and Spain call for protectionist policies for their agriculture and the DG trade, German and Finland take a more liberal stance in EPA negotiations. It is important to explore EU-ESA stalemate in the context of an enlarged EU with divergent interests and the notable rifts and cracks within the EU bloc.

### **2.3.9 The EU’s Neoliberal Agenda in the EPAs Partnership**

The EU neoliberal growth model which was formulated as a response to the 1970s economic crisis is based on two key elements. The first was the globalisation of production and especially the shift of manufacturing to the emerging new centres of growth outside the industrialised North, in particular in East Asia. The second element, which is especially relevant in the context of the eurocrisis, is the globalisation and world-wide liberalisation of

finance or more generally the financialisation of global capitalism.<sup>18</sup> From Lome IV to Cotonou 2000 the EU's insistence on the neo-liberal 'sustainability and non-execution clause' political conditionality as an incentive for bilateral aid hindered the smooth flow of negotiations (Schimieg. 2014:4 and Ochieng. 2009:22). The Governance Incentive Tranche and GSP were awarded to third countries for governance commitments (Stahl. 2011:152). ACPs felt that 'equal partnership' had been replaced by 'conditionality' and 'good governance' linked to sustainable development (Borrmann, Busse and Neuhaus. 2006 cited in Busse. 2010:252). 'Essential elements' such as 'human rights', 'democracy' and 'rule of law' were incorporated whose violation can lead to suspension of aid (Banthia. 2007:1, Fontagne et al. 2008:37-38 and Stahl. 2011:152). Banthia (2007:16), Stevens and Bilal (2009:91), Ochieng (2009:22) and Schimieg (2014), augment that Articles 96 and 97 of the CPA(2000) mandates the imposition of sanctions for failure to fulfill the obligations of democracy and the rule of law and in serious cases of corruption. In the same logic the EU once invoked Articles 96 and 97 of the CPA (2000) twice on Zimbabwe in 2001 following electoral fraud and Fiji in 2007 following a coup (Ochieng. 2009:22 and Stevens and Bilal. 2009:91).

The World Bank (2009) report indicators published in 2009 revealed that SSA has rather low 'governance' scores in the world ACP resists the 'non-execution' principle on the basis that politics and trade should be separated (Busse. 2010:252). Given that the first phase of EPA negotiations and iEPAs were initiated amidst violence and political disturbances in some ACPs, this study explores examines negotiations and ratification in a new political environment in post electoral violence, conflicting coalition governments among ESA with Zimbabwe being the case study.

Regional and especially economic integration holds potential and strong benefits for Africa. But this is true only if Africa could succeed in identifying a successful formula to counter challenges confronting the project of regional integration. (Byiers and Vanheukelom. 2014:11) The creation of six different ACP regions in the EU ACP EPA negotiations risks weakening the existing ACP regional integration efforts underway (Stevens. 2006:445 and Borrmann, Busse and Rocha. 2007:235 and Traidcraft. 2012:2). Article 1(4) of the CPA (2000) states that 'Regional and sub-regional integration processes which foster the integration of the ACP countries into the world

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<sup>18</sup> For more information visit, <http://corporateeurope.org/2012/04/>.

economy in terms of trade and private investment shall be encouraged and supported' (CPA. 2000). The liberalization theory on regional integration pose that "regional integration is a vital tool for providing an economic extension to domestic markets in ACP countries and for reducing the cost of doing business in the ACP regions. Efficient markets, from an institutional as well as a transaction-cost competitiveness and the size of their market, which in turn can have positive spin-offs for exports (Pricewaterhouse Coopers. 2007:52). This optimism motivates the EU' regional integration agenda posing that ACP are set to reap benefits in the long run.

The EPA negotiating and ratification structure of ACPs as six separate regional configurations has been criticized as EU' 'divide and rule strategy' and derailed meeting the 2007 deadline and militating against regional integration objective (Concord. 2008:6, Stevens. 2008:212 and Melber. 2013:11). Quedraogo (2009:66-70) opine that negotiating structure weakens the negotiating capacity of the already fragile ACP in competition with the most powerful and experienced EU. Olund (2012:20) rightly notes that "the negotiation of separate agreements has reduced the ACP countries' 'collective bargaining power' and even weakened existing regional economic arrangements. To dissolve the power of the counterpart is a strategy that has been used for long for domination.

The configurations in the ongoing EPA processes has been critically labeled as an equivalent to the repartitioning and recolonizing Africa". Fontagne et al (2008:4) augment that "It is important to remember the strong asymmetry existing between the two trading partners. ACP countries are highly dependent on the EU market due to their historical links" hence continued dependency. Karagianais (2004:7) cited in Hartmann (2009:21) alludes that, "on one hand Europe is represented by the member states and the European institutions while the 79 ACP countries are not legally represented by their own secretariat or institution which could unite common interests". Stevens (2008:212) and Keet (2012) affirm that whatever internal differences may be within the EU, the EC bureaucrats confronts the ACP on behalf of the Director General (DG) of the EU as one powerful force. Considering that iEPAs were initialed amidst such criticism this study explores the implications for the ESA iEPA transitional negotiations.

Contrary to liberal theoretical optimism on RTAs the EPA integration agenda has been criticized as EU' divide and rule strategy as summarized by Ochieng and Sharman cited in Melber (2013:8) that EPA configurations might, "enable the EU to target its trade restrictions more effectively on

products it chooses not to liberalize”.The EU has been accused of undermining the process of consolidating existing ACP customs unions. The system creates tensions between LDCs and non-LDCs through imposing different market access regimes for example GSP, GSP-plus, EBA access, MAR-GSP and MFN among ESA states. (Traidcraft. 2012:2 and Kwa. 2014:13). This assessment is being conducted in an environment in which the 11 states access the EU market under different trading regimes and market access commitments.

## **2.4 Overlapping Regional Membership and EPAs**

The question of regional integration at both the macro and micro levels has proved to be a paradox in the EPA negotiation process due to complicated overlapping regional configurations coined the ‘spaghetti bowl’ nightmare or ‘multilateral constellations’ (Lorenz. 2012:8-9 and Melber. 2013:7.) Overlapping membership in some groups in Africa and EPA groups do not correspond with existing customs unions. (Bilal. 2005:10, Pricewaterhouse Coopers. 2007:10, Trojan and Hebebrand. 2011:16, Lorenz. 2012:8-9 and Melber. 2013:7). Complicated regional webs create divisions between LDCs and non-LDCs, present challenges on a common consensus on selecting goods to liberalize and levels of external tariffs. Ochieng and Sharman cited in Melber (2013:9) augment that the EPA initiative “has created new regional groupings that are inconsistent with, and undermine existing African economic and political blocs. Reducing regional integration to trade liberalization undermines the broader socio-economic and political objectives of existing bodies”. Fig 2.2 below illustrates the African and EPA overlapping membership.

ACPs are worried about shocks, adjustment costs, revenue loss and trade diversion rather than trade creation and competition from subsidized EU goods (Pricewaterhouse Coopers. 2007:53, Borrmann, Busse and Rocha. 2007:235, Khumalo and Mulleta. 2010:11 and Brown. 2012:7). This is a typical ESA case with COMESA/SADC/EAC groups with overlapping membership and customs unions. For the SADC region members are split between EAC, COMESA and SACU in the EPA negotiation process.

Considering that ESA iEPAs were initialed amidst EU pressure and such complicated regional membership, it is important to examine the impact of overlapping membership in the conclusion of comprehensive ESA EPA.

In many respects, Zimbabwe like any other developing countries has sought regional integration (RI) as the device to propel her into a new era of development and economic prosperity<sup>19</sup>. Its position within an African context, is the importance of regrouping countries further strengthened by the need to deconstruct the artificial borders that had been imposed, and thus became a post-colonialism mantra.(Ochieng 2007:102,365) The belief in the importance of integration and its“ consequent pursuit has continued, despite its admittedly limited success on the continent, amidst what has been referred to as a „puzzling web of overlapping, contradictory and ineffective agreements.“ (Borrman Etal 2005:165) In this regard, Southern Africa is no exception. There is a litany of socio-economic challenges that the region faces. Consequently, regional organizations such as Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market for East, Southern Africa (COMESA), and East African Community (EAC) continue to search for new approaches to RI to enable them to tackle these challenges. Although technocrats profess “integration fatigue”, the advancement of regional efforts continues. Bhagwati (2008:23) noted that regionalism is a threat to the multilateralism. A “...major drawback of this free trade regime has been identified, which tends to proliferation of regionalism at the cost of dilution of multilateralism” (Pandey, 2006: 1).Notably most negotiators are frustrated in attempting to achieve multilateral free trade thus, Nations are increasingly eager to negotiate bilaterally removing barriers because multilateralism talks are progressing so slowly ( Krugman, 1993:16; Bhagwati, 2008:24) Also, the multiple memberships of RTAs may generate duty-free market access and zero-tariffs on imports with many trading partners and can hence be an appealing alternative to national policy makers as a substitute to free trade (Schiff and Winters 2003: 75). Therefore, RTAs<sup>20</sup> have become a ubiquitous feature of global trade.

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<sup>19</sup> Dot Keet „The implications of the EU“s proposed „Regional Economic Partnership Agreements“ with respect to regional integration and development in Southern Africa“ 16 available online at [http://www.tni.org/archives/archives\\_keet\\_implications](http://www.tni.org/archives/archives_keet_implications).

<sup>20</sup> Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) refers to any preferential access for members of such an agreement. Thus RTAs are used to encompass set of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), Customs Unions (CUs), and Common Markets (CMs). In practice, there are some differences between these categories of RTAs. In a FTA group, countries enforce their own external trade restrictions. In a CU group, members adopt a common set of external trade restrictions (Grant and Lambert, 2008). In a CM area, the movement of factors must be unrestricted and fiscal, monetary, and other economic policies must be harmonized between members (DeRosa, 1998:67).Note that RTAs were conceived as an exception to Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause to cater to the specific needs of developing as well as developed countries (see Art. XXIV of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade – GATT). According provisions on RTAs in GATT, the formation of a RTA commits members to eliminate restrictions on “substantially” all trade.

## **2.5 STOP EPA Campaigns**

The 2004-2009 negotiating period saw the emergence of the ‘STOP EPA’ campaign groups from both Europe and ACPs. ‘STOP EPA’ refers to the civil society and transnational activism aimed at showing awareness on what pro-development WTO-compatible EPA entails (Felice. 2012:145 and Elgoscozabal. 2009:32). Bendini et al (2012:35) assert that during the run to the January 2008 deadline there was need for public awareness so that ACPs would not conclude EPAs hastily. These pressure groups include: Action Aid, Oxfam, Attack Germany, 11.11.11, Eurostep, ENDA, Third World Network Africa, farmers, Trade Unions and others. ‘STOP EPA’ campaigned against: ‘Singapore issues’, lack of alternatives to EPA, limited negotiation timeframe, inclusion of Cotonou-plus commitments and the need for development friendly EPAs (Bilal. 2005:13, Felice. 2012:146-153, Elgoscozabal. 2009:32 and Bendini et al. 2012:35). Newell and Tussie (2006) cited in Felice (2012:146).

## Fig 2.1 EPAs and overlapping membership in Africa



**SOURCE:** Bendini, Armanovica and Goede. 2012:29

Furthermore Dur and De Bievre (2007:89) argue, a recent study on the role of European NGOs in EPA negotiations concludes that, “they have largely failed to shift policy outcome in their favor (Felice. 2012:146). The impact of the civic society in the new iEPA transitional negotiating phase needs to be probed further.

Thus the development partnership between the EU and ACPs from the last half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century has put neoliberal and neo-classical theories under scrutiny from the dependency school. The fact that iEPAs were initialed under duress upon threats of losing preferential market access and development aid shows that satellite ACP cannot disengage but heavily depend on the metropolis. Banthia rightly notes that, “...from Rome to Yaoundé to Lome and finally Cotonou, EU-ACP development policy failed to deliver on each of those objectives leaving states impoverished, uncompetitive, underdeveloped, and weak as the relationship begins its sixth decade”. This

vindicates Matunhu's view that, "the metropolis is dependent for its development on the underdevelopment of the satellite (Matunhu. 2011:69). Osabu-Kle (2001:1) explains satellite ACP poverty and underdevelopment as stemming from, "historical forces of four centuries of slavery, a century of colonization, decades of neo-colonialism...". White (2008:145) caps it up by noting that, "The developed world try to use aid to promote the adoption of Western institutions and technology, along with acquiring participation in the international trade regime". This explains why the iEPAs were initiated amidst pressure in 2007 and the EU' threats of October 2014 deadline.

## **2.6 EPAs in the Zimbabwean economic history**

Regional integration and global market access coupled with reciprocity and Most Favoured Nation principles of the GATT Article XXIV have been used as the major arguments for the success of EPAs in Africa. However not much has been investigated as to the actual impact of the EPAs on an individual country's economic performance. (Bilal. 2005:13, Felice. 2012:146-153, Elgoscozabal. 2009:35) An assessment of an epoch of successive EPA negotiation and ratification for a country like Zimbabwe will also bring to light the actual benefit of the trade partnership since the Cotonou Agreement in 2000. Zimbabwe is a signatory of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. This is the framework for EU-Zimbabwe relations, along three related pillars: political relations, economic and financial relations, and Trade. The EU and Zimbabwe relationship stretches from 1981 meaning it became part of the Lome. (Bilal. 2013:16) In 2002, the EU partially suspended its government to government co-operation under the European Development Fund. This was a consequence of major disagreements over essential elements of the Cotonou Agreement ( Human Rights, Democratic principles, and the rule of law). The EU also adopted restrictive measures within the Common Foreign and Security Policy: prohibition of arms supply, travel ban and the freezing of assets against a number of persons or entities. In essence, partial suspension of co-operation translates as follows : no budget support, suspension of projects except those in direct support to the population, humanitarian assistance not affected, regional projects assessed on a case to case basis, trade not affected. Felice. 2012:146-153, Elgoscozabal. 2009:32 Notably , between 2002 and 2009 the EU committed more than 700 million Euros in Zimbabwe to support emergencies mainly implemented through NGO's, such as in food aid , small scale farmers and basic education support however it has also minimally maintained an effective cooperation at

technical level with the Government and in recent years it has made significant proposals to engage with the Government on a number of issues in particular in relation to the land issue, the mother of all difficulties.

### **2.6.1 EU - Zimbabwe Reengagement through EPA implementation**

The reengagement process between Zimbabwe and the EU has been hailed as the key indicator of the revival of trade as an important catalyst for growth and poverty reduction. The EU is currently Zimbabwe's third major trading partner. The EU backed the GPA, and confirmed its desire to normalize its relationship with Zimbabwe. The new Dispensation of Zimbabwe asked for a dialogue with the EU, based on Article 8 of Cotonou, and aimed at normalizing EU-Zimbabwe relations. This dialogue was formally launched on 18 June 2009 in Brussels, between the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe and his inclusive three parties Delegation, and the EU Ministerial troika. Zimbabwe signed and ratified the interim Economic Partnership Agreement under the ESA region. EU view this iEPA as a major stepping stone to a wider and more comprehensive deal that supports sustainable development and fosters regional integration. The National Indicative Programme signed between the Zimbabwean Government and the EU is the also a major milestone in the normalization of the trade relations between the two partners<sup>21</sup>. It is therefore imperative for this research to seek to assess the how the EPAs have impacted the Zimbabwean Economy and evaluate the broader implications of the agreements on the region.

Zimbabwe has benefited from preferences under the ACP-EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement. She can meet the existing beef export quota, and if she has not met it, it is due to foot and mouth disease, not sanctions. As a Sugar Protocol<sup>22</sup> Country she is significantly benefiting from financial

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<sup>21</sup> [http://eeas.europa.eu/zimbabwe/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/zimbabwe/index_en.htm)

<sup>22</sup> The Sugar Protocol, laid down in the Convention of Lome, has been an established instrument of commodity policy for nearly 20 years. Its basic rule is that the EC imports at guaranteed prices specified quantities of sugar from ACP countries. It is the objective of the article to provide an economic evaluation of the Sugar Protocol. Impacts on prices, trade, export earnings and economic welfare are elaborated. The Sugar Protocol's impacts on the level and instability of sugar export earnings are jointly evaluated by computing transfer and risk benefits (Newbery 2006 :12, Stiglitz 2007 :15). The Sugar Protocol induces international income transfers that are untargeted in terms of per capita income. It causes, however, rather strong risk benefits compared with other instruments of international commodity policy and sizeable welfare gains for individual recipient countries. (Herrmann & Weiss 2007: 918-941)

support for an adaptation strategy of the Sugar industry. Zimbabwe is a leading country in ongoing trade related negotiations with the EU in the context of Economic Partnership Agreements as part of this Cotonou framework. A number of EU funded programmes aimed at increasing her capacity to take full advantage of EU-Zimbabwe trade possibilities are being implemented. This is more important now than before the GPA was signed, as prospects for economic recovery are real<sup>23</sup>. Zimbabwe has signed an interim EPA with the EU. It has secured the continuation of free access to EU markets for this country as a non LDC ACP and provided legal security for economic operators as well as improved rules of origin<sup>24</sup>. (Balial. 2013:16) EU has been actively seeking the conclusion of a full EPA to make it possible for concerned countries to take maximum advantage of Trade as a powerful agent of Development with and from the EU, as well as of a vital regional economic integration but has this been effectively enhancing Zimbabwe's quest for regional trade boosting and integration..

On the 25-26th November 2014, the Fourth meeting of the EPA Committee under the Interim Economic Partnership Agreement (iEPA) between the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) region and the EU was held in Harare, Zimbabwe. The two Sub-Committees, the Customs Cooperation Committee and the Joint Development Committee, took place back-to-back with the EPA Committee. It is recalled that the iEPA is being implemented by four signatory countries, namely Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and Zimbabwe, while the larger ESA configuration, comprising of 11 countries in all, is negotiating a full and comprehensive EPA with the EU, including in services, investment and other trade-related issues<sup>25</sup>. It is critical in this study to evaluate the progress in the implementation of trade and development commitments made under the iEPA. In particular, this study seeks to ascertain the impact of EPA to the Zimbabwean economy in accelerating the implementation of projects following the allocation of €4 million under the 10<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund (EDF) to address ESA States' immediate needs as a result of the implementation iEPA.

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<sup>23</sup> <http://ecdpm.org/great-insights/peacebuilding-statebuilding/epa-update-december-2014january-2015/>

<sup>24</sup> <http://ecdpm.org/great-insights/peacebuilding-statebuilding/epa-update-december-2014january-2015/>.

<sup>25</sup> <http://ecdpm.org/great-insights/peacebuilding-statebuilding/epa-update-december-2014january-2015/>

## **2.7 SUMMARY**

This chapter reviewed that both the WTO and EU-ACP EPA negotiations are premised upon the neoliberal theoretical benefits of free trade and market forces. It was noted that the evolution from the Lome to the CPA framework was not a smooth snail's pace movement but rather a bumpy movement with several impediments. The stumbling blocks to some extent justify the neo-Marxist theories of dependency as Europe just change the policy instruments but maintained its permanent interests in the ACP. The WTO legal system further complicated the already asymmetrical relationship. The EU-Zimbabwe trade partnership has evolved from just initialing the interim EPA in 2009 to ratification and to the signing of the National Indicative Programme in 2015. whilst the majority of the literature focused on the trade relations and legal implications of the EPAs an examination of the impact of the trade agreements critical in establishing the real economic benefits Zimbabwe stands to gain or lose.



**MAP 2 EPAs in Africa By October 2014**

## **CHAPTER 3; RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

### **3.1 INTRODUCTION**

This chapter describes the research design and methodology, including the population, data collection and analysis. An outline of the qualitative research methodology which links with the literature review in the previous chapter is done as it describes the explorative qualitative research type and qualitative research tools used for the EU-Zimbabwe EPA case study designed in accordance to the research problem, questions and objectives. Precise descriptions on the population sampling design and the roadmap for data collection, presentation, coding and analysis was also done.

### **3.2 RESEARCH PARADIGM**

Research paradigm is defined as, “a general organizing framework for theory and research that includes basic assumptions, key issues, and models of quality research and methods for seeking answers” Neuman (2011:94). Between the quantitative and qualitative this research employs the latter paradigm. Scholars; Ezzy (2002:3), Silverman (2008:43), Berg (2009:3), Newman (2011:174) and Jackson (2012:86) define the qualitative paradigm as suitable for social science research because data is analyzed without statistics, uses linguistic techniques such as analogies, metaphors, symbols, themes, motifs and taxonomy to draw conclusions about the meaning of social events and relationships. The qualitative research paradigm underlied this study considering the nature of the research topic which sought qualitative data, opinions of technocrats, and facts to explain the evolving EU-Zimbabwe relations and the impact of EPAs on Zimbabwean economy.

The qualitative exploratory research type characterizes the nature of inquiry pertaining to the challenges and opportunities confronting the EU-Zimbabwe EPAs; and the economic value of the trade relations since 2009 to present. Kothari (2004:35), Berg (2010:327), Newman (2011:39) and Bhattacharjee (2012:10) assert that exploratory research type major emphasis is on discovering new ideas, insights, formulate and focus questions for future research about the phenomenon or problem. Thus this research endeavored to achieve new insights through exploration and

investigating the challenges and opportunities confronting EU-Zimbabwe EPA negotiators and policy makers and pave the way for future research.

### **3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN**

A research design is a plan, structure and strategy of investigation so conceived as to obtain answers to research questions (Kumar 2005:23). It clearly shows the identified procedures and logistical arrangements required to undertake a study to ensure valid, objective and accurate procedures Kothari (2004:31) defines research design as, “the conceptual structure within which research is conducted: it constitutes the blueprint for the collection, measurement and analysis of data”. This research will employ the qualitative Case Study design or strategy as regards to the impact of EPAs on the Zimbabwean economy. Yin (2009:18) defines case study as, “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in-depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”. The strengths of the case study inquiry according to Miles and Huberman (1994) cited in Punch (2011:144), Gray (2004:61), Creswell (2007:73), Yin (2009:4), Vaughan (1992) cited in Neuman (2011:42), Jackson (2012:87) and Bhattacharjee (2012:94) is that it takes a holistic elaboration, in-depth and comprehensive study of real life events, processes and phenomenon in one or more cases within a bonded system and has a heuristic impact. This study took an all-inclusive analysis of the impact of EPA negotiation and implementation on the Zimbabwean economy.

### **3.4 SAMPLE DESIGN**

#### **3.4.1 Study Population**

Polit and Beck (2006:258), refers to a population as “the total number of people or elements that fit the specific set specifications of the study. This is also known as the target population which is simplified by Bhattacharjee (2012:67) as, “all people or items with the characteristic that one wishes to study”. Furthermore Kothari (2004:153), Neuman (2011:246) and Majumdar (2011:151) defines population as the large group of cases or universe or canvas or total of the items or units within a defined space (geographical or social) from which the researcher draws a sample about which information is desired. The target population for this study was the EPA negotiating partners that is the EU Commission on one hand and sectors of the Zimbabwean economy which are Ministries of Finance and Economic Development, Ministry of Commerce and Trade, Ministry

of Agriculture, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the corporate world particularly the Zimbabwe Sugar Association, Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce, TIMB, Confederation of Zimbabwean Industries, Tongaat Hullets, Commercial Farmers Union and the civic society. This research employed a ‘finite universe’ whereby the number of items is certain; that is the one ESA state in the EPA configuration which is Zimbabwe. (Khotari. 2004:56).

### **3.4.2 Sampling Unit**

Sampling is a process of selecting a portion of the population to represent the total population and the findings from the sample represent the rest of the group. The selected sample should therefore, have similar characteristics to the population under study to allow generalizability of the results to represent the population (Burns & Grove 2001:365; Polit & Beck 2006:259). Kothari (2004) classifies a sampling unit as a geographical one such as state, district, school or village from which a sampling frame of a study population is drawn. The sampling unit for this study was the economic sector of Zimbabwe.

### **3.4.3 Sampling Frame**

The sampling frame was drawn from the sampling unit above. The sampling frame has been defined by Neuman (2011:248) as a “parameter”, that is, “a characteristic of the entire population that is estimated from a sample”, whilst Kothari (2004:56) theorize it as “source list” which contains the names of all items of a finite universe and such a list should be comprehensive, relevant and reliable and Bhattacharjee (2012:68) treats it as an accessible section of the target population. Thus the sampling frame or population parameter for this research included: EU and Zimbabwean parliamentarians and policy makers, members of the academia in the field of political science, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Trade Center in Harare and civil society organizations actively involved in the EPA negotiating process and implementation.

### **3.4.4 Sampling Technique**

In the typical qualitative nature of the EU-Zimbabwe research problem, the researcher employed the non-probability sampling procedure encompassing purposive (expert or deliberate or judgmental method). Non-probability sampling is a process of selecting respondents into the study with less chances of obtaining a representative sample (Burns & Grove 2001:301). Kothari (2004:59), Berg (2009:50), Bhattacharjee (2012:68) and Jackson (2012:101) concurs that in non-probability sampling the investigator does not base the sample selection on the quantitative probability theory. For this study the researcher purposively selected key technocrats and experts from the Ministries, companies and organisations that were directly involved in the EPA negotiations and implementation as they represent the population parameters. Judgmental or purposive sampling was employed to select representative experts since some ministry officials were not be accessible due to their busy schedules.

The researcher purposively selected key specialists in the area of bilateral trade negotiations and implementation as the EU-Zimbabwe iEPA ‘negotiators’ may be difficult to access. The merits of non-probability purposive sampling as argued by Ezzy (2002:74), Silverman (2008:306), Neuman (2011:267), Punch (2011:187) and Jackson (2012:101) is that it allows critical thinking about the population parameters and expert opinions are more credible. The method is less expensive, the researcher used his subject area expertise in determining key respondents and can be employed on highly sensitive or difficult to research study populations.

### **3.4.5 Study Sample**

The study sample for this research comprised of ten EU-Zimbabwe key informants representing the population parameters highlighted in the above sampling frame. Neuman (2011:240) defines a sample as, “a small set of cases a researcher selects from a large pool and generalizes to the population”. Furthermore, Silverman (2008:404) avers that sampling, “allows you to estimate the representativeness of the cases you study, and thereby the degree of confidence in any inferences you draw from them”. In this vein ten key informants were a true representation of the EU-Zimbabwe population parameters. Kothari (2004:56) opines that, “an optimum sample is one which fulfills the requirements of efficiency, representativeness, reliability and flexibility”. The sampling frame satisfies the Kothari’ criteria in determining the ten study sample respondents for the EU-Zimbabwe population under investigation.

### **3.5 DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS**

The researcher employed in-depth interviews and secondary sources as research instruments.

#### **3.5.1 In-Depth Interviews with Key Informants**

The impact of the evolving EU- Zimbabwe trade relations through negotiations and implementation of an iEPAs was explored through in-depth interviews with key informants. The researcher employed purposive sampling strategy in selecting key informants and specialized technocrats for in-depth interviews as regards the EU-Zimbabwe relations. Majumdar (2011:236) notes that interview is, “an interactive process between two or more individuals in which one person provides the necessary verbal stimuli and other person(s) responds to it by a verbal reply”. Bhattacharjee (2012:198) purports that the primary mode of data collection in case study researches are interviews. Interviews was relevant to this study on EU-Zimbabwe trade relations since primary data was collected afresh from key experts and happen to be original in character (Kothari. 2004:95). Creswell (2007:5) posit that purposeful sampling is critical in selecting key interviewees who understand the research problem and central phenomenon under investigation and Yin (2009:106) reiterates that key informants are often critical to the success of a case study as they also initiate access to corroboratory or contrary sources of evidence.

A semi-structured interview allows flexibility, level of language can be modified to the ability and educational level of the respondents and allows restructuring some questions and some probing for better understanding argues Khotari (2004; 97), Silverman (2008:110) and Jackson (2012:89). Open ended questions allow the respondents to elaborate further and even give own opinion and insights regarding challenges and opportunities in the EPA negotiation and implementation process. In-depth interviews allow the researcher to ask respondents about the facts of EU-Zimbabwe trade matters as well as their true opinions, beliefs, and insights regarding the implications of iEPAs (Yin. 2009:107, Byrne 2004:182 cited in Silverman. 2008:110, and Jackson. 2012:89). Arguably, interviews when conducted well achieve a level of depth and complexity (Kothari. 2004:98 and Silverman. 2008:110) and accesses individual values which cannot be accessed through questionnaires. Interviews were thus insightful in this research problem as they provided perceived causal inferences and explanations on the real implications of the iEPA to the turning around of Zimbabwean ailing economy.

### **3.5.2 Secondary Sources**

To combat for the weaknesses of the interview research instrument, this research used secondary data in the EU- Zimbabwe negotiating and ratification process. Secondary data entails data that are already available, i.e., they refer to the data which have already been collected and analyzed by someone else (Kothari. 2004:111). Yin (2009:102) avers that, “For case studies, the most important use of documents is to corroborate and augment evidence from other sources”. Secondary documents including EPA impact assessments, journals, EU reports and working papers would be surveyed to supplement interview data. Yin (2009:3) confirms that document information is stable, can be reviewed repeatedly, unobtrusive, not created as a result of case study, exact and gives broad coverage. The EU Commission, Ministry of Industry and Trade, Trade Centre and the Community Development Centre in Waterfalls and Bindura University online Journals would be the source of these documents. In selecting secondary data sources the researcher took into consideration the reliability, sustainability and adequacy of the data (Kothari. 2004:111).

### **3.5.3 Validity and Reliability**

It is the concurrence of research scholars that a good research instrument should meet the criterion of reliability and validity. Reliability is the degree of consistency with which the data-collection instrument produces the same results every time it is implemented in the same situation or used by different investigators. It means dependability, consistency and stability of a research tool (Kothari. 2004:74, Hammersly. 1992:67 cited in Silverman. 2008:46, Neuman. 2011:214 and Jackson. 2012:66). Stability reliability is achieved if the EU-Zimbabwe research instrument yields consistent results among different key informants and representative reliability if the instrument yields consistent results across different indicators (Neuman. 2011:2008-9). In this research reliability was achieved through careful sampling of expert informants for interviews who are representative of different EU-Zimbabwe population parameters.

#### **Validity**

Validity is the extent of accuracy of an instrument to measure the construct it is supposed to measure in the context of the concepts/variables being studied (Brink 1996:167; Polit & Beck 2006:329). Qualitative validity entails the utility, truthfulness, authenticity and genuineness of

research tool whether it measures what it claims to measure (Kothari. 2004:73, Jackson. 2012:71 and Neuman. 2011:214). Hammersley (1990:57) cited in Silverman (2008:405) posit that validity is, “the extent to which an instrument accurately represents the social phenomena to which it refers”. The researcher ensured that inferences in this study are not due to chance through interviewing key informants with the requisite expertise and understanding of the EU-Zimbabwe multilateral EPA negotiation and implementation process. Content validity or adequate cover of the topic under study was achieved through the selection of a sample representative of different EU-Zimbabwe population parameters and interview protocol designed in line with research objectives and research questions.

Furthermore to ensure the validity of the research tool the researcher devised interview questions in line with proposals made by Berg (2009:115), Neuman (2011:3180 and Jackson (2012:94-95) to avoid: double barreled questions, affectively worded questions, leading questions, double negatives, response bias questions and complex questions. This ensures the validity of the research instrument as authentic responses regarding EU-Zimbabwe negotiation and ratification challenges and implications were given by key informants.

### **3.6 DATA COLLECTION**

The researcher used the research instrument designed in line with the project research objectives and research questions. The research instrument incorporated valid research questions, background statement about the project, its purpose and the people involved in the conducting and sponsoring of the project (Yin. 2009:8, Berg. 2009:115, Neuman. 2011:318 and Jackson 2012:94-5). The researcher crafts a budget for financing the project including transport costs to and from research areas, internet and stationery expenses.

The researcher obtained a Letter of Introduction from Bindura University of Science Education, to be used to introduce self to the key informants. The researcher organized interview schedules with all key respondents and sought permission from respective organizations and EU and specific ministries. Interview schedules were flexible and catered for the interviewee’ convenience and availability.

The ethical principle of informed consent is employed whereby interviewee were to be allowed to choose to participate, or not to participate in research after receiving all relevant information about

the risk or harm that might arise if they participate in the research (Vaus. 2001:83, Gray 2004:90, Williams, Karp and Dalphin. 2007:90 and Bhattacharjee. 2012:134).

On the interview date the researcher identified himself through the BUSE student Identity Card and official letter from the Social Science Department acknowledging the research topic and process (Neuman. 2011:344 and University of Minnesota. 2003). The researcher explained why a specific respondent, not a substitute must be interviewed. The right of participants to access research findings on EPAs was upheld (Makore.2001:40). The researcher assured respondents on promises of anonymity and confidentiality (Neuman. 2011:149-152, Berg. 2009:87-90, Bhattacharjee. 2012:135 and Jackson. 2012:41). Furthermore the researcher conducted debriefing in which information about the true nature and purpose of the study was availed to the respondents (Neuman. 2011:303 and Jackson. 2012:49).

During the interview process the researcher created a good rapport with the interviewee through putting forth friendly and non-threatening questions and the interviewee' answers was upheld and respected. (Neuman, 2011:343-344 and Yin. 2009:106-7). The interviewer followed a line of inquiry as reflected by the research instrument. Interaction was maintained through asking probing questions and neutral requests to clarify ambiguous answers. The interviewees was accorded opportunity to give their own opinions and insights and initiate access to other key sources or informants. Lastly the interviewer thanked the respondent and left timeously.

### **3.9 DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS PROCEDURES**

The researcher employed thematic coding in the presentation and analysis of qualitative responses. Strauss and Corbing (1990) cited in Ezzy (2002:91-93) and Strauss (1987) cited in Neuman (2011:510) identified three types of qualitative data coding: open coding, axial coding and selective coding. The researcher explores EU-Zimbabwe data through organizing data into categories or classes, paragraphs, sentences, phrases themes and concepts guided by research questions and objectives (Ezzy. 2002:86, Kothari. 2004:263, Berg. 2009:354 and Neuman. 2011:510). According to Charmaz (1995:37) cited in Ezzy (2002:86) coding in thematic analysis and grounded theory is, “a process of defining what data are all about” and “the researcher attempts to build a systematic account of what has been observed and recorded, it is a process of identifying themes and concepts that are in the data”.

### **3.9.1 Open Coding**

The researcher commenced with open coding which is the initial coding of qualitative data to condense them into preliminary analytic categories and themes. The researcher explored the data, identified the unit of analysis, code for meanings, make metaphors, break codes into sub categories and identified the properties of codes (Ezzy. 2002:93, Berg. 2009:354, and Neuman. 2011:511).

### **3.9.2 Axial Coding**

The second phase of data analysis was the axial or theoretical coding in which the main categories which had emerged from open coding of data were interconnected with each other. The aim of axial coding was to integrate codes around the axis of central categories (Ezzy. 2002:93, Berg. 2009:354 and Punch. 2011:209).

### **3.9.3 Selective Coding**

The last phase to be employed in data analysis was the selective coding (Strauss and Corbin. 1990:97) or theoretical coding (Glaser. 1978) in which the researcher identified the core code, examines the relationship between the core code and other codes and compare coding scheme with pre-existing theory (Ezzy. 2002:92). It began after concepts were well developed and several core generalizations have been identified. It's the saturation phase of the coding system in which codes and theory was merged (Ezzy. 2002:93, Punch. 2011:212 and Neuman. 2011:514).

## **3.10 SUMMARY**

This chapter was an accentuation of the qualitative research methodology of this study. It described the case study research design and exploratory method in a clearly laid out expose. The sampling design, sampling strategies and research tools incorporating EU-Zimbabwe population parameters has been pointed out. Data presentation and coding procedures has been spelt out in this chapter. The methodology prescribed in this chapter sets the basis for the next chapter on data presentation, analysis and discussion.

## **CHAPTER 4; DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION**

### **4.1 INTRODUCTION**

This chapter elaborates on data presentation, analysis and discussion gathered through the qualitative methods as highlighted in the preceding chapter. Findings obtained through interviews and document search will be analyzed through the thematic coding system. The chapter establishes the relationship linking the research findings to research objectives, theoretical and conceptual framework. It establishes the harmony and divergent themes between findings and literature review in trying to fill the knowledge gaps in the evolving EU – Zimbabwe trade relations.

### **4.2 OVERVIEW OF RESPONDENTS**

The researcher employed the non-probability purposive sampling of the interview respondents. It was ensured that all respondents selected have the requisite knowledge on the area of EU-Zimbabwe EPAs under investigation. It was ensured that all research population parameters were equally represented. Key and general respondents were selected from the respective government departments, Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development Ministry of Agriculture and Mechanisation in Zimbabwe, civic organizations and research centers encompassing; the Southern African Research and Documentation Centre (SARDC), Trades Centre, Community Technology Development Trust (CTDT), Southern African Political Economy Series (SAPES TRUST), Embassy of the Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Zimbabwe, ZimTrade, Tobacco Industries Marketing Board (TIMB), Zimbabwe Sugar Association, Tongaat Hullets, Industrial Development Corporation of Zimbabwe (IDC), Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI) and Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC), members of the academia in the field of political science from the University of Zimbabwe Political and Administrative Studies Department and Bindura University of Science Education (BUSE) Economics Department . However due to unforeseen circumstances in the field the researcher interviewed 10 respondents representing all the population parameters.

The following quotation sums up well the widespread skepticism among the respondents about the benefits of EPA among the key respondents:

“The jury remains out on whether trade preferences have actually made a substantive difference in the welfare of recipient countries. The developing countries that were granted the fewest preferences at the inception of the programme in the 1960s, those in East Asia, have subsequently grown the fastest. Those granted the deepest preferences, including the least developed countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, have not managed to increase their per capita incomes or diversify their exports significantly in the last 40 years.” (Francois et al., 2006:197)

#### **4.3 EVOLVING EU –ZIMBABWE TRADE RELATIONS**

Ministry of Industry and Commerce respondent stated that the overall rationale for the EU’ radical policy shift from non-reciprocal to reciprocal EPA preferences was mainly precipitated by the need to be WTO-compliant. This emanated from the WTO dispute settlements regarding the EU’ ‘Banana regimes’, favorable treatment of ACPs and discrimination complaints lodged by other third parties. Furthermore a SAPES respondent stated that the EU’ 1996 Green Paper also recommended policy shift since the non-reciprocal Lome regime failed to wean ACP’ from poverty and underdevelopment, rather their contribution to global trade declined to insignificant levels despite 30 years of non-reciprocal trade preferences. These views from respondents are also augmented by Elgstrom (2008:5), Egoscozabal (2009:33) and Bilal and Stevens (2009:14).

A key respondent from Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries further uphold that it was not only the WTO-compliant reason for EU’ radical shift to reciprocal EPAs regime but global competition for ACP’ resources and markets. One political scientist registered a realist perception when he stated that the radical shift was “ EU’ geostrategic and geoeconomic interests in the wake of renewed scramble for ACP’ resources among the USA, China, BRICS and the EU motivated EPAs”. In addition to this view government official from the Ministry of Industry and Trade also reiterated that “The EU has vested interests in the raw materials of its former colonies and associated territories”. In 2006, the EU announced its new ‘vision’ for future trade policy and negotiation in *Global Europe: Competing in the World*, a strategy meant to promote Europe’s commercial interests in raw materials and markets in the world (European Commission. 2006 cited in Action aid, Christian Aid and Oxfam (2008:2). According to Action Aid et al (2008), “The EU wants to secure access to resources and raw materials for its industries. Those mentioned include agricultural materials, energy, metals, minerals, scrap metal, hides and skins”.

The researcher observed that the EU' Green Paper, CPA framework and ZNCC, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and SARDC NET informants overlooked that the real cause of ACP' poverty emanates from the centuries of slave trade, mercantilism, colonialism and neoliberalism, poor governance systems rather than the popularized issue of non-reciprocal Lome preferences. A respondent from the IDC noted that the logic behind EPAs may be the much vaunted reasons, 'WTO compliant, poverty reduction, sustainable development and gradual integration of ACPs into the world economy' but also the quest for raw materials, strategic resources and markets by the EU.

A political scientist, further raised that the "EU' engagement with the ACPs in the post-Cold War era through EPAs was premised on geopolitics and securing sources of raw materials in the former colonies and suggested that the post-Cold War global competition for resources has witnessed innovative developmental models and preferences among the USA (AGOA), China (FOCAC) and the EU". Aurre propounds that, "both the EU and US plans, presented examples of the new open regionalism, are intended to formally bind together the economic future of developed countries with their historic areas of influence, at a moment when they are also seem to be threatened by competition of some emerging economies of Asia especially by China' growing presence in the rest of the world which is generating so much interest and controversy in Africa." Furthermore Stahl (2011: 154) also states that Brussels and Beijing pursue converging security interests in Africa. Meanwhile Chipaike and Makwerere (2012) characterized the US-Sino offensive in Africa as the 'new scramble' or 'new Cold War'. Correspondingly Seifudun (2010) summed it, "China is the new neo-colonial power in the making because the logic of capital is the same whether those in the driving seat are the Europeans, the Americans or the Chinese" (Mhandara, Manyeruke and Nyemba. 2013:85).

#### **4.4 EPAS AND MARKET ACCESS**

One EU delegation key respondent expressed that under the CPA of 2000 "Zimbabwe benefits from the EPA objectives particularly from DFQF market access on 100% of the exportable products to the EU". The overall EPA objectives enshrined in Article 34 of the CPA of 2000 include, "to foster [...] the smooth and gradual integration of the ACP States into the world economy, with due regard for their political choices and development priorities, thereby promoting their sustainable development and contributing to poverty eradication in the ACP countries [...]"

enable the ACP States to play a full part in international trade [and] manage the challenges of globalization and to adapt progressively to new conditions of international trade thereby facilitating their transition to the liberalized global economy”. Another EU key respondent remarked that EPAs mirror EU’ external policy towards the overall development of Zimbabwe when they maintain that, “... EPAs are not only trade agreements but also development agreements and the EPAs provide with a legal framework for the ACP countries to continue enjoying a preferential DFQF access to the EU”.

However a civil society respondent from SADRC NET expressed pessimism on the qualitative EPA objectives. He dismissed them as “too theoretical as empirical evidence proves contrary”. In addition respondent from CTDTTC argued that, “The EU exerted much pressure on the ESA countries to conclude EPAs on threats of losing preferential market access. EPAs are neither sustainable nor are they development tools as the EU is not forthcoming in increasing funding on EPA related costs and are at loggerheads with ESA regional integration plans”. In the same vein, Ato Girma Birru, Minister of Trade and of Ethiopia, affirmed in 2006 that “this type of liberalization between unequal partners has historically proven to be an ineffective development tool and even counterproductive. Such a policy of trade liberalization could inhibit our countries’ ability to reduce poverty and ensure sustainable development” (Bendini et al. 2012:27). Moreover a key respondent from CZI expressed concern in relation to preference erosion, infant industries and livelihoods for smallholder farmers in the face of increased competition from EU’ MNCs.

#### **4.5 IMPACT OF FREE TRADE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION ON ZIMBABWE**

The EU key respondents and the Ministry of Industry and Commerce concurred on the positive impact of EPA on the various sectors of the Zimbabwean economy. The EU ambassador pointed out that the, ‘i-EPA is to be used by Zimbabwean businesses, large and small, by exporters, importers and investors’. In agreement with the technical respondent from the Ministry of Industry and Commerce the EU key respondent listed some of the major benefits of the i-EPA to Zimbabwean businesses as follows:

- *Increasing exports of goods to regional and EU markets.* i-EPA offers preferential treatment in EU market for all Zimbabwean goods, in the form of tariff elimination (with the EPA any product that Zimbabwe exports to the EU market whether agricultural,

processed value added products and other non-traditional export products of Zimbabwe will enter the EU market duty free). For businesses already exporting goods to the EU, this increases the competitiveness of their products in those markets, especially compared to competitors from countries that do not receive such level of preferential treatment under an FTA. i-EPA also address within the region and in EU countries, customs and trade facilitation matters, to provide expeditious, predictable, transparent and simplified customs administration for Zimbabwean importers and exporters.

- *Commencing new goods exports to regional and EU markets.* Lower tariffs and particularly other preferential treatment can be a good incentive for Zimbabwean businesses to consider exporting to a new market for the first time or expanding a product range. EU businesses may be more interested in importing Zimbabwean products as a result of an EPA coming into force.
- *Increasing goods production competitively.* EPA led reforms and reduction of supply side constraints will improve the business environment, the cost of doing business in Zimbabwe and productivity. This will give Zimbabwean business the opportunity to improve and diversify its production capacity of Goods to satisfy the domestic, EU and regional markets.
- *Achieving efficiencies through cheaper imported inputs.* While in general Zimbabwe's tariffs are already low on some input product, i-EPA may improve access to cheaper, better quality or more technologically advance imported inputs to business. This is because the i-EPA agreements also contain commitments to eliminate and bind tariffs. Those savings can provide a little more to invest in other parts of the business.
- *Starting or deepening engagement in global value chains.* Global value chains are increasingly a feature of international trade, and i-EPA helps open up these opportunities through preferential tariffs and services market access. The linkage between the EU and Zimbabwe as a free trade area in particular may encourage production to be shared across countries, including through rules allowing the "accumulation" of origin for the purposes of meeting the i-EPA rules of origin. So the positive incentive created under i-EPA may help businesses secure contracts to supply a production input.
- *Addressing 'behind the border' barriers to trade.* A range of 'behind the border' issues can make international trade more complicated and less competitive. i-EPA seeks to address these issues as well. For example, it addresses competition policy to ensure the trade and

investment liberalisation achieved in i-EPA is not undermined by anti-competitive practices. And it looks at new technologies. Depending on whether a business is involved in high-technology or innovative industries, or concerned about anti-competitive domestic markets, i-EPA can be an important factor in business decision making.

Trade growth is also visibly increasing between Zimbabwe and EU since 2012 when the Government of Zimbabwe ratified the iEPA. Zimtrade statistics of 2014 show that import and export business has grown significantly on the top ten products, as shown in **Table 4.1 and Table**

#### 4.2

| Product code | Product label   | European Union (EU 28)'s imports from Zimbabwe |                |                |
|--------------|---|--|----------------|----------------|
|              |   | Value in 2012                                  | Value in 2013  | Value in 2014  |
| <b>TOTAL</b> | <b>All products</b>   | <b>550,408</b>                                 | <b>528,193</b> | <b>686,445</b> |
| '170114      | Raw cane sugar, not containing added flavouring or colouring matter (excl. 1701 13) | 119,711  | 57,082         | 138,746        |
| '240120      | Tobacco, unmanufactured, partly or wholly stemmed or stripped                       | 70,159   | 122,433        | 126,162        |
| '720241      | Ferro-chromium containing by weight more than 4% of carbon                          | 146,107  | 83,255         | 91,930         |
| '710231      | Diamonds non-industrial unworked or simply sawn, cleaved or bruted                  | 25,252   | 57,076         | 68,506         |
| '710210      | Diamonds unsorted whether or not worked   | 9,499  | 36,763         | 54,552         |
| '080510      | Oranges, fresh or dried   | 18,490   | 30,320         | 31,766         |
| '251611      | Granite, crude or roughly trimmed   | 16,055   | 17,925         | 20,792         |
| '070810      | Peas, shelled or unshelled, fresh or chilled  | 11,102   | 17,383         | 20,273         |
| '410320      | Reptile skins, raw  | 16,085   | 18,711         | 18,404         |
| '240130      | Tobacco refuse  | 5,346  | 9,036          | 8,308          |

**Table 4.1: Top 10 EU IMPORTS FROM ZIMBABWE**

**UNIT: USD Thousands**

Source: ZIMTRADE

| Product code | Product label   | European Union (EU 28)'s exports to Zimbabwe |                |                |
|--------------|---|--|----------------|----------------|
|              |   | Value in 2012                                | Value in 2013  | Value in 2014  |
| <b>TOTAL</b> | <b>All products</b>   | <b>359,933</b>                               | <b>320,458</b> | <b>294,150</b> |
| '300220      | Vaccines, human use   | 896  | 261            | 25,199         |
| '100199      | Wheat and meslin (excl. seed for sowing, and durum wheat)               | 0  | 4,715          | 19,753         |
| '843143      | Parts of boring or sinking machinery, whether or not self-propelled     | 16,741                                       | 24,233         | 11,319         |
| '842951      | Front end shovel loaders  | 9,942  | 3,367          | 9,879          |
| '870323      | Automobiles w reciprocating piston engine displacg > 1500 cc to 3000 cc | 10,242                                       | 7,720          | 6,186          |
| '870333      | Automobiles with diesel engine displacing more than 2500 cc             | 3,272  | 5,070          | 6,086          |
| '300490      | Medicaments nes, in dosage  | 3,175  | 3,598          | 5,912          |
| '842230      | Mach f fil/clos/seal/etc.btle/can/box/ bag/ctnr nes,mach f aeratg bev   | 16,504                                       | 10,038         | 5,415          |
| '851762      | Machines for the reception, conversion and transmission or regeneratio  | 14,418                                       | 7,451          | 5,317          |
| '040210      | Milk powder not exceeding 1.5% fat                                      | 3,288  | 1,601          | 4,933          |

**Table 4.2: TOP 10 EU EXPORTS TO ZIMBABWE**

**Unit: US Dollar Thousands**

Source: Zimtrade

#### **4.6 CONTENTIOUS AND COMPLEX LEGISLATION IN IEPA**

Ministry of Industry and Commerce key respondent highlighted that the so called ‘Contentious’ or ‘Outstanding issues’ in the iEPA framework have been the major impediments in negotiations

for a transition from an iEPA to a comprehensive EPA from 2007 to date. The ‘rendezvous clause’ in the 2007 ESA iEPA prescribes continuous negotiations on these outstanding legislations. He stated that, “the contention ranges from the legal interpretations and their nexus with the WTO legislation governing FTAs and implications on the long term economic development of the ACPs”. In this respect eight out of the ten respondents expressed regret that the EU is fighting for the inclusion of these issues in the full EPA mainly for its offensive selfish interests. Thus the ESA states at different levels of negotiations and market access regimes backtrack into finalizing the next phase of negotiations.

#### **4.6.1 The GATT Article XXIV Legal Debate**

Research findings from Ministry of Industry and Commerce respondent indicated that the legal interpretation of the GATT XXIV phrases ‘substantially all trade’ and ‘reasonable period of time’ resulted in ACPs failing to meet the 2007 deadline and slowed the signing of comprehensive EPAs. Also the implications of ‘reciprocity’ sparked controversy. Ministry officials, NGOs, academia and political scientists disagree with the EU over the interpretation of the WTO GATT XXIV governing Regional Trade Agreements. Trojan and Hebebrand (2011:10) reiterate that, “EU interpreted ‘substantially all trade’ to mean 90% of trade between the parties and ‘reasonably period of time’ as not exceeding 15 years.” Two respondent economists raised that according to the Turkey Clause in the WTO’ ruling no agreement has been reached among the WTO parties on the legal interpretation and implication of the phrase ‘substantially all trade.’ The EU thus manipulates the phrase to its own advantage. Thus in the international system the powerful will always do what they want and the poor or weak will always comply.

EU proposed ‘asymmetrical’ liberalization namely the immediate removal of 100% of EU duties and the gradual removal of 80% of ACP countries’ duties.” Four key respondents articulated that, Zimbabwe registered the need to liberalize lower tariff thresh holds over a long period of time, taking into account its developmental needs. On the other hand the EU maintains that anything lower will open up challenges at the WTO. Ministry of Finance and Economic Development informant propounded that theoretically, “EU’ proposed asymmetrical liberalisation appears to be a fair deal given that it is liberalizing more than the ACPs (100% versus 80%). However civil society respondent from LEDRIZ noted that in Zimbabwe “revenue from import duties is the principal source of government income and constitutes a significant portion of Government’s

revenue. The quick elimination of tariffs could prejudice the government of their source of revenue to fund public service which in this case is already desperately underfunded.” Though trade volumes may increase for Zimbabwe as shown by Zimtrade statistics due to 100% DFQF access to the EU markets, one key respondent noted that “inversely highly subsidized EU imports will flood their markets heavily affecting infant industries, domestic consumption and unemployment”. Bendini et al (2012:43) indicated that only six ESA countries submitted their tariff reduction schedules, Comoros and Madagascar 81%, Zambia and Zimbabwe 80%, Mauritius 96% and Seychelles 98%. By interpretation these different tariff liberalization commitments militates against regional integration efforts or creation of a common external tariff (CET) for COMESA.

Notable arguments have been raised by an academic respondent that, “if Zimbabwe failed to eradicate poverty and underdevelopment during the 30 years of protectionism and non-reciprocal preferences under Lome Conventions and European Development Fund, it will be difficult to imagine that it will develop under trade liberalisation.” Addressing the projected impact of reciprocal liberalization Action Aid et al (2008:16) notes that, “If not carefully managed, eliminating tariffs on a wide range of products could result in significant dislocation of local producers as well as trade diversion, loss of output, exports and jobs, and increased imports with further implications for the trade balance and the debt position. In the EU-ACP negotiations, full liberalization would lead members of the East and Southern Africa (ESA) region to lose \$212 million worth of trade with each other, while the EU would increase its exports to the region by \$1, 1 billion”. One key respondent from ZNCC commented that, no country ever prospered through free trade except Britain which was the first to industrialize and other late comers practiced protectionism at one point in time. It is important to note that “even the Asean Tigers experimented with a mixture of liberalism and government protectionism” one political scientist concluded.

The researcher observed that the contentious GATT Article XXIV phrases “reciprocity’ and ‘substantially all trade’ characterizing legal debate for a transition from iEPAs to full EPAs in the period 2009 to 2014 is not a new phenomenon at all. Respondents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed a situation that has been obtaining in the multilateral WTO debates and noted that , “This contentious issue is also one of the reasons why the EU and ACP’ failed to beat the

December 31, 2007 deadline for the conclusion of EPAs.” In the international system multilateral and bilateral rules are manipulated by the rich and powerful to project their own agenda.

#### **4.6.2 Resistance to Neoliberal Political Conditionalities in iEPA**

Eight out of ten respondents highlighted that inclusion of the fundamental principles or essential elements (good governance, law, human rights and democracy) has led to an impasse in the EPA negotiations. Government respondents argued that “this issue, although it is part of the agreement which was signed and ratified, they have nothing to do with trade or development in fact it is an encroachment on sovereignty”. Meanwhile the EU maintains that “the good governance provisions of the agreement which provisions also find expression in the Cotonou Agreement are the bed rock of any socio and economic development agenda.” This position is also strengthened by the statements of the former EU Ambassador to Zimbabwe, HE Aldo Dell’ Arriccia (2014) who reiterated that, “That the sanctions are hurting the country’ citizens is myth. During the period of restrictive measures, economic and trade relations between EU and Zimbabwe have in fact been flourishing. From 2009 to 2012, our trade with Zimbabwe doubled; we are the second largest trading partner for Zimbabwe exports, and the third largest in imports to Zimbabwe. Most importantly, Zimbabwe exports to the EU are much more than it imports. Our relations with trade partners have been excellent. The interim Economic Partnership Agreement between East and Southern Africa and the regions in the Indian Ocean, signed by Mugabe, has seen Zimbabwe entering into economic partnership with the EU...” However the above statement contradict empirical evidence in chapter 2 that from Lome to Cotonou neoliberal political conditionalities guided EU’ aid and bilateral relations.

Earlier on HE ambassador Dell’Arriccia (2011:3) issued a contradictory statement, “The appropriate measure that accompany the restrictive measures are based on Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement and corporation between the African Caribbean and Pacific countries with the European Union which says that when there is the disruption of the rule of law and the democratic settings in a certain country, the European union suspends the official corporation with this country”. Correspondingly during interviews the EU key informant expressed reservations on

the impact of political conditionalities in slowing progress towards full EPAs but rather proposed that relevant ministries should be consulted on the matter.

One political scientist asserted that neoliberal political conditionalities form part of the EU' external relations with partner states, even though they are employed selectively depending on how they hinder the EU' interests. The controversial issue of including neoliberal political conditions characterizing the 2009-2014 transitional debate also contributed to an impasse in the run up to the December 31, 2007 deadline in the EPA talks. Since the time of the Lome Conventions, IMF and WB SAPs, aid and development cooperation has always been linked to political conditionalities under the Washington Consensus. The paradox is that Zimbabwe and Madagascar, ESA member states that have experienced post-election violence and a coup respectively are among the only six ESA countries to submit their tariff liberalization commitments and thresh holds, yet other member states which did not experience such disturbances has not yet either initialed or signed iEPAs.

#### **4.6.3 Most Favoured Nation Clause (MFN) Challenge**

Key respondent from the Ministry of Industry and Trade who was also a member of the EPA technical team indicated that the inclusion of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause in EPAs has derailed ESA negotiations and the ESA governments are demanding the removal of the clause from the EPA framework. A director in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development cited the MFN "as one of the key contentious issues in the conclusion of the EPA". It has been part of the contentious issues challenged by the developing parties in the WTO. Key informants from ZNCC opined that the implications of the MFN on Zimbabwe include; "... preference erosion, increased competition from EU' third parties and negative export net reduction and it hinders the existing ESA regional integration and common customs unions." These findings confirm earlier research concerning challenges in the pre-2007 negotiation phase.

According to the Stevens and Bilal (2009:85), "The basic principle for the MFN clause is simple: following the EPA, should any ACP country or grouping conclude a free trade agreement with any developed country or any other (i.e. no-EU) country or grouping which is a major trading economy, then any more favourable treatment provided to that developed country or major trading economy must also be passed on to the EU". Furthermore, Action aid, Christian Aid and Oxfam (2008:3)

asserts that, under its Global Europe strategy the EU is negotiating FTAs with India, South Korea, Andean Community, ASEAN countries, Central American nations and Mercussor countries, which negatively impacts on Zimbabwe and the ESA under the MFN. One economist interviewed noted that, “Due to numerous reciprocal EU’ FTAs, Zimbabwe’s preferential margin is severely eroded, given that the value of Africa’ contribution to EU’ markets is less than 5%, we cannot compete with Bangladesh and ASEAN textiles, Brazil’s sugar, beef and tobacco and India’ rice”.

#### **4.6.4 EU’ Stringent Rules of Origin (RoOs)**

A key respondent from the Ministry of Industry and Commerce cited the EU’ RoOs in the iEPA framework as one of the major obstacles not only for a transition to comprehensive EPAs but to poverty alleviation and development agenda in Zimbabwe. In support of the above point a respondent for the horticulture industry registered that, “the EU’ RoOs are stringent and goes beyond the WTO premises.” Bendini et al (2012:67) defines RoOs as, “Laws, regulations and administrative procedures that determine a products’ country of origin. A decision by a customs authority on origin can determine whether goods fall within a quota limitation, qualify for a tariff preference or are affected by an antidumping duty. A typical RoO would be that a certain minimum percentage of the value of the good must represent value added from within the PTA; otherwise it is subject to the tariff that importing country applies to imports from outside the PTA”. Two key respondents from the academia argued that, EU’ RoOs are a form of protectionism contrary to the EPA overall free trade objectives and promoting market access.

A snap shot survey revealed that several product categories will require to proof of origin and a movement certificate EUR 1 issued by the customs authorities. The products are typical raw materials which Zimbabwe generally capable of exporting. The product list include, Minerals and other naturally occurring products extracted from the soil or from their seabed of a country; Vegetable products harvested therein; Live animals born and raised therein; Products from live animals raised therein; Products obtained by hunting or fishing conducted there; products of aquaculture, including mariculture, where the fish are born and raised therein; Products obtained from the rivers or lakes within the Member States by vessels of that Member State; Products obtained from the sea outside the territorial waters by their vessels of a country; Used articles collected there fit only for the recovery of raw materials, including used tyres fit only for re-

treading or for use as waste; and Waste and scrap resulting from manufacturing operations conducted therein

For the above products EU also demands a declaration given by an approved exporter or by any exporter provided that the total value of the products does not exceed € 6 000. Exemption from proof of origin can only be approved when the total value of the imported products does not exceed € 500 in the case of small packages or € 1 200 in the case of products forming part of personal luggage. However a derogation may also be applied; which is simply a temporary lessening or relaxation of the law or the rules, therefore allowing preferential treatment to be accorded to products which may not strictly satisfy the criteria for "originating products".<sup>26</sup>

A political scientist stated that the implications of EU' RoOs "act as non-tariff technical barriers (NTB) to trade. Zimbabwean agricultural products, fisheries and textiles products find it difficult to access the EU markets given highly protective RoOs". One key respondent from the government noted that, "Given Zimbabwe' capacity constraints and poor infrastructure, cumulative effect and percentage of value addition for raw materials imported from other areas hinder it from enjoying DFQF market access to the EU". In addition, Action aid et al (2008:26) observed that for the EU' RoOs, "The language is so complicated and technical that it seems impossible for anyone other than the drafters to understand what would be and what would not be eligible for export to Europe" hence the debate for transition to full EPAs continues. In 2014 Zimtade posted an increase in raw can importation from Zimbabwe worth of nearly \$700 000, making it hard for the Zimbabwean refined sugar to compete with sugar manufactured in the EU market manufactured by the same cane but better with advanced technology and protected by Sugar protocol regulations.

The EU' requisite demands and application of RoOs in EPAs differs from the agreement reached at the multilateral level. ICIS (2009:52) notes that, "The first ever agreement on the subject requires WTO members to ensure that their RoOs are transparent: they are administered in a consistent, uniform, impartial and reasonable manner; and that they are based on a positive standard..." The EU application of the ROOs contradicts what has been prescribed in the above

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<sup>26</sup>[http://ec.europa.eu/taxation\\_customs/customs/customs\\_duties/rules\\_origin/preferential/article\\_785\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/preferential/article_785_en.htm)

premise. Three key respondents hinted that the situation is further complicated by ESA countries' capacity constraints, poor infrastructure and associated adjustment costs. It should be noted that the rich EU countries trade legislations are guided by personal interests rather than developmental needs of the poor countries. One key respondent from LEDRIZ hinted that most ACPs are not experienced in negotiating deals at the end they are affected by the complexities therein.

#### **4.6.5 Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) and Protectionism**

The researcher found out that some exporting industries in Zimbabwe felt sidelined and restricted by the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS) measures to access the EU markets. SPS measures are regulations and standards applied to both imported and domestic goods that aim to protect human, animal or plant life or health from pests or diseases. A respondents from the academia stated that SPS have become powerful tools to impede international trade and protect domestic producers through unjustified different requirements in different markets and unnecessary costly and time-consuming testing. Another respondent from ZNCC also noted that 'EU' SPS standards are always changing, and are becoming increasingly stringent and these changes have increased production and marketing costs for Zimbabwean products for export to the EU market.' It was also noted that regulations should not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between countries where identical or similar conditions prevail.<sup>27</sup>

The EU policy contradicts the concept of Good Agricultural Practice (GAP). ISCI (2009:50) notes that the WTO agreement on SPS, "recognizes countries' rights to adopt the standards they consider appropriate for example, for human, animal or plant life or health, for the protection of the environment or to meet other consumer interests". Eight informants noted with concern that the EU vaunts of the mutual benefits of free trade through export and import tariff reductions but inversely they protect their farmers and industries through highly technical and stringent NTBs. Practically this restricts Zimbabwe's ability to enjoy the EU' DFQF access preferences.

According to the EC Export Helpdesk portal<sup>28</sup>, export of plants and plant products must be accompanied by a plant health certificate, undergo SPS inspections, be imported by a registered importer and announced before arrival to the customs office at the point of entry. Six respondents

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<sup>27</sup> <http://www.rcz.ac.zw/index.php/home/163-public-lecture-on-the-technical-barriers-to-trade-phytosanitary-and-sanitary-measures.html>

<sup>28</sup> <http://exporthelp.europa.eu>

argued that without capacity building, technical assistance and financial assistance for adjustment costs Zimbabwe struggles to meet these standards for their goods to be competitive on the EU markets. The matter is complicated by the fact that the WTO only encourages countries to apply RoOs and SPS which conforms to the international standards but does not preclude them to use their own standards. Zimbabwe is faced with a dilemma whereby she either does not have harmonized RoOs and SPS or she is not effective at enforcing the gazzeted ones.

According to the Trades Centre bulletin (2004:4), for ACP countries, there is no capacity to check for EU' GMOs and the SPS standards stipulated by the EU are difficult for developing countries to meet. One key respondent from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development noted that, without suitable financing, infrastructure and vertically integrated industries and with stringent and costly SPS, many LDCs are not able to fully take advantage of the preferential market access. Thus the transition to comprehensive EPA has been a turbulent process with ESA states objecting to SPS clauses in iEPAs which are beneficial to the developed EU but for the poor countries they are prohibitive, protectionist, scientifically complex and expensive. Due to poor infrastructure and lack of SPS standards the implication of these measures is dumping of low quality and highly subsidized EU goods on the African markets negatively affecting the livelihoods of smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe.

The research findings show that a typical case of the NTBs and protectionism is the Zimbabwean bovine beef export ban by the EU' sanitary regulations since 2001. Zimbabwe Commercial Farmers Union respondent noted that, Zimbabwe through Cold Storage Commission used export beef to the EU market until the outbreak of the uncontrolled foot and mouth disease which contaminated the meat; hence last exported beef 2007. Confirming this ban in 2015, Ambassador Aldo Dell'Araccia, Head of the EU Delegation to Zimbabwe stated that, "Currently, the export of beef from Zimbabwe to the EU is still not authorized. Apart from the Foot and Mouth Disease initial banning, Zimbabwe cannot be eligible for bovine meat exports to the EU due to other internal regulations of the EU market." He argued that to export to the EU, Zimbabwe (like the rest of the nations exporting to the European countries) needs to comply with technical provisions in several areas: Animal Health, General Hygiene, Residue Monitoring and organisation of official controls in these areas.

The ambassador confirmed the alleged stringent sanitary and phytosanitary regulations when explained the reintroduction process of beef export to the EU. One respondent from the CFU noted that , “The beef will have to go through the rigorous evaluation on the Directorate General for Health and Consumer protection of the European Commission. If the evaluation of the plan is positive, an inspection by the Food and Veterinary Office of the EC is carried out to assess the situation on the spot.” On the supply side Zimbabwe’s CSC which used to have sophisticated and integrated facilities in Chinhoyi, Marondera and Masvingo has now collapsed. Since the EU suspended beef imports from Zimbabwe the huge annual tonnage of 9100 tonnes has been reduced to nothing<sup>29</sup>. One key responded who is an economist and a former MP stated that the “revival of the company through resuming exports to the EU was critical for the revival of many companies especially in Bulawayo where the company had its Headquarters.” He further stated that “CSC is critical to the recovery, stability and growth of the industry and will have to be revived in order to restore Zimbabwe’s economic potential.”

#### **4.7 IMPACT OF THE COLLAPSE OF WTO DOHA DEVELOPMENT ROUND**

##### **4.7.1. Offensive Bilateral Agreements**

Respondents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledged that the impasse in the prolonged WTO Doha Development Round since 2001 has an adverse influence on bilateral agreements and FTAs in which Zimbabwe was involved. Critical matters which stalled the Doha Development Round had an impact on the EPA transitional negotiations as the two were running concurrently. Analysts concurs that, what the developed nations could not secure at the multilateral level sought to achieve them at the bilateral level and in the long run the poor countries suffer.

Khor (2012:8) observed that, “Bilateral and regional FTAs between the developing countries and developing countries are proliferating. They usually contain tariff reduction commitments and disciplines deeper than at the WTO and also contain rules that are not in the WTO”. Bellmann (2014) augments this notion by stating that, “The difficulties the WTO members have experienced in bringing the Doha Round talks to a conclusion have clearly affected the ability of smaller developing countries to advance their development concerns.” One political scientist interviewed asserted that, with the fall of the Doha Development Round most developing countries are no

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<sup>29</sup> For more information visit, <http://www.cfuzim.org/>

longer willing to put development issues that affect developing countries on the table. This may also explain the EU' offensive interest in the EPA negotiations and lack of political will for increased financial commitments.

The EU key informant disputes that the Doha Round has stalled. One government informant succinctly puts it that, 'The multilateral Doha has not collapsed and in fact the last conference in Bali new agreements in some areas were achieved (including some in agricultural sector). Also Trade Facilitation Agreement was signed and implementation will start soon.'" However the much hailed Bali Conference of 2013 as a 'historic milestone' in the multilateral Doha round has been disputed by political scientists as a 'small package'. Bellman (2014) purports that, "The Bali Package consists of a series of political statements, non-binding commitments, and procedural decisions with very little tangible and immediate benefits for developing countries. This partly reflects LDCs' limited bargaining power..." One respondent, an economist purported that trade facilitation would only contribute to increasing imports, but do little to tackle supply side constraints affecting exports hence Zimbabwe and other ESA states still face challenges to reap the envisaged EPA benefits.

#### **4.7.2 EU Pursuing WTO Plus Issues**

LEDRIZ respondent noted with concern that the collapse of the pro-poor development oriented Doha Development Round of negotiations prompted the developed countries to pressurize poor countries into accepting liberalisation of services and trade related issues. The research findings obtained that in addition to the liberalisation in goods the EC is pushing for the liberalization of investment and services as part of EPAs which go beyond the current WTO commitments. The developed nations sought to achieve what they failed to secure at the multilateral level through extending preferences in exchange for WTO plus commitments from poor ACP communities. Political scientists noted that the collapse of the Doha Round coincided with policy realignments by the developed world especially the Global Europe initiative of 2006 and the US Africa initiative.

A member of the academia interviewed stated that the EU is insisting on the inclusion of the 'Singapore Issues' into the EPA framework that is investment, competition and government procurement. Such contentious issues were resisted by the developing countries at the Singapore Ministerial Conference under the Doha Development agenda and they were dropped by the WTO.

Bendini et al (2012:26) corroborates the above findings, “While defending its choice to support Doha and multilateral talks in Geneva, the EC acknowledged that the conclusion of the new round may not be within reach and redefined its external trade priorities. These include the launch of negotiations for a new generation of FTAs with stronger chapters on trade in services, investments, competition and the protection of the intellectual property rights (IPR)”. It is apparently clear that the EU is seeking to revive the agenda it failed to achieve at the multilateral level through FTAs with poor countries thus ‘WTO plus’.

Being among the ACP ESA grouping Zimbabwe is constantly being loaded with WTO plus agendas by the EU which is detrimental to developmental plans and regional integration initiatives. This perpetuates dependency as it is put under pressure to retain DFQF market access and other preferences in the name of trade liberalisation.

#### **4.7.3 Agricultural Protectionism**

Key respondent from the Ministry of Agriculture and Mechanisation confirmed that the fall of the Doha Round negatively impacted on agriculture liberalisation which also negatively impacts on EU-Zimbabwe negotiations for trade liberalisation. Another ministry of Agriculture official noted that “in addition the highly protective EU’ Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is a major impediment for Zimbabwe’s agro products.” She went on to argue “one factor that led to the collapse of the Doha talks is that the developed countries had not shown much commitment in implementing reduction schedules as regards export and domestic support subsidies for their farmers in relation to the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), furthermore EU’ farmers are heavily subsidized under CAP.” One respondent from AFRODAD supported the above view in the Zimbabwean context when he argued that, “ Whilst the EU puts pressure on Zimbabwe to conclude comprehensive EPAs, the EU has not included subsidy elimination for its agro-business in iEPAs yet demands Zimbabwe and its ESA members to do away with export subsidies and import tariffs. The implication would be the flooding of ESA markets with high quality and highly subsidized EU farm products to the detriment of ESA farmers and food security. In essence the EU promotes protectionism rather than liberalism.”

However the EU key respondent disagreed that the EU export subsidies, import support and domestic support for its farmers militates against poor farmers from ACP countries. One EU

respondent maintained that, “The EU has been forthcoming in supporting the implementation of the AoA tariff reduction commitments at a multilateral level, the CAP is under reform, the EU is phasing down subsidies over a period of time hence this guarantees ACPs DFQF preferences.” However four key respondents refutes the EU assertions and further posits that, “ the EU protects its farmers through the Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty measures (AD/AVs), SPS, RoOs, and Ad valorem duties<sup>30</sup>.” The implications for ESA countries is that due to their impecunious position, dependency on EU, capacity constraints, poor countries cannot effect these measures in times of import surges from the EU or price escalations.

According to Agritrade<sup>31</sup> ,“The OECD’ September 2013 analysis of agricultural support policies in OECD found that the EU farm support had risen from a level equivalent to 18% of farm receipts to 19% and argued that the agreement of June 2013 on CAP reform for the 2014- 2020 period does not represent a major departure from either the current orientation or the size of farm support in the 28 country bloc.” Furthermore Agritrade notes that in terms of debates on agricultural safeguards in the WTO, the EU appears through its wider policy to be pushing for only limited application of such measures.

One EU respondent stated that the EU is aware of the difficulties posed by the reform of its Common Agricultural Policy, which includes the sugar sector and is assisting Sugar Protocol countries in adjusting during this difficult period. He further noted that to support the adjustment process the EU has established an assistance scheme (2006-2013), called Accompanying Measures for Sugar Protocol Countries, under which it is providing aid to the 20 ACP Sugar Protocol Countries worth €1.25 billion for the period 2006-2013, in addition to the established European Development Fund assistance. Zimbabwe received \$19 million to support the sugar sector. This intervention in Zimbabwe forms part of the EC’s programme of Accompanying Measures for Sugar Protocol Countries for 2010. Ambassador Dell Arricia noted that “This project aims at restoring the capacity and the level of production of the sugar industry, on which the livelihood of

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<sup>30</sup> Charge levied as a percentage of value of the item it is imposed on, and not on the item's quantity, size, weight, or other such factor. Value added tax (VAT) and, generally, import duties are ad valorem taxes. Ad valorem as a percentage of their price and specific as a fixed amount per unit. They are a source of revenue for the government. Ad valorem duties provide the least protection when imports are inexpensive; conversely, protection is greatest when imports are expensive and therefore fall in volume

<sup>31</sup> <http://Agritrade.agritrade.cta.int/Agriculture>

more than 200 000 people depend.” The EU funds will also contribute to the implementation of the national land audit programme, which is critically needed to ensure a proper framework for an increased productivity of the agriculture sector in Zimbabwe. However respondents from the civic society noted that it is clear that the EU is trying to buy out its stringent measures by funding the sector but that will not help to spur trade. This was also confirmed by Tongaat Hulett (Tongaat) executive when he stated that “sugar exports from Zimbabwe to the European Union (EU) are unviable due to the high cost of producing the commodity in the southern African country and the tough regulations imposed by the western economic trade bloc made it difficult for African sugar exporters to make profit.’ He also noted that “The European Community has determined that the price of sugar in the EU should be traded at prices as close to world market pricing”

An economist and a former CEO of CZI interviewed registered that, “the dilemma confronting our country is that the EU is on the driving seat initiating and spearheading all the agendas for its own benefit. The developed EU has a clear-cut and consistent plan of action for the next 30 years but African states are either inconsistent with their programs or are recipients of foreign agendas.” Khor (2012:6) augments that, “Over the years development in developing countries has been undermined often as a result of wrong-headed policy prescriptions from international financial institutions and the inequitable provisions of bilateral and multilateral agreements”. The above scenario characterizing EU-Zimbabwe EPA negotiations vindicates the argument that, dependency is the historical condition which shapes a certain structure of the world economy such that it favours some countries to the detriment of others and limit the development possibilities of the subordinate economies (Ferraro. 2008).

#### **4.8 CIVIL SOCIETY AWARENESS CAMPAIGNS**

SAPEZ respondent noted that the STOP EPA campaigns in Europe and Africa almost derailed the transition from iEPA to full ESA EPA. One political economist at the University of Zimbabwe noted that, “Civil society acted as the ‘watchdog’ in the process. It did a lot of relevant research for African countries so that they did not sign agreements harmful to African economies. They provided background papers for the negotiations and these were well grounded” and Kwa et al (2014:53) argues, “Furthermore, civil society in the region is highly critical of the view that the EPA perpetuates the unequal trading relationship with Europe. Adverse effects on regional integration, the elusiveness of adequate development aid and the impact of liberalisation are often

cited as major concerns”. This reflects the contribution of the ‘Bottom-Up’ (Goldstein and Pavehouse. 2012) politics model in shaping up decisions and guiding as regards EPA negotiations.

Analysts and researchers in earlier works casted doubt on the comparable impact of the ‘STOP EPA’ campaigns in influencing negotiation outcome during the first phase of the ACP EU EPA negotiations. They opine that civil society has minimal powers to influence policy outcomes. However, one EU respondent argued that the role of the civil society, “has been one of lobbying and advocacy mainly against the EPAs. ... but the majority if not all CSOs have not taken the time to read the EPA document and gain a deeper understanding of its provisions; opportunities and challenges arising from the EPAs. This has tended to confuse the debate on EPAs, for example CSOs remain stuck in past, the negotiation phase without realizing that the country has already signed the agreement and debate must move a gear up to discuss how best the country can benefit from the agreement. When the government ratified the I-EPA in 2012, surely they must have realized that there is something good in it for Zimbabwe and this where the debate should focus.”

#### **4.9 LACK OF AN ALL INCLUSIVE NEGOTIATION PROCESS**

In response to an interview question on the credentials of Zimbabwean negotiators and consultations between the negotiating state and non-state actors, a key Ministry of Foreign Affairs respondent expressed that the scenario has been dominated by inconsistencies and a monopolistic approach by the political circles. This also explains why conclusion of a comprehensive full EPA has delayed. The EPA negotiation structure comprise of; “Lead Ministers/Spokespersons, Lead Ambassadors/spokespersons, Lead and other Ambassadors, capital based officials, NGO representatives and the Secretariats (Trade Centre. 2004 and Bendini et al. 2012. 25).

In view of the knowledge and expertise of negotiators ,an economist highlighted that, “In some ESA countries even parliamentarians and diplomats are ignorant of these issues but Zimbabwean negotiators were aptly knowledgeable in the technical and legal issues however the GNU phase since 2009 brought in a challenges of inconsistencies due to the political dynamics but eventually it was for the good as the ratification was done under the GNU. Political scientists also noted that a sour relationship prevailing between Zimbabwe and the civil bodies and NGOs means that unpopular decisions on critical issues are made by a few members of the political elite. Such a top-down politics model undermines informed policy decisions in Zimbabwean negotiations.

#### 4.10 REGIONAL INTEGRATION

Ministry of Industry and Trade respondent stated that regional integration remains a mammoth task under the iEPA transitional period. He further assert that the multiple memberships or the spaghetti bowl nightmare which characterized the pre-2007 negotiating phase still haunts the current iEPA transitional negotiations. In essence the perceived and anticipated CPA regional integration at both the micro and macro level has stalled and due to a plethora of complications. The European Commission website<sup>32</sup> acknowledges this complication, “Eastern and Southern Africa is a diverse Economic Partnership Agreement group, including Indian Ocean islands (Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles), countries from the Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan) and some countries of Southern Africa (Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe). Regional integration remains a challenge for this region.” The complex geographical composition of the ESA group militates against the CPA regional integration objective.

Key respondent from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested that “impediments derailing regional integration and a speedy conclusion of a comprehensive EPA stems from the multiplicity of COMESA countries affiliated to different regional alignments and negotiating EPAs as different blocs in comparison to a unified EU. Various regional constellations include: EAC, COMESA, ESA, SACU and BLNS countries.” In this vein Bendini et al (2012:44) highlighted that “It is for this reason that the EU officials have indicated that ESA is a possible case for an EPA with variable geometry. This would mean that some countries sign on to more commitments than others”. The ESA EPA is further complicated by the fact that the region comprises of LDCs and non LDCs, different market access regimes under iEPA, different liberalisation thresholds and implementation time frames and different goods exclusion categories. Also the selfish interests and suspicions inherent within ACP negotiating groups is incomparable to the offensive single minded EU bloc.

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<sup>32</sup> <http://www.ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/esa/>

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs respondent further pointed out that, “regional integration is further impeded by so many fears among ESA countries of the anticipated negative outcomes which include: loss of government revenues, trade diversion, infant industry, supply side constraints lack of funding and loss of economic sovereignty.” The Euroactive website <sup>33</sup>notes that,“If so many Africans are dragging their feet, it is because they fear heavy financial losses after customs duties are abolished. They also worry about the influx of European products, which will become more competitive on the African market because of customs exemptions...” One respondent opined that South Africa a member of SACU, SADC and COMESA has a separate trade deal with the EU and SA was among the first to resist the idea of using a single currency in SADC out of fear that de industrializing countries like Zimbabwe might affect the performance of the Rand.

One economist noted that “The creation of a common external tariff amalgamating EAC, COMESA and SADC has dragged than anticipated. More so South Africa is more inclined to its BRICS partners than local regional initiatives.” The SADC countries reached an agreement with the EU regarding the SADC EPA in July 2014 hence this further complicates regional integration initiatives. Research findings reveal that overlapping membership greatly contributed to the failure of regional integration during the first phase of EPA negotiations. In the second transitional phase inherent contradictions in the iEPA framework, different liberalization schedules and market access regimes further divide the ESA countries hence derailing the conclusion of a comprehensive EPA.

#### **4.11 SUMMARY**

This chapter presented qualitative data analysis from 10 respondents through the coding system. It established that trade liberalisation guiding EPAs is at variance with CPA objective. It has been noted that despite the EU’s ultimate objective of the full normalisation of relations with Zimbabwe in the attainment of the country’s aspirations which include consolidation of democracy, peace and stability, prosperity and sustainable development, the EPAs have some stringent regulations attached to the trading relationship. The chapter established links between overall research findings and chapter 1, chapter 2 and chapter 3 methodology. Qualitative findings were corroborated with

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<sup>33</sup> <http://www.euroactive.com/special-reports>,

quantitative document statistics. The chapter further illustrated that the turbulent process in the pre-2007 negotiating phase also characterize the second IEPA transitional phase.

## **CHAPTER 5; SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **5.1 INTRODUCTION**

This final chapter basically summarizes the whole research processes as well as the presentation of a review of the research process and constraints encountered. It highlights the major key findings and conclusions based on the assessment of EU-Zimbabwe evolving trade relations through the EPAs linked to the research topic and research objectives in chapter one. The chapter also presents research recommendations in relation to discussions and findings in chapter four and finally recommendations for further research are made.

### **5.2 SUMMARY**

#### **5.2.1 Summary of the Research**

The purpose of the research was assess the major impact of EPAs on Zimbabwean economy from 2009 to date. The research gave a panoramic view on the how trade and development relationship between the EC then EU and ACPs and in particular Zimbabwe evolved over a period of 50 years. It traced the evolvement of the relationship from the Rome Treaty up to the Cotonou partnership Agreement establishing the ESA-EPA negotiations in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Through intensive document review it established the rationale motivating EU-ACP EPAs negotiations, ratification and implementation.

The research indicated that EPAs are WTO compatible trade preferences unilaterally granted by the EU to ACP trading partners. The major objectives of EPAs can be summarized as poverty reduction, sustainable development, regional integration and overall ACP' integration into the world economy. The objectives where tailor made to replace the 30 year old non-reciprocal Lome

preferences which violated the WTO GATT MFN principle governing trade. It emanates that EPAs are the EU' ambitious program if implemented to fruition.

The discussions on EU-Zimbabwe EPAs and the literature review process were informed by the trade liberalism theory. A perusal of the EU websites, working papers, policy papers and impact assessments proved that the EU-ESA negotiation process have been marred with controversy and various challenges emanating from both sides but the EPAs have been ratified in Zimbabwe including the National Indicative Programme. The literature review indicated that the EPA negotiations failed to meet the 2007 deadline when the waiver granted by the WTO expired. This necessitated the signing of the EU-ESA iEPA in 2009. The research showed that iEPAs were concluded under pressure the EU hence 4 out of the 10 ESA countries managed to sign iEPAs in 2009. The transitional negotiations from iEPAs to full EPAs has been derailed by a series of contentious technical issues. Despite these contentious issue Zimbabwe and EU have been making some considerable strides in normalizing relations after the lapsing of the Article 96 measures. Some sectors of the economy have benefited from the DFQF market access while others have not.

In this research the qualitative research paradigm was used due to the nature of the study which seeks qualitative data and opinions of trade technocrats in the EU-ESA negotiations. In this respect a Case Study research design was chosen because case inquiry takes a holistic elaboration of real life events, has a heuristic impact and seeks to address the 'Why' and 'How' questions. The non-probability purposive sampling technique was employed to select interview technocrats with the requisite technical expertise. The advantage of purposive sampling was that the researcher had a choice in selecting EU-ESA respondents representing different population parameters. Data was analyzed through the coding system and linked to the research questions and objectives in chapter one.

Major constraints in the research include the ESA Embassy officials who were either not accessible or hesitant to release information citing security reasons in releasing classified information. One embassy official professed that the issues are too technical to be handled by his Consulate. However the EU embassy was cooperated well in responding to interview questions and even providing additional material and relevant websites. It was noted with regret that Zimbabwe has a deficiency of research centers. More so some of the targeted government ministries in Zimbabwe

neither cooperated nor did they value research instead treat it with suspicion, except the Ministry of Industry and Commerce which provided valuable information. Nevertheless the EU websites, members of the academia in the field of political science, economists and some civic centers provided relevant data for the success of the whole research process and they were corroborated with documentary search.

### **5.2.2 Summary of Findings**

Even though some challenges and limitations were encountered in the research field, the inquiry unearthed significant findings in relation to the research topic and objectives.

Most respondents noted that EPAs have taken so long mainly due to the realisation by the government that EPAs are at variance with the developmental dimension. They are designed to suffice the EU' commercial interests. The ambitious EPA objectives do not match with the empirical evidence.

The research unearthed that the drive by the EU for a WTO plus agenda immensely affected a speedy conclusion of comprehensive ESA EPA. In the same logic the legal interpretation and application of the WTO GATT Article XXIV has been a thorny issue in the negotiations.

All respondents acknowledged that the contentious issues in the iEPA sparked a legal row between the EU and Zimbabwean negotiating partners. The EU' legislation governing trade and market access are too complicated given the Zimbabwean capacity constraints especially RoOs, NTBs, and SPS measures.

The research findings also established that the collapse of the Doha Development Round has had a negative impact on Zimbabwe. The developed countries are pursuing their own offensive interests through FTAs with the developing world and also trying to include contentious issues dropped at the Doha Round.

Furthermore the findings indicated that the iEPAs doomed from the onset. This is due to the Rendezvous Clause which gave room for further negotiations on sensitive matters covering not

only trade in goods but in services, trade facilitation and trade related aspects. The local government negotiators and technocrats felt that they were being shortchanged and negotiation under duress and amidst threats from the EU.

### **5.3 CONCLUSIONS**

From the above findings the researcher was able to infer the following conclusions in relation to the research topic, assumptions and theoretical framework. The conclusions are also answers to the research questions and research objectives. The conclusions include:

A perusal of the evolvement of the trade and development relations between the EU and Zimbabwe has shown unsatisfactory results. Whether under the non-reciprocal Lome preferences or the reciprocal EPAs trade volumes and statistics between Zimbabwe and the EU are in favor of the latter. The value of Zimbabwe's contribution to world trade and exports to the EU has been insignificant. What has only changed in the EU-Zimbabwe relationship are policies and preferences but the EU' permanent commercial interests in former colonies remain. In this manner there is no catalyst to motivate Zimbabwe to conclude comprehensive EPAs with the EU.

An analysis of the Zimbabwean exports to the EU from the Rome Treaty of 1957 to the Cotonou Partnership Agreement indicates that the EU' exports are mainly dominated by machinery, pharmaceutical products and chemicals and EU imports from Zimbabwe are mainly raw products including minerals, tobacco, flowers, textiles and sugar. Zimbabwe's comparative advantage in unprocessed raw products and without value addition cannot be compared with EU' comparative advantage in manufactured products. This negates the trade liberalism theoretical benefits of comparative advantage under trade liberalisation. This invokes the neo-Marxist dependency school argument that the global capitalist structural imbalances reduced poor ACPs into exporters of raw materials and recipients of finished goods.

It can be concluded that the EU' WTO compatible EPAs rationale is only a scapegoat being used to defend its trade policies with the country. The major crux of the matter are the post-Cold-war geostrategic competition from the rising economies of Asia. What is unfolding is a non-military

smart re-colonization of Africa whether under the conditional Washington consensus or the non-conditional Beijing Consensus. Zimbabwe and other ACPs are in a dilemma whether to disengage or disengage with the EU or to continue engagement.

Neoliberal political conditionalities including essential elements: rule of law, democracy and good governance continue to characterize the Washington Consensus developmental policies from Lome up to Cotonou. It has to be noted that under such demands ACPs failed to make a breakeven under the nonreciprocal Lome preferences WB and IMF SAPs which further worsened balance of payments and social service delivery in ESA countries like Zimbabwe and Zambia. Aid dependency continue to lure poor countries into adopting Western prescribed neoliberal policies to the detriment of their economies and livelihoods. This also explains why African technocrats and negotiators have been dragging their feet into concluding full EPAs.

It can be concluded that the developing countries are using their influence and economic muscle in manipulating the WTO GATT legal system in FTAs at the expense of the poor countries. The EU' interpretation of the 'substantially all trade' and 'reciprocity' militates against the EPA objectives: poverty reduction, development and ACPs' integration into the world economy. The EU is mainly chasing offensive commercial self-interests through EPAs. It would be foolhardy to imagine that Zimbabwean companies can fully reap the benefits of commercial liberalisation whilst dealing with a first world industrialized EU. In this respect the theoretical benefits of free trade do not match with the empirical evidence.

Notably whether iEPAs or no iEPAs the challenges confronting the Zimbabwean economy remain the same. The EU is acting as big brother on the steering dictating policy and Zimbabwe is a mere recipients. The initialing of iEPAs under duress proves that the former colonial power and the metropolitan EU continue to dictate the pace for the satellite states like Zimbabwe. This emanates from a long history on engagement through slave trade, mercantilism, colonialism and neoliberalism. With the October 2014 deadline for the expiration of the MAR 1528/2007 Zimbabwe was under pressure to sign iEPAs hence the initialing and ratification by 2012. Thus power determines winners and losers in international economic relations.

Furthermore it can be concluded that various contentious issues in iEPA reveals the power asymmetry between the EU and Zimbabwe It is apparently clear that the power and influence that

characterize developed powers in the multilateral WTO trading system continue to impede negotiations under bilateral agreements. The EU imposes stringent rules (SPS, RoOs and NTBs) contrary to what has been agreed at the WTO. It entails that contrary to the trade liberalisation rhetoric the EU is advancing protectionism for its industry and farmers.

The collapse of the multilateral Doha Development Round has been a sad development for the poor economies of the world. This has resulted in developed countries like the EU pursuing their own agendas through FTAs. The EU is pursuing trade plus related aspects in iEPAs. It rolls back to the realist conception that the international system is anarchical and states pursue power, wealth, security and selfish interest.

It emerged that the EPA agenda for regional and gradual integration into the world economy is a far-fetched agenda. The EU' divide and rule strategy in EPA negotiations under separate configurations has weakened the power and one voice of the developing and LDCs in the multilateral WTO negotiations. Thus the divide and rule weapon has often been a common weapon of the strong against the weak. Zimbabwe and other ESA states may be left with no choice than to conclude the EPAs given that SADC group concluded in July 2014. The EPA integration agenda is being fast tracked in comparison with the integration of the EC then EU which commenced with smaller countries and grew gradually over a long period of time.

One may conclude that there has not been effective consultations and awareness campaigns on the part of the government in the EPA negotiating agenda as mainly government officials and a few selected members were involved. Notably in some cases government officials are novices in negotiating international trade deals versus the experienced EU. This has detrimental long term implications for the country and developmental plans. More so the EU is in the forefront in preparing the agenda, crafting the policies, funding the process and at the end Zimbabweans are mere recipients. The former colonizer the EU has a long term well prepared strategy for Zimbabwe, yet the latter has no strategy on the table for the EU. Thus the developed may extend a hand to the developing world but it is hardly out of benevolence only.

#### **5.4 FINAL POSITION**

The EPA objectives are high sounding and colorful for Zimbabwe. The final standpoint position in this research is that the EU- Zimbabwe EPAs negotiations and implementation are not mutually beneficial as the developed EU and developing Zimbabwe are not equal trading partners. In the EU- Zimbabwe trade relationship, the theoretical benefits of trade liberalisation are at variance with what is on the ground despite the micro droplets of the NIP funding. The relationship is promoting Zimbabwe's economic dependency on the EU. The complex WTO rules, iEPA contentious issues and complicated ESA regional configuration impeded upon a speedy conclusion of EPAs.

## **5.5 RECOMMENDATIONS**

Given the above findings and conclusions, this study recommends:

- To enjoy comparative advantage of Zimbabwean raw materials, legislations and efforts should be speeded up towards value addition and beneficiation. This would entail the realization of the August 2014, 34<sup>th</sup> SADC Summit agenda, 'SADC Strategy for Economic Transformation: Leveraging the Region' Diverse Resources for Sustainable Economic and Social Development through Beneficiation and Value Addition.'
- Due to its previous experience in dealing with the West, Zimbabwe should pursue other alternatives including engagement with the East, South-South cooperation but being cautious of avoiding another form of colonization. Zimbabwe and other African governments need to make radical decisions not those decisions emanating from the West. There is no need to speedily conclude EPAs in a panic mode.
- The government of Zimbabwe should address issues of corruption, embezzlement of donor funds and lack of accountability by government officials. Zimbabwe has a vast array of precious resources which can be utilized to finance local projects including infrastructure development, power and telecommunications if the Harare administration is accountable
- Zimbabwe and the ESA should prioritize home grown solutions for regional integration and economic development rather than the Western prescribed solutions. COMESA politicians and trade ministers should show commitment in establishing a Tripartite

Common Customs Union cooperating EAC, COMESA and SADC. More resources should be channeled towards the harmonization of the customs tariffs, trade facilitation, transport and information systems

- The African countries should negotiate with the EU as a unified bloc rather than giving in to the EPA regional configurations. The EU 28-plus negotiates as a single bloc and the negotiating team represents the interest of all countries. African states should confront the EU as a single bloc both at the multilateral and bilateral levels.
- Zimbabwe should establish 'Inner Circles' of technocrats from different fields to negotiate deals rather than either as single ministries or the political elites without technical expertise on the legal implications of these deals on the economy and livelihoods.
- There should be a concerted effort by the Zimbabwean government to resist incorporating issues either rejected at the multilateral WTO level or those issues still being debated.
- There is need for a home funded impact assessments and Zimbabwe should implement issues raised in these impact assessments. The government should value research, promote awareness forums, debate these issues in parliament and conduct consultations with key stake holders before rushing into suicidal deals.
- A study and experiment with the model of development implemented by the Asean Tigers that is a mixture of protectionism and liberalism may be attempted by the government since the Western model has proved disastrous over the years.

## **5.6 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH**

Areas for further study identified in this research include;

- ✚ A quantitative assessment of EPAs on the SADC region which signed EPAs in July 2014.
- ✚ A quantitative comparison of AGOA and EPAs in COMESA countries.
- ✚ An evaluation of the impact of EPAs on the infant industries and smallholder farmers in ESA states.
- ✚ An assessment of the effects of the spaghetti bowl in EPA implementation

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**APPENDIX 1; PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM**

**STUDY TITLE;** Economic Partnership Agreements and the Zimbabwean Economy since 2009:  
A Case Study

**RESEARCHER;** B13367476

Dear Participant

I am a Masters in International Relations student carrying out a research on the impact of the Economic Partnership Agreements on the Zimbabwean economy since 2009 to present. This study is a prerequisite to complete my Masters Dissertation and program completion. The study is purely for academic purposes only.

As one of the identified participants, I hereby seek your voluntary consent to go ahead with my interviews. Your identity will not be used in the write-up and data will be handled confidentially.

Thank You for your cooperation.

**Participant’s signature..... Date .....**

**Researcher’s signature..... Date .....**

**APPENDIX 2; APPLICATION LETTER TO MINISTRY**

No 6 Chatham Rd

Eastlea

Harare

12 August 2015

The Permanent Secretary

Ministry of .....

.....

Dear Sir/Madam

**RE: APPLICATION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH WITH YOUR MINISTRY**

The above matter refers. Permission is hereby sought to conduct a Masters research with your Ministry. I, B1336747 am a student at the Bindura University of Science education (BUSE) doing research for a Masters Degree in International Relations.

My research topic reads, '**Economic Partnership Agreements and the Zimbabwean Economy since 2009: A Case Study.**'

This research is purely for academic purposes. Research ethics including voluntary consent and anonymity will be put into consideration. Your identity will not be revealed in the data analysis and coding. See the attached BUSE letter of research attached.

Thank you for your usual co-operation.

Yours Faithfully

Student number B1336747

## **APPENDIX 3; INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR KEY RESPONDENTS**

**BINDURA UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE EDUCATION**

**DEPARTMENT OF PEACE AND GOVERNANCE**

**B1336747**

**PROGRAMME; MSc International Relations**

**CONTACT DETAILS;**

**Email :**

**DISSERTATION INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR THE ACADEMIA**

**RESEARCH TOPIC: Economic Partnership Agreements and the Zimbabwean Economy since 2009: A Case Study**

1. Do Zimbabwean EPAs negotiators have the conceptual understanding of the EU free trade trajectory in the 21<sup>st</sup> century?
2. What would Zimbabwe benefit from Lome to Cotonou Agreement paradigm shift by the EU?
3. How practical is the regional integration initiative under EPAs?
4. Will Zimbabwe have global market access under a full EPA?
5. What evidence in the Zimbabwean economy point to the impact of EPAs?
6. What are the possible alternatives for Zimbabwe beyond the EPAs?
7. What impact will free trade policy implementation have on the sectors of the economy?
8. What conflicts remain between the WTO and the EPAs
9. Why is the ratification of a full EPA facing impediments?
10. How has the inclusion of political clauses comparatively impacted on the reciprocity of the trade partnership
11. What recommendations do you have on the economic policies which the Zimbabwean government and EU should pursue for the benefit of the trade and commerce at a multilateral level?

## **APPENDIX 4; INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR KEY RESPONDENTS**

**BINDURA UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE EDUCATION**

**DEPARTMENT OF PEACE AND GOVERNANCE**

**B1336747**

**PROGRAMME; MSc International Relations**

**CONTACT DETAILS;**

**Email :**

### **DISSERTATION INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR GOVERNMENT MINISTRY**

**RESEARCH TOPIC: Economic Partnership Agreements and the Zimbabwean Economy since 2009: A Case Study**

1. What are the credentials of the Zimbabwean EPAs negotiators?
2. What challenges confront Zimbabwe in accessing the EU markets?
3. What motivated Zimbabwe to initial iEPAs in 2009?
4. How practical is the regional integration initiative under EPAs?
5. How do you assess the role played by the Civil Society and other non- state actors in the EPA negotiation process?
6. Which sectors of the economy have benefited from the EPAs and how much has been contributed to the Treasury, specify products that have been exported to EU under the EPAs?
7. What are the possible alternatives for Zimbabwe if it fail to conclude EPAs?
8. What impact will free trade policy implementation have on the sectors of the economy?
9. What effect does the Most Favoured Nation Clause has on EPA implementation and free trade policies of the WTO
10. Why is the ratification of a full EPA facing impediments?
11. How has the inclusion of political clauses comparatively impacted on the reciprocity of the trade partnership

**12.** What are your recommendations on the state of the Zimbabwean economy and EPAs

## **APPENDIX 5; INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR GENERAL RESPONDENTS**

**BINDURA UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE EDUCATION**

**DEPARTMENT OF PEACE AND GOVERNANCE**

**B1336747**

**PROGRAMME; MSc International Relations**

**CONTACT DETAILS;**

**Email :**

**DISSERTATION INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR CIVIL SOCIETY/ CORPORATES**

**RESEARCH TOPIC: Economic Partnership Agreements and the Zimbabwean Economy since 2009: A Case Study**

1. What is the major role did your organisation play in the negotiation and implementation of EPAs
2. What are the interests being pursued by the EU in the EPA negotiations?
3. Do Zimbabwean Negotiators and even the government have leverage in the EPA negotiations?
4. What socio-political value do the EPAs impede upon; during and after negotiations?
5. How do you assess the role of civil society in your country' EPA negotiations?
6. What are the major concerns and worries confronting civil society/Companies on the implementation EPAs in Zimbabwe?
7. How has the ratification of iEPA improved the livelihoods of Zimbabweans
8. How has domestic politics impacted the current multilateral trade regime?
9. What recommendations would you propose for the EU-Zimbabwe EPA negotiations and implementation?

