

BINDURA UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE EDUCATION



**SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY AND THE MILITARY-LED
TRANSITION IN ZIMBABWE.**

By

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Abstract

The study sought to research on how military-led transition may lead to democracy. Regional bodies such as SADC may be instrumental in the democratization process. Between 2008 and 2017, the Zimbabwe military was often involved in politics resulting in alternation of power in November 2017. In order to unravel this paradox, a qualitative research design informed by a constructivist philosophical world view was employed. Data was collected from one hundred participants through interviews, questionnaires and document analysis. Respondents were drawn from the military, politicians, academia, embassies and general public through purposive and snowballing sampling. The study established that when an authoritarian leader is removed from power, the democraticness of his removal may be eclipsed by the general desire of the nation-state to see such a leader gone. In 2017, military intervention in Zimbabwean politics did not lead to democracy but to liberalisation though with evidence of reversion to autocracy but the study is optimistic that democracy will eventually come after two or three elections. Having also been frustrated by Mugabe stayism as well as authoritarianism and buoyed by snippets of liberalization, SADC generally supported the military-led transition in Zimbabwe in 2017. The study concluded that power politics and national interests are more important than democracy in international relations. It is therefore recommended that SADC and the international community walk the talk on democracy regardless of the moral benefits to the contrary (227 words).

Key terms

Military-led transition, Democratization, Regional body, Military intervention, Liberalization, National interests, Stayism.

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I declare that this dissertation, SADC and military-led transition in Zimbabwe: 2008-2019, which I have submitted for the MSc International Relations at Bindura University of Science Education (BUSE) has not been submitted for any degree or whatever qualification anywhere in the world.

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Date

...../11/2019

I hereby approve the final submission of this dissertation.

..... Supervisor

Dr D.N Mahuku

Date

...../11/2019

DEDICATION

To my wife, MaTshabalala

And

To all those fighting for democracy under different dictatorships in their countries, military or otherwise. Remember you are fighting a good cause, the darkest hour is always before dawn!

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

| | |
|----------------|--|
| AGOA | African Growth and Opportunities Act |
| AU | African Union |
| CMR | Civil Military Relations |
| FRELIMO | Front for the Liberation of Mozambique |
| G40 | Generation 40 |
| GNU | Government of National Unity |
| ICGLR | International Conference of the Great Lakes Region |
| EU | European Union |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |
| FL | Frontline States |
| IR | International Relations |
| MDC | Movement for Democratic Change |
| MDC-A | Movement for Democratic Change-Alliance |
| MJF | Movement for Freedom and Justice |
| MPLA | Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola |
| NDC | National Defence Council |
| NPP | National Patriotic Party |
| NRM | National Resistance Movement |
| OPDSC | Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation |
| ORL | Operation Restore Legacy |

| | |
|----------------|---|
| PNDC | Provisional National Defence Council |
| SADC | Southern Africa Development Community |
| SWAPO | South West people's Organization |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council |
| US | United States |
| USA | United States of America |
| ZANU PF | Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front |

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the study

There is generally reluctance by African leaders to handover political power when the law, health or age no longer permits them to continue in office. The New York Times (24 December 2008) for example reports that Lansana Conte, a former president of Guinea died in office on 23 December 2008 after having been in office for over twenty-four years without naming a successor. In most instances, such leaders stay in power by rigging elections, rigging tenure prolongation procedures (Uganda's Museveni in 2002) or simply denying office to winners, among other options [(Mugabe refusal to handover of power to the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) who had won the internationally free and fair acclaimed March 2008 initial round of elections according to Southall, 2017)].

More often than not, there are no other ways of removing such powerful leaders from office. Powell (2014) observes that such a vacuum creates opportunities for the military to remove such leaders with the military often styling their action under democracy despite the military sometimes having a bad record in terms of democracy. Omotola (2011) argues that in Africa, armies have a history of corruption, authoritarianism and intolerance hence cannot be trusted with power. Finer (1962) argues that the military cannot govern (thus cannot be trusted with democracy) simply because they have no technical ability to govern and even if they have it, they lack legitimacy should they govern. Ironically, in 2012, post coup countries were four times likely to transition to democracy than those who had not. Focusing on authoritarian governments assisted by the military to take-over power without also paying attention to success stories like Ghana lead to bias in any analysis (Powell, 2014).

In 2017, Mugabe who had been in power since independence on 18 April 1980 was removed from office with the assistance of the military in Zimbabwe in an operation the military code-named, 'Operation Restore Legacy' (ORL) which Ndimande and Moyo (2018) call a military-

inspired take-over or soft coup. He (Mugabe) had on numerous occasions refused to name a successor. Mugabe's stayism led to a lot of factionalism all geared towards succession. Mugabe cleverly played the factional race to his advantage promoting Joyce Mujuru to the vice-presidency in 2004 against publicly Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front party (ZANU PF) internally-elected Mnangagwa, dismissing Mujuru in 2014 and replacing her with the military-backed Mnangagwa and attempting to have his wife to the vice-presidency by firing Mnangagwa on 6 November 2017.

Whilst, this factional succession matrix ensued, Zimbabwe was economically, socially and politically burning. These factors ganged up together leading to the military intervention on 14 November 2017. The general populace supported the military intervention with even the then-MDC president, Morgan Tsvangirai thanking the same military which had prevented him from assuming office in 2008 (Rodgers, 2019). On the 18th of November 2017 when there were rumours that the then usually pro-Mugabe SADC was to respond, the people went onto the streets demanding Mugabe resignation, raising placards against SADC that Zimbabwe should go it alone. To Pickering and Peceny (2006) such public approval of military intervention is a form of legitimacy. Obviously, the belief among the populace was that democracy was to come after years of Mugabe personal dictatorship but whether this came out to be true is something else. The military argued they were executing their constitutional mandate of promoting the interests of Zimbabwe by 'targeting criminals around the President' (Major General SB Moyo ZBC Address, 15 November 2017).

The issue of the correlation that exists between the involvement of the military in politics and democratization in Zimbabwe requires academic interrogation. Rodgers, (2019) notes that during the initial period of the military intervention, the military took over public policing duties for up to five weeks as they did not trust the police long known for being loyal to deposed Mugabe.

1.2 Purpose of the study

The study sought to understand the relationship between military involvement in politics and democratization with particular emphasis on the role the SADC played in Zimbabwe in the 2017 military-led transition.

1.3 Statement of the problem

Although the military intervened in politics arguing they wanted to lead the country away from Mugabe's type of authoritarian administration, what is perplexing is that the opposition and many Zimbabweans say the Second Zimbabwean Republic is more authoritarian. This is despite the existence of SADC to superintend over democratization in member states. In Zimbabwe, military intervention in politics which reached its climax with a military-led political transition in November 2017 has been seen by others as the same bus that had simply changed the driver whilst others consider it a vehicle for democracy after considering different issues such as the manner in which SADC reacted to it. Against this background, this dissertation sought to refine understanding on whether military-led transition in Zimbabwe done in full view of SADC may be a vehicle for democratization.

1.4 Research Objectives

The objectives of the study were;

- ❖ To discuss the reasons for military-led transition in Zimbabwe in 2008-2017
- ❖ To examine whether the military-led transition led to democracy
- ❖ To assess the role of SADC in Zimbabwe's military-led transition

1.5 Research Questions

In order to pursue the above objectives, the study was guided by the following research questions;

- ❖ What were the reasons for military-led transition in Zimbabwe in 2008-2017?
- ❖ Did the military-led transition lead to democracy?
- ❖ What role did SADC play in Zimbabwe's military-led transition?

1.6 Assumptions of the study

This dissertation was based on three principal assumptions namely;

- ❖ that military intervention in politics is to promote democratization
- ❖ that military intervention in politics may be a vehicle for democratization

- ❖ that regional bodies such as SADC influence democratization or authoritarianism in member states

1.7 Significance of the study

The researcher opines that this research work is important to different stakeholders two of them being SADC and other researchers. To SADC, the study sought to help the regional body to self-introspect on their role when the military is involved in democratization. The study is timely as it provides analysis to a recent issue (2017 military intervention in Zimbabwe) to the body so that SADC can evaluate whether it can provide regional solutions to a regional challenge. To other researchers, it seeks to add a voice to the debate surrounding the ability or lack thereof of the military in democratization within a regional security complex.

1.8 Delimitations of the study

The study is guided by a scope, spatial and temporal delimitation. On scope delimitation, the mainstay of the study is SADC and the military-led transition in Zimbabwe between 2008 and 2019 but with much weight on the November 2017. The research does not go into much details of the intervention such as its legality or constitutionality but accepts it just as military intervention or what Huntington (1991) calls transformation. Other forms of democratization such as replacement and transplacement are therefore ignored. The study accepts that democracy has a plethora of features but considers democratic elections, civil society and multi-partyism as the sine qua non of democracy. Last but not least on the scope delimitation is that out of the sixteen SADC countries, only Zimbabwe is studied in full with other states being referred to sparingly. Zimbabwe does not proffer defensible representativeness but is instructive in this regard on common trends found in SADC in its generality. On spatial delimitation, the study considers only SADC member states in as much as they relate to democratization in Zimbabwe with any other states being relegated to the periphery. Finally on temporal delimitation, the study focused only on the period March 2008 to September 2019. 2008 is chosen as it the time when military intervention in Zimbabwe politics became more open and 2017 is chosen since it was the climax of that intervention. 2019 was the year the results of the intervention became clearer.

1.9 Limitations of the study

Bureaucracy during the research particularly from political parties led to the withholding of some primary data leading to the use of secondary data and reliance on reasonable inferences. The researcher, who witnessed the period under review, also went into the streets to celebrate the demise of the Mugabe regime. The researcher however tried to be as objective as possible but obviously, this has a bearing on the study.

1.10 Definitions of key terms

The researcher defined key terms operationalised in this research as follows;

- ❖ **Authoritarian regime:** A government that suppresses democratic rights of its people (Huntington, 1991).
- ❖ **Democracy:** Is when a government runs a country with the acquiescence of the people/ legitimacy (Zembere, 2018 citing Fraenkel and Kane, 1983).
- ❖ **Democratic Regime:** a government that allows the opposition to challenge its policies and to replace it through democratic elections (Stradioto & Guo, 2010).
- ❖ **Democratic Transition/democratization:** Interval between an authoritarian polity and a democratic one or the political process that is done to ensure that there is a democratic political system (Stradioto & Guo, 2010).
- ❖ **Liberalization:** Is when a government allows its citizens some democratic values but without fully democratizing (Huntington, 1991).
- ❖ **Military intervention in politics:** takeover of political power from civilians that is unconstitutional done by brute force by the armed forces (Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni, 2010).
- ❖ **Region:** A social construction of states recognized by closer relationships and thorough diplomatic engagement without necessarily belonging to a similar or contiguous geographic space, for example SADC (Benyera, 2017 citing Hammerstad, 2005).

1.11 Outline of the Study.

This dissertation has five chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction. Chapter 2 is made up of three main pillars namely conceptual framework, theoretical review and literature review. The chapter is therefore mostly analytical. Chapter 3 explicitly analyses the research methodology of the

dissertation. The presentation of data, its analysis as well as its interpretation are the mainstay of chapter 4 whilst chapter 5 is the summary, conclusions and recommendations of the study.

1.12 Summary of the Chapter

In this chapter, the general introduction of study has been given. The stage for the argument that military intervention in politics is a common trend in Africa with both democratic and undemocratic outcomes has been set. The next chapter is the literature review and theoretical framework of the study.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

In the present chapter, literature relating to the study was reviewed. Considering the preponderance of realist and liberalist principles in the general argument of the study, the study straddled both paradigms as overarching theories. Rebecca Schiff's Concordance Theory was used as the specific theory of the study. Empirical case studies relevant to the study were also analysed in order to provide a firmer foundation for the study.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

As already, argued above, this study is guided by liberal and realist research paradigms. These paradigms are hereunder summarized in relation to the study.

Realism has different forms but for this study, neo-realism by Waltz (1979) is used. Waltz (1979) gives a modern, nuanced understanding of realism. He argues that realism is characterized by four major tenets. Firstly, political structures are not arranged in hierarchies of authority or subordination as with states but anarchy. Secondly, every nation-state exists as a separate, autonomous and in theory, equal political unit that needs to harness its resources to realize its interests as no other state can do so. There is no division of labour as with states unlike with liberalism. Thirdly, the hierarchical political set up of the international system is defined by changing fates of the great powers with no superior agent prepared to assist weakening states. The major interest of each state is relative power (Waltz, 1979 in Donnelly, 2000).

Neo-Realism was considered relevant to this study for many reasons. It is state-centric and has bias towards power and state interest within a system making it relevant to analyse the reasons for military intervention in Zimbabwe and whether it led to democracy or not. Although SADC is a supranational body, the issue of sovereignty remains high. As such, the state is a key component. The reaction of SADC states [for example, Shaban (2017) explains how Botswana

publicly called on Mugabe to resign in November 2017 following the military intervention] as determined by their interests following the military intervention explains the anarchic environment of the international system hence the need to use the neo-realist theory. Realism in its general form has been criticized by different scholars. McClelland (1987), for example, argues that realist scholars like Waltz put 'sunglasses at night' for failing to understand that Man is motivated by three needs namely power, achievement and affiliation and not only power creating the impression that realism is an incomplete theory. Realists have however argued that states operate in the international system which is more complex than individual thinking. This is why there is need to buttress realism with liberalism.

Liberalism whose leading proponents are Kant, Keohanne and Nye has many subsets such as idealism, pluralism or utopianism. In this study, idealism was used for reasons explained hereunder. Kegley (1993) gives a convincing explanation of idealism in his famous six principles of idealism. These six principles are that human nature is generally not evil but good, evil institutions cause evil behaviour on humans and structural arrangements that promote selfishness, humanity is concerned with the welfare of others making progress possible, war can be reduced by reducing conditions that favour or encourage anarchy conditions that encourage it, war can be eliminated by international cooperation and international society need to reorganize itself to eliminate anarchy. Dowding (2011) sees these states as having division of labour all geared towards improving the well-being of humanity. It thus means that in a plural world, economic, security and military matters all matter thus different state actors though the state remains the main actor.

The choice of liberalism makes it possible to analyse the role of SADC. In terms of Article 5 of the SADC Treaty (1992), the main thrust of the body in terms of politics is intra-state and inter-state peace and security in the region through collective action. One can easily infer here that such a liberal or idealist view means that once peace exists in states, democracy is most likely to come naturally and so will regional security. In other words, an idealist lense makes it possible to promote a new SADC regional order of co-existence within states and within the region. To Pickering and Peceny (2006) the mere co-existence with democratic states means there is a bearing on any other non-democratic state. In the SADC, region, Botswana and South Africa are

known fledgling democracies so their neighbourhood further harnessed by the SADC Treaty ought to have a bearing on democracy on other countries such as Zimbabwe. In this way, international cooperation becomes a vehicle for reduction of anarchy. Such analysis is unarguably the province of idealism were people in one country are concerned with the welfare of people of other sovereign states.

The increase in the number of state actors rather than being merely the state as in realism means that the military and or the ruling elites no longer have the sole mandate of deciding the future of their nations. Other actors such as the public, civil society, SADC and beyond have a fair share in political transition in member states. All such factors point to the need to straddle the liberal or idealist paradigm when analyzing the role of SADC in Zimbabwe political transition of 2017. It is fundamental here to note that liberalism as a theory of international relations had received visceral attack for being too utopian from realist scholars such as Carr (1939) but the fact that the mere mention on international community hinge on idealism (Walker, 1995) naturally demands that liberalist principles be also used in this study especially to analyse the role of regional bodies. Kegley (1993) contends that in the 1970s, the idealist paradigm of IR was waning only to be propped up by Waltz's neo-realism theory above. In other words, this study uses a hybrid theoretical analysis that I refer to as the 'ideal neo-liberalism' theoretical analysis. The weaknesses of either theory are exactly the strength of the other hence they augment each other at least in this study.

Armed with the above theoretical basis, the researcher finds it logical to modify that theoretical framework into a specific theory that best suits the study. Schiff's Concordance Theory (1996) was thus used. She avers that the ruling elites, military and citizenry must have a cooperative relationship of equals within a community which may or may not involve separation of political and military institutions but does not require it (Schiff, 1996). It thus seems that Schiff is of the contention that equality of this triad ensures concordance absence of which means military intervention. Mahuku (2017) sums up this position by arguing that the theory gives premise to the contextual set-up among these three arms embedded in the country's customs, norms, military style and involvement of the populace in the day-to day running of the state as partners. Put differently, the major aspects of a community must be in agreement to prevent military

intervention. These aspects are the nature of the society, its institutions and culture. Schiff (1996) avers that her theory rests on four indicators namely officer corps' social composition, political decision-making, recruitment method and military style which all hinge on cultural and historical conditions. In this way, the theory does not specify the nature of the government, its institutions or constitutionality as long as concordance exists, the military will not intervene.

Schiff's theory is relevant to this study as it uses an African perspective. Leading theories on Civil Military Relations (CMR) other than Huntington (1957) such as Janowitz, Feaver, Nordlinger, Desch, among others are all Huntingtonian as they use the American military model which stress on a dichotomy of the military and the ruling elites excluding the citizens which Schiff did (Ulucakar and Caglar, 2017). Therefore, Huntingtonian theories are not applicable to exigencies of history, culture, alliances, blocks and collaborations between at least two arms of the triad at some particular times. Mahuku et al (2019) does not mince their words when they categorically state that the Zimbabwe military is an amalgam of western and communist models. Put differently, Zimbabwe is on paper, a constitutional democracy where the military need not intervene in politics but its history places it squarely in that matrix. Wiking (1983) may also be having this in mind when he argued that when there is a change in the relationship between the ruling elites and the military, a coup becomes highly likely. I therefore did not intend to develop or critique the theory per se but use it to shed light on the study.

The next port of call now is an analysis of SADC and military-led transitions within the broader rubric of the theoretical framework given above.

2.3. SADC and Military-led transitions

SADC, which is governed by the SADC Treaty (1992), has various organs but of interest in this dissertation is the OPDSC, popularly known as the Organ which is SADC's political wing. In terms of Article 11(2) of the 2001 Protocol, the organ can only intervene when there is genocide, ethnic cleansing, gross violations of human rights, military coups, civil war or insurgency. It can therefore be said that what is generally referred to as SADC for the purpose of this dissertation is the Summit, OPDSC and the Secretariat. It is thus clear that SADC subscribes to AU and UN statutes such as the UN Charter, Constitutive Act (2000), Lome Declaration (2000) and The

African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007). All these statutes alongside the SADC Treaty outlaw unconstitutional transfer of power which includes military intervention in politics arguing that it undermines civilian trust in democratic institutions.

The OPDSC or SADC generally have been negatively viewed by opposition parties and some authorities. The late former MDC-T President, Morgan Tsvangirai once dismissed SADC as a club of dictators. To Lissom (2012), SADC has failed in most of its endeavours whilst Thompson (2011) sees SADC mediation efforts as having been generally successful as military intervention by SADC is difficult due to the absence of a standby force. Tsunga (2012) categorically dismiss SADC efforts on democracy accusing the body of ignoring civil society due to its state-centric nature instead of being people-centric. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011) argues that the solidarity of member states based on liberation war history affects interference on internal issues thereby affecting democracy. It is therefore clear that the efficacy of SADC in democratization under the gun or not is contested.

With the above issues to its credit or the antithesis thereof, it is interesting to note how scholars have viewed the 2008 SADC lackadaisical approach to the military intervention in Zimbabwe. Adolf (2009) said that prior to 2008, liberation war governments of South Africa (under Mbeki), Angola, Namibia and Mozambique denied that there was a crisis in Zimbabwe whilst non-liberation war governments such as Zambia, Botswana and Malawi said that there was a crisis demonstrating how disunited the body can be. To Mahuku (2017) SADC publicly condemned the sham election but did not militarily intervene because regional superpower, South Africa, benefitted from the brain drain of Zimbabwe explaining how realist notions dictated regional democracy.

It becomes only natural here then to discuss reasons for military intervention in politics generally but eschewing cases where political transitions did not result.

2.4 Reasons for military intervention in politics

The reasons for military intervention in politics have now occupied a thriving industry within the CMR scholarship. To Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2010), a strong military is a potential

cause of military intervention in politics where the military intervenes to increase their rent. Martz (1987) explains that in 1971, a populist opposition leader, Bucaram was expected to win elections the following year in Ecuador. He had promised to redistribute oil rents to all classes including the ordinary citizens. The military which enjoyed large benefits were not comfortable with that hence a coup was done in February 1972 to prevent Bucaram electoral victory so that the military elite would not lose their benefits. Following the coup, the military expenditure of the Ecuadorian government increased from USD\$44 million in 1971 to USD\$98 million in 1976 with fifty percent of all oil royalties also going to the military (Martz, 1987). In this way, the military is portrayed as a selfish entity that neglects the citizenry as long as the regime in power furthers the military elite's interests. Janowitz (1964) cited in Luckham (1971) dismisses such a view of the military arguing that the military has a higher degree of national consciousness than any other elites (such as the ruling class) which pulls it into politics for national interests reasons and not necessarily personal aggrandizement. To Wiking (1983), the military will never say their involvement in politics is to advance personal ambitions no matter how glaring evidence to the contrary may be availed.

To other scholars (Finer, 1962., Huntington, 1968., Diamond, 2000., Mahuku, 2017, among others) economic challenges on the populace motivate the military to intervene or bring about social and economic change, sort the rot and return to their barracks. In this way, the military intervenes when it is bundled together by the ordinary citizens in terms of suffering. Diamond (2000) appears to have blindly followed this trend when he states that when there is drought of democracy, weak civil society, corruption and factionalism then the military will prevail. These later views absolve the military from having personal ambitions outside the purview of national interests which is difficult to buy in a realist world of today. Collier and Hofler (2005) submit that the desire to accumulate wealth which in Africa often comes with political power, may motivate the military to intervene in politics.

Wiking (1983) gives a long list of reasons for military intervention in politics ranging from misrule in general, power struggles, lack of legitimacy, lack of law and order through to lack of success in nation-building, corruption and economic failures to government having acted unlawfully, among other reasons. The varied reasons given by the military as basis for intervention make it difficult to find an all-embracing explanation to this phenomenon (Wiking,

1983). Mahuku (2017) summarizes reasons for military intervention in politics as on the table below.

Table 2:1 Reasons for Coups: Summary

| Justification | Example |
|----------------------------------|---|
| Incompetent, corrupt politicians | Benin – Kerekou, October 1972 Ghana, 1981 |
| Political struggles | Togo (Eyadema, January 1967 Ghana, 1966, 1967, 1972) |
| Lack of democracy | Nigeria (Muhammed, July 1975) |
| Economic Failures | Ghana (Ankrah, February 1966 Ghana, 1981) |

Source: (Wiking (1983))

As shown in Table 2:1 above, there is a compendium of factors explaining military-led political transitions which cannot be exhausted in a small work such as this one. Of interest to note here however is that the reasons for military intervention hinge on case by case basis but it appears these reasons can be bundled together as national interests or personal ambitions.

Interesting as the above analysis is, it is also fundamental here to analyse more contemporary military intervention in politics. In August 2014, the government of Prime Minister Thabane, under pressure to reform, directed the police to arrest government officials for corruption. Most such officials had strong links with the military. This angered the military who staged a coup on the 30th of August 2014 to, dislodge the executive and paralyse the whole public service especially the police (Rupia, 2016). It is instructive here to note that besides the military who were benefiting from the administration’s corrupt largesse did not intend to see those leaving as the police and the military belonged to different factions. It is further noted that in the case of Lesotho, section 5 of the Lesotho Defence Forces Act, 1998 authorizes the military to do law enforcement duties thereby setting a potential clash with the police.

In other words, economic factors and political struggles played a role in the coup thus the same script with only new a new cover and writer. It can be noted therefore that even in modern cases where the military intervenes in politics, the reasons can generally be bundled together into one of the several reasons given by Wiking above.

As analysed above, authorities are generally not in agreement whether military led transition lead to democracy or not. Two case studies are now presented. In the first one, the military intervention led to democracy and in the next, it did not. In either case, the role the regional body played is also clarified.

2.5 Ghana 1979-2000

Ever since its independence in 1957, Ghana has had a number of coups and attempts thereto. Of particular interest here is the coup led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings in 1982. The major reason for the coup was economic decline in the country. Mahuku (2017) explains how Rawlings successfully carried out a coup based on widespread discontentment over poverty amongst the military and the populace when the ruling elites were enjoying. The putschists regarded it as a guardian coup that was meant to clean up the mess created by the civilian politicians.

Having assumed office after the coup against the elected Limann administration, Rawlings demonstrated that he was not democratic. His military-dominated Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) banned political parties arguing that multipartism was alien to Ghanaian societal ethos and that it promoted ethnic differences hence national disunity (Aidoo, 2006). The economy continued on a free fall leading to pressure from different pressure groups over both the economy and democracy which severely undermined the legitimacy of the PNDC (Ninsin, 1998). Pressure groups and political parties finally came together under the Movement for Freedom and Justice (MFJ) banner to demand democracy (Aidoo, 2006). Under pressure, Rawlings then set up consultative processes aimed at democratization in July 1990 leading to a constitution which guaranteed multi-partyism. At the same time, the Bretton-Woods institutions demanded that all development assistance was to be linked with democratization (Ake, 2000 quoted in Aidoo, 2006). In this way, internal and external pressures ganged up together against the PNDC regime to democratize.

Under the external and internal pressure explained above, Rawlings called for presidential elections in November 1992 which his party the PNDC then renamed National Defence Council (NDC) won amid accusations of fraud by opposition parties who then boycotted the December 1992 parliamentary elections (Gyimah-Boadi, 1997). Following the electoral boycott, a legitimate NDC one party parliament with a military socialist-oriented president took office (Botchway, 2018).

Against such accusations of rigging by the major opposition party, the National Patriotic Party (NPP) and ordinary citizens, Leite, Pellechio, Zanforlin, Begashaw, Fabrizio, and Harnack (2000) saw light in the alleged darkness by arguing that the 1992 elections heralded representative democracy simply because opposition parties were allowed to contest the elections and civil society had a say in the elections. Botchway (2018) further buttress that argument by noting that the 1992 election prepared the ground for a return to democratic rule. Rawlings again won the 1996 elections whose validity was then better than in 1992 (Botchway, 2018).

In the 2000 elections, Rawlings did not contest as he had served his two terms as per the constitution. After a run-off, the 2000 elections were won by prominent opposition leader, Kuffor and his NPP Party. The NPP further created better conditions for civil society, democratic elections, among other democratic norms. Gyimah-Boadi (1997) argues that it was the 2000 election which was the first democratic election as pressure to democratize both internally and externally had increased on Rawlings. Botchway's (2018) analysis of democraticness of the elections which were later on done every four years with smooth handover of power even if the opposition won like in 2000, 2008 and 2016 demonstrates the march towards consolidated democracy in Ghana. In most of these elections, the regional body, ECOWAS said the election was free, fair and credible (Botchway, 2018).

It is interesting to note that Ghana was able to democratize after the third election counting from the time Rawlings came into power. Huntington (1991) refers to that as the second or two turnover test which is a way towards democratic consolidation. Even then, some authorities such as Mensah (2007) argue that Ghana has not yet fully democratized as there are some inequalities at both the local, regional and national levels. Different authorities point to different deficits in

Ghana for it to be called a fully-fledged democracy though there is progress towards that. Linberg (2008) says the Constitution of Ghana gives too much executive powers to the president for example of appointing all ministers and judges. Ribot (2001) says civil society in Ghana has no platform to consult government hence can be easily ignored. Mensah (2007) argues that the Constitution of Ghana demands equal representation in public and political office between males and females but women who he says constitute over fifty percent of Ghana population only occupy about five percent of public and political office. Botchway (2018) says that Ghana is now an electoral democracy but is yet to become a consolidated democracy. Military intervention thus generally led to democracy in the long run.

Whatever the argument, what is worth noting is that democratic consolidation in Ghana is still on-going (but democratic transition was already done) and Ghana today can be considered a fully-fledged democracy at least by Sub-Saharan Africa standards. Whitefield (2009) could have been having that in mind when he says that despite these odds, Ghana remains a classic example of democratic consolidation in Africa.

2.6 Uganda: 1986 to 2019

In 1978 Museveni was one of the losers of the elections which he argued were rigged. He then led his National Resistance Movement (NRM) in a guerrilla civil war against the Obote regime and won it in 1986 thereby taking over power. The first fifteen years of his administration was generally pro-democracy for example, he released from prison political prisoners of both the Amini and Obote administrations. A people-driven constitution was even introduced. Thereafter, military intervention in politics in Uganda had been glaring. Murray, Mesfin and Wolters (2016) explain how the military-backed regime then banned multi-partyism arguing it was the reason for disunity in the country. Civil society was also heavily suppressed but he however stopped ethnic killings with some assistance from the World Bank, Germany and the USA.

Museveni promised to usher in a democratic dispensation which culminated in the democratic 1995 public-consulted Constitution. Carson (2005) says the Constitution limited the term of the president to two terms. Museveni then won the 1996 and 2001 election but he fraudulently amended the Constitution in 2005 to exclude term limits on the president. Through widespread

rigging and military-backed violence on the electorate, Museveni won the 2006, 2011 and 2016 elections. He however reverted to multi-partism in 2005 following wide-spread resistance to the movement system.

The regional body, the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) is chaired by Museveni. Murray, Mesfin and Wolters (2016) say that Museveni is highly regarded in the region not only because he is the president of the regional body, but is very instrumental in regional peace-keeping for example his forces were the major component of African Mission in Somalia (UNISOM). That alone, makes Museveni a darling of the West particularly the US who consider him as fighting terrorism hence they turn a blind eye to the need to dismantle autocracy in his country. He was also instrumental in representing ICGLR in mediating Burundi's President Nkurunziza's contested third term. This demonstrates the region's approval of Museveni regardless of a weak democratic system in his country.

As a result, Uganda today is an authoritarian country regardless of the existence of gagged civil society, elections (often rigged) and such other democratic features that are often interfered with by the regime. The military intervention therefore had not led to democracy even after the fifth election. This is despite the existence of ECOWAS and the international community who as demonstrated above, are more interested in advancing their own interests than democracy. Museveni is actually a darling to ECOWAS and the US than to his own people. The national interests argument thus has more weight than domestic democracy.

2.7 Zimbabwe (2008-16)

Evidently, military intervention in Zimbabwe politics was noticeable from the liberation war days, Gukurahundi massacres (Doran, 2017) and attempts at Mugabe alternation of power within ZANU PF in 2002, 2004 and 2007. In this way, 2008 was thus normal, usual intervention in politics. Following the inconclusive 2008 elections in Zimbabwe, SADC mediation resulted in a forced political transition, the GNU (Dewa, 2014) but that was a new trajectory in the country's democratization (Malungisa, 2012). After the first round of elections in 2008, results were not released for forty-five days. Zuma raised his concern over the delay of announcing of the election results and implored SADC to use the requisite mechanisms and guidelines to resolve the impasse. The MDC pleaded with SADC and AU to intervene with no response. Mbeki

adopted Quiet Diplomacy that is relying on dialogue to solve the impasse. This is again the same military that Dodo et al (2012) had said during the time in question here had vowed not to accept an MDC government if it were to win the elections after the GNU in 2013. Article 52 of UN Charter entrusts regional bodies with peace and security mechanisms in their areas.

The military therefore continued to call the shots in ZANU PF up to the 2013 elections. Lalbahadur (2014) says that SADC sent Zuma to represent them in Zimbabwe politics. The elections were relatively quiet compared to 2008 and Zuma endorsed the process with SADC declaring them free and fair. This was further confirmed by SADC giving Mugabe the rotational SADC chairpersonship in August of the same year (SADC, 2014) with only a lone voice of Botswana opposing the 2013 elections as not being free and fair (Hengari, 2014). Bratton, Dulani and Masunungure (2016) clearly demonstrated that the elections were rigged with military assistance.

As already argued above, ZANU PF succession politics continued even during the GNU era. The military-backed Mnangagwa who had been prevented from assuming the vice-presidency by Mugabe divisive politics in 2004 in favour of Mujuru, orchestrated her dismissal in 2014 as she had become very powerful and well positioned to take-over from Mugabe. The Mnangagwa faction hatched a plan to introduce Mugabe's inexperienced wife, Grace Mugabe to politics. At the behest of Grace, Mujuru was dismissed in 2014 paving the way for Mnangagwa ascendancy to the vice-presidency of both the party and government with military intelligence playing a central role (Mandaza, 2016).

The coming in of Grace Mugabe into politics worsened factionalism. On 15 August 2014 she was voted to become the powerful Women's League boss. She orchestrated the dismissal of Mujuru which came in December 2014 with Mugabe dismissing her for 'factionalism' alongside her alleged backers such as Francis Nhema, Didymus Mutasa and Munacho Mutezo among others (Matyszack, 2015). Mahuku (2017) explains the factional battles pitting Grace and her young supporters such as Professor Moyo, Kasukuwere and Muzembi (the so-called Generation 40 or just G40) as civilians and the Lacoste or Mnangagwa faction which was supported by the military. The G40 was thus a civilian outfit with the Lacoste faction being a military one (Mahuku, 2017).

During the time ZANU PF was embroiled in factional fighting between 2008 and 2016, the nation was burning economically and politically. Gukurume (2017) for example, says that during that time of political uncertainty, the public demonstrated against the social, economic and political decline. On 6 July 2016 for example, the This#Flag Campaign leader, Pastor Evan Mawarire was able to call for a business boycott in Harare in which Harare was completely shut for business. The military, alongside other national security establishments, threatened protesters with violence demonstrating how the military interfered with democracy during this period (Gukurume, 2017).

Ironically, the danger of military intervention in politics appears not to have been that exaggerated even as early as 2017. Moretti (2017) writing eleven months before the November military intervention, anticipated four scenarios before the 2018 elections in terms of Mugabe incumbency namely Mugabe resignation under opposition and popular pressure, Mugabe voluntarily resigning, Mugabe dying and Mugabe contesting. The stepping in of the military was thus not anticipated.

In light of the case study of Ghana and Uganda, it is interesting to note that in one way or the other the military has a bearing on democracy though over some time. This researcher argues that such military involvement in politics resulting in democracy as in the case of Ghana, is what Huntington (1991) sees as a transformation. It is thus proposed hereunder to take an academic detour and analyse Huntington's transformation where the military is involved.

2.8 Military intervention and Transformation

Huntington (1991) identifies four transitional modes of democratization namely transformation, replacement, transplacement and intervention by a foreign democratic power. Considering that the military putsch in Zimbabwe in 2017 was, from the analysis of this researcher, a transformation, the researcher eschewed the latter three transition modes and dwelt on the first one only. The basis of the argument is that the military is part of the government based on the emerging CMR of an African origin from the writings of Schiff (2009).

For a transformation to take place, the opposition has to be weaker than the government and those in power must be prepared to democratize through a regime-initiated liberalization which

precedes democratization. Transformation, Huntington (1991), argues, follows a five step process. The first step is the emergence of reformers which may be due to the belief among reformists that democracy is desirable to avert prevailing economic challenges, increase chances of remaining in power and to increase international legitimacy.

Acquiring power is the next stage in the transformation process. Huntington (1991) says that having acquired power the leader will liberalize as explained above. The third stage is the failure of liberalization. Huntington (1991) argues that once a liberal teams up with standpatters, he is doomed to fail. The fourth stage is backward legitimacy. At this stage, reformers are challenged by standpatters under different criteria such as corruption or are forced to appoint close relatives of the standpatters. The final stage in transformation is co-opting the opposition for example through a GNU. That action alone, Huntington (1991), argues, will weaken standpatters in the government. Huntington (ibid) further argues that the standpatters in government may however use the co-option of the opposition as an avenue for their longevity in power.

Such analysis resonates correctly with Carothers' (2002) five assumptions of democratic transition which clearly shows a distinct movement from authoritarianism to democracy but sometimes passing through some dips on the way.

Regardless of the military being able to usher in a democratic dispensation, their intervention in politics had often been viewed as contra-democracy or just as coups. In that regard, it is imperative here to have a brief analysis of coups in their general nature.

2.9 Coups in general

The term coup or coup d'état is a French word meaning, 'a sudden blow or strike' done by a few people through force or the threat thereof against the popular will (Thompson, 2004). To McGowan (1984), a coup is whereby the security sector departments acting singly or in concert with other civil servants or politicians remove the government from power whether accompanied by spilling blood or not.

The evolution of coups has been traced to the 18th Century with key examples being the 1799 Brumaire when Napoleon Bonaparte came to power. In Africa the key example is the 1828

assassination of King Tshaka by Dingane (Ritter, 1990). McGowan (1984) argues that today coups are exclusively found in Africa especially in sub-Saharan Africa. This can be attributed to the fact that most African countries got their independence around this period hence were still experimenting with democracy. In most of the coups in Africa, coup plotters argued they wanted to be in power for a short time during which they would restore the country to legitimacy for example the six coups in Benin (1960-72) and in Burkina Faso between 1980 and 1987 ().

Huntington (1969) says there are three types of coups namely breakthrough, guardian and veto. A breakthrough coup is whereby junior army officers overthrow the government to create new bureaucratic elite for example Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso. A guardian coup is whereby the army stages a coup to improve public order and prevent corruption whilst a veto coup is whereby the army vetoes the public (supported by the majority) mobilization.

Ironically, nowadays coups are supported by the majority hence popular coups whose constitutionality becomes debatable as explained later in this dissertation in the case of Zimbabwe. What is important to note here then is that whether a coup is populist or not, in Africa, it has been frowned at. In terms of the Lome Declaration on the 'Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government' (OAU, 2000), unconstitutional changes of power include a coup, intervention of mercenaries to replace a constitutional regime, replacement of a constitutional governments by dissidents.

Involvement of the military in a transition has always been viewed as a coup and counter-majoritarian desire for democracy. Powell and Thyne (2016) studied four hundred and fifty coups in the world. Amongst their arguments was that a coup promotes democracy particularly in countries that would not have achieved democracy by other means. In the case of Uganda above, the country failed to democratize even after the fifth election in 2016 making it a possible candidate for a democratic coup. According to Varol (2017), a democratic coup is where there is an authoritarian regime, the military then respond to popular will for the annihilation of the unpopular regime, the regime refuses to leave office against popular will, the military which is respected by the people carries the coup, the military facilitates free, fair credible elections over a short space of time and the coup ends with a transfer of power to a democratically elected government. In Ghana, it led to incremental democracy and democracy over a reasonably short period which was the second election hence meeting the second tier test.

As argued above, there are bad and good coups. Ikome (2007) explains good and bad coups arguing that where an undemocratic regime is removed, the putchists become liberators of the people. Collier (2008) appears to have oversubscribed to Ikome's (2007) argument when he says then that the West need to accept a military coup against Mugabe because elections in Zimbabwe are always not free and fair. Ironically, by his (Ikome, 2007) own admission, most putchists have not governed better than those removed. Democracy thus needs to be propagated over a considerable time based on exigencies in a particular country and not necessarily imposed by the men in uniform. It thus appears that the few men in uniform that had governed better have therefore been eclipsed by the bad majority.

2.10 Summary of the chapter

This chapter explained how realist and liberalist theories can reinforce each other to explain the military and democracy. Leading theorists on those theories are Waltz (realism) and Kegley (liberalism). Schiff's Model gave a specific context of military intervention and politics. SADC particularly based on the 1992 SADC Treaty (as amended) does not condone military involvement in politics even if that leads to democracy, at least on paper. Analysis of research by leading scholars such as Luckham, Wiking, Finer as well as Collier and Hoffler gave interesting analysis on the topic especially on reasons for military intervention and prospects of democracy. case studies of the military intervention leading to democracy was demonstrated with a case study of Ghana but with opposite results in Uganda. The next chapter explains the research methodology of the study.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I analyse the study's research methodology. The chapter takes on board the general research framework that encompasses key issues such as philosophical world view, research design, population, sampling methods, data gathering methods, validity and reliability, ethical considerations and peer review examination.

3.2 Philosophical World view

Slife and Williams (1995) opine that philosophical ideas remain hidden in any research work but influence the research methodology. Cresswell (2014) makes a similar observation by noting that philosophical worldview determines the research design. Other notable researchers such Lincoln and Guba (2011) differ only on semantics referring to world views as the beliefs that guide action preferring instead to use the term research paradigms thus the two terms were used interchangeably in this dissertation. Cresswell (ibid) says that a worldview is determined by the discipline under study, student or mentor orientations and research experience. Cognizant of all these factors and the four philosophical worldviews namely post-positivist, constructivist, transformative and pragmatism, this researcher opted to use the constructivist research paradigm.

Constructivism or social constructivism can be traced to the works of Berger and Luekamann (1967) who identify it as a qualitative research world view. Crotty (1998) opines that in social constructivism, individuals attempt to understand the world in which they live and work in. They then develop objective meanings of it based on their experiences. Different people have different views hence the researcher has to identify the best way to go through asking open ended questions. Meanings participants proffer are often based on their historical and cultural experiences or backgrounds (Crotty, 1998).

Khun (1962) opines that a research paradigm is informed by philosophical assumptions of ontology, epistemology and axiology. In the present study, the researcher sought to refine understanding on the role of SADC based on, among other issues, the views of different stakeholders. To do so, broad questions were largely used to enable participants to fully air out their views. These meanings have a political, cultural, historical and economic basis on how SADC member states interact thus background has a lot of bearing on participants and how they position themselves to advance their interests as states thus constructivism was adopted as the research paradigm as it suits the afore-going criteria ontologically, epistemologically and axiologically.

3.3 Research Design

This is generally the method used for data collection which is largely affected by the world view. According to Denzin and Lincoln (2011), the research design is the strategy of the research which can be qualitative, quantitative mixed. In the present study, data to answer the research questions was obtained from among others, knowledgeable persons in the military (serving and retired), academia, government and SADC based on their attitudes, motivations, perceptions and understanding. This can best be collected in the form of words which is largely qualitative hence a qualitative research design was adopted. Thomas (2011) contends that qualitative research aims at developing an understanding of how individuals or groups comprehend their environments. I argue that people within SADC in general and Zimbabwe in particular seek to understand their political and social environment from their historical and cultural background. This therefore blends well with the social constructivist world view already employed. Regardless of all such strengths to its credit, qualitative research design has not been spared of criticism. Kothari (2011) for example argue that qualitative research is difficult to apply in practice. To minimize this challenge in this research, I extensively consulted from other experienced researchers in the social sciences.

It is fundamental to note that there are different approaches of research design within the qualitative design school. By virtue of the nature of the research questions, this study situates itself in the case study research design strategy as is hereunder explained. A cursory analysis of the research questionnaire or interview guide shows that the questions are mainly ‘how, what and why’ questions which Yin (2003a) says point to a case study. Yin further argues that a research

that concentrates on contemporary events at the same time allowing the researcher to rely on different data collection methods or instruments is a case study. Thomas (2011) observes that a case study analyses persons, projects, events, polices and institutions which are studied holistically through different methods. As this researcher takes a constructivist philosophical world view that makes it possible for the researched to redefine their interests and objectives based on their background within the SADC regional complex and how these states position themselves to advance their interests, a case study becomes a natural specific research design. Cresswell (2009) is oblivious to the challenges of a case study such as creating huge amounts of data which may be difficult to summarise for example, SADC has different states whose different political and cultural background may produce complex data for interpretation. In order to make such a problem easier, the researcher used two research assistants to assist him in minimizing this problem.

3.4 Population and Sample

Population and sample are integral parts of the research methodology and are hereunder discussed at length.

3.5 Population and target population

Population is generally the aggregate of all the possible targets from which a sample for the study is taken. Pandey and Pandey (2015:40) presents this position better by stating that population is, "... the entire mass of observations, which is the parent group from which a sample is to be formed". The population is therefore the whole of SADC region which is roughly three hundred million people.

From the population, one can deduce the target population. For this study the military elite in Zimbabwe at the time of the military intervention (rank of lieutenant colonel and above was considered elite), SADC embassy states defence attachees in Harare, ZANU PF, other political parties (especially MDC formations), the academia (at least a Masters degree in international relations, political science, law), general public from SADC. It is difficult to state an exact total of the target population but suffice is to say at least six different classes of persons made the population. All these classes of people were chosen because they were deemed to have an interest and or knowledge of the matter under study.

3.6

Sampling Method Used

Sampling in this work was done from a qualitative research perspective. As such, the interest was to obtain a theoretical generalisability and not a statistical inference as in quantitative research. According to Trochim and James (2006) purposive sampling is the most appropriate sampling method for qualitative case study research since the crux of the research is not representativeness but the possible rich insights into the matter that it provides. Garson (2004) differs and argue that snowballing is more effective for the same reason. In this study, I did not intend to examine the merits of these two contending views; rather, I used both methods depending on how I considered them applicable. I now briefly describe these two sampling methods and how they apply to particular research participants.

Purposive sampling is a non-probability sampling method whereby a researcher deliberately selects items and purposively subjected them to intensive study based on the principle that they are representative of the entire population (Kothari, 2011). In this study Zimbabwe was chosen to represent SADC whilst Harare was chosen to represent Zimbabwe and intensely studied for generalization. Purposive sampling was used to select politicians (both ZANU PF and all opposition parties) and embassy staff (politics department) who were in public office during the time under review as these were directly involved in the politics of the transition especially in 2017.

Snowballing was used to select military elites both retired and serving who were involved in the matter under discussion. The academia was also selected using the same method. Last but not least, members of the public who are known to have an interest in political matters without necessarily being politicians were also selected using this method.

3.7

Sample, sample size and sample size determination

As already indicated above, the sample size was determined by the data saturation point of each class of respondents as determined by the researcher. Charmaz (2006) opines that with data saturation, a researcher stops gathering fresh data when doing so no longer sparks new insights. The data saturation point was reached at as per Appendix C where one hundred (100) persons became research subjects. David (2002) opines that in qualitative research particularly where

interviews are used, interviews should continue until data saturation is reached. As such, a sample size could therefore not be determined prior to the research.

3.8 Research Instruments

Cresswell (2014) argues that qualitative research is characterized by four research instruments namely interviews, documents, observations and audio/visual materials. Walliman (2005) further notes that questionnaires are also an instrument of qualitative research. For the purpose of this study, a triangulation method based on interviews, questionnaires and documents was used due to advantages and limitations explained below. The principal research instrument however remained the interview with the other two being used for triangulation purposes thereby addressing the potential danger to validity, reliability and practicability.

3.8.1 Interviews

The interview method can be personal (face-to-face) or by telephone and both methods can be direct personal investigation (by the researcher himself) or indirect (through an assistant) and can be structured or unstructured (Kothari, 2004). In this study, the researcher utilized all these forms except the unstructured interview method after considering time constraints, participant issues (such as availability), among other considerations. Through structured interviews, the researcher was able to obtain data in the most preferred manner which made analysis easier and it was easier to do clarifications when required unlike with a questionnaire. Kothari (2004) gives this method thumps up citing easiness of generalisation, economics and the requirement of lesser skills from both the researcher and his assistants which were all relevant in this study.

The use of the interview method presented some challenges to this researcher. It was time-consuming even though the researcher had started fairly early. The presence of the researcher in some interviews may also have had as stimulant on some respondents and may have affected the results regardless of prior request on participants not to exaggerate. Last but not least, the absence of prior rapport of the researcher and some respondents especially politicians made it difficult at first to elicit data but the promise of feedback after the researcher was a good motivator.

3.8.2 Questionnaire

Participants who are not key persons for particular set of questions or those who were difficult to find, had data from them elicited by use of questionnaires. The obvious advantage of this method was that of low cost, convenience and reduced chance of bias since the researcher was not available when they completed questionnaires. The method was however slow and it was difficult to know if they did not copy each other, however the mere fact this was part of the broader tri-angulation instruments at a time when the researcher was using the saturation method with the purpose of the research having been fully explained to participants before collecting data hence the researcher had less to worry.

3.8.3 Documents

Last but not least, documents were used as a research instrument. Cresswell (2014) and Zembere (2018) say documents are mainly archival data such as journals, newspapers, circulars, minutes of meetings, official reports and private journals, among others. The main advantage of this form of data was that it was obtained in the words used by the researched. On the other hand, the fact that not all people are articulate and impressive affected this method but this was augmented by using different documentary sources. The method ensured that there was triangulation with the other two methods above thus aiding validity.

3.9 Data Validity, Reliability and Practicability

In general research parlance, a research work's measuring tool needs to satisfy sound measurement. Kothari (2004), notes that sound measurement is defined by validity, reliability and practicability. These factors are forthwith discussed in turn.

Validity generally measures the extent of accuracy or meaningfulness of a measure. In this way, it is more important than reliability. Authorities such as Kothari (2004) and Bollen (1989) identify different forms of validity such as statistical, internal, criterion-related, content and external validity. The researcher believes that an examination of each of these forms of validity is beyond the scope of a small project like this one. Suffice however, is to say that, having considered these different forms of validity, the researcher resorted to the use of judges to determine the efficacy or validity of the measuring tool used. The reader could have noted that this method of measuring validity does not provide any mathematical formula to express it but the judges were trained prior to the judgement to minimize the chances of bias. In an endeavour

to make the data collected valid, the validity of the research methods were further done as explained on pretesting of the measuring tool below.

Reliability is the extent of consistency of a measure. Bollen (1989) substantiates this view by arguing that reliability is the extent to which a measure can be replicated by different persons on different occasions under different conditions with different instruments. Elsewhere in this dissertation, I explain how reliability of the measuring tools was further enhanced for this study.

Kothari (2004) argues that a measuring tool for example the questionnaire which was also used in this research, needs to be practicable. The same author contends that practicability rests on three issues namely economy, convenience and interpretability. The use of questionnaire and interview methods in this research were seen as affordable, easy to administer as well as possible for persons other than the researcher to analyse them based on the instructions and scoring keys, among other issues. These issues were then used to measure the practicability of the measuring tools. Under pretesting of the measuring tools, the researcher further explains how practicability was enhanced in this study.

3.10 Data Presentation and Analysis

In the present study, the researcher relied on narrative text to describe and narrate the experiences of participants and meanings they attach to those experiences. In this way, the researcher is arguably the principal instrument of data collection. The analysis of that data follows Kothari's (2004) data analysis procedure (hereinafter called the procedure). In this procedure, data is first edited, that is scrutinized for errors at collection time and also after collection. Having done that, the data was coded through mutual exclusivity and undimensionality, classified and finally tabulated, where necessary. In some cases, participants' diaries were transcribed verbatim. Of important to note here is that data collection and analysis were done simultaneously but explained differently for easy of understanding.

Data from respondents was presented and analysed in Chapter 4 in two parts. A demographic matrix of the respondents and a comment thereto is given in Appendix D with the rest of Chapter 4 being devoted to answering the research questions.

3.11 Pretesting of the Measuring tools

The efficacy of the measuring tools used in this research (the questionnaires, interview and documents methods) was tested through two methods. Firstly, since tri-angulation was used, that was a form of verification of their internal efficacy. A peer examination by one PhD student and two Masters Students was also done to strengthen the validity, reliability and practicability of the research instruments. The three's comments resulted in this researcher making some adjustments on the questionnaire and interview guides prior to their administration.

3.12 Ethical Considerations

Ethics are generally those inert mannerisms that appeal to our moral senses as humanity. In this research, the researcher paid tribute to ethical considerations such as informed consent, anonymity, interview ethics and referencing ethics. On informed consent, participants were asked on whether they consented or not before answering questions whether through interviews or questionnaires. Participants were also given the right to withdraw at any part of the study especially considering the sensitivity of the topic. A research consent form was also given to all respondents.

Anonymity was a research ethic this study factored in. with the topic being highly sensitive and the military still considering it classified hence cannot be publicly discussed, anonymity was considered with utmost good faith. Even throughout the research, most respondents remained anonymous as per their requests.

Last but not least, the researcher took notice of referencing as a fundamental research ethic. The BUSE academic requirements on referencing were fully complied with.

3.13 Summary of the Chapter

In this chapter, a qualitative case study research informed by a constructivist world view was presented. A triangulation method of interviews, questionnaires and document analysis was presented as basis for data collection with priority being given to the interview. These three methods were further used to assist on checking on the study's validity, reliability and practicability by a peer review examination. A population of hundred respondents drawn from the military, embassies, academia, politicians and the public was explained. The narrative text method of data analyses was explained as the data analysis method of the research. Last but not

least, the chapter gave a brief summary of informed consent, anonymity and referencing as among the key research ethics this research considered. Data obtained by the research method explained in this chapter was presented, analysed and discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4

DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, data gathered during field work as explained in Chapter 3 is presented, analysed and discussed with a view to answer the research questions. Data collection was qualitative hence the responses are also mainly qualitative. Data presentation was based on narrative text analysis to describe and narrate the experiences of participants and meanings they attach to those experiences. The research objectives as standard research questions are answered by zeroing in on what key informants and other informants said during field work.

Section 'B': Discussion of issues answering the research questions

Under this heading, the research objectives which were chiseled into research questions were put to test by participants. For the purpose of field work, these research questions were further broken down into more questions in order to draw deeper, subjective understanding of the perceptions of respondents as demonstrated below and discussed, analysed and presented in the order they are reported as research objectives.

4.2 Reasons for military intervention in Zimbabwe politics in 2008-17

The reason for military intervention in politics brought forth a number of interesting issues amongst all participants. The general consensus amongst respondents was that when Mugabe fired Mnangagwa on the 6th of November 2017 that infuriated the military since he was their choice for the presidency should Mugabe leave office by any reason, natural or man-made. My sources within ZANU PF claimed that there was a general feeling within ZANU PF that Mugabe wanted to clear the way for his wife.

An embassy source said that,

We have over the years heard the people of Zimbabwe complaining of the ruling class but perhaps the intended desire of a dynasty irked the public and the military as well as a section of the ruling elites.

One academic in Harare, brought a similar argument saying that the feud between the Lacoste and G-40 factions was about to explode into the political and economic well-being of the nation-state. The academic categorically stated that;

With the feud going to explode, it was then jungle politics. He who had the support of the military was to triumph especially when the G40 already had the disadvantage of a public disgrace, Grace.

A military source said that ZANU PF in-fighting brought a novel situation in the country. The colonel claimed that,

With no other institution, ready solve the impasse, the military filled the void in terms of Section 212 of the Constitution which the High Court validated on the 24th of November 2017.

From data collected from respondents, a novel situation appears to have presented itself to ZANU PF politics in 2017. It was however merely the ‘Sarajevo Incident’ of a war which was obviously going to explode. Rodgers (2019) for example says factionalism in ZANU PF started in the 1990s. Mahuku et al (2019) argue that the military had always preferred Mnangagwa as Mugabe’s natural successor. Crisis Group (2017) observes that Mugabe in early November 2017, Mugabe made overtures to change the military command. This was therefore a surprise to then open factional fights in ZANU PF which required open confrontation. The Lacoste faction therefore had no option but to unleash the military on the G40. It appears the military was probably the last option the Lacoste faction had whilst they worked their way whilst Mnangagwa was vice-president. With him fired, the last, lethal option proved too good to discard hence the impromptu nature. Soon after being deposed from the presidency, Mnangagwa, wrote a letter threatening to take-over power and to fire Mugabe from ZANU PF in a few weeks (Mnangagwa, 2017). The use of the military was not mentioned but the threat came to pass in two few weeks meaning that the military option had long been there as the last resort.

The major motivation for the intervention was therefore to prevent the likely elevation of Grace Mugabe to the state vice-presidency (which would have created dynastic politics against the ethos of the liberation struggle thus an attack on the military as the vanguard of the revolution) against the military's preferred option, Mnangagwa (Mahuku et al, 2019, Maromo, 2017, Crisis Group, 2017). The military however used the catchy words of political and economic crisis to woo the public. It was the same military which was there in the worst economic decade of 2000-2008 yet they did not intervene. It therefore demonstrates that the military is an extension of the ZANU PF factional fights.

In a public address about thirty hours before the military intervention on 12 November 2017 (Newsday, 12 November 2017) Chiwenga retorted that ZANU PF had been infiltrated by counter-revolutionaries intending to destroy the party. By saying so, he thus forgot that he was supposed to be a professional soldier who should not have dabbled in politics. It is therefore not a surprise that the responses of the military and ZANU PF as to the reasons for the intervention were the same. Factoring in Schiff's Model (1996) here means that there are certain instances where the ruling elites and the military are one entity whilst the citizens are another entity hence a throwback into Schiff Model that may give credence to the need for a different dichotomy of CMR where the military and ruling elites are one entity and citizens (as represented by parliament or civil society) are another entity.

Having failed to find logic in the reasons as argued above, it is only logical to say that Mugabe stayism was the reason for military intervention. It was that Mugabe had overstayed so much that he thought he owned the party. His entrenched, long personal dictatorship was an affront to other ambitious people in the party such as Mnangagwa, Mujuru and others even though they were all beneficiaries to the corruption largesse in the party-state. Raftopoulos (2019) says Mnangagwa was instrumental in the removal of Mujuru from the vice-presidency through some conspiracy with Chiwenga in 2014 (Tendi, 2016). Mnangagwa thus held some presidential ambitions for some time probably earlier than 2004. Tendi (2016) further argues that the Mujuru-Mnangagwa feud started in the 1990s.

Mugabe stayism could also have irked the international community. Aseulime (2017) argues that the international community might have been involved in the behind the scenes issues to offload Mugabe. China who had invested billions of dollars in Zimbabwe in terms of aid, loans

and investment, appeared to have been worried of ZANU PF succession politics considering Mugabe's advanced age and his presiding over the collapse of the economy. That Chiwenga was there a few days before the coup was therefore because he wanted to brief them of the coup (*ibidem*). Having realized that it was less likely that the opposition was to take over power in Zimbabwe, the international community could have welcomed the longevity of ZANU PF but under a more moderate leader. With his then pro-western stance, Mnangagwa could thus fit the bill. Ndimande and Moyo (2018) quote Mnangagwa as having said long in 2015 when he was still the Vice-President that Zimbabwe cannot do without the West. That obviously showed a different line of thinking from his principal, Mugabe who was often known for his anti-west rhetoric.

Having established the reasons for military intervention I now examine the potentiality of another military intervention and its motives in Zimbabwe.

Asked if in the circumstances another military coup is likely in Zimbabwe, the majority of respondents argued that the euphoria that was there just after the coup had gone. An opposition source said that with the military now seen in torn uniforms and earning ten times less than when they removed Mugabe, a coup is highly likely. The source further claims that the mere 'redeployment' of some military officers like Chiwenga from the presidency to the vice-presidency is an acknowledgement by Mnangagwa of that possibility hence an attempt to put his trusted lieutenants there.

Within the military and ZANU PF, the general impression of respondents was that the military intervention was done to further the interests of the people after 'state capture' by the G40. An academic who claims to have also gone into the streets in support of the people against Mugabe concurred with opposition sources that he thought democracy was to be ushered in first through a transitional government or another GNU then free, fair and credible elections. The opposition argues that they were used by ZANU PF and the military in 2017 to create a veneer of legality to the coup hence are less likely to take part in future military intervention. Within ZANU PF, the general belief is that if the situation so warrants, then a military intervention is possible. It appears this ZANU PF position has not changed ever since the disputed 2018 elections. Mpofu (2018), says that ZANU PF is a party that follows its constitution and as such, will not hesitate to 'restructure' the party if need arises in the same manner the Mujuru and G40 factions were

excommunicated prior to 2018. In this way, ZANU PF believes that the party and the state is one thing.

An academic in Harare was of the view that should ZANU PF intend to do another military intervention, they will use a different style much to the surprise of the opposition. The academic said;

My brother, ZANU PF has many evil tricks. Should internal power struggles lead to another coup, the rogue party will use a different strategy to gain 'popular support' in the same way different strategies were used to rig elections in 2008 and 2013.

Amongst members of the public, the biting economic challenges coupled with experience of having successfully led a revolution were cited as the basis of another military intervention. An elderly lady in Budiriro West honestly poured out her heart as follows;

My son, we participated in the liberation struggle of this country. When Mugabe was no longer doing what we had put him in office to do, we removed him. We can still do the same to this one who is there. The only challenge as of now is that people are afraid of our trigger happy soldiers. If the economy does not improve, we will go into the streets.

The general impression of respondents is that Zimbabwe is already in a coup mood. The only difference is probably how and when. It is an open secret admitted to by respondents that the economy is far worse than when Mugabe left yet that was one of the reason the putschists gave for the military intervention. Although that reason makes some sense, it was can be deduced that he who controls the military within the factions of ZANU PF decides when a coup can be done.

Should another military intervention take place, the people can still support it under different promises by the politicians. Considering how the feared Mugabe fell from power, people can still have another coup obviously calling for better economic and social conditions. There had been claims of corruption in government with fingers pointing at Mnangagwa's business partners such as Tagwireyi which has infuriated many. It can thus be logically argued that conditions leading to the 2017 military intervention have resurfaced increasing the potential of a military intervention in Zimbabwe. According to the Muvundusi ((2019), the government has already labelled the August 2019 demonstrations as an attempt to topple Mnangagwa. Whoever will

take over will thus know that a failure to address such issues will cost him or her office thereby being forced to democratize or at least further liberalize.

4.3 Zimbabwe's 2017 Military-led intervention and good governance or democracy

Among the commonest issues cited as evidence of democracy was that the 2018 elections were free and fair even from the view of the West who had never said so since 2000, less violence in the 2018 elections especially before the election, the number of presidential contestants, among other reasons. Such responses were however attributed to the period prior to the election. The violence after the 2018 elections was however viewed differently by other respondents. A popular MDC-A councilor in Harare gave a similar argument when asked why the ZANU PF government became violent after the elections especially in August 2018 and in January 2019. He had this to say;

When people went to the streets to demonstrate for Mugabe to go, ZANU PF people mistook all those people as their supporters. They were actually our supporters. The reality only came after the 2018 election results were collated. The surprise defeat of ZANU PF forced them to revert to their old tricks of rigging elections and violence hence the illegitimacy of the regime.

With all such issues to its credit, the new dispensation was therefore somewhere good on the democracy radar. Maromo's (2017) argument that this was merely 'Mugabeism' without Mugabe meaning that authoritarianism remained could therefore have been premature given a short period of just a month as the military was then still 'guiding' democratization.

Quizzed on whether the ORL process itself was democratic, one female adult in Mbare said,

People went to the streets on their own volition. Mugabe voluntarily resigned from office when parliament started the process of impeachment. To me that was democracy because the military never told Mugabe to step down.

From the academia, the responses oscillated between being used by the militarized ZANU PF and outright unconstitutionality. One academic had this to say,

Whatever offence Mugabe had committed, he was voted overwhelmingly by the people of Zimbabwe in 2013 never mind the usual rigging allegations. The fact that his regime was not

democratic is something else. The High Court which okayed the coup was actually told of the judgment before the matter was even brought to it.

The general response from embassies was that if the people were all over the streets demanding Mugabe resignation then it was well. For the elections, one embassy political attaché from a country which did not wage a war for independence gave this account,

SADC said they were free and fair whilst the West as usual, said otherwise. They did not say that with Trump victory. Of late we have heard that the President has capacitated ZACC by giving it arrest powers. The high profile arrest and trial of former Minister, Prisca Mupfumira may be a demonstration of change from the past days of impunity by the ruling elites. Incidences of violence sharply reduced if compared with previous elections. The challenge with Zimbabwe and probably SADC in general is that social media or propaganda by the opposition or the West is given so much weight to be termed the truth. There is thus need to ensure that the truth is disseminated to the public who should not rely on social media.

The above argument was however sharply contested by a lone voice from another embassy whose country is run by a liberation movement. The political attaché opened up and said that,

A disputed election outcome cannot stabilize any economy. Look where Zimbabwe is heading. The economy is comatose; no employment, the liquidity crunch is hard pressing.

Pertaining to the absence of enough media coverage which is not pro-ruling party, one respondent from another embassy, EP, had this to say,

There may be a need to close the internet if it affects the democratic rights of law-abiding citizens as was once in Zimbabwe in 2019.

On comparing the new dispensation with its predecessor in terms of democracy, there was a general acceptance by respondents that the present one fairs better. Many respondents pointed to the 2018 election as having been endorsed by the West, the first after 2000. The twenty-three contestants to the country's presidency was also pointed alongside, minimal incidences of violence especially before elections. One outspoken member of the public however had a different view on the democraticness of the new regime. He said,

In terms of democracy, so-called new regime is old wine in old wine skin. The 2018 elections were won in the Concourt and the contested ZEC server in relation to that election is nowhere to be seen.

However, the majority of respondents from members of the public believed that the mere fact that people are now free to discuss politics, corruption in government, among other ills without much fear of arrest mean that there is now some democracy.

An analysis of the responses to this question therefore offers hope. Democracy per se did not result. What the respondents said was that incidences of both democracy and authoritarianism were evidenced in the so-called new dispensation's administration. The decrease in violence, invitation of foreign observers, capacitating of ZACC (being given arrest powers) among other issues all point to democracy. Violent incidences of August 2018 and January 2019 however point to authoritarianism. With such public approval and equal disapproval of the Second Republic, Mhlope (2019) could have exaggerated the situation on the ground by saying that Mnangagwa's record is worse than that of Mugabe. This is despite Mhlope basing his article on evidence from over twenty Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). This can be the reason why such claims have been refuted particularly that of Amnesty International (Mugauri, 2019). What is interesting is that the same crowd which had supported Mnangagwa ascendancy to power is the same crowd that sang to denounce him less than a year later. One can therefore ask if that is not an issue of legitimacy which I call public legitimacy. Having seen the sea of people on the streets to oppose his authoritarianism, Mugabe could have easily realized that a revolution was imminent. His successor too can learn from that. What that means then is that 'democratic authoritarianism' or benevolent despotism resulted. As argued elsewhere in this dissertation, that is liberalization. I argue that the military intervention then was a form of transformation. I hereunder briefly relate the liberalization aspects of the New Dispensation with Huntington's (1991) theorization of transformation.

As argued by respondents above, the new dispensation assumed power after taking over from Mugabe with public support that is the assumption of power in transformation. The third stage in transformation is failure of liberalization due to the influence of standpatters (Huntington, 1991). After being instrumental in the transition, the military elites did not return to barracks against what SB Moyo had said on ZTV on 15 November 2017 when he said the military expected the

country to 'return to normalcy' after ORL. A number of them such as Chiwenga (Vice President) and SB Moyo (Minister of Foreign Affairs) were given powerful posts in government. This militarization of politics unarguably introduced standpatters to ZANU PF politics or at least increased their number notwithstanding the military-party-state oneness of Zimbabwe politics. With this military omnipresence, it creates the impression that Mnangagwa is merely a rented face with the military being in charge. In this way, liberalization may fail resulting in backward legitimacy. This may explain the violence characterizing the security forces response to the August 2018 demonstration. Presently, the country is grappled with economic crisis and the president has responded by co-opting the opposition through POLAD which the main opposition, the MDC-A has not joined.

Although the main opposition, the MDC-A, is yet to join POLAD, it may bow down to pressure groups such as churches and join probably leading to another GNU. Huntington (1991) says that may become an avenue for standpatters in government to become stronger. With the previous GNU experience and how ZANU PF emerged stronger out of that, I am optimistic that the opposition has learnt a lesson and will push for more liberal reforms or even democracy (c.f Carothers, 2012). It is then interesting here to compare also from the Ghanaian experience where all opposition parties came together under the MFJ to force Rawlings to liberalize at the same time the Bretton-Woods institutions were demanding that all aid was to be linked with democracy leaving Rawlings with only one card to play - to democratize (Aidoo, 2006). In like manner, ZANU PF may under pressure of the public who have tested their ability of dislodging an authoritarian regime and the pressure to join the Commonwealth be forced to shape up or shape out. The first option of democratizing is not only important for ZANU PF, but for its longevity in office.

By way of concluding the above argument, one can say that Zimbabwe is therefore in a dip on the continuum from authoritarianism to democracy and democracy can still result due to either ZANU PF internal power struggles or pressure from outside, local or international. In the case of Ghana as argued in Chapter 2, local pressure from pressure groups and opposition parties as well as external pressure from the Bretton-Woods institutions forced Jerry Rawlings to democratize by the third election in 2000 but significant liberalization overtures were noticeable since the early 1980s. In Zimbabwe as argued by respondents above, the military is an extension of the

ruling party thus its involvement is arguably the ruling elites' involvement. In other words, the state-party exigencies in Zimbabwe makes ZANU PF better positioned to lead the country to democracy than the opposition simply because the party-state system will not accept electoral defeat. That makes transformation possible because the opposition Huntington (1991) argues, has to be weaker than the ruling regime for transformation to take place as explained above.

Whether democracy was the beneficiary or not, what struck this researcher then was the motivation of different classes of Zimbabweans and the public in general of participating in the alternation of power in Zimbabwe. The arguments given by different classes of persons were then juxtaposed to democracy.

The motivation of participating in the alternation of power in Zimbabwe in 2017 amongst different groups was a question participants responded to with much vigour. Responses to this question were split into three different opinions. According to ZANU PF and military sources, people were not forced to go into the streets. They further stated that in as much as people could have an admiration of Mugabe that was not the same with his wife.

Opposition parties and the general public were of the view that Mugabe was the stumbling block to democracy. One male adult interviewed at Makomva Business Centre in Glenview had this to say,

We just wanted to make sure that Mugabe was gone. Whether the police were to continue demanding bribes from us or beating us for demonstrating, or whether the CIO were to continue harassing or threatening us whenever we said anything negative about Mugabe was something else.

To the military elites and ruling party, people including the opposition went onto the streets to demand Mugabe resignation on the 18th of November 2017 acting on their own volition. A military female senior officer presented that view clearly when she said;

To us, the overture of Grace Mugabe taking over the presidency was a bitter pill to swallow. We were quite aware of Grace's expensive shopping sprees in the East, her disrespect for Vice-Presidents, and how she took over the Women's League post, among other shenanigans.

To the opposition and general public, democracy meant removal of Mugabe from office first. Whoever followed was better. This could be the reason why the ‘Mugabe must go’ mantra was common to the MDC right from its formation in 1999. The police state and its attendant corruption was another reason. To most embassies, however, the mere fact that Zimbabweans were generally comfortable with what was happening means it was democracy.

The academia saw all those issues as being useless but ZANU PF alongside ‘its’ military using the public to fight own internal factional wars. Such arguments reverberate with Rodgers (2019) who concur with Mandaza and Reeler (2018) that the new dispensation is merely a reconstituted regime and not a reformed state. To Rodgers (ibid) once the wrong people (the military) do the right thing (military intervention), then problems emerge. Oppositely, Huntington (1991) chronicles how military intervention had resulted in democracy in Spain during the Third Wave of Democratization (transformation) and in Romania and Portugal (transplacement); two modes of transition to democracy he argues are very similar. Interestingly, these case studies were from Huntington’s analysis, personal dictatorships. I argue that Zimbabwe was prior to November 14 2017, a personal dictatorship.

There is thus no way Zimbabwe cannot metamorphosise into a democracy over within two elections or so bearing in mind that Huntington (1968) says that the transition to democracy is a long, sometimes violent process which requires gradual development of political relations. To Lindberg (2006), a country can become a democracy after the third election but the first and second elections are part of the transition thus it may be too early to judge Zimbabwe. In Ghana as explained elsewhere in this dissertation, democracy came after the third election but in Uganda, it did not come even after the fifth election in 2016.

As a way of concluding the above arguments, this researcher notes that the meaning of democracy to the respondents was public legitimacy. As already argued in this study, public approval or disapproval means legitimacy or absence of it (Pickering and Peceny, 2006). What then surprises the average reader is the constitutional meaning of that. Once people go to the streets demanding the annihilation of a democratically elected government can that then be viewed as democracy? When the Parliament of Zimbabwe commenced impeachment proceedings against Mugabe, Rodgers (2019) reports that it was Monica Mutsvangwa, a ZANU PF senator who tabled the motion. The first person to second it was James Maridadi of the MDC

(Rodgers, 2019). Without the support of the MDC, the impeachment process could have failed due to the existence of many G40 sympathisers in ZANU PF. It was merely rubberstamping what the people had already done. Rodgers (2019) observes that when the people of Zimbabwe went to the streets to demand Mugabe resignation on the 18th of November 2017, the march was organized with a degree of unity and precision unknown in Zimbabwe. Crudely expressed, Zimbabweans from all walks of life joined the march without necessarily considering the democraticness of it. With no institution capable to lead the country towards democracy, giving the military a chance makes sense as neither the opposition or the people of Zimbabwe in general can be trusted with democracy. Prosaically stated, Luckham's (1971) argument that the military's degree of national consciousness exceeds that of all other citizens makes some sense in Zimbabwe from this argument here.

Given such a paradox, it is then only natural to consider if it is necessary to reform CMR statutes or policies in Zimbabwe.

Respondents were not agreed on whether or not it was necessary to reform the military in terms of democracy. The majority of political party respondents, the military, embassies and the public in general thought that the Constitution already have all such checks and balances on the military. Amendments were therefore seen as unnecessary. Among the academia, it was felt that there should be a clear code of CMR or the clarity in the Constitution particularly on section 212 which the military used to intervene in politics in 2017. It can thus be said that all the necessary statutes are in place to ensure a stable CMR in Zimbabwe. What is only required to achieve that is a democratic dispensation or political will which politicians in Zimbabwe over the years had failed to do.

4.4 SADC and the democratization process in Zimbabwe

On whether SADC is a democratic body or not ZANU PF and military sources argued the body has always been democratic hence can be trusted with democratization. They argued the body makes unanimous or majority decisions.

The general view among embassies was that SADC can be trusted with democracy. In a face-to-face interview with one embassy political attaché, he has this to say,

SADC can be trusted with democracy but the problem is that there is need for the region in particular and the continent in general to have their own definition of democracy because needs of specific regions differ. Democracy itself is a subjective term hence calling a region democratic or not is subjective.

Within the opposition parties, public and the academia in general, the view was that SADC had always neglected Zimbabwe. The argument was that 2017 came as a golden opportunity for citizens to remove the Mugabe dictatorship after years of neglect by SADC particularly in the bloody 2008 run-off. A minority of respondents under this group however thought that by accepting the coup, as legitimate, SADC was violating its own statutes hence cannot be trusted with democracy.

Respondents who saw the military intervention as lawful or moral therefore did not see any reason why SADC should have intervened militarily or even diplomatically especially in 2008 whilst those opposed to the military involvement thought the opposite was correct. One academic said that,

It is a common cultural belief within African heads of states especially so-called founding fathers that they should not humiliate each other. African states often intervene at the last opportune time. The spirit of brotherhood appears to supersede democracy.

In the midst of such political jittery external powers such as the US, EU and China affect the manner in which SADC operates. There was consensus among respondents that external powers affect the manner in which SADC operate. One embassy political attachée observed that;

The West in particular has its own interests where they want to define democracy for SADC. In the USA for example, Trump's electoral victory in 2017 was allegedly rigged in his favour. SADC itself is heavily sponsored by the West and many countries within it such as Malawi depend largely on donor funds from the West. Their decisions may probably have a bearing on such backgrounds.

Accepting SADC as democratic by some respondents was flawed. Dziva, Dube and Manatsa (2013) traces lack of democracy in SADC from 2008 when through the GNU, SADC took away the Zimbabwe public's right to choose their own government through creating a monster one of

winner and losers. There was clearly a lack of understanding on what democracy is arguing the term is subjective. It thus calls for an analysis of how SADC herself define democracy and then to analyse it in terms of military intervention in politics in Zimbabwe and how the body defines coups whether good or bad. The influence of the powerful West, China and other bodies on SADC could not just be wished away. Poverty, donor aid, AGOA benefits, among other issues have a bearing on SADC democracy. Mahuku (2017) argues SADC which although it condemned, publicly, the sham election of June 2008, remained mute on the Zimbabwe reverse democracy mainly because they, especially regional superpower, South Africa, benefitted from the brain drain of Zimbabwe thus power politics in the realist environment cannot be ignored in the region.

To Dziva, Dube and Manatsa (2013) the GNU was based on the SADC Treaty Article 5(c) which puts emphasis on peace more than democracy. At the same time, African brotherhood based on liberation war histories amplified by Adolf (2009) who said that prior to 2008, liberation war governments of South Africa (under Mbeki), Angola, Namibia and Mozambique denied that there was a crisis in Zimbabwe whilst non-liberation war governments such as Zambia, Botswana and Malawi said that there was a crisis. Obviously, this creates the impression that SADC can be theoretically dissected into liberation and non-liberation governments which thus undermine its efficacy on discharging its mandate. A short tour in history will take one to 2003. Adolf (2009) explains how in 2003, the ANC government of South Africa hosted SADC liberation movements (who are all in power) such as ZANU PF (Zimbabwe), MPLA (Angola), FRELIMO (Mozambique) and there these movements swore that they should not allow their countries falling into the governorship of 'pro-Western movements'. Oppositely, Niger was suspended from AU at the behest of the regional body, ECOWAS when the military staged a coup in 2010. Similarly, ECOWAS imposed suspended, sanctioned and condemned the junta leader, Manuel Augusto following a coup in Mauritania in 2008 (Engel, 2010). It is ironic therefore for one to expect a similar behaviour in a brotherly environment of SADC buoyed by such behaviour of liberation war history as taking precedence over democratization. One thus can say that SADC has not yet reached democratic levels already reached by other regions such as ECOWAS.

Fast forward to 2017, the same SADC did not support Mugabe as usual. Following the military takeover on 15 November 2017, the Organ met on November 16 2017 to deliberate on Zimbabwe. (Aseulime, 2017) says that the then SADC Chair, South Africa's Jacob Zuma only send a delegation to find out if Mugabe was safe and slept on its laurels waiting to hear from the military. The delegation found that Mugabe was fine but under house arrest (Agerlorm, 2017) but he later resigned before SADC did anything. This information alone demonstrates that a coup or insurgency was arguably underway if a careful reading of Article 11(2) of the 2001 OPDSC Protocol which mandates the Organ to intervene in a member state was ever done. This was therefore a basis for SADC military intervention. The Treaty stresses the need for peaceful means such as diplomacy, international diplomacy, mediation, conciliation, negotiation, good offices and arbitration (Article 11). Only if this fails can the Organ refer the matter to the Summit which will in turn advise the AU (which can use peaceful or military tactics in terms of Article 4 of the Constitutive Act, 2000) and UNSC (which can use force acting on own volition in terms of Article 42 of the UN Charter).

SADC inconsistency on the democratic radar in 2008 and 2017 in respect to Mugabe is clear. When the military intervened and it became increasingly clear that his days in office were numbered, SADC states' brotherliness shifted to Mnangagwa. Rodgers (2019) even reports that Mugabe requested for military assistance from Zambia with no results. A call by Grace Mugabe to Zuma to request assistance also fell on deaf ears (Rodgers, 2019). With the international community generally supporting the military intervention, it is clear that external influence have a bearing on democracy. One may wonder if powerful beneficiaries of AGOA such as South Africa and Botswana were to oppose the view presented by the United States. Crisis Group (2017) writing a month after the military intervention, argues that democracy under the circumstances was a tall order given that the military remained a key political actor. The group argued then that it was therefore up to international actors to pressure the 'new' administration to conform to democratic principles giving the impression that SADC could not go it alone. Rummaging through history as already argued, the same SADC had again pursued their own national interests when they did not intervene militarily against the 2008 coup by the military when the latter prevented the MDC from assuming office having won the first round of credible elections. Mahuku (2017) said the brain drain South Africa benefitted from Zimbabwe as the

political, social and economic crisis was important to her in 2008. It is only natural that the same mentality gripped South Africa nine years later.

Having presented the role of SADC in the military intervention in Zimbabwe in 2008 to 2017, it is only natural here to analyse why SADC response was lackadaisical. External pressures can therefore be a scapegoat for SADC lackadaisical reaction to military intervention in Zimbabwe 2017. The majority of respondents' arguments on SADC response to the military intervention oscillated between democracy and sovereignty. The issue of Mugabe having overstayed in power was not considered important by the majority of respondents.

As already argued above, the democracy argument did not hold water. The sovereignty argument also has its flaws. A legal expert in Harare argued citing the matter between *Campbell v Zimbabwe* (see full citation in the reference section), that a regional body can override state sovereignty through referring the matter to the SADC Tribunal. Another academic argued that the Responsibility to Protect doctrine can still be applied by the UN at the behest of SADC to override state sovereignty.

The inapplicability of the two common reasons for SADC lackadaisical approach lends credence to the stayism argument regardless of its unpopularity. Mahuku et al (2019) explains how SADC and the generality of the international community welcomed Mugabe departure. At that time, the SADC region was generally against Mugabe considering how he had failed the economy and politics in Zimbabwe with the region having millions of Zimbabwean economic refugees (Aseulime, 2017). SADC itself demonstrated this by hailing the people of Zimbabwe for their discipline and peacefulness following Mugabe resignation (Herald, 23 November, 2017). Mugabe's rants against the West had also angered even his all-weather friends, the Chinese (Chidza and Nyangani, 2017). In this way, the general views of SADC on the coup were those of approval as opposed to the 2008 time when SADC expressed its disdain of the coup. Other countries in the region, Botswana in particular, urged Mugabe to resign (Shaban, 2017). According to the Herald (Herald, 2017), South Africa's then president, Zuma was fully aware of ORL and South Africa had always preferred a reformed ZANU PF.

In short, the region and beyond viewed Mugabe's longevity in power as against their interests hence their immoral morality of not viewing it as a coup (Aseulime, 2017). It appears Mugabe

was everywhere seen as a security threat on the continent hence laws, protocols and regulations had to be bent against him at will. International Crisis Group (2017) observes that Western countries alongside Russia and China did not condemn the military intervention because there was international consensus that Mugabe needed to be replaced. The mere fact that General Chiwenga was in China a few days before the military intervention was, probably, because he wanted to brief them about ORL. However, that does not of course exonerate SADC from having abdicated her duties and functions when the military intervened in Zimbabwe. SADC could still have intervened militarily (regardless of not having a standing army) by assembling armies to undo the coup as happened in 1994 when Zimbabwe, Botswana and South African armies were sent by SADC to restore a government removed by a coup in Lesotho.

To Chikohomero (2019), SADC has a history of failure in Zimbabwe and other member states when it comes to democratization as evinced for example by the 2013 and 2018 elections for which SADC did not chastise the military's behaviour. The way in which the elections were ferociously contested later by the MDC-Alliance and the manner in which the body did not reprimand the opposition who had no evidence of rigging further demonstrate the challenges the body face (Chikohomero, 2019).

By way of conclusion, it can be said that unlike back in 2003, SADC states can no longer be dissected into a dichotomy of liberation and non-liberation movements as Adolf (2009) had observed. National interests and power politics at stake now dissect them.

4.5 Summary of the Chapter

In this chapter the views of respondents were presented, analysed and discussed. These responses showed that the military intervention was intended to serve national interests although factionalism in ZANU PF cannot be ignored. The intervention was expected to lead to democracy by the majority of respondents although Zimbabwe is yet to reach that level but evidence of movement towards democracy was noted by respondents. SADC indirectly supported the alternation of power in Zimbabwe even though it was clear that the SADC Treaty was violated. The next chapter dealt with summary, conclusions, recommendations and areas for further study.

CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

5.1 Introduction

This is the last chapter of the study. The chapter summarizes the whole study with a view to make it possible for a reader to understand the central argument of the dissertation by merely reading this chapter. Conclusions are then drawn from the argument that then provided basis for recommendations. Areas for further study were also highlighted.

5.2 Summary

This dissertation was presented in five chapters. Chapter 1 explored the background to the study, statement of the problem, research objectives, among other issues. The objectives of the study were;

- ❖ To discuss the reasons for military-led transition in Zimbabwe in 2008-2017
- ❖ To examine whether the military-led transition led to good governance
- ❖ To assess the role of SADC in Zimbabwe's military-led transition

The research questions of the study were as follows;

- ❖ What were the reasons for military-led transition in Zimbabwe in 2008-2017?
- ❖ Did the military-led transition lead to good governance?
- ❖ What role did SADC play in Zimbabwe's military-led transition?

The main assumption of the study was that a military-led transition can lead to democracy.

In Chapter 2, the theories of the study were the;

- ❖ Neo-realist theory by Waltz

- ❖ Liberalism theory
- ❖ Schiff's Concordance Theory

The researcher used neo-realism and liberalism theories as they reinforce each for the weaknesses of either theory are the strengths of the other. With most CMR studies generally based on the dichotomy of ruling elites and the military, this study took a detour and included the public as another major component of the CMR complex hence the use of Schiff's Theory as the specific theoretical framework of the study. Ghana was presented as a success story of military-led transition with Uganda presenting the exact opposite whilst the bumpy road of military intervention in Zimbabwean politics which dates back to the liberation war days was analysed from 2008 to 2016.

Major authorities cited to inform Chapter 2 were Luckham, Wiking, Finer, among others. The general view of these authorities was that involvement of the military in alternation of power amounts to a coup and often leads to autocracy with isolated cases of it leading to democracy.

Chapter 3 presented the research methodology. A qualitative case study research design informed by a constructivist world view dictated the research. The research instruments used in order of the weight attached to them were;

- ❖ Interviews
- ❖ Questionnaires
- ❖ Document analysis

This triangulation method was further buttressed by a peer review examination of the questionnaires or interview guide to improve data validity, reliability and practicability.

Non-probability sampling methods of purposive sampling and snowballing were used in this research. The sample size was determined by the data saturation point for all classes of respondents drawn from the ruling party, military, SADC states embassies, academia, opposition parties and the general public. General research ethics such as informed consent and anonymity were factored in the research in terms of the dictates of the Belmont Report.

In Chapter 4, data obtained through fieldwork was presented, discussed and analysed. The major findings were that;

- ❖ Several reasons explain military intervention in politics in Zimbabwe in 2017. Some of the reasons are the twin issue of social and economic decay in the country and factionalism in the ruling ZANU PF. It appears the major reason however was Mugabe stayism in power which could have prevented democracy because it was an entrenched personal dictatorship. The need for an alternation of power was felt not only within ZANU PF and the military as its extension, but also in SADC, EU and China, among others. This explains why there had been attempts to change the ZANU PF leadership dating back to the 1990s with internal and external pressure.
- ❖ The alleged need to remove Mugabe due to his stayism within ZANU PF, the military and beyond was powerful enough to eclipse democratic requirements. Mugabe's regime had a well documented counter-democracy history which was often buoyed by the support the military. The same military was instrumental in his removal with the direct approval of the majority of Zimbabweans and indirect approval of SADC. The military-led transition did not lead to democracy per se but evidence of liberalization is there for all to see.
- ❖ Having been tired of Mugabe stayism and being interested by the resultant liberalization, SADC did not chastise the military. The lackadaisical behaviour of the body can be explained by national interests and regional power politics.

In Chapter 5, which is this chapter, the researcher gave a synopsis of the dissertation clearly highlighting how this dissertation has contributed to military-led transition and democracy. I then drew conclusions as shown below followed by recommendations as informed by the findings. Last but not least, I also suggested areas for further study.

5.3 Conclusions

The dissertation provided a conceptual framework to analyse domestic politics within the broader regional and international security complex. A regional body such as SADC is established to promote intra and inter-state peace and security. Although democracy is on paper given importance, it is not viewed in SADC as important as peace and security. In the case of Zimbabwe in 2017, SADC in particular and the international community in general peace and security appears to have eclipsed the need for democracy.

Civil military relations remain largely a determinant of domestic politics in SADC. Incremental power of the military which is synonymous with waning popularity of an undemocratic regime, often result in alternation of power under the auspices of the military. Over a relatively short period of time which is often two or three elections, the undemocratic system may metamorphosise into a fully-fledged democracy. On the way, the democratization process may experience a deep from which the new dispensation may march to or from democracy. Zimbabwe is in that dip and has a chance of slipping into either democracy or autocracy even though this researcher opines that a democratic dispensation may be borne out of this liberalization predicament.

In certain circumstances SADC states choose to maintain good relations with powerful states like the US and the West than to align with their kith and kin. In other words, democracy and neighbourliness are not as important as national interests and relative power among states. Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe is a microcosm of this paradox in SADC specifically and Africa generally. Findings therefore support the view that regardless of the hullabaloo about liberalism, realism still dictates international relations.

5.4 Recommendations

Riding on the findings, analysis and conclusions reached at after carrying out this study, I therefore give some recommendations. The recommendations are based on each objective of the study as follows;

- ❖ The military needs to be reminded on the supremacy of the Constitution regardless of the military intervention being a good coup.
- ❖ SADC needs to self-introspect and consider democracy as more important than peace and security. Institutions to ensure compliance such as a standby force or ability to mobilize a force at the earliest possible moment be muted. In the case of Zimbabwe, the new dispensation must be pressurized to democratize fully and not merely liberalize.
- ❖ SADC needs to ensure that regional sovereignty should not give in to some powerful western countries. This can be done if the body follows its own laws. Democracy in member states must always be seen as the fountainhead of economic integration and the general wellness of the people of the region.

5.5

Areas for further study

As already explained in Chapter 1, this study has a limited scope. Several other areas relating to democracy and CMR require further interrogation. Future research on this topic needs to focus on areas such as those briefly explained below.

- ❖ The development of a model of achieving democratic control of the armed forces which is suitable to individual SADC countries such as Zimbabwe
- ❖ The legality or constitutionality of the 2017 military-led transition in Zimbabwe
- ❖ A reconstruction of Schiff's Model based on a dichotomy of the ruling elites and military as one side versus the citizens
- ❖ Analyzing the study based on other theories of international relations such as the Feminist theory
- ❖ Analyzing whether Zimbabwe will achieve democracy by the second or third election that is by 2030 or so.

5.6

Summary of the chapter

In this last chapter, I summarized the dissertation from chapter 1 to 5. The major findings of the research were that the military-led transition in Zimbabwe was necessitated by factionalism in ZANU PF but social and economic decay in the country was the reason the military gave. The resultant alternation of power from Mugabe to Mnangagwa did not lead to democracy per se but to liberalization. It was concluded that regional power politics and national interests are more important than democracy hence the recommendation, among others, that the regional body and states must respect not only their national constitutions, but the SADC Treaty.

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APPENDIX A

Introductory Letter for all respondents

To whom it may concern

I, **Lucas Mmavura**, by notice of this letter, wish to advise you that I am a final year student at Bindura University of Science Education. I am studying towards the attainment of a Master of Science Degree in International Relations (MScIR). As part of the degree programme, I am required to carry out research work relevant to my topic, '**Role of regional bodies in democratization: The case of Zimbabwe, 2008-19**'.

I therefore humbly request your assistance in this research work by responding to questions I will ask you as per my interview guide to the best of your knowledge. All the information you shall provide will be used solely for academic purposes and treated with utmost confidentiality.

Thank you in advance.

Yours Faithfully,

..... **Lucas Mamvura** (0782286556/071292779)

APPENDIX B

Section A: Demographic data

1. What is your gender? Male female
2. How old are you? 18-39 40-61 Over 61
3. What is your highest educational qualification? Below 'O' Level
'O' Level to First Degree Masters Degree and Above
4. Whose interests did you represent in November 2017??
Parliament MDC ZANU PF Presidium Academia
Pressure group (Specify)
Other (Specify).....

Section B: Questions answering the research questions

Did that lead to good governance?

1. How democratic were the 2018 elections?
2. Do the 2018 elections show any difference with other elections in Zimbabwe especially those from 2000. What are the differences, if any?
3. Is there a need to reform the military in Zimbabwe? Yes/no. Explain your answer.
4. Did the new regime increase the participation of organized civil society, experts in different fields, or the public in general? Yes/no. Explain your answer.

5. Was the bringing in into government of experts such as Kirsty Coventry and Mthuli Ncube a gesture of for example, the roping in of experts? Explain.
6. To what extent has the new regime decentralized decision-making to lower governmental structures such as provinces or districts or to what extent has the government prioritized devolution considering that funds have recently been disbursed for devolution?
7. To what extent have non-state actors been given influence to dictate how the state should be governed especially to issues that concern them.
8. To what extent has the government introduced new modes of steering the mode of governing such as creating conducive environments for business? How does government involvement in issues such as Command Agriculture and the availing of cheap transport under ZUPCO affect the spirit of good governance.
9. In your opinion, what are the prospects of good governance under the current administration considering that some of top government officials are former military officers without much experience in civilian matters?

Reasons for military intervention

1. Do you think that the military putsch was a long planned event or it was impromptu? Explain your answer.
2. What do you think were the major reasons for military intervention in Zimbabwe in 2017?
3. From the way you analysed the military intervention, who was likely to benefit most among the ruling ZANU PF, the military or the public in general? Explain your answer.
4. Is another military intervention likely to take place in Zimbabwe in the near future? If it is ever going to occur in the future, how likely are members of the public going to support the military and why. Explain your answer.

Challenges of SADC on 2017 Zimbabwe military intervention

1. From the way you analysed the role SADC played in the military intervention, what challenges did the body face.
2. How do you think these challenges can be minimized?
3. Are these challenges exogenous or endogenous?. Explain

4. Is SADC able to solve these challenges alone or it needs the help of other international organizations or states such as the AU, UN or United States.

Duties and functions SADC on 2017 Zimbabwe military intervention

1. Is SADC a democratic body or can the body be trusted with democratisation?
2. Does SADC seek to promote the interests of member states per se or the interests of the body?
3. To what extent is the body influenced by the decisions or interests of regional powerhouses like South Africa?
4. Were there any basis of military intervention for SADC in Zimbabwe in 2017 or thereafter?
5. How do external powers such as the US, EU and China affect the manner in which SADC operates?
6. To what extent does SADC as a body demonstrate that it is a united front in promoting democratic ideals?
7. How should SADC strike a balance between the need to democratize and state sovereignty?
8. Does SADC as a body has the political will and capacity to intervene diplomatically or militarily in member states particularly in the case of Zimbabwe in 2017.
9. What do you think should be done to help the body improve on her efficiency in terms of democratization.

APPENDIX C

Table 4:1 Demographic matrix for all participants

| Group | Male | Female | Total | Sampling Method | Interview: Questionnaire Ratio | Questionnaire Response Rate |
|------------------------------------|-------------|---------------|--------------|------------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Military | 8 | 2 | 10 | Random | 7:3 | 100% |
| Embassy | 4 | 0 | 04 | Random | 3:1 | 100% |
| ZANU PF | 15 | 3 | 18 | Random | 17:1 | 100% |
| MDC-A and other opposition parties | 14 | 8 | 22 | Random | 18:4 | 100% |
| Persons (general) | 20 | 14 | 34 | Random | 34:0 | N/A |
| Academia | 8 | 4 | 12 | Random | 6:0 | 100% |
| Total | 69 | 31 | 100 | | | |

Source: Primary Data

As shown on Table 4:1 above, both males and females were interviewed randomly for each class of respondents. Males were generally more than females because politics, the military and politics-related matters are generally the mainstay of males in Zimbabwe. All respondents who said they had no time for interviews returned their questionnaires. In both questionnaires and interviews, the data saturation point was used.